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SECTION A

Shifting Risk and Fixing Blame: The
Vexing Problem of Credit Card
Obligations in Bankruptcy
by
Margaret Howard*

Nothing is more ubiquitous in our mailboxes than the preapproved credit
card offer. l More than a billion credit cards are in circulation-a dozen for
every household in the country2-and the total amount owed by Americans
on their cards is steadily increasing. 3
With credit cards so pervasive in our economy, it comes as no surprise
that debtors in bankruptcy often bring with them considerable debt owed to
credit card issuers. 4 These issuers, with increasing frequency, are challenging
the dischargeability of those debts in their cardholders' bankruptcies. s
The issue of credit card dischargeability has vexed courts for the last two
·Bruce W. Nichols Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, Spring 2001; Professor of Law,
Vanderbilt Law School.
lBetween three and four billion solicitations are mailed every year-more than forty,one mailings to
every household in America. The Depository Institution Regulatory Streamlining Act of 1999: Hearing
on H.R. 1585 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the House Banking
and Financial Services Committee, l06th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999) (statement of Frank Torres, Legislative
Counsel, Consumers Union) (hereinafter Torres Testimony). That is up from 2.4 billion in 1995. Lenders
Worry That Consumers Cannot Afford Increased Debt, 28 BCD No.7 at A8, Jan. 23, 1996. See also
AT&T Universal Card Servs., Corp. v. Sziel (In re Sziel), 206 B.R. 490,492 (Bankr. N.D. fit. 1997).
2Torres Testimony, supra note 1.
3Consumer credit card debt has doubled in four years and, at the end of 1997, $422 billion of credit
card loans were outstanding. Id. Three out of five American households owe $7000 or more on their
credit cards. Id. Last year, Americans charged $515 billion on credit cards, incurring roughly $65 billion
in finance charges. Monique R. Brown, Clear Credit Card Hurdles, BLACK ENTERPRISE, April 2001, at
149. A recent report issued by the Federal Reserve tound that Americans collectively added approxi'
mately $143 million a day to their credit card balances. David Kaplan, Do Your Dum Credit Rilting/
Experts in Debt Management: Not All Card Deals are as Good as They Seem, THE BoSTON GLOBE, Jan.
17, 2000, at C6.
"In the twelve months ending on March 31, 1997, consumer debtors in Chapter 7 sought to discharge
$30 billion dollars in debt, $6 billion of which represented credit card obligations. AT&T Universal Card
Servs. Corp. v. Ellingsworth (In re Ellingsworth), 212 B.R. 326, 332 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997) (citing
Faulkner & Gray, Inc., Fending Off the Personal Ban~TUptcy Plague, BANK TECHNOLOGY NEWS, March 1,
1997).
'Of all the adversary proceedings filed in U.S. bankruptcy courts in calendar year 1995, twenty,nine
percent dealt with the dischargeability of a particular debt; in calendar year 2000, thirty,six percent of all
adversary proceedings challenged dischargeability of a particular debt. Administrative Office of the United
States Courts (internally compiled data, on file with Statistical Division). Filing statistics do not distin'
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decades. The Bankruptcy Code6 provides guidelines, after a fashion,' and the
Supreme Court has stepped into the fray, albeit indirectly.8 The problem has
proved difficult, in part, because of the indirectness of this positive law. Even
so, the dischargeability problem need not have led to the mess found in CUf"
rent case law if bankruptcy courts had remained fixed on some simple con"
cepts. These concepts include fundamental normative and economic
principles that risk should be placed on the party in the best position to avoid
or to insure against the loss at issue. Analysis will also be assisted by recog..
nizing that the various approaches courts have taken are neither complete in
themselves nor true alternatives to each other. Rather, each of them has a
place.
This Article will review the issue of credit card dischargeability, analyz..
ing it in light of basic risk allocation principles. The first task is to under..
stand the unique problems presented by credit card obligations and the
particular difficulty one encounters in applying conventional analytical
guish among the various grounds for nondischargeability, but plainly the level of activity under this rubric
is increasing.
Although issues surrounding credit card obligations almost ahvays arise in the context of dis'
chargeability, the nature of a particular debtor's obligations might be relevant to the question whether
that debtor is eligible for bankruptcy, either at all or under a particular chapter. In a very unusual case, In
re Wolniewic%, 224 B.R. 302 (Bankr. W.DN.Y. 1998), the amount and nature of the debtors' credit card
debt did affect their eligibility for Chapter 7. The debtor,husband, \vho had not been employed outside
the home for eighteen years, devoted his time to raising the children, remodeling the family home and
managing the family's finances. At the time of filing, the debtors had fifty,nine credit cards and owed
$336,328.15. That balance derived from three sources: remodeling the family home, small purchases for
ordinary items such as groceries and clothing, and interest. The average interest rate on the cards was
twenty percent and interest ofS67,OOO, which exceeded the family's gross income, was accruing each year.
The debtor'husband acknowledged "that he had often used cash advances from one card to make minimum
payments on another'" and "'that he had long passed the point at which his cumulative monthly transac"
tions could effect any reduction of principal.'" Id. at 304.
The United States Trustee sought dismissal under § 707(b), contending that substantial abuse occurs
whenever debtors accumulate debts grossly in excess of their ability to repay. The debtors, on the other
hand, contended that § 707(b) applies only to cases in which a debtor retains an ability to repay a signifi,
cCint portion of their d~bts. Th~ cvurt rej.::ct~c both arguments, but f.)cnd s'Jhst:anthl ahuse ~nd dismissed
the case. The court noted that the debtor..husband sPent one day a week managing the bills (which
explained how he was able to remain current on fifty..nine cards), but did not bother to get a part,time job.
Also, the debtors' remodeling efforts wer~ so incomplete that the house's value was less than the total of
the outstanding mortgage and the homestead exemption. The court concluded that, for the debtors, "fi,
nances became a game rather than an honest attempt to address obligations'" and that "'bankruptcy was just
the final step in their efforts to avoid the ultimate repayment of debts.... Id. at 307.
See also Neary v. Padilla (In re Padilla), 222 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2(00) (holding that credit card "'bust,
out'" may be grounds for dismissal of the petition under § 707(b), but cannot constitute "cause'" under
§ 707(a».
611 U.S.C. §§ 101,1330 (1994). All statutory references in this Article are to the Bankruptcy Code
prior to any amendments that may result from H.333 and 5.420, as passed by the 107th Congress, unless
otherwise indicated.
7 See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
8See infra notes 42..67 & 243,56 and accompanying text.
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frameworks to these obltgations.9 The next task is to review § 523(a)(2)(A)
of the Bankruptcy Code, which bars the discharge of debts incurred by fraud,
and the Supreme Court"s interpretation thereof. lo Finally, this Article will
discuss the elements that issuers must establish in order to except credit card debts from discharge. In the course of that discussion, this Article will re,
view the approaches courts have taken to the dischargeability analysis and
demonstrate where and why they have gone off course. I I The essential error
is a belief t~at the existing approaches to the analysis of the dischargeability
of credit card debt in bankruptcy are mutually exclusive. This Article will
argue, on the basis of the Supreme Court'ts interpretation of § 523(a)(2)(A),
that the proper analysis uses each of the previously developed approaches at
different stages. Each of those approaches focuses on a different element of
fraud-the essential ground for nondischargeability-and should be utilized
in its proper place.

I. APPLICABLE THEORETICAL STRUCTURE
Surprisingly, even the most fundamental starting point-the theory on
which liability is based-is difficult to determine in the context of preap'
proved credit cards. In part, this difficulty derives from the way such obliga'
tions typically arise. Credit card issuers may be unique among voluntary
creditors in bankruptcy in that no face,to,face contact with the debtor occurs
at any time-neither when the account is opened and the card issued, nor
when the card is used.
Some degree of contact may occur at the time the card is issued, although
it is not face,to,face, because correspondence may be exchanged in the course
of establishing the credit card account. To call this w,correspondence't't is some,
what misleading, however, since it consists, at best, of nothing more than a
cardholder receiving a preapproved offer (which was also mailed to thousands
of others), filling-out an application form,12 and receiving, in response, a credit
card and accompanying w,agreement't't from the issuer. I3
The indirectness of this debtor'creditor contact contributes to the diffl"
culty of identifying the analytical foundation of credit card liability. No one
would argue that use of a credit card creates no obligation, or that card issu'
ers do not have allowable claims in the bankruptcies of their account hold..
9See infra notes 12.. 40 and accompanying text.
lOSee infra notes 41,70 and accompanying text.
II See infra notes 104.. 317 and accompanying text.
12How completely such forms are filled out is another question. See infra note 2i4.
13This is nothing like an "agreement" in the usual sense of something read, understood and assented to.
These "agreements" are neither bargained,for nor read, and most debtors understand only in a general \\·ay
that use of the card will require repayment with interest. Of course, failure to read and understand d~s
not of itself provide any defense to that obligation.
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ers. I4 Nevertheless, the theoretical basis of liability is less than obvious.
Understanding the applicable theoretical structure may help clarify issues
arising in nondischargeability cases-issues having to do with the elements of
fraud. Hence, the inquiry is worth brief undertaking.
No legal obligation arises at the time the account is opened, under any
obviously applicable doctrine. Is A contract requires a bargained,for exchange
between contracting parties, which includes the giving by both sides of some'
thing with legal value. 16 Promises have legal. value and can constitute the
required consideration, but each promise must bind, in some way, the party
who makes it. Classic contract doctrine has long recognized that illusory
promises cannot constitute consideration; ~,.either·party"s promise is illusory,
no contract is formed. I7
Against this background, one searches in vain for nonillusory promises,
made ~n either side, at the time a credit card account is opened. Card issuers
remain free to withdraw card privileges or to alter the terms governing ac'
counts. IS As a result, any promises made by issuers are illusory. Similarly,
I·See §§ 101(5) and 502.
lSNovak v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 372 A.2d 89, 92 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1977), cat. denied, 396 A.2d 583
(NJ 1978) (quoting SO AM. JUR. 20 428, utters of Credit and Credit Cards § 38 rBasically, ... a credit
card is nothing more than an indication to sellers of commodities that the person who has r~ceived a credit
card from the issuer thereof has a satisfactory credit rating and that if credit is extended, the issuer of the
credit card will pay (or see to it that the seller of the commodity receives payment) for the merchandise
delivered.'").
16RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 71 (1981) (hereinafter RESTATEl\fE~T); E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACTS § 2.3 (3d ed. 1999) (hereinafter FARNSWORTH).
I'PARNSWORTH, supra note 16, at § 2.13; Garber v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 432l':.E.2d 1309 (111.
Ct. App. 1982). Courts sometimes are willing to and or imply undertakings sufficient to prevent nullifica,
tion of a contract on lack of consideration grounds. The best known example of such an approach is,
perhaps,Judge Cardozci's opinion in Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff,Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917). In that
case, the court implied a promise to utilize -'best efforts'" in order to salvage a contract that gave Wood an
exclusive right to market Lady Duff,Gordon"s designs and requir~d hjm to pay her half the profits, but did
not expressly require him to do anything to generate any profits. No similar analytical approach seems
avaitahl~ in the credit card context.
18The point is illustrated by cases outside of the bankruptcy context. In Garber \'. Harris Trust &:
Savings Bank~ 432 N.E.2d 1309 (111. App. Ct. 1982), cardholders alleged that credit card issuers had
breached their cardholder agreements by making various kinds of changes in the terms governing the
accounts: adding an annual fee; increasing the percentage of the outstanding balance that must be paid
each month; and changing the method of computing finance charges. The cardholders addressed contract
formation as follows:
The applications and brochures, displayed and advertised by defendants, are in\·ita,
tions for an offer. The credit application submitted by a potential cardholder to one
of the defendant credit card issuers constitutes an offer. Acceptance of this offer
occurs when the issuer issues a credit card to the cardholder. A cardholder fur'
nishes consideration to the issuer by providing the issuer \vith requested ~redit
information and by allowing the issuer to commence a credit check prior to the
issuance of the card.

Id. at 1311. The court rejected the cardholders" argument that the agreements formed contracts not
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any promises the cardholder has made remain illusory19 because the card,
holder is not obligated to use the card. Even if a signed agreement can be
produced,20 the cardholder has undertaken (or promised), at most, to repay
the issuer if charges are made on the card.21 The choice to make or not make
charges, at the cardholder"s own whim, renders the promise to repay entirely
illusory as of the moment the card is issued.
The obvious difficulties with finding a contract formed at the time the
card is issued has led most courts to conclude that contract formation occurs
when the card is used. Indeed, if any contract is to be found at all, it must be
susceptible to unilateral modification. The court held that no contract is formed at the time' a card is
issued; rather, each use of the card forms a separate contract according to the terms of the agreement then
in effect. Thus, the agreement was modifiable at will.
In the course of its decision, the Garber court relied on Novack v. Cities Service Oil Co., 374 A.2d 89
(NJ. Super. Ct. 1977). In N.ovac~, the cardholder sued the issuer on the grounds, inter alia, that revocation
of the card breached an express contractual provision requiring written notice to the cardholder. The
court held that the issuance of a credit card does not create a contractual relationship between the parties:
It is well settled that to be enforceable a contract must be supported by valuable
consideration. Consideration involves a detriment incurred by the promisee or a
benefit received by the promisor, at the promisor's request. In the credit cardrela,
tionship, neither status is created. The holder of the card (promisee) is free to
cancel or not use it, and has gratuitously received an opportunity to purchase with,
out incurring any detriment. Additionally, there does not appear to be any benefit
bargained for or received by the issuing company (promisor). Lacking consideration,
the credit card account is ... a continuing offer to purchase which may be with,
drawn by either party at any time.

Id. at 549 (citations omitted). Thus, even accepting the cardholder's contention that the issuer's brochure
required written notice before cancellation, "since no contract existed ab initio, the statement cannot be
incorporated into any prospectively created contract, and hence has no binding effect.'" Id. at 550 (foot,
note omitted). Cf Samuels v. Old Kent Bank, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11485 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
1.9Garber v. Harris Trust & Save Bank, 432 N.E.2d 1309 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982). But see AT&T Uni\"er,
sal Card Servs. Corp. v. Nguyen (In re Nguyen, 208 B.R. 258,261 n.2 (D. Mass. 1997) (suggesting that an
"express undertaking'" was present, but not specifying where that undertaking was found).
2°ln a surprising number of cases, issuers can produce only rudimentary documentation or none at all.
In AT&T Universal Card Services Corp. v. Ellingsworth (In re Ellingsworth), 212 B.R. 326 (Bankr. \V.D.
Mo. 1997), for example, no application was ever signed; the cardholder verified income and employment by
telephone. Id. at 328,29. Similarly, in FCC National Bank v. Etto (In re Etto), 210 B.R. 734 (Bankr. 1'.D.
Ohio 1997), the creditor issued an unsolicited, preapproved credit card without requiring the debtor to
sign an application and without any investigation into the debtor's credit\vorthiness. ld. at 739. In First
Card v. Leonard (In re Leonard), 158 B.R. 839 (Banke. D. Colo. 1993), the debtors filled out an Invitation
Certificate giving dates of birth, social security numbers and telephone numbers. The form also asked for
employment information, and the debtor,wife listed ..self..housewife.... The debtors later recei\·ed a
Cardmember Agreement and Disclosure Statement, but they never signed the Agreement. According to
the court, ...[t]he Invitation Certificate contained no language constituting, or purporting to constitute~ an
agreement for an extension of credit,'" ide at 841, although it did contain a clause, "in print size only an
optometrist could appreciate,'" ide n.3, providing that use of the account would constitute a representation
of intent and ability to repay.
21AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. Mercer (In re Mercer), 246 F.3d 391,406 (5th Cir. 2001) (en bane)
("'Of course, by card,acceptance, [the debtor] was not obligated to use that credit....).
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created at the time of use. 22 Here, too, however, the theoretical route is
unclear.
One possibility is that a unilateral contract is formed at the moment of
use:
When an issuer of a credit card . . . sends to the holder the
card and the form describing the terms for its use, it makes
an offer [for] ... the formation of a number of contracts by
successive acceptances from time to time,.... as the card is
used. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 31 (1981)....
The credit card relationship, properly analyzed, should be
viewed as an offer by the issuer to create the opportunity for
a series of unilateral contracts which are actually formed
when the holder uses the credit card to buy goods or ser,
vices or to obtain cash. 23
lo4t

A unilateralcontract 24 is one in which only one party-the offeror-has
made a promise. The promise is to do something if the offeree accepts by
rendering the requested performance. Performance by the offeree, rather than
a reciprocal promise, constitutes the benefit requested by the offeror. 25 In
the credit card context, unilateral contracts analysis must of necessity view
the card issuer as requesting that the debtor perform by using the card. Once
the debtor has accepted by using the card, a contract is formed. 26
At this juncture unilateral contracts doctrine, when applied to credit
cards, breaks down. Under traditional unilateral contracts doctrine, the of,
feree"s contractual duties are completed once the requested performance is
delivered. All that remains is for the offeror-the one who requested the
22Garber v. Harris Trust &; Save Bank, 432 N.E.2d 1309 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); Novack v. Cities Serv.
Oil Co., 374 A.2d 89 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1977), cert. denitd, 396A.2d 583 (NJ. 1978).
23 Manufacturer"s Hanover Trust Co. v. Ward (In re Ward), 857 F.2d 1082, 1086..87 (6th Cir. 1988)
(Merritt,]., dissenting). &e also Anastas v. American Save Bank (In rt Anastas), 94 F.3d 1280, 1285 (9th
Cir. 1996).
24The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS does not use the term ..unilateral.. . contract, referring
instead to offers that invite acceptance by performance. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, at § 30(1). Such
an offer "does not invite a promissory acceptance..... Id. at § 45(1).
2'FARNS\VORTH, supra note 16, at § 3.4. Because the requested performance typically requires time
to complete, unilateral contracts doctrine hCis focused on the problem of revocation by the promisor while
the promisee is performing. Id. at § 3.24. &t also RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, at § 45. In the credit
card context, the significance of a unilateral contract approach is that the issuer can withdraw the offer,
that is-revoke the card-at any time, with or without reason, before the card is used. Since acceptance
by performance takes little time, the problem of revocation during performance, which looms large in most
unilateral contracts, seems decidedly insignificant.
26City Stores Co. v. Henderson, 156 S.E.2d 818 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967); Garber v. Harris Trust &; Save
Bank, 432 N.E.2d 1309, 1312 (Ill. Ct. App. 1982) ClT]he prevailing view in this country is that the
issuance of a credit card is only an offer to extend credit.....); Novack v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 374 A.2d 89
(N.]. Super. Ct. 1977), cat. denitd, 396 A.2d 583 (N.]. 1978).
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performance in the first place-to perform as promised. In other words, the
offeree's performance has the effect of creating a duty on the part of the
offeror to do whatever was promised in the event the requested performance
was rendered. But this is the opposite of what happens in the credit card
context. When unilateral contracts doctrine is applied to credit cards, the
issuer is the offeror and the cardholder is the offeree. Rendering of the re,
quested performance-use of the card-does not create an obligation on the
part of the issuer-offeror; rather, it triggers a duty on the part of the cardholder-offeree 27 to render the further performance of repaying the card issuer.
Completion of the requested performance triggers the contractual duty of
paying the charges; it does not complete the promisee's obligation, but creates
it.
The dilemma is not resolved by viewing the cardholder as the offeror and
the issuer as the offeree, as two circuit courts have done. These courts expressed the view that a unilateral contract is formed when a credit card is
used: a cardholder promises to repay the debt if the issuer will render the
requested performance of reimbursing the merchant who accepts the card. 28
But would any analyst seriously assert that no contract is formed until reimbursement actually occurs?29 Surely the reimbursement obligation is enough
in itself, even if not yet performed. If so, then use of the card constitutes a
promise to repay on the part of the cardholder, and acceptance of the charge
triggers an obligation on the part of the issuer to reimburse the merchant.
This is a promise for a promise, which does not describe a unilateral contract.
Thus, unilateral contracts doctrine cannot provide the conceptual foundation for the cardholder's repayment obligation in credit card cases.
An alternative and analytically more sensible possibility is that a bilateral,
rather than unilateral, contract is formed at the moment a card is used. This
2'Use of the card triggers a further duty on the part of the offeror-issuer to reimburse the merchant,
but that duty is derived from a different contract. For a description of this contractual relationship, see
United States v. Dabbs, 134 1'.3d 1071, 1074 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Sealander, 1996 U.S.
App. LEXIS 18121, at ·s n.2 (10th Cir. 1996); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Computer Input Servs., Inc.
(In re Computer Input Servs, Inc.), 33 B.R. 292 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983).
28The court in AT&T Universal Card Services v. Mercer (In re Mercer), 246 F.3d 391,406 (Sth Cir.
2001) (en bane), so asserted without realizing the inconsi~tency between this analytical approach and its
nearly-simultaneous statement that use of a card constitutes ~acceptance~ of the line of credit, including
the obligation to make minimum payments, established when the card was issued. Id. If use of the card is
an acceptance in a cO!ltract-formative sense, then issuance of the card must constitute a continuing offer
and the issuer, not the cardholder, must be the offeror.
Mercer relied on Anastas v. American Savings Bank (In re Anastas), 94 F.3d 1280 (9th Cir. 1996),
which also took the view that a unilateral contract is formed by the cardholder's promise to repay and the
issuer's performance of repaybg the merchant. Anastas, in turn, relied on Ward, supra note 23, without
realizing that its analysis was backwards from the approach taken in Ward, switching offeror and offeree.
29And recall that the reimbursement obligation rests on a different contract-that between the issuer
and the merchant. See supra note 27.
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bilateral contract cannot be based upon a concurrent exchange of express
promises, of course, since the charge slip mayor may not contain promissory
language. 3o Even if it does, the card issuer is entirely passive at that moment,
having already made whatever promises it is going to make. Thus, it is ana"
lytically more appropriate not to look for an exchange of express promises at
the time of use; rather, issuance of the card constitutes a continuing offer, to
be accepted from time to time by the cardholder"s decision to use the card. 3 !
Each use of the card creates a separate contract. 32
Given the discomfort of both bilateral and unilateral contracts doctrine in
credit card cases, it may be advisable to jettison contracts analysis altogether.
:wlCourts disagree as to the significance of such language, even when it is present. Under one view,
promissory language on the charge slip creates the parties· contractual relationship:
The agreement of the parties respecting the purchase and obligation of payment is
founded upon the terms of the charge slip signed by the purchaser which states:
"Customer acknowledges the credit card used in this purchase is unrevoked and
agrees to pay for this purchase upon receipt of statement in accordance with the
terms and conditions of the agreement governing the use of such card."
Novack v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 374 A.2d 89, 93 n.3 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1977), cat. denied, 396A.2d 583 (NJ.
1978). Under another view, the presence of such language is of no analytical assistance to the card issuer,
since the debtor incurs an obligation to pay even in the absence of such a statement. See also Chase
Manhattan Bank v. Murphy (In re Murphy), 190 B.R. 327, 332 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) C"The presentment
of a credit card, the signing of a charge slip or other express ackno\\'ledgment of the obligation and the
receipt of value in exchange are enough to constitute'" a promise to pay.); J.C. Penney Co. v. Shanahan (In
re Shanahan), 151 B.R. 44 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1993) (each charge slip stated ""{t]he cardholder acknowl,
edges receipt of goods/services in the total amount shown hereon and agrees to pay the card issuer accord,
ing to its current term,'" but the court did not attribute any legal significance to the language); United
States v. Malone, 231 F. Supp. 174 (S.D. Tex. 1964) (holding, for purposes of criminal charge of illegal
transportation in interstate commerce of forged securities, which is defined to include ""any,... evidence of
indebtedness,'" that credit card charge slips are merely receipts for the purchase of merchandise and do not
evidence indebtedness).
31The signer must be the cardholder, however. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stover, 513 N.E.2d 361
(Ohio Mun. Ct. 1987) (holding no contract implied between the. authorized user of a. credit card and the
issuer on the basis that the user signed charge slips during the transaction).
'2The cou:t in City St~r~ Co '1. Henderson, 156 S.E.2d 818 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967), seemed to adopt
this view, in the context of a suit for wrongful termination of a credit card:
The issuance of a credit card is but an offer to extend a line of open account
credit. It is unilateral and supported by no consideration. The offer may be with,
drawn at any time, without prior notice, for any reason or, indeed, for no reason at
all, and its withdrawal breaches no duty for there is no duty to continue it and
violates no rights. Acceptance or use of the card by the offeree makes a contract
between the parties according to its terms ....

Id. at 12Q.-21.
But ~e AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Feld (In re Feld), 203 B.R. 360, 366,67 (Bankr. E.D. Pa
1996) ("'The use of the card does not represent a separate contract but rather is the anticipated perform
ance of the contract created when the card was issued:"); The GM Card v. Cox (In re Cox), 182 B.R. 626
636 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995) ("'Use of the card did not create a separate contract. The debtor was mere!)
exercising his rights under the parties' contract....). True enough, but no obligation arises unless and unti
the cardholder decides to use the card.
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Weare not left without doctrinal underpinnings, however, nor need we go
far from contracts doctrine itself. Instead, we could resort to restitution and
acknowledge that, even if a contract in the traditional sense is absent, the
cardholder has received a benefit for which repayment should be made. 33
Surprisingly little authority addresses restitution in a credit card context,
however, and most of it focuses on different problems. 34
On the face of it, restitution seems quite plausible, since it is available as a
theory of recovery when a contract fails for some reason. 35 Given that the
issuer is bound to reimburse the merchant, the credit card context presents
both the unjust enrichment lying at the heart of restitution,36 as well as the
feature that distinguishes restitution from reliance-the nonbreaching party
(issuer) has both suffered a loss and conferred a benefit on the party in breach
(cardholder).37
Even if available, restitution may not be a doctrine attractive to credit
33RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1936).
34Several cases address the liability of a person who used the card with the cardholder·s permission. In
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Ragucci, 495 A.2d 923 (N.]. Super. Ct. 1985), Sears sought summary judgment in
its attempt to recover from an authorized user after the cardholder, her husband, died. In a consolidated
case, Sears sought summary judgment against an authorized user following her divorce from the cardholder.
The court acknowledged that recovery in -quasi'Contract" might be possible. Recovery under that theory
required proof of what items were purchased and who benefited from the purchases, however, and these
matters were material facts precluding summary judgment. See also Nat·l City Bank, Norwalk v. Stang,
618 N.E.2d 241 (1992 Ohio Ct. App.) (holding husband, whose signature was forged on loan documents
by wife, liable in unjust enrichment for the amount deposited into their joint account and used to pay
debts on which he was personally obligated).
On the other hand, in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stover, 513 N.E.2d 361 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1987), the card
issuer sued an authorized user of the card after the cardholder, her father," died without assets. The court
found no liability on an unjust enrichment theory:
This court does not believe that the defendant was unjustly enriched; if anything,
Sears m~de more profits be~use [the cardholder] let defendant make additional
purchases on his account. Only upon his death without assets did the possibility of
"unjust enrichment" arise. Defendant had never before been called upon to pay for
Sears charges. It is clear to this court that Sears was relying upon the credit of [the
cardholder], and not upon the credit of [the authorized user], given the fact that it
knew nothing about her.

Id. at 363. Similarly, in F.C.C. National Bank v. Reid (In re Reid), 237 B.R. 577 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1999),
the card issuer sought to have amounts incurred by a husband declared nondischargeable as to the card,
holder..wife. The court stated repeatedly, but with no citation of authority or reference to theory of
liability, that the husband was not liable on the account.
35FAR.1IoJSWORTH, supra note 16, at § 2.20. The converse proposition is that restitution will be denied
if a contract between the parties governs the same subject matter. ld. This proposition distinguishes cases
holding restitution unavailable when a plaintiffs full performance has created a contract debt for money,
JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CoNTRACTS, § 15..6 (3d ed. 1987) (hereinafter
CALAMARI & PERILLO), since there will be no contractual obligation if contract theory fails in credit card
cases.
36CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 35, at § 15..2.
37Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue,jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1,46 YALE Lj.
52, 56 (1936).

A·9

72

AMERICAN BANKRUPT.CY LAW JOURNAL

(Vol. 75

card issuers. Restitution measures recovery according to the reasonable value
of the benefit conferred by the aggrieved party upon the party in breach.
Credit cards often carry high interest rates, as well as additional fees and
charges. 38 Issuers may be loath to abandon their contractual entitlements
and to accept in their stead whatever the court finds to be a reasonable
return.
These approaches relate to the existence of a claim in the first place, of
course, and the creditor will have a cognizable claim in bankruptcy as long as
liability, whatever its basis, is present. Thereafter, one must determine
whether that claim is dischargeable, which requires distinguishing a breach of
promise from fraud. Bankruptcy represents, in its essence, an institutionalized
breach of contract. The mere breach of a contract cannot possibly constitute
fraud, since bankrupt'cy is all about breach. Some creditors, apparently, have
missed this distinction, arguing that the debtor's mere failure to pay, without
more, reveals a fraudulent intent sufficient to establish grounds for nondis'
chargeability.39 Although courts seldom fall for the ploy,40 they sometimes
381n AT&T Universal Card Services Corp. v. Ellingsworth (In re EUings\vorth), 212 B.R. 326 (Bankr.
W.O. Mo. 1997), for example, the cardholder agreement stated an annual interest rate of 16.4%, but the
addition of cash advance fees created an effective rate of 29.54% on the debtor"s first statement. Id. at 338
n.78.
39AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Nguyen (In re Nguyen), 208 B.R.258, 261 (D. Mass. 1997)
("'an intent to deceive cannot be inferred solely from a failure to perform an implied promise~); Chevy
Chase Bank, FSB v. Briese (In re Briese), 196 B.R. 440, 452 (Bankr. W.O. Wis. 1996) ("'the debtor"s
subsequent failure to pay is ~clearly insufficient" to prove an intent to deceive; this demonstrates only a
breach of contract, not fraud~); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Blackburn (In re Blackburn), 68 B.R. 870, 876
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1987) ("'the failure to fulfill a promise to pay for goods ordered on credit cannot in itself
support a finding of actual fraud~); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Faulk (In re Faulk), 69 B.R. 743, 750 (Bankr.
N.D. Ind. 1986) ra mere breach of contract by the debtor" without more, does not imply existence of
actual fraud for purposes of the exception to discharge under Section (aX2XAr); Chase Manhattan Bank
(U.SA.) NA. v. Carpenter (In re Carpenter), 53 B.R. 724, 730 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1985) rMere violations
of any. contractual provisions do not constitute fraud"').
40The court in AT&T Universal Card Services Corp. \I. Ramirez (In re Ramirez), 184 B.R. 859 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 19Q5), left no doubt what it thought of the creditor"~ argument:
Plaintiff alleged that it relied on debtor to abide by terms of the credit agree..
mente The Court concludes that if such reliance and breach of such agreement
constituted grounds for nondischargeability there would be no discharge of any
debt in bankruptcy, since whenever a debt is incurred there is a promise to repay it
and the breaking of that promise, as a matter of law, would constitute grounds for
denial of discharge. This is ludicrous.

Id. at 862. &e also American Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Christensen (In re Christensen), 193
B.R. 863, 866 (N.D. Ill. 1996) rThe fact that [the debtor] subsequently failed to pay his credit card debts
does not provide the requisite [fraudulent] intent"'). In AT&T Universal Card Services Corp. V. Wong
(In re Wong), 207 B.R. 822 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997), on the other hand, the court noted that the debtor was
. . clearly required to make at least a ~minimum payment" to [the creditor] each month in which there
remained an outstanding balance due on the account.~ Id. at 828. The court implied that, by breaching
this obligation, the debtor engaged in a fraudulent misrepresentation sufficient to support nondis..
chargeability under § 523(aX2XA). The court did indeed so hold, but without further analysis.
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end up in much the same place by falling victim to other equally inappropri,
ate lines of argument regarding fraud,based nondischargeability.

II. THE STATUTE AND ITS INTERPRETATION
Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code governs nondis'
chargeability of debts incurred by fraud:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b),
or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual
debtor from any debt(2) for money, property, services, or an extension, re,
newal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent ob,
tained by(A) false pretenses, a false representation or actual
fraud, other than a statement respecting the
debtor"s or an insider"s financial condition ....
This provision makes no specific mention of credit cards. We know that it
governs credit card cases, however, primarily because of long habit-courts
have applied it to credit cards for too long to stop now. 41
Section 523(a)(2)(A) received its most significant explication in Field v.
Mans,42 which involved a real estate deal rather than credit card transac,
tions. In Field, creditors sold real estate to a corporation controlled by the
debtor, who supplied part of the purchase price and personally guaranteed a
promissory note for the balance. The note was secured by a second mortgage
containing a due,on,sale clause.
.
The corporation sold the property four months later,. without the credi,
tors" knowledge or consent. The next day, the debtor wrote _~he creditors
asking them to waive the due,on,sale clause, but he did not bother to mention
that sale had already occurred. The creditorg re8rond~d with an offer to
waive upon payment of $150,000. The debtor offered $50,000, but the credi,
tors did not reply. No further correspondence was exchanged.
1

The REPORT Of THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW CoMMISSION alludes to the frequent, and
increasing, use of § 523(aX2XA) to challenge the dischargeability of credit card obligations, and to the fact
that application of the subsection "has been fraught with doctrinal difficulty." COMMISSION REPORT at
181 (quoting AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Feld (In re Feld), 203 B.R. 360, 365 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1996». The Commission·s REPORT did not quarrel with § 523(aX2XA)'s current applicability in credit
card cases, but it recommended that a new provision be crafted specifically for these obligations. Under
the Commission's proposal, § 523(aX2XA) would no longer apply to routine credit card use. In its st~ad,
the Commission recommended a bright..line rule under which debts not exceeding the cardholder·s cr~dit
limit would be dischargeable unless they were incurred within thirty days of bankruptcy filing. ~.-\.
TIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW CoMMISSION, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 194..96 (1997).
4

.u S16

U.S. S9 (1995).
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During the next three and one,half years, the creditors learned that a
third party claimed ownership of the property, but they did not investigate
until after a sharp drop in local real estate prices precipitated the debtor's
bankruptcy fuing. The creditors then learned of the sale and sought an order,
based upon the debtor"s guaranty, excepting their claim from discharge under
§ 523(a)(2)(A).
The bankruptcy court found that the debtor"s letters were false represen'
tations on which the creditors had relied to their detriment, but also required
that the creditors" reliance had been reasonable. Because the court concluded
that a reasonable person would have checked for conveyances after the ex'
change of letters and would have investigated the third party's claims of own'
ership, it held the creditors" reliance unreas~~able and found the debt
dischargeable. 43 The district court 44 and the""Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit 45 both affirmed.
The issue before the Supreme Court was what level of reliance, above
mere reliance in fact, a creditor must show in order to except a debt from
discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A). The Court concluded that the operative
terms in § 523(a)(2)(A)-"'false pretenses, a false representation,. or actual
fraud~ -are common law terms and should be given their common law mean'
ing. That common law meaning was derived chiefly from two sources-the
Restatement (Second) of Torts and Prosser's treatise on torts. Because the
Restatement requires both actual and justifiable reliance in connection with
fraudulent misrepresentation,46 the Court held that a creditor must show47
actua1 48 and justifiable reliance,49 rather than reasonable reliance, in order to
except a debt from discharge. 5o

Field v. Mans poses a number of signific"ant problems in the credit card
context, beginning with the question whether it applies at all. Issuers have
3
4 Id. at 63.
44Id.

4'36 F.3d 1089 (1st Cir. 1994).
46516 U.S. at 70 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 537 (1976».
47Creditors have the burden of proof on nondischargeability issues and must meet a "preponderance of
the evidence~ standard, rather than a "'clear and convincing'" standard, in carrying that burden of proof.
Grogan v. Gamer, 498 U.S. 279 (1991).
48 The Court never questioned that some sort of reliance is necessary: "'No one, of course, doubts that
some degree of reliance is required to satisfy the element of causation inherent in the phrase ·obtained by;""
516 U.S. at 66. See also AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. Alvi (In re Alvi), 191 B.R. 724, 730,31 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1996).
49Justice Ginsburg concurred, writing separately to highlight the causation issue of whether this debt
.was "'obtained by'" fraud, given that the fraudulent letters were written well after the debt was incurred.
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented on the grounds that remand, which the majority ordered,
was inappropriate because the bankruptcy court had reached· the right result. Thus, the Court unani..
mously agreed that justifiable reliance is the correct standard.
sOFor a discussion of the Supreme Court's reliance analysis, see infra notes 226..40 and accompanying
text.
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argued in credit card nondischargeability cases that the factual differences
between those cases and Field are sufficient to distinguish it. 51 For the most
part, this argument has fallen on deaf ears; courts recognize the factual differ'
ences but refuse to distinguish Field on that basis. 52
Another issue is Field's answer to the question whether § 523(a)(2)(A)
requires application of a single test or whether each of the statutory
phrases-"false pretenses,~ "false representations'" and "actual fraud'"-em'
bodies an independent test. Whether any distinction exists between "false
pretenses,~ "'false representations~ and "actual fraud'" is crucial to the legal
theory because it determines whether misrepresentations can appropriately
be implied in any case under the subsection. 53 Credit card cases are particu,
larly at stake because of the lack of direct, express representations by
cardholders.
The predecessor to § 523(a)(2)(A), § 17a(2) of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act,
provided that obligations "for obtaining money or property by false pretenses
or false representations~ were not dischargeable. 54 The 1978 Code added
"actual fraud"" to the list, and the significance of this statutory rewording is
sharply debated.
Congress provided little guidance as to whether it intended, by adding
"actual fraud"" to § 523(a)(2)(A), to effectuate any substantive change in the
standards being applied by courts. The most relevant portion of the legisla,
tive history states that "[s]ubparagraph (A) is intended to codify current case
law, e.g., N.eal v. Clar~, 95 U.S. 704 ... (1877), which interprets ~fraud'l to
HIs &liance Becoming The Issue in Credit Card Dischargeability Actfurls?, 28 BCD WEEKLY NE\VS &
No. 16 at A7, A8 (March 26, 1996).
[Creditors] contend tbat the facts of the instant proceedings are very different from
the facts of Field, and therefore Field is not controlling. The facts of the instant
proceedings certainly differ from the facts of Field. Yet, nothing in the Field analy..
sis suggests that the standard it established was limited to the particular fact pat..
tern before the Supreme Court. . .. The most lo~ical interpretation of the SuprE':me
Court"s holding is that "'justifiable reliance" is an element of all "'fraud" actions
brought by creditors under section 523(aX2XA).

CoMMENT
52

AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. Alvi (In re Alvi), 191 B.R. 724, 729,30 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) (footnote
omitted). Accord AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Akdogan (In re Akdogan), 204 B.R. 90, 95
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1997); American Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Christensen (In re Christensen),
193 B.R. 863, 866 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Chevy Chase Bank, FSB v. Briese (In re Briese), 196 B.R. 440,449
(Bankr. W.O. Wis. 1996); AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Totina (In re Totina), 198 B.R. 673, 676
n.2 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1996). Sa also AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Feld (In re Feld), 203 B.R. 360,
370 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996) \principles gleaned from Fidd v. Mans, a case not involving credit card debt,
may be usefully applied in that context"). But sa F.C.C. Nat"l Bank v. Reid (In re Reid), 237 B.R. 577
(Bankr. W.DN.Y. 1999).
'3The overlap with the implied representation theory is obvious, and the conclusion that three sepa'
rate legal standards are present in the subsection may explain why courts are sometimes accused of import..
ing the implied representation theory into the "Roddenberry loophole." Chase Manhattan Bank, N A. \'.
Ford (In re Ford), 186 B.R. 312, 320 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995).
'''Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 550 (repealed October 29, 1979).
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mean actual or positive fraud rather than fraud implied in law:~ss Given Neal
v. Clark"s holding that fraud, within the meaning of the then,current version
of the bankruptcy laws, had to involve ~moral turpitude or intentional
wrong,'"S6 the reference to N.eal v. Clar~ has been viewed as a signal that
Congress intended only to preclude imputations of fraud,S? not to ~create a
new ground for preventing the discharge of a debt:'s8 This debate is of criti,
cal importance, for it determines whether the five elements of common law
fraud, one of which relates to scienter, are indispensable to nondis'
chargeability under § 523(a)(2)(A).
One view is that the revision made no particular difference and that
§§ 17a(2) and 523(a)(2)(A) are substantively indistinguishable:
The term "actual fraud'" in section 523(a)(2)(A) is, ex'
cept to exclude constructive fraud from the operation of the
statute, redundant, since it does not encompass or define any
conduct or activity that was not otherwise encompassed
within or defined by the terms "false representation or false
pretenses.'" It is, in fact, difficult to find a definition of "ac,
tual fraud'" that does not include the words -false representa,
tion'" or "false pretenses,~ or synonymous terms, or which
does not mirror the elements of the terms that appeared in
section 17(a)(2) of the Act ... .S9
Under this view, scienter is necessary to a finding of nondischargeability
under § 523(a)(2)(A).
55124 CoNG. REc. HI 1,096 (daily ed. Sept. 28,1978),517412 (daily 00. October 6, 1978) (remarks of
Rep. Edwards and Sen. De(;oncini).
5695 U.S. at 709.
57
The addition of the words Woor actual fraud'" probably makes no change in the law as
it exist~d prior to enactment of the Code because false pretenses and representa..
tions were construed to mean acts involving moral turpitude or intentional wrong;
fraud implied in law, which may exist without imputation of bad faith or immoral..
ity, was held to be insufficient.

ITT Financial Servs. v. Hulbert (In re Hulbert), 150 B.R. 169, 174..75 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993) (quoting 3
BANKRUPTCY MANUAL 1 523.08 (15th ed.) (citations omitted».
58The GM Card v. (;ox (In re Cox), 182 B.R. 626, 632 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995). Accord AT&T
Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Totina (In re Totina), 198 B.R. 673,676 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1996); Hechfs, A
Division of the May Dep"t Stores Co. v. Valdes (In re Valdes), 188 B.R. 533, 536 n.4 (Bankr. D. Md.
1995).
59F.C.C. Nafl Bank v. Gilmore (In re Gilmore), 221 B.R. 864, 871 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1998). This
passage was substantially misconstrued by the court in F.e.C. National Bank v. Reid (In re Reid), 237 B.R.
577 (Bankr. W.DN.Y. 1999), which concluded that the three terms in § 523(aX2XA) are independent and
that the five elements of common law fraud are inapplicable to Wofalse pretenses'" and ""false representations....
Reid said that Gilmore reached the same result by a different road. Id. at 586. It is not at all the same
thing, however, to decide that § 523(aX2XA) comprises three separate and independent standards, only
one of which requires scienter, and to decide that "'actual fraud'" is so broad that it consumes the other
two, leaving no ground for nondischarge that is free of a scienter requirement.
CoLLIERS
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The contrary view is that addition of the phrase "'actual fraud't" expanded
the scope of fraud,based nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2)(A). The ef,
fect of the change was to bar discharge in the face of positive fraud rather
than fraud implied in law, but not to limit "'false pretenses't" and "'false repre'
sentations.~60 Under this view, those two grounds remain available discharge
exceptions, independent of the five common law elements of fraud. 61
6OP.C.C. Nafl Bank v. Reid (In re Reid), 237 B.R. 577 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1999). According to Reid,
Congress added "actual fraud'" in order to overrule Davison,Paxon Co. v. Caldwell, 115 F.2d 189 (5th Cir.
1940), ctrt. dmied, 313 U.S. 564 (1941), which had permitted the discharge of a debt incurred through
fraud "because there were no false pretenses or representations.'" 237 B.R. at 586. Thus, Congress did not
intend "to limit prior interpretation of'fa1se pretenses' or 'false representations' to those that included the
five elements of common law deceit.'" Id.
Some courts (surprisingly few, perhaps) have taken great pains to distinguish the three separate
grounds for nondischargeability encompassed within § 523(aX2XA):

A "false pretense'" involves an implied misrepresentation or conduct intended to
create or foster a false impression. By comparison, a "'false representation'" involves
an expressed misrepresentation by a debtor. On the other hand, "'actual fraud'" has
been defined to include a "deception intentionally practiced to induce another to
part with property or to surrender some legal right, and which accomplishes the
end designed.'"
FCC Nat'l Bank v. Etto (In re Etto), 210 B.R.734, 739 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1997) (citations omitted). The
court in Citibank F.S.B. (Florida) v. Cox (In re Cox), 150 B.R. 807 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1992), defined "'actual
fraud'" as "'any deceit, artifice, trick or design involving direct and active operation of the mind, used to
circumvent and cheat another; something said, done or omitted with the design of perpetrating what is
known to be a cheat or deception.'" Id. at 811 n.6 (citing 3 CoLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11 523.08[5] (15th
ed. 1992». Accord Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Faulk (In re Faulk), 69 B.R. 743 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986).
61The facts of F.C.C. National Bank v. Reid (In re Reid), 237 B.R. 577 (Bankr. W.DN.Y. 1999), well
illustrate that ...[njot all scams, stings, or shell games involve the ... false representations that some courts
believe to be a sine qua non of a § 523(aX2XA) action.'" Id. at 579. In that case, the debtors had nine
credit cards. including those in separate and joint names. The debtor,wi(e was aware that her husband
used cards in her name, but she testified that he took care of the family's financial matters and she never
inquired. (Or, as the court put it. "Never. Absolutely never. Not a single time.'" Id. at 581.) The debtor'
husband charged approximately $8800 on one of her cards between September 1997, when the card had a
negligible balance. and the end ef January 1998. When the couple filed bankruptcy the following March,
they owed $71,000 on the nine cards. Of that amount, $50.000 had been incurred in the preceding six
months. The issuer of the wife's card challen~ed the dischargeability of that obli~ation. The COl,rt seemed
to assume that application of the five elements of common law fraud would lead to discharge (which is a
debatable proposition at best), but held that § S23(aX2XA) does not require satisfaction of that test. The
court found nondischargeability on the ground of ~false pretenses"':
There is a ~fa1se pretense'" when the account holder who is under no duress
whatsoever. aided and facilitated her husband's use of the card with complete and
utter disregard (on her part) for how it was being used and for the ability to repay
it.
. . . [A] premeditated, calculated ignorance. coupled with active participation
and assistance in the use of [the] credit line by someone else, while the account
holder is insolvent in fact. belies any defense of "'intent to repay.'" This defendant's
self,serving protestations of actual intent to repay are of no weight against the
back,drop of complete indifference to what was being charged to her name.
Indifference is not the same as misplaced confidence. Misplaced confidence
might be among the mistakes or lapses of judgment that bankruptcy forgives. Mis,
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The Supreme Court in Field v. Mans did not directly address the ques'
tion whether § 523(a)(2)(A) mandates a single test.62 The Court left open
the possibility that some elements of a creditor~s prima facie case under
§ 523(a)(2XA) might be different under "'false pretenses'" or "'false representa,
tions'" than under "'actual fraud.'"63 The Court, however, did hold that the
terms (plural in the opinion) in § 523(a)(2)(A) "'incorporate the general com'
mon law of torts, the dominant consensus of common,law jurisdictions, rather
than the law of any particular state.'"64 The requirements for establishing
false pretenses, false representations and actual fraud are often described in
different terms, which may suggest that three separate tests should apply
(although the distinctions often seem more formal than real).65 Yet Field v.
placed confidence might be found where a debtor knows how high the debt has
become, but accepts a spouse·s promise, backed,up with voluntary counseling, to
clean up his act or his vow and demonstrated effort to work extra hours to repay
their debt.
Indifference is not the same as desPeration or submissiveness, either. An abused
spouse, or one who fears that the family unit will fall apart if she cuts up the card,
might have a defense, at least up until what the spouse is doing approaches out'
right thievery. (Even if Bonnie were to have assisted Clyde only to keep peace in
the relationship, her actions would not have been without culPability.)
In sum, the defendanfs conduct here constitutes a "false pretense.... . .. Specifi,
cally, the plaintiff clearly approved each of the Pertinent transaetionson an ines..
capable belief that it was the judgment and discretion of the defendant that was
being exercised regarding the use of the account, when, in fact, the judgment and
discretion that was being exercised was that of someone against whom the plaintiff
has no rights.

Id. at 587,88 (footnotes omitted).

~

62The Supreme Court"s oblique treatment of the question has permitted subsequent courts to distin'
guish the case. The court in F.C.C. National Bank v. Reid (In re Reid), 237 B.R. 577 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y.
1999), for example, distinguished Field on the grounds, inter alia, that it "did not present any argument to
the effect that the five..prong test is or is not the only test applicable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX2XA).... Id.
at 583 n.5.
631n discussing whether a creditor seeking to establish "'actual fraud'" under § 523(aX2XA) must estab.lish reasonable, or merely justifiabl~ r~lian~e, th~ Cot:rt said: "Although we do not mean to suggest that
the requisite level of reliance would differ if there should be a case of false pretense or representation but
not of fraud, there is no need to settle that here.... 5 16 U.S. at 70 n.8.
64 Id. at n.9.
65The Collier treatise treats false pretenses and false representations seParately from actual fraud, but
cites Field v. Mam in the former. 4 CoLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY" 523.08[1][d] & 523.08[I][e] (15th ed.
Rev.). The district court in Goldberg Securities, Inc. v. Scarlata (In re Scarlata), 127 B.R. 1004 (N.D. Ill.
1991), distinguished false pretenses from false representations, describing the former as involving "an im'
plied representation or conduct that is intended to create and foster a false impression'" and the latter as
involving "'an express representation.... Id. at 1009. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit described the elements
necessary for false pretenses in terms strikingly similar to those required for actual fraud - that is, a statement made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth, intent to deceive, and
actual and reasonable reliance. 979 F.2d 521, 525 (7th eire 1992). In In re Sheridan, 57 F.3d 627 (7th Cir.
1995), the Seventh Circuit again defined false pretenses in terms similar to the elements of actual fraud:
To prevail on a false pretenses claim., the creditor must show that the debtor ob..
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Mans emphasized that discharge should be denied only to debtors with scien..
ter. 66 Since scienter, however described, is a factor in actual fraud as well as
in false pretenses and false representations at common law,67 that may sug..
gest the use of a single test.
However the test is articulated, discharge should be denied under
§ 523(a)(2)(A), as a matter of policy, only to debtors who have behaved cuI..
pably.68 Additionally, discharge exceptions should be given only to diligent
creditors who were not responsible for their losses. If culpability on the
debtor's part and responsibility on the creditor"s part are read out of the
subsection, credit card issuers will be invited to contest the discharge of
credit card obligations when debtors have done little more than use their
cards while insolvent,69 and when the creditors themselves could have pre"
vented the loss.
When applied to the credit card context, Field v. Mans provides a frame ..
work for analysis that can be imposed over the cacophony of current case
law, much of which developed before the case was decided. 70 Use of that
tained the money "'through representations which the debtor either knew to be
false or made with such reckless disregard for the truth as to constitute willful
misrepresentation.... [First Nat'l Ban~ of Red Bud v.] Kimzey, 761 F.2d [421] at 423
[(7th Cir. 1985)]. [The creditor] must also prove that [the debtor] acted with an
intent to deceive and that [the creditor] relied on [the debtor·s] misrepresentations.
Matter of Mayer, 51 F.3d 670, 674,76 (7th eire 1995) ("'Reliance means the con'
junction of a material misrepresentation with causation in fact." A misrepresenta'
tion is not material if the creditor knows it is false or "possesses information
sufficient to call the representation into question.......).

Id. at 635. See also AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. Mercer (In re Mercer), 246 F.3d 391, 403 (5th Cir.
2(01) (en bane) (treating false pretenses and false representations as carrying identical requirements;
describing those requirements as "'somewhat overlapping" those for act~al fraud, and finding no need to
decide whether the differences survived Field.) Authorities such as these give ample reason not to draw
technical and strained distinctions between false pretenses, false representations and actual fraud.
66516 U.S. at 67,68.
67See sources cited supra note 65. But see AT&T Universal Card Servs. V. Alvi (In re Alvi), 191 B.R.
724, 729 n.8 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) (statinf! that scienter is an element of common law fraud.. but not of
false pretenses or false representations).
68REPORT Of THE CoMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS Of THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc.
No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 54 (1973) rclaims arising from conduct of the debtor egregiously
violating community standards, such as claims for fraud, larceny, embezzlement, \villful and mali~ious
wrongs, and civil penalties, should not be discharged because social policy directs, impliedly at least. that
the debtor should.not be able to escape his responsibility through the bankruptcy process"). See ';:50 2
DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY § 7,24, at 327 (1992) (Section 523(aX2) is among the di~harge
exceptions "'morally distinguishable from usual debt" in that it Wocarries with it a moral opprobrium.-).
69For a discussion of this problem, see infra notes 126..32 and accompanying text.
10The opinion in Citibank South Dakota, NA. v. Dougherty (In re Dougherty)~ 84 B.R. 653 lB.:\.P.
9th Cir. 1988), which has been very influential in determining whether the debtor had the requisite lr.tent
to defraud the creditor, h~ been read as requiring no more for nondischargeability than that ir.tlnt.
F.C.C. Nafl Bank v. Cacciatore (In re Cacciatore), 209 B.R. 609, 613 (Bankr. E.D~.Y. 1997), re:"d on
other grounds, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11246 (E.DN.Y. 1998); AT&T Universal Card Servs. Co=-;," v.
Akdogan (In re Akdogan), 204 B.R. 90,94 (Bankr. E.DN.Y. 1997). If Dougherty so holds, it is clearly out
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framework reveals that each of the current approaches, like the blind men and
the elephant, captures a bit of reality. Current law, therefore, needs to be
reorganized and refocused, not discarded. A common law fraud standard can
work in the credit card context, if common sense and a focus on fundamental
principles of risk allocation are maintained.
III. RISK ALLOCATION PRINCIPLES
Discharge in consumer bankruptcy is best viewed through a risk alloca,
tion lens. The relevant bankruptcy risk, for every creditor, is that it will
have to absorb the economic loss attendant upon discharge, which renders
the debt forever uncollectible.?1 When the specific context of credit card
obligations is isolated, the precise risk faced by issuers can be variously de,
scribed: that the cardholder will not have the ability72 and/or the intent?3 to
repay the amounts charged; that the cardholder will discharge prerevocation
charges;74 that the cardholder will exceed the credit limit;75 or that the card,
holder will not pay.76 Or, as one court expressed it, the creditor may have
assumed ~the risk of the user"s ignorance, mistake, naivete, gullibility, misfor,
tune, accident, or other innocent failing or adversity.'"77 Creditors, however,
do not assume the risk of fraud. 78
of step with Field v. Mans. A better interpretation is that Dougherty applies to the intent element of
fraud (and it is discussed in that context infra, at notes 147,,73), but that it is not authority for the
proposition that intent to defraud is alone enough to sustain a finding of nondischargeability. See. e.g.,
AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Feld (In re Feld), 203 B.R. 360 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding the
debt dischargeable, despite the debtor"s false representation of intent to repay, because the creditor failed
to show (eliance).
71 Under § S24(a), discharge acts as an injunction prohibiting further debt collection efforts. ,
72 First Card Servs., Inc. v. Kitzmiller (In re Kitzmiller), 206 B.R. 424, 426 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1997).
Sa also Citibank South Dakota, NA. v. Dougherty (In re Dougherty), 84 B.R. 653, 656 (BA.P. 9th Gir.
1988); Household Credit Servs., Inc. v.Jacobs (In reJacobs), 196 B.R. 429,432.. 33 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1996);
Chase Manhattan Bank v. Murphy (In re .Murphy), l~ B.R. 327, 331 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995); Norwest
Bank of Iowa, NA. v. Orndorff (In re Orndorff), 162 B.R. 886, 8R9 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1994);j.C. Penney
Co. v. Shanahan (In re Shanahan), 151 B.R. 44,47 (Bankr. W.DN.Y. 1993).
73 AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Pakdaman (In re Pakoaman), 210 E.R.. 886, 888 (D. l\lass.
1997).
7·The GM Card v. Cox (In re Cox), 182 B.R. 626, 634 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995).
7SChevy Chase Bank, FSB v. Briese (In re Briese), 196 B.R. 440, 447 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1996); The
GM Card v. Cox (In re Cox), 182 B.R. 626,631 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995) (interpreting First Nat"l Bank of
Mobile v. Roddenberry, 701 F.2d 927 (11th Cir. 1983».
76 AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Ellingsworth (In re Ellingsworth), 212 B.R. 326, 334 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1997).
77J.C. Penney Co. v. Shanahan (In re Shanahan), 151 B.R. 44, 47 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1993).
78Colonial Nat"l Bank USA v. Leventhal (In re Leventhal), 194 B.R. 26, 30 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(rejecting the assumption of risk approach "'insofar as that theory may be invoked to defeat a claim of
nondischargeability under section S23(aX2XA) in circumstances where a defendant obtained property or
credit by means which can fairly be characterized as deceitful or fraudulent"'); Hecht's, A Division of the
May Dep"t Stores Co. v. Valdes (In re Valdes), 188 B.R. 533, 536..37 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995) (the assump"
tion of risk approach puts the creditor ""in a virtually impossible position with respect to charges incurred
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Debtors are not without risks of their own. For them, the, risk is that
after the surrender of nonexempt assets,79 a particular debt will remain for'
ever nondischargeable.80
Discharge exceptions are the primary vehicle 81 by which the Code at'
tempts to allocate these risks, and to strike the proper balance between the
desire to give debtors a fresh start and recognition that some obligations, for
whatever reason, should not be discharged.
Exploration of the problem of risk allocation should begin with simple
propositions drawn from widely accepted principles of economic analysisthat the' party who is best able to minimize a particular loss is the superior
risk bearer and, therefore, should be assigned to bear that risk. 82 A particular
party is the superior risk bearer either because it is better positioned to pre'
vent the risk from occurring or because it can better insure against that
risk. 83 Prevention means that loss can be averted by an expenditure smaller
than the loss itself is expected to be. 84 Being the cheaper insurer, on the
other hand, means that a party is better able to measure the risk-to deter'
mine the probability that the risk will occur and its magnitude if it does
occur-and to spread the cost by pooling the risk. 8s
These simple propositions should be the touchstone of an analysis of dis,
charge in bankruptcy, but their application is neither simple nor self..evident.
The first commentator to attempt the analysis was Professor Theodore Ei,
senberg, in a pioneering article published shortly after passage of the 1978
prior to the revocation of charging privileges. . .. During the pre,revocation period, all charges would be
discharged regardless of the debtor"s intent, ~hereby leaving the creditor with little or no recourse even
under the most egregious of situations. The focus should not be on the conduct of the 4oimprovident
creditor" but on a fundamental tenet of bankruptcy - the discharge and fresh start are intended for the
honest, but unfortunate debtor....). See £11$0 Citibank South Dakota, N.A. v. Dougherty (In re Dougherty),
84 B.R. 653,656'57 (BA.P. 9th Cir. 1988);j.C. Penney Co. v. Shanahan (In re Shanahan), 151 B.R. 44, 47
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1993); Citibank F.S:B. (Florida).v. Cox (In re Cox), 150 B.R. 807,811 (Bankr. N.D. Fla.
1992).
79This is a problem limited to Chapter 7 cases, since in those liquidation proceedings nonexempt assets
are surrendered as the "'price'" for discharge. See TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR
DEBTORS 25 (1989). In Chapter 13 cases, obligations incurred by fraud are dischargeable. See § 1328(a).
soSection 523(aXI0) provides that an obligation held nondischargeable in a prior Chapter 7 case can'
not be discharged in a later proceeding under any chapter. If the debtor fails to complete payments under
a Chapter 13 plan, but receives a discharge under § 1328(b) (the so,called Wohardship discharge"'), that
discharge does not include debts of a kind specified in § 523. § 1328(cX2).
l
8 Other types of debtor misbehavior are regulated by § 727, which bars discharge completely for
conduct interfering with administration of the case.
2
8 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.5 at 103 (4th ed. 1992) (hereinafter
POSNER).
l
8 Id.; Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract
Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 j. LEGAL STUD. 83, 90 (1977).
84Id. at 103.
RSId. at 104..05.
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Bankruptcy Code.86 Professor Eisenberg was discussing the merits of a bank..
ruptcy system requiring debtors to attempt to repay their obligations over
time (often described as W,mandatory 13'"), rather than the proper allocation of
risk in the context of any particular discharge exception. He looked at the
economic propositions summarized above and reasoned that debtors are in a
better position than creditors to prevent losses caused by the discharge of
obligations in bankruptcy because W,[d]ebtors in general have greater control
of their financial activities than any particular lender.~87 He also reasoned
that the cause of a particular debtor"s financial distress is relevant to the
analysis: Wolf a debtor has greater knowledge of the likelihood and magnitude
of his potential financial distress than do those who lend to him, that too
would weigh against forgiving the debtor"s failure to perform by repaying his
debts.~88 Professor Eisenberg recognized that Wo[s]ome sophisticated commer..
cial lenders probably are better than many of their borrowers about project..
ing the borrowers" future financial status,~89 but he concluded that risk
analysis requires restricted access to discharge:
But even assuming that some lenders are better placed than
some debtors to assess the likelihood and effect of bank..
ruptcy, it is implausible that all or even most lenders could
be so situated. In general, borrowers know more about
themselves and have greater control of their affairs than
lenders do. If bankruptcy law is going to reach a single con"
clusion with respect to discharge, the single economic an"
swer would most likely be to limit the discharge.90
.Professor Eisenberg may not have been entirely on the mark even in the
context he was discussing;91 he is much less so when his analysis is applied to
discharge of credit card obligations. His approach overlooks the sharp differ..
ential between the parties involved in standard consumer credit card transac..
tions. These fact patterns involve highly sophisticated credit card 'issuers
who engage in thousands of virtually identical transactions. These creditors
know, actuariaIly, what the rate of loss will be for particular credit standards.
86Theodore Eisenberg, Ban1{rtJptey Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 953 (1981).
87Id. at 982.

88Id.
89Id.
9OId. at 983.
91Professor Jackson found Professor Eisenberg"s conclusions not without doubt. In discussing the
nonwaivability of discharge under § 524(a), Professor Jackson reasoned that creditors may be superior risk
bearers because "'the creditors of an individual, having gained experience through dealing with many debt..
ors, may be more adept than the individual at monitoring his borrowing.... THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE
Loclc AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 230 (1986) (hereinafter JACKSON). See also Margaret Howard,
A 'Theory of Discharge in Consumer Ban1{ruptey, 48 OHIO STATE L.}. 1047, 1063..68 (1987) (hereinafter
Howard).
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They are entirely capable of adjusting those standards in order to reduce
losses, if they but will. Nor are they helpless on an individual level. It may
indeed be difficult to know whether any particular debtor will file bank,
ruptcy,92 but appropriate credit investigations can reveal debt,income ratios
that would alert a creditor to the likelihood that a cardholder is carrying a
debt load beyond his or her reasonable financial capability.93
Conversely, typical consumer debtors are anything but sophisticated in
their financial understanding. Poor money management skills seem almost
inevitable among debtors who end up in bankruptcy.94 In addition, the vast
majority are overly hopeful and inclined to deny the severity of their financial
woes,9S and courts have repeatedly found a naivete that falls short of fraud. 96
Empirical research supports the instinct that debtors clearly are the less
sophisticated parties in credit card transactions, often failing to recognize
even how frequently they use their cards.97 These research findings are per'
2

AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Ellingsworth (In re Ellingsworth), 212 B.R. 326,332 (Bankr.
W.O. Mo. 1997).
931n Chevy Chase Bank, FSB v. Briese (In re Briese), 196 B.R. 440, 444 (Bankr. \V.D. Wis. 1996), the
creditor was aware that the debtors had debts equal to sixty,six Percent of income. An even better
example of this point is In re Wolniewicz, 224 B.R. 302 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1998), discussed supra note 5.
Although it was not a nondischargeability case, the debt service alone, on the debtors' fifty..nine credit
cards, exceeded their gross annual income.
94Cf AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Reneer (In re Reneer), 208 B.R. 731,736 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1997) ("'Poor money management skills do not constitute fraud under § 523(aX2XA). Likewise, the
Court may question one's attitude in attempting to evade what seems to an outsider as the inevitable;
however, that is not fraud under § 523(aX2XA):'). Some banks are trying to address this problem by
establishing educational programs to help borrowers get out of trouble and/or stay out of trouble. Credit
Cltrd Delinquencies Drop in Third ~uaTta, 31 BCD WEEKLY NEWS & CoMMENT, No. 20 at A13 Qanu,
ary 13, 1998).
9SCourts have occasionally recognized the relevance of debtors' (unreasonable) optimism. Citibank
(South Dakota) NA. v. Eashai (In re Eashai), 87 F.3d 1082, 1090 (9th Cir. 1996) C"ln hard financial times,
People may engage in the practice of using cash advances to solve their short..term cash flow problems or
to deal with sporadic and seasonal income.... Moreover, we recognize the fragility of human nature.
"[H]uman experience tells us debtors can be unreasonably optimistic despite their financial ;dr-cum..
stances......) (quoting The GM Card v. Cox (In re Cox), 182 B.R. 626, 635 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995» (other
citation omitted). S~e £liso ~lanufacturers Hanover Trust v. DougheHY (In re DO\Jglierty), 143 13.R. 23, 26
(Bankr. E.DN.Y. 1992).
96Karelin v. Bank of America Nafl Trust Be Sav. Ass"n (In re Karelin), 109 B.R. 943, 948 (BA.P. 9th
Cir. 1990); Bank One Columbus, NA. v. Fulginiti (In re Fulginiti), 201 B.R. 730, 732 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1996); Colonial Nafl Bank, USA v. Carrier (In re Carrier), 181 B.R. 742,'749 (Bankr. S.DN.Y. 1995). But
see FCC Nafl Bank v. Berz (In re Ben), 173 B.R. 159, 163 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994) ("The fact that one has
profoundly fooled oneself with regard to prospects for the future should not mean that any consequent
damage to others was merely inadvertent and not fraudulent."').
971n a study of competition in the credit card industry, Professor Lawrence Ausubel found several
pieces of evidence to support the hypothesis that ""there are consumers who do not intend to borrow but
continuously do so.. . Lawrence M. Ausubel, 'The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Mar~et, 81
AM. ECON. REV. 50, 71 (1991) (hereinafter Failure o/Competition). For example, banks report that three..
fourths of their active accounts are not paid off each cycle and, therefore, are accruing finance charges.
Forty,seven percent of consumers reported in survey responses, however, that they nearly ahvays pay
their cards in full. ""Unless this is evidence of a bad consumer sutvey, it suggests that a sizeable proportion
9
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tinent to the human tendencies that affect debtor behavior in the credit card
context. Such realities reinforce the conclusion that credit card issuers are
the superior risk bearers when the question is the allocation of credit card
losses through the vehicle of discharge in bankruptcy.
"Moral hazard" remains an issue, naturally. It represents the possibility
that "individuals systematically-and rationally-underestimate the real
costs of engaging in a risky activity because some of those costs are borne by
someone else.'"98 Whenever individuals have shifted the risk of a particular
loss to some other entity, as through the procurement of insurance, the possi..
bility arises that those individuals will relax efforts to prevent the risk from
arising-efforts they might otherwise have undertaken. Bankruptcy, with its
concomitant discharge, necessarily presents a special and serious form of
moral hazard. A debtor permitted to discharge any and all debts is likely to
incur obligations without making a rational economic choice beforehand.99
The fact that discharge is available shifts some of the risk of default to
creditors,lOO but not all. The Code's answer to the moral hazard of discharge
is found in the limitations on the availability of discharge in certain instances
of debtor misbehavior. Several sections of the Code, most of \vhich are 10"
cated in § 523(a), address various types of debtor misbehavior, relating to the
incurring of liability, that the Code wishes to discourage. Subsec..
tion 523(a)(2)(A), with its prohibition on the discharge of obligations in..
curred by fraud, is a central part of this effort to prevent debtor misbehavior.
Creditors have their own role to play. They are able to set the criteria
that debtors must meet in order to qualify for loans of various kinds, and to
monitor their borrowers for changes in financial condition that may affect
future lending decisions. lOt By policing debtors, creditors can protect them'
of consumers who borrow on credit cards are unaware of how frequently they do it or, more likely, deny
(to themselves and others) that they do it." Id. at 71,72.
9~;JACKSON, supra flote 91, at 231. Sec c.ls') PO~NFR, ~upr(1 note 82, at 108.
99Howard, supra note 91, at 1070. Judge Posner presents this difficulty as one of the reasons why we
might have some doubt about the availability of voluntary bankruptcy in nonbusiness cases:
[One] source of dubiety about voluntary nonbusiness bankruptcies is the same rea'
son it is difficult to purchase insurance against defaulting on one·s d~bts: It makes
default so attractive. One can buy and consume all sorts of nice things on credit
and then default. This problem, which is a particularly serious form of the general
moral hazard problem of insurance, could be solved only by distinguishing between
voluntary and involuntary defaults and limiting the privilege of ycluntary bank,
ruptcy to the latter. But the distinction is difficult to make in practice.
POSNER,

supra note 82, at 402.

lOoThe availability of discharge "imposes much of the risk of ill,advised credit decisions not on social
insurance programs but on creditors.'" JACKSON, supra note 91, at 231.

IOICf JACKSON, supra note 91, at 231.
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selves against the moral hazard created by discharge. 102
The notion that the behavior of creditors must also be scrutinized as part
of fraud analysis has met with outright hostility at times:
There are some who place blame for credit card defaults
upon the industry and the seeming cavalier manner in which
cards are issued to nearly anyone. While the industry may
well be far too lax in its card issuance policies, this court
does not believe that policy should in any respect lessen the
degree of individual financial responsibility to be imposed
upon credit card consumers. It is not the issuance or even
possession of a card which results in the incredible number
of credit card driven consumer bankruptcies. Rather, it is
the unbridled and irresponsible use of credit by people who
either have no cash flow consciousness in the first place, or
who conveniently leave it at the curb side when entering a
retail establishment that is at the root of the problem. To
place blame on the card issuer is akin to moralizing over the
crime of shoplifting by putting the retailer at fault for attrac,
tive merchandising efforts and for not stationing armed
guards in every isle (sic). Each person must accept responsi'
bility for his or her own actions and be responsible for.his or
her own pocketbook. It is an unfortunate observation of
modern society that the phrase, "'1 can"t afford it'" has become
relegated to the unconscious mind of the American con'
sumer. It is no dishonor to shop at K,Mart nor ~s it dishon'
arable to look at upscale merchandise and conclude, "'1 can"t
afford it.'" 103
- The simple fact is that no matter how badly a debtor' has behav'ed, dis'
charge should not be denied if the creditor did not actually land justifiably
rely. Hostility to the notion that creditors must also play their part is incoffi'
patible with common law fraud, which requires examination of the quality of
the creditor"s reliance, with risk allocation principles, which look to attrib,
utes of both parties, and with bankruptcy policy, which seeks to deny dis'
charge only when that outcome makes sense.
Saying only that much merely begs the question, however. The task is to
determine what "'makes sense"" in these cases. An appropriate answer to the
question of what co.nstitutes fraud in the context of credit card debt requires
102""Because creditors can monitor debtors and are free to grant or withhold credit, the discharge
system contains a built..in checking mechanism.- Id.
I03Citicorp Credit Servs. v. Hinman (In re Hinman), 120 B.R. 1018, 1023 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1990).
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application of the statutory language in light of the Supreme Court"s holding
in Field v. Mans and in light of the theories underlying proper allocation of
risk. One can only conclude that the courts have made a muddle of the task.
In their efforts to interpret and apply § 523(a)(2)(A), courts have followed a
variety of approaches and have often missed the mark.

IV. PROVING FRAUD
A.

INTRODUCTION

In order to prove actual fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A), using the common
law elements of fraud mandated by Field v. Mans, a creditor must show that:
1. the debtor made representations;
2. at the time the representations were made, the debtor
knew they were false;
3. the debtor made the representations with the intention
and purpose of deceiving the creditor;
4. the creditor relied on the representations; and
5. the creditor sustained the alleged loss and damage as a
proximate result of the representations having been
made. 104

These elements can be variously packaged, of course. l05 It is probably
simplest, when dealing with the requirements for a showing of fraud under
§ 523(a)(2)(A), to view the requirements as clustering around t\VO interre..
lated elements, one of which focuses on the debtor and the other of which
focuses on the creditor: (1) the debtor"s making of representations with
knowledge of falsity and intent to mislead the creditor;106 and (2) the credi..
l04E.g., Citibank (South Dakota) NA. v. Eashai (In re Eashai), 87 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 1996).
losThe court in AT&T Universal Card services v. Alvi (In re Alvi), 191 B.R. 724 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1996), stated the test as requiring the showing of three. elements:
First, the creditor must prove that the debtor obtaineJ ch~ n.or!ey th~Gugh r.:pre,
sentations which the debtor either knew to be false or made with such reckless
disregard for the truth as to constitute willful misrepresentation. The creditor also
must prove that the debtor {X>ssessed scienter, i.e., an intent to deceive. Finall)', the
creditor must show that it actually relied on the false representations, and that its
reliance was reasonable.
Id~

at 728,29 (relying~ inter alia, on First Nafl Bank of Red Bud v. Kimzey, 761 F.2d 421, 423,24 (7th Cir.
1985».
lCl6Courts usually articulate five elements of fraud in credit card nondischargeability cases, but many
do not give those elements independent vitality. The most egregious example of this is AT&T Universal
Card Services v. Mercer (In re Mercer), 246 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2001) (en bane). The court listed thre~
elements of fraud relating to the debtor: a representation; known to be false; made with intent to deceive.
Id. at 403. The court then found that a representation is impliedly made v..'henever a card is used. Id. at
404..Q5. That representation is false, according to the court, if a debtor knows that she is financially
unable to make minimum payments. Id. at 409. Finally, intent to mislead automatically tlows from the
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tor"s justifiable reliance on those representations. (The fifth common law ele'
ment of fraud-that the creditor suffered a lossl07-is so clearly met when
the creditor is a claimant in the debtor"s bankruptcy that we can presume it
satisfied and ignore it hereafter. lOS)
Courts using the established "approaches"" to credit card nondis'
chargeability cases-implied representations, totality of the circumstances
and assumption of risk-have spilled gallons of ink explaining what is wrong
with one or the other of them, and why a particular approach will be adopted
and others rejected. 109 Each of the approaches is unsatisfactory in one way
or another. The overlap and "shifting boundaries"" between them "have lead
some to contend that the courts are waging nothing more than a war of
words over distinctions which have no substantive difference..... 11o
What courts have failed to realize is that each of the "approaches"" actu'
ally relates to a different element of fraud. The implied representations ap'
proach deals with the requirement that the debtor made a representation.
false representation because the debtor uses a card with an intent that the creditor approve the charge. Id.
at 413,14. Thus, the only element of fraud, relevant to 'the debtor, that requires any evidence or is
susceptible to rebuttal is the second-that the debtor knew she could not afford to make minimum pay'
ments. Three elements collapse handily into one and debtors are well on their way to an exception from
discharge simply by having used a credit card during a period of financial distress.
107Each use of a credit card constitutes a separate contract, made under circumstances that may differ
from those in existence at other times the card has been used. See supra notes 28,32 and accompanying
text. Thus, charges incurred at one time may be infected by actual fraud while charges made at another
time are not. Courts should be alert to the possibility, therefore, that only part of the total obligation
owed by the debtor to a credit card issuer is PQtentially'nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A). The fact
of loss, alone, is not sufficient to satisfy this fifth element in the absence of a nexus between the loss and
the other elements of intent and reliance.
108&t: AT&T Universal Card 5ervs. v. Mercer (In re Mercer), 246 F.3cl 391,425 (5th Cir. 2001) (en
banc) rII]f the bankruptcy court flOds [the debtor] fraudulently misrepresented her intent to pay and
[the issuer] justifiably relied on that misrepresentation, then, as a matter of law, [the issuerrs loss (unpaid
loan) resulted from the reliance.'-) (emphasis added).
100000e court in Citibank South Dakota, NA. v. Dougherty (In rt: Dougherty), 84 B.R. 653 (BA.P. 9th
eire 1988), noted the shortcomings of the implied representation and assumption of the risk approaches
and refused to follow either one:
We decline to adopt the implied representation theory because it implies the
existence of the representation and reliance elements in the above test. This vio'
lates the principle that creditors must prove each of the elements of a dis,
chargeability action by clear and convincing evidence. It also is contrary to the
principle that exceptions to discharge are to be construed strictly against the ob...
jecting creditor and liberally in favor of the debtor. Moreover, it places credit card
issuers in a preferred position in proving nondischargeability vis'a,vis other
creditors.
We decline to adopt the assumption of the risk theory because it places credit
card issuers in a virtually impossible position with respect to credit card charges
made prior to revocation of the card.

Id. at 656 (citations omitted).
1lOChevy Chase Bank, FSB v. Briese (In re Briese), 196 B.R. 440, 448 (Bankr. W.O. Wis. 1996).
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The totality of the circumstances approach aids in analysis of the debtor's
intent to mislead the creditor. And the assumption of the risk approach is
relevant to the requirement that the creditor justifiably relied on the debtor"s
misrepresentations. Thus, it really is not that the approaches have no sub,
stantive differences; rather, none W,fully explains or resolves the issue of a
debtor's fraudulent use (or abuse) of a credit card..... l !! The correct approach
requires use of each analytical device previously developed.
When viewed in this way, it is evident that the approaches are not alter'
natives to each other. Nor is any approach complete in itself. Rather, each
has something to offer to the analysis of credit card obligations under
§ 523(a)(2)(A).

B.

THE REQUIREMENT OF A REPRESENTATION

One of the elements of fraud-a representation-is difficult to locate in
credit card cases, given the lack of face,to·.[ace contact between the card,
holder and the issuer. Without some representation having been made, how,
ever, a fraud analysis is impossible. Locating some sort of representation
made by the debtor to the creditor is analytically imperative, despite the fact
that, at best, the debtor is standing before a third party merchant rather than
the creditor. (The debtor, in fact, is often standing before an automated teller
machine.)
If an actual representation is required, fraud doctrine will never apply to
credit card cases. That leaves two choices: to hold credit card debt never
nondischargeable on the basis of fraud, or to permit the use of implied repre'
sentations. 112 Since the first alternative flies in the face of years of case law
llild. (citing AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. Alvi (In re Alvi), 191 B.R. 724 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996».
See also Chase Manhattan Bank v. Murphy (In re Murphy), 190 B.R. 327, 332 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995);
Chase Manhattan Bank, NA. v. Ford (In re Ford), 186 B.R. 312, 317 n.4 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995); The
GM Card v. Cox (In re Cox), 182 B.R. 626, 629 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995).
_
112 A belief that an express promise in the agreement created a contract lead. the court in The GM
Card v. Cox (In re Cox), 182 B.R. 626 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995), to reject the notion of implied
representations:
[R]eliance by one contracting party upon the other's implied representation of in..
tent to pay is an unrealistic concept. A party extending credit under a contract
reli~s upon the other's express promise to pay contained in the contract, not a later
implied representation of intent to pay flowing from performance. Here, GM fur..
nished the Debtor with an elaborate cardholder's agreement. The agreement in..
cludes a promise by the Debtor to pay for all card charges, including charges in
excess of the card's limit, plus interest and attorney's fees. With GM in possession
of that express promise, it would be irrational for a fact finder to conclude OM
relied upon a later implied representation of intent to pay emanating from use of the
card.

Id. at 636. If the court had recognized that the promise, at that stage, is illusory, it might not have been so
quick to reject the concept of implied representations.
The court in AT&T Universal Card Services v. Alvi (In re Alvi), 191 B.R. 724 (Bankr. N.D. 111.1996),
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and is a proposition dubious at best under the statute,l13 the second alterna,
tive-using implied representations in credit card cases-is inescapable. 114
The real problem, once some sort of implied representation is admitted, is
to determine exactly what representation the debtor has impliedly made.
Here, some courts, given an inch, have been persuaded by creditors to take a
mile. The objection is not that an implication is used, but that implications
have sometimes been taken to indefensible extremes.
Courts using implied representations have almost universally held that
the debtor implies an intent to repay.IIS If implied representations are to be
held that use of a credit card involves no representation, either express or implied. The court relied on
Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279 (1982), which held that issuance of a check does not constitute a
factual assertion and, therefore, is not a representation that there are sufficient funds in the account. The
court in AT&T Universal Card Services v. Mercer (In re Mercer), 246 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2001) (en
banc), criticized Alvfs point of view, finding that Williams did not compel that result. Mercer distin,
guished Williams On the grounds that that ·card..use is a loan,request against a line of credit, an inherent
part of which is a promise to repay; a check is neither a loan'request nor a promise to repay.... Id. at 406,
n.14.
113 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
1 HOne court seemed to believe that the use of implied representations solves analytical problems only
when a court is applying "false pretenses'" or "'false representations"':
Given the lack of an actual verbal or written representation by the cardholder,
there exists no realistic basis for determining that the cardholder engaged in "'false
pretenses'" or a ·false representation"', and courts who choose to analyze credit card
cases as such are forced to engage in the fiction of an implied representation of an
ability to repay upon the use of the credit card. The judicial fiction of an implied
representation allows a court to analyze § 523(aX2XA) credit card cases by refer..
ence to decisional law involving other fraudulent representations.
However, I conclude that a resort to the fiction of an implied representation,
and the resultant application of the theories of false pretenses and false misrepresen..
tation, is unnecessary in credit card cases. I reach this conclusion because there is
an alternative, more direct way to approach the problem through the application of
a theory of actual fraud.
General Electric Capitol ConsumerCard-Co. v.Janecek (In re]anecek), 183 B.R. 571, 574 (Bankr. D.Neb.
1995). An actual fraud approach is not, in fact. an alternative to the use of implied representations.
Couns use the impiied repl'esentati<Jn approach in actual frauu cases as well. That s~ems perfectly xnsi,
ble, given that the first element of actual fraud. under the common law, is that the debtor made a represen'
tation. The court believed that it could avoid using implied representations because it interpreted "'actual
fraud" to depend only on a showing that the debtor did not intend to repay the obligation at the time the
charges were made. As this Article will show, infra note 186 and accompanying text, using factors to
determine the debtor's intent does not ·avoid[] the fiction of an implied representation.... Id.
ll'AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. Mercer (In re Mercer), 246 F.3d 391,405 (5th Cir. 2001) (en
banc); Rembert v. AT&T Universal Card Servs., Inc (In re Rembert), 141 F.3d 277, 281 (6th Cir.)~ CeTt.
denied. 525 U.S. 978 (1998); Anastas v. American Savings Bank (In re Anastas), 94 F.3d 1280, 1285 (9th
Cir. 1996); AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Feld (In re Feld), 203 B.R. 360,366 (Banke. E.D. Pa.
1996); AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Richards (In re Richards), 196 B.R. 481, 482 (Bankr. E.O.
Ark. 1996); Chase Manhattan Bank v. Murphy (In re Murphy), 190 B.R. 327,332 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995).
At least one court noted that the electronic age makes it unnecessary to imply a representation of
intent to repay: ·With the advent of electronic transmission of credit card transactions, creditors are now
instantly aware when a debtor uses its card. Therefore, debtors make an express representation to the
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used at all, that particular one makes a great deal of sense. 116 But some courts
also find implied representations of much more. The favorite is to find that
debtors, by using a credit card, also impliedly represent their ability to pay. 11 7
Courts have reasons, seemingly good, for implying a representation of
ability to repay. One reason is to supply the representations that creditors
would seek if they dealt with the debtor face,to,face. 118 Another reason is to
overcome debtors' inevitable testimony that they really did intend to fe'
pay.119 Such an implication introduces a degree of objectivity into the in'
quiry,120 helping a court cope with the debtor"s protestations of intent to
issuer each time they use the card that they intend to repay the debt.... AT&T Universal Card Servs.
Corp. v. Ellingsworth (In u Ellingswonh), 212 B.R. 326, 334 (Bankr. W.D. ~vfo. 1997) (footnote omitted).
116()ther sensible implied representations are possible, but miss the point. For example, one might
conclude that, by presenting a credit card to pay for a purchase, the cardholder makes an implied represen'
tation that he or she is an authorized user of the card. That is well and good, but it \vould lead to
nondischargeability of the debt incurred thereby only when the debtor is not an authorized user. (But see
.supra note 31 for a discussion of cases holding that authorized users may escape liability.) Ultimately, that
\\'ould isolate too few debtors, permitting the escape through discharge of debtors \vho ha\'e used their
cards knowing all along that they were going to file bankruptcy rather than repay their credit card
obligations.
117Mercantile Bank v. Hoyle (In re Hoyle), 183 B.R. 635, 638 (Banke. D. Kan. 1995); Bank One Colum'
bus v. McDonald (In re McDonald), 177 B.R. 212, 216 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994); Household Card Servs./
Visa v. Vermillion (In re Vermillion), 136 B.R. 225, 226,27 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992).
118
In fashioning the implied representation doctrine the courts look to what kind of
representations are normally required before credit is extended between persons
dealing one on one with each other. In such cases the creditor wants assurances
that the debtor intends to repay the debt and also that he has the ability to pay the
debt. The ability to repay the debt may be determined by the creditor or the
creditor may simply rely upon [the] debtor's representations of his ability, but in
either case the creditor desires reassurances that the debtor can repay the debt.
Since in the credit card system the debtor deals di~ectly with a third party, the .
representations which would normally be made to the said party are passed through
to the credit card company. The debtor, by using the credit card, forces the credit
card company to guarantee payment. Therefore, the issuer should be able to step
.. into the shoes of the supplier of goods, services or money and receive the same
representations that said supplier would normally receive.
nousehokl Card Serv~./vYba \I. Vt:;nrJHion (11. r.: Vcrcil!ioi1), 136 B.R. 225, 226 (Ba~kr. \V.D M0. ]992)
There is some degree of absurdity, which the court apparently failed to appreciate, in speaking of represen,
tations that creditors require in face,to,face dealings. If these parties actually met face,to,face, many of the
cardholders would not be deemed creditwonhy. See infra note 237 and accompanying text.
119
Where only intent to repay is implied, the card company is at extreme disadvan'
tage. This debtor's own testimony that she intended to repay the debt is practi,
cally impossible for the card company to disprove, since under that standard the
total insolvency of the debtor at the time is irrelevant.

Id. at 227. See also Rembert v. AT&T Universal Card Servs., Inc (In re Rembert), 141 F.jd 277, 282 (6th
eir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 978 (1998); Chevy Chase Bank, FSB v. Briese (In re Briese), 196 B.R. 440,451
(Bankr. W.O. Wis. 1996) rRare indeed is the case in which the debtor broadcasts his intent to friends and
neighbor~, or writes a letter to his mother confessing the details of his plot to defraud his creditors. As a
result, courts may legitimately utilize circumstantial evidence to ascertain the debtor's intent....); Colonial
Nat'l Bank USA v. Leventhal (In re Leventhal), 194 B.R. 26, 30 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
120
An implied representation of intent to repay leaves too much discretion to the ad
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repay notwithstanding hopeless insolvency.121
Despite these justifications for implying a representation of ability to re,
pay, doing so goes entirely too far for several interrelated reasons. 122 First,
one of the advantages of implying an ability to repay-the introduction of
objectivity-is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's admonition in Field v.
Mans that the debtor's subjective intent is what counts. Of course, what is
being implied is both ability and intent, and the objectivity only goes to abil'
ity, leaving intact the requirement that lack of intent be established indepen'
dently and on a subjective basis. While that is possible, few courts have
managed to maintain such analytical discipline. 123 If, on the other hand,
courts maintain a distinction between ability and intent, and if lack of intent
cannot be based solely on inability,124 then the implied representation of abil'
hoc rulings of court [sic] and severely impairs the creditor·s rights to make a case
even under bizarre facts. If the implied representation of ability to repay is used
however, then at least one objective criteria is applied; did the debtor have the
ability to repay? If he did not have the ability to payor reasonable expectation of
ability to repay in the future, then you must look to whether he made the represen'
tation with the intent to deceive. The question is now more focused because if he
did not have the ability to pay, the only question is did he know that he did not
have the ability to pay? If the court finds that debtor knew he was unable to repay
or incurred the debt with reckless disregard as to reasonable belief that he could
pay, then fraud has been proven.
Household Card Servs./Visa v. Vermillion (In re Vermillion), 136 B.R. 225, 227 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
121
The goal of the trier of fact in a fraud action is to determine the defendanfs subjec,
tive intent. But because the trier of fact cannot know the thoughts in a defendanfs
mind, the solution many courts have employed is to allow intent to be proved or
disproved by objective facts. Certainly, without this, or some similar solution,
fraud could never be proved, absent an admission on the part of the defendant of an
intent to defraud, an unlikely occurrence.

199~).

F.C.C. Nat'l Bank v. Gilmore (In re Gilmore), 221 B.R. 864, 868 n.5 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1998).
122The court in Chase Manhattan Bank, NA. v. Ford (In re Ford), 186 B.R. 312 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1995), noted that, while "'the implied representation doctrine solves the problem of fitting credit card
transactions witbin the section 523(aX2)(A) criteria[,] ... the employment of sucb a fiction breeds its o\\·n
series of concerns, the majority of which arise from the ability,implying prong of the doctrine." Id. at 31 j.
123Th~ Cvurt in I-lou~ho:d CdrJ Sei"i~~sI'Visa v. \.T€..nnillivr. (In rl 'IJ.:;rmillivn), 136 D.n.. 225 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1992), fell into this very trap:
Some courts reject the implied representation of ability to pay and instead say that
the debtor only makes an implied representation of his intent to repay. The main
fear of courts ruling this way seems to be that by allowing an implied representa,
tion of ability to pay, we are actually relying upon "'implied fraud". Implied fraud is,
of course, not permitted under § 523(aX2XA) nor should it be. Implying a repre'
sentation of ability to pay is not implied fraud because intent to deceive must still
be shown. If the debtor did not have the ability to repay and represents that he
does have the ability to pay t this is actual fraud, not implied fraud.

Id. at 227 (citations omitted).
124The court in Huntington National Bank v. Lippert (In re Lippert), 206 B.R. 136 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1997), pointed out an "'emerging consensus" among courts
that credit card debt will be held nondischargeable only if it appears both that the
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ity to repay has not· advanced the creditor"s case in the least. If it is analyti..
cally irrelevant, it should be excised and given a decent burial.
Second, an implied representation of ability to repay is necessarily a rep"
resentation of financial condition. Section 523(a)(2}(A), however, expressly
precludes from its reach ~a statement respecting the debtor"s . . . financial
condition.'" Thus, reliance on unwritten representations of a debtor"s finan..
cial condition cannot form the basis of a nondischargeability complaint under
§ 523(a)(2)(A). If nondischargeability is to be based on representations re'"
garding financial condition, those representations must be in writing and the
cause of action must be brought under § 523(a)(2XB).12S
The third problem with implying an ability to repay is that it proves too
much. Once any representation is in place, the next step is to determine that
it was false. The implied representation of ability to pay becomes a misrepre'"
sentation of intent when the debtor in fact lacks the ability to pay.126 The
representation is proved false by the desperate financial problems that led the
debtor into bankruptcy.127 In essence, the very filing of bankruptcy itself
debtor could not have realistically expected to pay the charges incurred and that
she did not, in fact, intend to do so. In other words the proscribed fraudulent
intent cannot be inferred solely from the debtor's insolvency, unemployment, or
financial condition as so many issuers appear to assume.

Id. at 140.
125AT&T Universal Card Servs. \'. Mercer (In re Mercer), 246 F.3d 391, 402 (5th Cir. 2001) (en
banc);Rembert v. AT&T Universal Card Servs., Inc (In re Rembert), 141 F.3d 277, 281 (6th Cir.), cat.
denied. 525 U.S. 978 (1998); Anastas v. American Sav. Bank (In re Anastas), 94 F.3d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir.
1996); Citibank (South Dakota), NA. v. Senty (In re Senty), 42 B.R. 456, 459 (Bankr. S.DN.Y. 1984). But
see Chase Manhattan Bank v. Murphy (In re Murphy), 190 B.R. 327, 332 n.6 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1995).
126Another difficulty embedded in the representation of ability to pay is the failure of courts to distin,
guish a debtor's ability to make minimum monthly payments from his or' her ability to pay all obligations in
full. The Code defines insolvency as an excess of debts over assets. See § 101(32). Virtually every debtor
is insolvent in this balance sheet sense, but that does not mean the debtor is or has been unable to make
minimum monthly payments. Even if a court finds that use of a card carries a representation of ability to
pay (despite this Article's efforts to diSsuade), the- representation should never go beyond an ability to
make minimum payments. A debtor who has been making such payments may be financially naive-even
deiuded-but that debtor 1S not necessarily dishonest.
127Creditors have made exactly this argument in case after case:
In an attempt to use the "'implied representation" analysis, Plaintiff maintains that
the Court must conclude that [the debtor] never intended to pay for the charges he
incurred because [he] was "hopelessly insolvent" during the period the charges
were incurred....
Plaintiff would have the Court "'bootstrap" the fact that [the debtor] was hav'
ing financial difficulty into an intent to defraud Plaintiff. This is what is wrong
with the "'implied representation" analysis; intent to defraud is too easily implied
from the fact a debtor was having financial problems.
Chase Manhattan Bank (U.SA.) N.A. v. Carpenter (In re Carpenter), 53 B.R. 724, 729 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1985). See also Norwest Bank of Iowa, 1\.A. v. Orndorff (In re Orndorff), 162 B.R. 886,888 (Bankr. N.D.
Okla. 1994); Citibank P.S.B. (Florida) v. Cox (In re Cox), 150 B.R. 807, 811 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1992).
Objective inability to repay is not relevant only when a representation of ability to repay is implied.
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turns the representation into a misrepresentation. 128
The two representations-of intent and ability-are closely associ..
ated,129 but the relationship between the two should not obscure the fact
that they are not identical. One of the favorite ways courts have found the
Some creditors argue that the debtor~s inability to pay establishes that an implied representation of intent
is false:

For purposes of this motion, the Court will assume that each use of Defendant·s
FCC credit card for his OTa (Off Track Betting] transactions constituted an im'
plied representation that Defendant intended to repay the charge, either at once or
in installments in accordance with the credit card agreement. As noted above, De'
fendant asserts that he actually did have such an intent. FCC counters that Defen'
danfs objective inability to pay at the time establishes as a matter of law that
Defendant's implied representation was false and that it was made with the intent
to deceive.
F.e.C. Nafl Bank v. Cacciatore (In re Cacciatore), 209 B.R. 609, 615 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1997). The court
rejected Yothis extension of the 'implicit representation~ theory." Id. Although the case was reversed on
other grounds, the district court stated that the bankruptcy court "correctly rejected the argument that
Defendanfs 'objective inability to pay at the time established as a matter of law that Defendant's implied
representation was false and that it was made with the intent to deceive:" 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11246,
·4 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
8
12 The court in Colonial National Bank, USA v. Carrier (In re Carrier), 181 B.R. 742 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1995), used this sort of analysis:
Each time a debtor uses her credit card, she impliedly represents that she has the
intention and ability to pay the issuer for the charges she incurs. Further, the
issuer~s extension of credit constitutes both actual reliance and damages. Hence, in
most credit card cases, as in this one, the issuer easily demonstrates the elements of
representation, actual reliance and damage. The Court finds that in this case, the
debtor~s implied representation was false because she was unable to repay the
charges, a fact demonstrated both by her fmancial situation at the time the charges
and advances occurred, and also by her need to file a bankruptcy petition.

Id. at 747 (citations omitted).
This is characterized in some cases as making debtors a guarantor of their own financial condition-a
step against which courts caution:
Care must be taken to stop short of a rule that would make every desperate, finan'
cially strapped debtor a guarantor of his ability to repay, on pain of nondis,
chC'rge::lbi!it:y. Such a rute ~'~ld undcly expa:ld the "ac:ual fraud" ~i5Charg~
exception by attenuating the intent requirement. A substantial number of bank,
ruptcy debtors incur debts with hopes of repaying them that could be considered
unrealistic in hindsight. This by itself does not constitute fraudulent conduct war'
ranting nonJischarge.
In re Eashai, 167 B.R. 181, 185 (BA.P. 9th Cir. 1994), affd sub nom. Citibank (South Dakota), NA. v.
Eashai (In re Eashai), 87 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Karelin v. Bank of America Nafl Trust & Sav.
Ass·n (In re Karelin), 109 B.R. 943,947"48 (BA.P. 9th Cir. 1990). See also Chase Manhattan Bank, NA.
v. Ford (In re Ford), 186 B.R. 312, 317 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995) (-[T]o the extent that [the implied
representation doctrine] makes each card user an absolute guarantor of his ability to pay, the doctrine
offends the balance of bankruptcy policy struck by section 523.") (footnote omitted).
129AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Feld (Inre Feld), 203 B.R. 360, 368 n.l1 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1996); The GM Card v. Cox (In re Cox), 182 B.R. 626, 630, 635,36 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995) (thinking
them so intertwined that credit card obligations· should not be dischargeable on the grounds of fraud
except to the extent they fall with (aX2XC».
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representation of intent to repay not to be true, however, has been to look at
the debtor's ability: the greater the debtor"s financial distress, the more likely
it is that intent to repay is absent. l30
Implying a representation of ability to repay, and then finding it false
because of the debtor"s desperate financial circumstances, automatically
checks off several of the elements of fraud in one fell SWoop13l and effectively
guts the standard. 132 It circumvents the burden of proof and gives the credit
card issuer a substantial advantage over other creditors, who must carry the
burden of proof on every element of fraud if they are to prevent the discharge
of obligations owed them. 133 It also virtually assures that the debtor will
lose. I 34
130The court in The GM Card v. Cox (In re Cox), 182 B.R. 626 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995), found an even
stronger relationship between the two representations:
Although the two representations.are different, when one is present, so too invaria..
bly is the other. Moreover, a debtor~s lack of intent to pay is usually inferred
primarily from this lack of financial ability. The symbiotic relationship between
intent and ability is borne out by the many decisions exempting debt from discharge
because of misrepresentation of both intent and ability. They should for this reason
be treated the same under the statute.

Id. at 634. Despite the appeal of this logic, Cox~s view has been disapproved by district courts in that
jurisdiction. AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. Pakdaman (In re Pakdaman), 210 B.R. 886, 889 (D. Mass.
1997); AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Nguyen (In re Nguyen), 208 B.R. 258,261 (D. Mass. 1997).
131The court in Hechfs, A Division of the May Dep·t Stores Co. v. Valdes (In re Valdes), 188 B.R.
533 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995), interpreted the implied representation theory as checking off two of the re..
quired elements, but a different two: representation and reliance. Id. at 535. The court did not explain
how reliance is affected by the implied representation of intent and ability to repay. See also Citibank
South Dakota, NA. v. Dougherty (In re Dougherty), 84 B.R. 653, 656 (BA.P. 9th Cir. 1988).
The court in FCC National Bank v. Branch (In re Branch), 158 B.R. 475 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1993), said
that, when a representation of ability to repay is implied, the first three elements of fraud are satisfied by a
showing that the debtor was aware of his or her financial circumstances. Id. at 477. But when would a
debtor not be aware, or at least not be charged with such awareness? The suggestion made by).C. Penney
Co. v. Shanahan (In re Sha~an), 151 B.R. 44 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1993), was when "a simple..minded
person who has obtained a credit card ... [has] -severely limited knowledge of his financial resources or
e'.'~n of his duty to repay...... Id. at 47.
132This evisceration is well illustrat~d by FCC National flank v. BrCinch (/;1 TL 3ranch), 158 !l.R. 475
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1993), noted above, which found the first three elements of fraud satisfied whenever a
debtor uses a card with knowledge that he is probably unable to pay the charges. Id. at 447. The court
then completed the gutting by holding that circuit level authority-specifically. Thul v. Ophaug (In re
Ophaug), 827 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1987)-required only a showing of "actual reliance which apparently
should not be too unreasonable.'" Id. The best thing that can be said of Branch is that it pre..dated Field v.
Mans and has lost whatever vitality it previously had.
13J04[U]sing such a series of presumptions gives card'issuing creditors an unfair advantage over normal
creditors, who have to establish each and every element of fraud before a court will consider their claims
nondischargeable." Chase Manhattan Bank, NA. v. Ford (In re Ford), 186 B.R. 312, 317 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1995). See also ITT Financial Servs. v. Hulbert (In re Hulbert), 150 B.R. 169, li4 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993)
(citing Citibank South Dakota, NA. v. Dougherty (In re Dougherty), 84 B.R. 653, 656 (BA.P. 9th Cir.
1988».
1341n the following cases, the court implied a representation of ability to pay and found the debt
nondischargeable: AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Wong (In re Wong), 107 B.R. 822 (Bankr. E.D.
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No policy justifies giving credit card issuers that much of an advantage,135
but the advantage often goes even further. Some courts take the position
that application of the implied representation approach requires the court to
find that the fourth element offraud-reliance-has also been satisfied. 136 If
this error is made, then the implied representation of ability to pay has effec..
tively resulted in checking off all of the elements of fraud, and nondis..
chargeability becomes presumptive. That would substitute implied fraud for
Pa. 1997); AT&T Universal Card 5ervs. Corp. v. Van Dyke (In re Van Dyke), 205 B.R. 587 (Bankr. W.O.
Mo. 1997); First Card Servs., Inc. v. Flynn (In re Flynn), 184 B.R. 8 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995); Mercantile
Bank v. Hoyle (In rt: Hoyle), 183 B.R. 635 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995); FCC Nafl Bank v. Ben: (In re Berz), 173
B.R. 159 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994); FCC Nafl Bank v. Branch (In rl: Branch), 158 B.R. 475 (Bankr. W.O. Mo.
1993); First Deposit Nafl Bank v. Pursley (In rt: Pursley), 158 B.R. 664 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993); House..
hold Card Servs./Visa v. Vermillion (In rt: Vermillion), 136 B.R. 225 (Bankr. W.O. Mo. 1992); Citicorp
Credit Servs. v. Hinman (In rl: Hinman), 120 B.R. 1018 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1990).
In a few cases, courts have implied an ability to pay, but nonetheless found the debt dischargeable:
Hecht's, A Division of the May Dep't Stores Co. v. Valdes (In rl: Valdes), 188 B.R. 533 (Bankr. D. Md.
1995); AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Ramirez (In rt: Ramirez), 184 B.R. 859 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1995); Colonial Nat'l Bank, USA v. Carrier (In rl: Carrier), 181 B.R. 742 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995).
1 HCourts have repeatedly expressed this concern:
[U]se of these implied representations gives credit card creditors an advantage over
normal creditors, who bear the burden of establishing each and every element of a
nondischargeability claim. For example, according to one court the "implied repre"
sentations" of ability and intent to repay, together with evidence regarding the
debtor's purported "knowledge or recklessness" is sufficient to "surmount the hur..
die'" of essential elements of a § 523(aX2XA) claim. Nothing in the bankruptcy
code authorizes such preferential treatment for credit card companies. Debtors do
not commit fraud just by using their credit cards, even when they are heavily in
debt. To permit credit card plaintiffs to benefit from "implications" is to engage in
impermissible burden..shifting.
Chevy Chase Bank, FSB v. Briese (In rt: Briese), 196 B.R. 440, 448,49 (Bankr. W.O. Wis. 1996) (citations
omitted). Set: also Hecht's, A Division of the May Dep't Stores Co. v. Valdes (In rt: Valdes), 188 B.R. 533,
536 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995); Chase Manhattan Bank, NA. v. Ford (In rl: Ford), 186 B.R. 312, 317 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1995) (";[B]y constructing separate implied representation of ability, the doctrine suggests that
a breach of that duty, in and of itself, will present sufficient grounds for denying a debtor his discharge.").
One might also note that such burden..shifting is inconsistent with "a fundamental precept of bank..
ruptcy jurisprudence that exceptions to discharge be narrowly construed in favor of the debtor." Chevy
Chase Bank, FSB v. Briese (In rt: Briese), 196 B.R. 440, 449 n.14 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1996). Accord
Citibank South Dakota, N.A. v. Dougherty (In rt: Dougherty), 84 B.R. 653 (BA.P. 9th Cir. 1988). How..
ever, this tenet is too general to be of particular utility in any case. It is repeatedly cited, but a revie\v of
the cases leaves absolutely no reason to believe that this "'fundamental precept" is making even the slight..
est difference in analytical approach or results. It may be a bedrock principle of bankruptcy jurisprudence,
but it seems to have no analytical impact whatever.
136AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Pakdaman (In rt: Pakdaman), 210 B.R. 886, 887 (D. Mass.
1997); Colonial Nat'l Bank USA v. Leventhal (In re Leventhal), 194 B.R. 26, 30 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996);
Chase Manhattan Bank, NA. v. Ford (In re Ford), 186 B.R. 312, 317 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995); ITT
Financial Servs. v. Hulbert (In re Hulbert), 150 B~R. 169, 174, 175 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993). A similar
error is the belief held by some courts that reliance is shown by the fact that the card issuer extended
credit. Citibank (South Dakota), NA. v. Senty (In re Senty), 42 B.R. 456, 460 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
See also First Card Servs., Inc. v. Flynn (In rl: Flynn), 184 B.R. 8 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995).

a
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the actual fraud required by § 523(a)(2)(A)137 and would constitute an in'
defensible judicial revision of the Bankruptcy Code.
Finally, an implied representation of ability to repay is inconsistent with
the posture taken by the entire credit card industry.138 Potential cardholders
are lured by the prospect of a buy'now, pay,later opportunity.139 Cards are
touted as the way to enjoy the good life today, with easy payments over
time. 140 Card issuers should not then be able to walk into court and take
advantage of an implied representation of ability to pay, proved false by the
very financial circumstances that were ignored when the card was issued.
Such a possibility comes very close to the taking of inconsistent pre' and
postlitigation positions, which equitable estoppel was designed to prevent. 141
The implied representation approach has been ~loosely described as pro'
creditor,'"142 but that characterization is accurate of the approach only at its
most benign. The implied representation approach, when carried to an ex'
treme, is a slam,dunk for creditors. It is not necessary to go to extremes,
however, in order ~to give creditors some protection against the depredations
of credit card abusers'" and to avoid giving ~these abusers carte blanche, so to
speak, simply to take money or property with no intention ever to pay for
137American Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. McKinnon (In re McKinnon), 192 B.R. 768, 772
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996); Montgomery \Vard & Co. v. Blackburn (In re Blackburn), 68 B.R. 870, 877
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1987); City Nat"l Bank of Baton Rouge v. Holston (In rt: Holston), 47 B.R. 103 (Bankr.
M.D. La. 1985).
I 38-[I]nferring a guarantee of ability runs afoul of consumer practice and the natural course of events in
the marketplace." Chase Manhattan Bank, NA. v. Ford (In re Ford), 186 B.R. 312, 317 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1995). The court in Chase Manhattan Bank (U.SA.) NA. v. Carpenter (In re Carpenter), 53 B.R. 724
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1985), rejected the implied representation approach for this reason, among others:

The ""implied representation'" analysis places credit card companies in a special cate"
gory of creditors and makes their debts too easily nondischargeable. Generally, people use credit cards because they do not have the present ability to pay. In fact,
this is how credit card companies make their profits. They charge high interest
rates on the unpaid portion of their card..holders~ accounts.

Id. at 728.
139The court in F.C.C. National Bank v. Gilmore (In re Gilmore), 221 B.R. 864 (Banke. N.D. Ala.
1998), described some of these marketing techniques. See infra note 279.
140
[A]s was recently pointed out by the Honorable Leif M. Clark, in the real world
very few people who use credit cards represent a present ability to pay. They are
using a credit card instead of cash precisely because they do not have the present
ability to pay. It is this condition that allows card issuers to charge the interest and
finance charges that make the credit card business so profitable. Judge Clark noted,
ironically, that "an ability to repay is inferred to protect an industry that purpose..
fully solicits customers who generally lack such ability....
AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Ellingsworth (In re Ellingsworth), 212 B.R. 326, 334 (Bankr. \V.D.
Mo. 1997) (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Hernandez (In re Hernandez), 208 B.R. 872, 880 (Bankr.
W.O. Tex. 1997».
I
14 F.C.C. Nafl Bank v. Gilmore (In re Gilmore), 221 B.R. 864,878..80 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1998).
u 2AT8cT Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Pakdaman (In re Pakdaman), 210 B.R. 886,888 (D. ~1ass.
1997).
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it.~143 An implied representation may be necessary to meet the first element
of fraud-necessary, in other words, to give the credit card issuer any chance
of making its nondischargeability case under § 523(a)(2)(A).144 But the deci..
sian regarding what is impliedly represented should be sensible in light of the
language of the statute, the purpose of the fraud exception and the realities of
today's credit card market. Finding that use of a credit card constitutes an
implied representation only of intent to repay, and not of ability to repay, is
consistent with all of these considerations. 145

C.

T;HE REQUIREMENTS OF FALSITY AND INTENT TO MISLEAD

The first step, as we have seen, is that the debtor made a representation.
The next, interrelated steps are that the representation was false and that the
debtor intended to mislead the creditor thereby.146
Courts have adopted a ~totality of the circumstances~ approach by which
to test intent. In the case usually credited with originating this approach,
Citiban~ South Da~ota, N,A. v. Dougherty (In re Dougherty),147 the court
thought that the elements of reliance and representation are not meaningful
in credit card transactions. 148 Thus, the court focused on the debtor"s intent
to repaY,149 which it inferred from a nonexclusive list of factqrs. 15o
14 l Id.
144This necessity may explain why the implied representation approach, despite "'its inherent problems,
pra<reditor orientation and risks of misapplication," Chase Manhattan Bank, NA. v. Ford (In re Ford),
186 B.R. 312, 317.. 18 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995), is followed by a majority of courts.
145
The implied representation of intent to pay is generally speaking an appropriate
tool of analysis in a section 523(aX2)(A) proceeding in that, in most cases, it is fair
and within the scope of reasonable expectation to hold that use of a credit card
should be deemed a representation by the user of an intent to pay "the charges
incurred in accordance with the credit card agreement.
Colonial Nafl Bank USA v. Leventhal (In re Leventhal), 194 B.R. 26, 30 (Bankr. S.DN.Y. 1996).
146Although the elements of falsity and intent to deceive are interrelated, they are not the same thing.
(For example, a debtor might be aware of current inability to repay, but have good reason to believe that
those circumstances are about to change, perhaps because a new job has been promised.) Nevertheless, at
least one court has collapsed these two requirements together. See AT&T Universal Card. Servs. v.
Mercer (In re Mercer), 246 F.3d 391, 404 (5th Cir. 2(01) (en banc) (stating that if a representation was
knowingly false, then "'intent to deceive is present"). Such an approach leaves no room for the starry..eyed
optimist, who is guilty of nothing worse than considerable stupidity and self..deception. "'Intent to
deceive'" is serious business; it should not be tossed about so lightly.
14784 B.R. 653 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988). Dougherty itself asserted that it was following Sears, Roebuck
&: Co. v. Faulk (In re Faulk), 69 B.R. 743 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986). 84 B.R. at 656.
148 Id. at 656. Ignoring these elements is now impermissible, post..Field.
149The court said that it was looking for "'actual fraud," ide at 657, but defined actual fraud as a lack of
intent to repay.
1'OThe so..called '" Dougherty factors" are:
1. The length of time between the charges made and the filing of bankruptcy;
2. Whether or not an attorney has been consulted concerning the filing of bank..
ruptcy before the charges were made;
3. The number of charges made;
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This approach is fraught with problems. First, as originally articulated,
the totality of the circumstances approach utilized a reasonable person or
objective test of intent. lSI That objectivity is one of the approach's most
attractive features, but it puts the approach on a collision course with Field v.
Mans. Although the Supreme Court focused on the fourth element of com'
mon law fraud-that the creditor relied on the debtor's misrepresentationthe Court addressed the other elements as well, including the requirement of
intent:
Section 523(a)(2)(B) expressly requires not only reasonable
reliance but also reliance itself; and not only a representation
but also one that is material; and not only one that is mate'
rial but also one that is meant to deceive. Section
523(a)(2)(A) speaks in the language neither of reliance nor of
materiality nor of intentionality. If the contrast is enough
to preclude a reasonableness requirement, it will do as well
to show that the debtor need not have misrepresented inten,
tionally, the statement need not have been material, and the
creditor need not have relied. But common sense would
balk. If Congress really had wished to bar discharge to a
debtor who made unintentional and wholly immaterial mis'
representations having no effect on a creditor's decision, it
4. The amount of the charges;
5. The financial condition of the debtor at the time the charges are made;
6. Whether the charges were above the credit limit of the account;
7. Whether the debtor made multiple charges on the same day;
8. Whether or not the debtor was employed;
9. The debtor's prospects for employment;
10. Financial sophistication of the debtor;
11. Whether there was a sudden change in the debtor's buying habits; and
12. Whether the purchases were made for luxuries or necessities.

Id. at 657 (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Faulk (In re Faulk), 69 B.R. 743, 757 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986».
These factors have been followed repeatedly. See Anastas v. American Sav. Bank (In re Anastas), 94 F.3d
1280 (9th Cir. 1996); Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. v. Eashai (In re Eashai), 87 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 1996);
AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Chinchilla (In re Chinchilla), 202 B.R. 1010 (Bankr. S.D. Fla 1996);
Mercantile Bank of Illinois, N.A. v. Troutman (In re Troutman), 170 B.R. 156 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1994);
Boatmen's Bank..Delaware v. Holmes (In re Holmes), 169 B.R. 186 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994); Norwest
Bank of Iowa, NA. v. Orndorff (In re Orndorff), 162 B.R. 886 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1994); FCC Nafl Bank/
First Card v. Friend (In re Friend), 156 B.R. 257 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1993); Montgomery Ward & Co. v.
Blackburn (In re Blackburn), 68 B.R. 870 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1987); Chase Manhattan Bank (V.SA.) NA. v.
Carpenter (In re Carpenter), 53 B.R. 724 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1985).
Courts need not make specific findings as to each of the twelve factors. Household Credit Servs., Inc.
v. Ettell (In re Ettell), 188 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 1999).
u1Househoid Credit Servs., Inc. v. Jacobs (In re Jacobs), 196 B.R. 429, 433 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1996);
American Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. McKinnon (In re McKinnon), 192 B.R. 768, 773 (Bankr
N.D. Ala. 1996).
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could have provided that. It would, however take a very
clear provision to convince anyone of anything so odd, and
nothing so odd has ever been apparent to the courts that
have previously construed this statute, routinely requiring
intent, reliance, and materiality before applying
§ 523(a)(2)(A).152

Later courts, interpreting this and other language from Field v. Mans, have
consistently found a mandate to determine the debtor's intent subjectively.153
The danger is that the factors will be applied mechanistically, ultimately
substituting for a tailored inquiry into a particular debtor's intent. 154 The
temptation must be all but overwhelming to find subjective intent to defraud
when several of these factors are present. 155 Doing so, however, would be
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's conclusion that § 523(a)(2)(A) codi,
fied the common law elements of fraud. Courts should appreciate that debt,
ors can be disorganized and desperate without having the requisite
scienter. 156
The use of objective factors is not inevitably inconsistent with a subjec'
tive test. Indeed, just such methods of determining an actor's subjective state
152

516 U.S. at 68 (footnote omitted).
IS3See, e.g., Rembert v. AT&T Universal Card Servs., Inc. (In re Rembert), 141 F.3d 277,281 n.2 (6th
Cir) cert. denied, 525 U.S. 978 (1998); AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. FeId (In re Feld), 203 B.R.
360,365 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996); AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Totina (In re Totina), 198 B.R.
673,679 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1996); American Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Christensen (In re Chris..
tensen), 193 B.R. 863, 866 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
IHAmerican Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Christensen (In re Christensen), 193 B.R. 863, 866
(N.D. Ill. 1996); AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. AIvi (In re Alvi), 191 B.R. 724, 733 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1996).
lSSChevy Chase Bank, FSB v. Briese (In re Briese), 196 B.R. 440, 448 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1996).
Commentators caution against such an approach in the analogous situation in the criminal law context:
A maxim much used in criminal law cases states that a person is "presumed to
intend the (lC1turdl anu probable Cl>n~qut:n~~ of his dCi,;S." . .. If thb is tak(n ~ a
rule of substantive law, it is apparent that it would in effect destroy the concept of
intention and replace it entirely with negligence. This is because the defendant
would be held to have intended whatever a reasonable man would have foreseen as
probable.
WAY~"E

R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. Scon,JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 3.5(f), at 225 (2d ed. 1986) (hereinafter
LAFAVE & Scan).
1S6In AT&T Universal Card Services v. Baker, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3174 (4th Cir. 2000), the
creditor argued that knowing misrepresentation should be inferred from the ""recklessness" of the debtor's
spending practices. Because the debtor was "deeply in debt," according to the card issuer, he "'knew or
should have known about all his liabilities, so he must have known that he would be unable to repay'" the
debt. Id. at 3. The cou.·t declined to decide whether kno\\'ledge of falsity can be inferred from the magni..
tude of the debtor's insolvency, finding instead that the debtor's conduct did not "rise to the level of
recklessness. . .. It is easy to second..guess [debtor's] choices in hindsight, but there is a difference between
optimism and recklessness.'" Id.
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of mind are familiar in other areas of law. 157 Intent can be determined
through examination of objective factors, even. though determination of sub..
jective intent is the goal, when only circumstantial evidence is available. 158
Nevertheless, the task, and it can be a formidable one, is to keep very firmly
in mind that the ultimate test is subjective. 159
Two recent cases focused on, and tried to comply with, the common law
requirement, derived by both courts from Field v. Mans, that a subjective
standard be applied. These courts even claimed to be applying an entirely
new approach, which they denominated the common law approach,160 while
concentrating on the same element of fraud-the debtor's intent. In one,161
the court was faced with a compulsive gambler who financed his games with
credit cards and knew full well that he could not pay his debts solely from
income earned in his real estate business. That knowledge would have been
enough for nondischargeability under an objective standard, as the court rec"
ognized,162 but the court came to a contrary conclusion under the subjective
standard required by Field v. Mans. 163
I~7Again, the most obvious example comes from criminal la",,':
It is not always easy to prove at a later date the state of a man1S mind at that
particular earlier moment when he was engaged in conduct causing or threatening
harm to the interests of others. He does not often contemporaneously speak or
write out his thoughts for others to hear or read. He \vill not generally admit later
to having the intention which the crime requires. So of course his thoughts must be
gathered from his words (if any) and actions in the light of all the surrounding
circumstances. Naturally, what he docs and what foreseeably results from his deeds
have a bearing on what he may have had in his mind.
LAFAVE &

ScOTT,

supra note 155, at 226.

1~8Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. EtteH (In

re Ettell), 188 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 1999) ("'Because
fraud lurks in the shadows, it must usually be brought to light by consideration of circumstantial evidence.
In that context, the Dougherty factors provide a useful means of objectively discerning intent based on the
probabilities of human conduct.~).
1~9AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. Mercer (In re Mercer), 246 F.3d 391, 409 ("The aim of the
1
objective factors ... is to discern the debtor s subjective intent. Bank One Columbus, N.A. v. Fulginiti
(In re Fulginiti)1 201 B.R. 730, 735 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996) ("'[Tlhese t\\,elve ~ohjective1 factors can be
1
useful in assessing a debtor s subjective intention to repay, but cannot be substituted for making the
judgment of the debtor"s subjective intent on the basis of whatever \ve find helpful in the record.
I60Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Jacobs (In re Jacobs), 196 B.R. 429, 432 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1996);
Chase Manhattan Bank v. Murphy (In re Murphy), 190 B.R. 327, 331 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995).
161Chase Manhattan Bank v. Murphy (In re Murphy), 190 B.R. 327 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995).
162.. A reasonably prudent person would not rely almost entirely on gambling and speculative invest'
1
ments as a basis for a promise to satisfy short term credit obligations. A reasonable person in the Debtor s
circumstances would not have believed that he could continue to pay substantial credit card debts forever.
Such a person would have realized that sooner or later he would lose enough to render him unable to pay
those debts.· Id. at 333.
1631d. at 334.
11

);

11

).

Other courts, even though articulating a subjective standard, \\'ould come out differently under such
facts. See AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. Mercer (In re Mercer), 246 F.3d 391, 409 (5th Cir. 2001) (en
bane) ("'lH]opeless insolvency," or inability to pay, at card,use mar support finding the debtor did not
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The second court was not nearly as analytically honest as the first. 164
The court said that the debtors' intent must be shown subjectively and used
the factors enumerated under the totality of circumstances approach in as..
sessing that intent. Using the factors without moving to an objective stan"
dard is very difficult, however,165 and this court was not up to the task. It
found the debt nondischargeable because the debtors "'knew or should have
~nown that they could not possibly pay for the charges, and therefore perpet..
uated [sic] a fraud upon [the creditor]''"166 This is a mere pretense of subjec..
tivity and perfectly illustrates how easily the factors can betray an effort to
find the debtor"s subjective intent.
The second problem with the totality of circumstances approach is that
the factors, even if necessary, are not sufficient. The test relates only to one
of the elements of fraud-the debtor"s intent. It ignores the other elements,
such as representation and reliance. Dougherty was quite aware that it was
doing this. Indeed, the court specifically stated that reliance and representa"
tion are difficult in a credit card context; it adopted an alternative to the
assumption of risk and implied representation approaches in order to obviate
the necessity of examining those elements. 167 Common law fraud includes
those elements, however, and discounting or attempting to evade them is
inconsistent with Field v. Mans. 168
Despite these difficulties, no ready alternative to the use of objective fac..
tors to determine a debtor's subjective intent presents itself. Debtors will
al\vays testify that they had no intent to deceive,169 leaving courts little
choice but to test the veracity of that testimony against objective indicators
inconsistent with the assertions. Thus, courts must continue to use the fac..
tor approach. In doing 50, however, they should rememb~r that the factor
approach is relevant only to the intent element of fraud. Inquiry into other
necessary elements of fraud, such as justifiable reliance, cannot be skipped
even when a coyrt finds~ that the debtor lacked the intent to repay.170
lah.nJ to (\..P<.tY, but only if she Wd~ aware of her financial condition and knew she could not (and theretore
did not intend to) make even the minimum monthly payment to the issuer."); LA Capitol Fed. Credit
Union v. Melancon (In re Melancon), 223 B.R. 300, 321 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1998) ("If the debtor has no idea
ho\\' the money will get paid back, or if it will get paid back, then he may hope to repay-h~ may even
\vant to repay-hut he certainly does not intend to repay."). Such an approach seems hardly subjective.
16-lHousehold Credit Servs., Inc. v. Jacobs (In re Jacobs), 196 B.R. 429 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1996).
16~See supra notes 151,59 and accompanying text.
166Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Jacobs (In re Jacobs), 196 B.R. 429, 434 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1996)
(emphasis added).
1('784 B.R. at 657.
l(,RCitihank (South Dakota), N.A. v. Eashai (In re Eashai), 87 F.3d 1082, 1087,88 (9th Cir. 1996).
169See supra note 120.
lioIn AT&T Universal Card Services Corp. v. Feld (In re Feld), 203 B.R. 360 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996),
for example, the court found all elements of fraud except reliance. It held the debt dischargeabl~. therefore,
despite the debtor~s lack of intent to repay.

A·39

102

AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL

(Vol. 75

The third problem with the totality of the circumstances approach is that
at least two of the factors are seriously misguided. One of these looks to the
debtor's financial condition at the time the charges were made. In the first
place, .debtors in bankruptcy almost 171 inevitably have critical financial
problems. If the mere fact of financial distress evidences an intent not to
repay creditors, then debtors are made into guarantors of their own financial
condition. 172 The element of financial condition is, in addition, all too likely
to swamp the other factors. Deep insolvency and desperate financial circum'
stances become strong evidence that a debtor did not intend to repay. In this
respect, the totality of circumstances approach tracks one of the problems
with the implied representation approach-the debtor's objective inability to
repay can easily overwhelm the inquiry. Just as implying ability to repay is
inappropriate when the first element of fraud is at issue, so also is focusing on
the debtor's inability to repay when the third element of fraud is at issue. 173
Another difficulty with looking to the debtor's financial condition is that
the creditor may have ignored these very circumstances at the time the card
17 1The occasional bankruptcy abuser can be ignored for these purposes. The financial condition factor
looks for insolvency and finds that debtors with the most serious financial problems are more likely to have
lacked an intent to repay. This factor would actually operate perversely when a debtor with resources is
abusing the bankruptcy system. That debtor would have better financial circumstances and, under the
financial condition factor, would be less likely to have lacked an intent to repay.
172 Chevy Chase Bank, FSB v. Briese (In re Briese), 196 B.R. 440, 448 (Bankr. W.O. Wis. 1996). See
also Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Ettell (In re Ettell), 188 F.3d 1141, 1146 (9th Cir. 1999) ("'[Al strong
argument may be made that if one examined [debtor·s] financial situation objectively, he was unlikely to
be able to repay the credit card debt. However, this factor alone is not dispositive ....").
173The Fifth Circuit in AT&T Universal Card Services v. Mercer (In re Mercer), 246 F.3d 391,408
(5th Cir. 2001) (en banc), stated that the debtor·s financial condition "'should not be the sole basis for
finding fraudulent intent.~ In this, the Fifth Circuit asserted its agreement with the Ninth Circuit's deci,
sion in American Express Travel Related Services Co. v. Hashemi (1n re Hashemi), 104 F.3d 1122 (9th
Cir. 1996), cat. denied mem., 520 U.S. 1230 (1997). MeTcer clarified an earlier Fihh Circuit decision,
Sears, Roebuck & Co.-v. Boydston (In re Boydston), 520 F.2d 1098, 1101 (5th Cir. 1975), that permitted
fraudulent intent to be inferred from hopeless insolvency:

[T ]he point beIng made In hoydston was that hopeless insolvency, when the
charges were made, was "'merely one method of establishing" the debtor·s "'subjec,
tive intent not to pay.~
To the extent Boydston could be interpreted as requiring a bankruptcy court to
infer fraudulent intent solely on the basis of "'hopeless insolvency'" at card'u5e, it
would be inconsistent with the Restatement. It requires, instead, that the inquiry
focus on the debtor·s subjective intent, with such "'hopeless insolvency'" simply be,
ing "'evidence from which his lack of honest belief may be inferreo....
Accordingly, "'hopeless insolvency", or inability to pay, at card,use may support
finding the debtor did not intend to pay, but only if she was aware of her financial
condition and kne\v she could not (and therefore did not intend to) make even the
minimum monthly payment to the issuer.

Id. at 408..09 (citations omitted). This comes perilously close to permitting the fact of inability to repay to
swamp the inquiry. See supra note 154.
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was issued. 174 If the creditor then bases its cry of fraud on facts it earlier
chose to ignore, basic fairness is seriously compromised. 175
The other suspect factor used in the totality of the circumstances ap"
proach is also the one most off the mark-that is, whether the debtor ex"
174

ATBeIS emphasis on its cardholders~ financial condition is not only legally insuffi..
cient, it is another disturbing display of institutional hypocrisy. At the marketing
stage, credit sellers like AT&T actively solicit new business with limited knowl..
edge of the fmancial condition of their targeted customers. . .. It is only then [when
bankruptcy is filed] that the card companies make their first meaningful investiga..
tion into a debtor's financial condition.... Credit card companies cannot issue a
card without regard to financial condition and then complain that they were de..
frauded when they later learn that the consumer had several other debts at the time
the card was used. They cannot encourage and, in fact, thrive on the high interest
accruing when consumers make only their minimum monthly payments and then
later look back and ask the Court to find fraud if, viewed objectively and in hind..
sight, the debtors lacked the ability to pay the entire balance.

AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Chinchilla (In re Chinchilla), 202 B.R. 1010, 1015.. 16 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1996) (footnotes omitted).
17sThis is well illustrated by F.e.e. National Bank v. Gilmore (In re Gilmore), 221 B.R. 864 (Bankr.
N.D. Ala. 1998). In that case, the issuer sent a preapproved application with a $5,000 credit limit. The
debtor then owed over $15,000 on three other cards. When she started using this card several months
later (following some encouragement from the issuer), she owed almost $22,000 on those other cards. She
charged $5022.29 to the card and made payments of $585 in the ensuing eight months. The issuer re..
voked her privileges a month after she last used the card and, when she filed bankruptcy, objected to
discharge of that obligation. The court, however, found the creditor barred by the doctrine of estoppel:
In this matter, the plaintiff relied almost exclusively on evidence of the debtor's
bleak personal financial condition. That evidence was introduced to show that the
debtor lacked the ability to pay charges made on the credit card at the time those
charges were made. But ... the plaintiff "pre..approved" the card b~d on informa..
tion kn9wn only to the plaintiff, who neither required nor obtained any credit
information from [the debtor] for the purpose of approving her receipt of or use of
the card. And when the plaintiff solicited [the debtor] to receive her "pre..ap"
proved'" card, it -informed [her] that the reason she was given the opportunity ~o
receive the card was because of her "excellent credit history.'" In other words,
when the plaintiff stood to benefit f~om [th~ debtor's] use of the V\rd: it expressed
confidence in [her] ability to repay the amounts that might subsequently be hor..
rowed by her on the card, ostensibly because it had satisfied itself, through its o\\'n
investigation, that [she] had the wherewithal to repay.
Now that the tables have turned, and [the debtor] wishes to be relieved of her
obligation to repay, the plaintiff takes the contrary position that [the debtor)
lacked the ability to repay the amounts charged on the card, an inability that the
plaintiff appears to contend existed at the same time the plaintiffextended the card to
the debtor ba..sed on the debtor's excellent credit history. That change of position is
contrary to the principals [sic] of equity and fair play. Having taken the position
that [the debtor] had the ability to repay and having encouraged her to use the
card, the plaintiff is now estopped from taking the position that [the debtor] lacked
the ability to repay when she used the card, and the plaintiff is estopped from
relying on evidence of the debtor's inability to repay in order to prove fraudulent
intent.

Id. at 878..79 (original emphasis).

A- 41

104

AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL

(Vol. 75

ceeded the credit limit on the card. A few courts have denied discharge of
amounts in excess of the credit limit with no additional showing whatso,
ever. 176 This sort of knee'jerk holding is entirely inappropriate. 177
To begin with, these so'called "limits'" are often artificial. In one case,
Ban~ One Columbus, N..A. v. Fulginiti (In re Fulginiti),178 the creditor"s rep'
1765«. t.g., Norwest Bank of Iowa., NA. v. Orndorff (In rt Orndorff), 162 B.R. 886, 890 (Bankr. N.D.
Okla. 1994) ("If a cardholder uses the card after it has been revoked, in excess of its limits, or on a pre..
bankruptcy spending spree, the Court would not hesitate to find actual fraud absent some compelling
explanation by the debtor....) (emphasis added); Household Bank, NA. v. Touchard (In Tt Touchard), 121
B.R. 397, 402..Q3 (Bankr. D. Utah 1990) (holding nondischargeable the amount in excess of the credit limit
because the debtor knew or should have known her credit limit had been exceeded, but not otherwise
explaining how exceeding the credit limit had affected the debtor's intent); Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co. v. Cirineo (In rt Cirineo), 110 B.R. 754 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Grogan v.
Gamer. 498 U.S. 279 (1991) (holding amounts accumulated after the debtor knew or should have known
that the credit limit was exceeded are nondischargeable).
The court in AT&T Universal Card Services Corp. v. Wong (In re Wong), 207 B.R. 822 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1997), found that the creditor failed to show justifiable reliance as to the amount of debt in excess of
the credit limit, because it failed to introduce evidence "to establish what steps, if any, were taken to
determine the credit worthiness of the Debtor for amounts exceeding his $10,500 credit limit.... Id. at 832.
One can only hope that the court is not standing on the principle that creditors need show justifiable
reliance only for amounts in excess of the credit limit, but nbt for the amount \vithin the credit limit itself.
The reliance requirement is discussed infra at notes 200..312 and accompanying text.
In First National Bank of Mobile v. Roddenberry, 701 F.2d 927 (11th Cir. 1983), although the debtor
exceeded her credit limit more than seven times over, the court held that charges incurred before the
credit card issuer revokes the debtor's right to use and possession of the card are dischargeable. The court
clearly thought that making charges in excess of credit limits is not legally significant: "The mere breach of
credit conditions is of minimum probative value on the issue of fraud because 'banks often encourage or
willingly suffer credit extensions beyond contractual credit limits.... Id. at 932. On the basis of this asser..
tion, Roddenberry has been read to hold that merely exceeding the credit limit is not grounds for denying
discharge. Chevy Chase Federal Save Bank V. Cacho (In re Cacho), 137 B.R. 864, 866 (Bankr. N.D. Fla.
1991); American Express'Travel Related Servs., Inc. v. Dorsey (In re Dorsey), 120 B.R. 592, 596 (Bankr..
M.D. Fla. 1990). Courts reading Roddenberry in that way often agree with' the assertion but then hasten
to add that "fraudulent use of credit cards is another matter.... Dorsey, 120 B.R. at 596.
177Creditors have even cited a debtor"s drawing close to the credit limit as an indicator of fraud,
Citibank- F.S.B. (Florida) V. Cox (In Te Cox), 150 B.R. 807, 809 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1992), and courts have
had varying reactions to evidence suggesting that a debtor was aware of the card"s credit limit. In l\ T &T
Unive:sal Card S~rJices rAr;>. V. Re'l~~r Un re Reneer)~ 208 B.R. 731 (Bankr. M.D, Fla. 1997), the court
stated that "in the typical credit card dischargeability case uGder § 523(aX2XA), extension over the card
holder"s credit limit may evidence fraudulent intent.... Id. at 736. It found that usual" rule inapplicable,
however, under the unusual facts of the case. The debtor worked for the creditor, in the fraud department
and as a customer service representative. She knew of the "cushion'" policy, under w~ich a cardholder who
was overlimit by ten percent or less would not be assessed an overlimit fee. Id. at 733. Although she
"knew exactly how far the limits could be stretched without being penalized,'" the court held that "[hler
inside knowledge and use of the system [did] not evidence fraudulent intent.... Id. at 736.
By way of contrast, in AT&T Universal Card Services Corp. v. Ellingsworth (In re Ellingsworth), 212
B.R. 326 (Bankr. W.O. Mo. 1997), the court made a considerable point of the fact that the debtors had
stopped using the card at issue when the credit limit was reached, suggesting that they did, in fact, know
the severity of their financial circumstances and inability to pay the debt. Id. at 335..36. Thus, the court
found lack of intent to repay, which creates a nice damned..if..you..do, damned..if..you,don"t predicament for
a debtor.
178
201 B.R. 730 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996).
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resentative testified that all cardholders were allowed to exceed their credit
limits by twenty percent before further credit was refused. In other words,
the real credit limit was twenty percent higher than the nominal credit limit.
In that case, the issuer objected to discharge of an amount that exceeded the
nominal credit limit of $7600 by a whopping $38.07. It is no wonder that
the court was unimpressed by the creditor"s argument that exceeding the
credit limit is indicative of fraud. 179
In addition, issuers routinely respond to spending in excess of credit limits
by raising those limits. In AT&T Universal Card Services Corp. v.
Chinchilla (In re Chinchilla),180 for example, the creditor argued nondis..
chargeability, inter alia, on the basis of spending that exceeded the credit
limit by less than $100. But the creditor had responded to the excess charges
by raising the debtors" credit limit by $2000. The court characterized the
creditor"s argument, which was based on the debtors having exceeded the
original credit limit, as "'hypocrisy"":
It is not the fact that the Debtors only slightly exceeded
their credit limit which generated the Court"s comment on
AT&T"s hypocrisy. Rather, it is the fact that AT&T"s re"
sponse to the Debtors exceeding their limit by $100 was to
raise their limit [from $6,500] to $8,500. . . . How can
AT&T now point to [the debtor] exceeding his limit by
$100 as an "'indicia of fraud"" when its response at the time
was to immediately grant him an additional $2,000 in unso..
licited credit?181
In truth, this creditor and others do n9t think thems~lves defrauded at
the time excess charges are made. 182 They only cry fraud when the opportu"
nity to prevent discharge presents itself. Swipe machines, which are widely
1"J9wo[Creditor"s] candid admission that the Debtor"s "rear credit limit was twenty (20%) percent. in
excess of his ·nominal" credit limit of $7,600 causes us to refrain from holding that the amount charg~d in
excess of the Debtor"s credit limit must be deemed nondischargeable........ Id. at 735. Cf AT&T Univer..
sal Card Servs. Corp. v. Reneer (In re Reneer), 208 B.R. 731 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997), in which the
creditor"s representative testified that the creditor "has a ·cushion" for the over limit fee, \\'hich is a policy
whereby if a card holder is over his credit limit by a certain percentage, normally 10%, [the creditor]
would not assess an over limit fee.'" Id. at 733. See also AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Szie1 (In re
Sziel), 206 B.R. 490 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1997).
18°202 B.R. 1010 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996).
181Id. at 1015.
182AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. S:iel (In re Sziel), 206 B.R. 490, 493..94 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1997) C"[W]hile the complaint alleges that the Debtor made a ·systematic \vithdrawal of the entire availa..
ble credit line," AT&T's response to the Debtor reaching his credit limit was to raise it from $2000 to
$3000. So apparently AT&T did not view that ·systematic withdrawal' as evidence of fraud at the
time.....). See also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Faulk (In re Faulk), 69 B.R. 743, 756 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986)
("'[M]erely exceeding the credit limit is insufficient proof, in and of itself, that the debtor did not intend to
pay the debt incurred on the credit card"'). But the debtor cannot expect to succeed in pointing a finger of

A-43

106

AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL

(Vol. 75

available and used for even the smallest purchases, enable creditors to moni,
tor their cardholders' spending and to refuse authorization of charges in ex'
cess of existing credit limits. The days when debtors could evade creditors"
efforts to curtail their spending by making purchases of less than $50-the
amount above which merchants were required to telephone for authoriza'
tion-are long gone. I83 Creditors have the technology; they need only the
will to use it. 184 Therefore, courts should not entertain arguments that fraud
is indicated by debt in excess of credit limits unless. unusual facts are shown.
Finally, too literal and narrowly focused an application of the factors may
obscure insights derived from theoretical literature regarding discharge,
which is relevant to the question whether debtors are aware of their account
balances. Professor Jackson, in the course of discussing the appropriateness of
making the right to discharge nonwaivable, posited that discharge is available
to individuals because of
inherent biases uncorrected by marketplace constraints in
the ways most individuals make decisions that lead them to
overconsume and undersave. This view, in turn, is based on
available evidence that suggests that many people systemati,
cally fail to pursue their own long,term interests \vhen mak,
ing decisions about whether to spend today or save for
tomorrow. ISS
Professor Jackson"s reasons for endorsing a nonwaivable right of discharge are
also pertinent to a determination of the appropriate scope of the fraud excep"
tion to discharge. One reason is a human tendency to lack impulse controlthat is, a tendency ~to choose current over postponed gratification, even if it
is known that the latter holds in store a greater measure of benefits.'l'l186 Dis··
charge, rather than supplying an opportunity for a debtor to engage in the
moral hazard of borrowing today, without regard to tomorrow"s obligation to
repay, actually provides a method of restricting impulsive credit decisions. It
does so by plaCing the risk of loss, represented by discharge, on creJitor3.
Thus, discharge ~controls impulsive credit decisions by encouraging creditors
to monitor borrowing. Other less intrusive rules would not be nearly as
blame at the creditor who permitted the making of charges in excess of the credit limit. Id.; Karelin v.
Bank of America Nafl Trust & Save Ass"n (In re Karelin), 109 B.R. 943, 948 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990).
18 3 These, of course, were the facts of Roddenberry. See infra notes 202..06 and accompanyin~ text.
184AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Ellingsworth (In re Ellingsworth), 212 B.R. 326,337 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1997) ("'Credit card issuers are very sophisticated creditors. Th~y have instant electronic
access each time a credit card is used now. They know the number of charges made in a given day, they
know the amount of those charges, and they know when a customer exceeds his credit limit.").
18'JACKSON, supra note 91, at 233.
186 Id. at 234.

A-44

2001)

CREDIT CARDS IN BANKRUPTCY

107

effective in controlling an individual"s urge to buy or borrow on credit.~187
Discharge of amounts in excess of credit limits is also appropriate when
nonvolitional, cognitive factors are taken into account. Professor Jackson
found support in the literature on cognition for the proposition that ~decision
makers systematically ... overestimate chances of success and ... underesti..
mate the corresponding risks..... 188 When applied to discharge, this insight
suggests that individuals underestimate "'the risks that their current consump"
tion imposes on their future well.. being.~189 Discharge, then, is justified as a
way of c~rrecting cognitive biases of which individuals are probably unaware.
These theoretical speculations are consistent with the propensity of debt,
ors to view the world through rose,colored glasses. These theories are also
consistent with empirical findings that consumers use their credit cards more
extensively than they realize and carry balances more often that they
think. l90 These are reasons why debtors may not know exactly when they
have exceeded their credit limits. 191 This may be especially true given the
rapid accrual of fees and interest. 192 That debtors are genuinely unaware of
their account balances does not necessarily suggest reckless indifference to
their obligations. (Do you know the exact balance on each card you carry?)
These theoretical and empirical insights provide ample reason for exercis'
ing caution. We should be careful about placing undue emphasis on anyone
of the factors courts have used in applying the totality of circumstances ap'
proach and, in particular, on whether credit limits have been exceeded. We
should also, and more importantly, be careful about denying discharge on the
basis of fraud when debtors are more likely to be displaying a human ten'
dency toward self,deception than to be actively pursuing a course of fraudu..
lent conduct. Appropriate risk analysis asks which party is best able to avoid
the risk, and the cognitive literature suggests that debtors are functioning at a
clear disadvantage.
187Id. at 236.
Is8Id. at 238..39.
189Id. at 239.
190Failurt of Competition, supra note 97, at 71 ..72.
1

That is not always the case, of course. The debtor in A T&l' Universal Card Sen"ices Corp. v.
Ellingsworth (In re Ellingsworth), 212 B.R. 326 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997), seemed to kno\\' exactly what
her credit limit was on each of her eighteen cards, since she would "'max out" one before moving to
another. The fact that she stopped using the card at issue in the case when she reached the credit limit
\vas used by the court not as evidence of her financial discipline, but as evidence that she kne\v she would
not be able to repay. That, in turn, evidenced an intent not to repay. Id. at 335..36. See supra note 177.
19

2
19 The fact that the debtor "'dramatically underestimated the interest payments," id. at 4, required by a
cash advance was among the reasons given by the court in AT&T Universal Card Services v. Baker, 2000
U.s. App. LEXIS 3174 (4th Cir. 2(00), for finding that the debtor was not reckless, but -\vas merely
optimistic about his future economic situation.... Id. at 3.
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THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF GAMBLING CASES

Gambling debts provoke "some especially strong reactions in bankruptcy
cases,'"193 probably because they present difficult fact patterns in which to
assess the intent elements of fraud. These obligations, by their very nature,
may be difficult to verify. Without a documentary trail, courts may legiti..
mately question whether a debtor actually suffered gambling losses or is at..
tempting to defraud the court. 194
In addition, a degree of moral judgment may be brought to bear against
debtors who have incurred large gambling debts. The suspicion is that such
debtors are not among the ranks of the "h~nest but unfortunate"'195 who de..
serve the benefit of a bankruptcy discharge. Rather, these debtors may be
seen as individuals, lacking discipline and impulse control, who created their
own misery, but are now trying to foist the losses off on innocent creditors.
The problem, of course, is to fit these cases within the requirements of
nondischargeability doctrine despite the presence of factual suspicion and
moral repugnance}96 Most cases decided before Field v. Mans held credit
card obligations incurred in order to gamble were not dischargeable. 197 Post..
1\)3AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. Alvi (In re Alvi), 191 B.R. 724, 734 n.19 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996).
19~In F.C.C. National Bank v. Reid (In re Reid), 237 B.R. 577 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1999), for example,
the debtor~wife abdicated all financial responsibility to her debtor'husband, who asserted that he had used
her credit cards to fund his gambling habit. By the time of bankruptcy, they o\\'ed $71,000 on nine cards
o\\'ned separately and jointly. The husband's lack of documentation to support his claims of a gambling
problem obviously troubled the court:
This writer makes no finding as to whether the husband's testimony is credible. If,
in fact, tens of thousands of dollars are sitting in a hidden account or hidden assets
somewhere else, then he (and perhaps the defendant as ~ell) will have made out
like the proverbial bandits if this account is held nondischargeable [sic] and if the
perjury goes unproven until the expiration of the statute of limitations. Such is the
current state of fact,finding when faced with an undocumented gambling defense.
Gambling- losses do not leave an audit trail if the gambler does not want them to.
Thus, a false gambling defense can be a haven for the criminal mind who seeks a
"'cover'" for hidde:l as~ts.

ld. at 582 n.4.
19sLocaI Loan v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
196
That gambling debt should be dischargeable in bankruptcy provokes strong reac,
tions. However this court may feel about the morality of the Bankruptcy Code
permitting the discharge of such debt, there is no statutory rule that the use of
credit cards to incur gambling debts shows the requisite intent of a debtor not to
pay his debts.... If Congress intended that credit card advances for gambling
losses be treated in any different fashion than any other debts incurred by an honest
albeit misinformed, and always overly optimistic debtor, it can always amend the
Bankruptcy Code.
AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Totina (In re Totina), 198 B.R. 673, 681 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1996).
1\)7In Karelin v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n (In re Karelin), 109 B.R. 9~3 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 1990), for example, debtor obtained a cash advance of $87,000 after losing a high'paying job, to
finan~e a gambling trip. The court applied an objective test and found that the very act of obtaining a cash
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Field, most courts are applying a subjective test that is more likely to lead to
discharge of these obligations. 198 Gambling cases are a stern test of a court'ls
commitment to the subjective test, given that these debtors so often harbor
such unreasonable expectations of gambling their way out of their financial
woes. Courts seem able, however, to identify debtors who have been view..
ing the world through rose'colored glasses:
In this case, [debtor] had an honest, if questionable and
undoubtedly foolish, belief that she could win enough to pay
her debts. She paid her bills and maintained the minimum
payments on her credit cards until the day she filed bank..
ruptcy. She had no intention of filing bankruptcy when she
incurred the charges, and did not even realize the depths of
her problem until she sat down to calculate how much of her
casino winnings were needed to payoff her credit cards. She
did not operate in "reckless indifference" to her financial
state. Rather, she acted as many gamblers do, ... whether
they file bankruptcy or not. She thought she was better off
than she actually was; she miscalculated her financial condi..
tion. The simple fact that many would consider her foolish,
or that she made significant "financial miscalculations," does
not make her guilty of fraud. 199
advance that large, while in "hopeless financial condition," id. at 947, constituted actual fraud de5pite the
debtor"s subjective desire to pay her debts. The court, however, did not find the creditor blameless:
In a general sense, Ms. Karelin was as much victim as culprit. The extent of her
long,term gambling addiction was in large part a function of the credit and facilities
made available to her by the casinos. The Bank"s extension of an unsecured and
unrestricted credit line in the amount of $55,000, which is more than half of Ms.
Karelin"s annual salary, made it possible for her to pursue her addictioa to its inexO'
rable conclusion.

Id. at 949. See alsc Hous:hc,ld Card &rvsJVi34 v. V~lmi1iion (In re \,"elDlil:ion), 136 B.R. 225, 220,2j
(Bankr. W.O. Mo. 1992); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Davis (In re Davis), 134 B.R. 990 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1991).
198 Anastas v. American Sav. Bank (In re Anastas), 94 F.3d 1280 (9th Cir. 1996); AT&T Universal
Card Servs. Corp. v. Totina (In re Totina), 198 B.R. 673 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1996); Chevy Chase Bank, FSB
v. Briese (In re Briese), 196 B.R. 440 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1996); AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. Alvi (In re
Alvi), 191 B.R. 724 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1996); Chase Manhattan Bank v. Murphy (In re Murphy), 190 B.R.
327 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995). But see Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Jacobs (In re Jacobs), 196 B.R. 429
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1996).
199Chevy Chase Bank, FSB v. Briese (In re Briese), 196 B.R. 440, 453 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1996) (citing
AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. Alvi (In re Alvi), 191 B.R. 724, 734 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996».
The contrasting approach, taken in AT&T Universal Card Services v. Mercer (In re Mercer), 246
F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2(01) (en bane), makes it quite unlikely that a starry,eyed, naive gambler will be able to
escape nondischargeability:
Cases such as this one, involving card,use to finance gambling, with the claim of
intent to pay with gambling winnings, present a particularly difficult challenge for
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Although gambling cases present a stark and difficult context for applica,
tion of § 523(a)(2)(A), they are not analytically different from other credit
card cases. All such cases should be approached irl the same way, when as,
sessing those fraud elements that focus on the debtor: first, the requirement
of a representation should be fulfilled by implying a representation of intent
to repay whenever a credit card is used; then, the elements of falsity and
intent to mislead should be evaluated by looking at relevant objective indica'
tors, without losing sight of the fact that determination of the debtor's sub,
jective intent is the goal.

E.

THE CREDITOR'5 JUSTIFIABLE RELIANCE

The first several elements of common law fraud focus on the debtor's
representations and intent. Most of the analytical approaches developed by
bankruptcy courts, reviewed above, also focus there. That is not the sole
inquiry, however. Common law fraud has an additional element that focuses
on the creditor and requires actual 200 and justifiable reliance 20 1 on the
determining whether the debtor, at card"use, subjectively intended to pay. Obvi..
ously, gamblers gamble with the hope of winning, not losing. Mercer so testified.
But, hoping to win is not synonymous with intending to pay. "'A statement of
intent (I will repay) is distinguishable from a hope or a desire to [do so. It] ...
suggests a plan to repay[, and] ... an anticipated source of funds from which [it]
might be made." Accordingly, if a debtor presents evidence of alternative sources of
expected..income sufficient to make her minimum payment, her intent with regard
to her gambling winnings would be less relevant.

Id. at 409.. 10 (footnote omitted) (quoting LA Capitol Fed. Credit Union v. Melancon (In re Melancon,
223 B.R. 300, 336 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1998).
2°OField v. Mans clearly assumed that the requirement of actual reliance has teeth. See supra note 45.
Some later decisions have gutted it, ho\vever, and nowhere is a more' vacuous conclusion reached than in
AT&T Universal Card Services v. Mercer (In re Mercer), 246 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2001) (en bane). The
bankruptcy court had found that the issuer relied on its own investigations at the time it issued the card
and not on any representations made by the debtor. That court concluded. tha~, ~ithout reliance on the
debtor's representations at the time of issuance, the creditor could not have relied on any representations
m2d~ hy the c1ebtor at the time she used the card. The Fifth Circuit, however, believed that the bank..
ruptcy court erroneously required "'reliance on representations by the debtor, regarding her financial condi..
tion, at card..issuance, in order for the issuer to rely on subsequent representations at card..use.... Id. at 412.
The Fifth Circuit concluded, instead, that "'[t]he actual reliance inquiry must focus on the representations,
through card..use, of intent to pay, even if, for card..issuance, the issuer relied on its investigation of the
debtor's creditworthiness, rather than on any representations by her.... Id. at 412. (This conclusion seems
to be derived from the court's recognition that pre.. issuance representations regarding financial condition
are not actionable under § 523(aX2)(A).) The court then proceeded to hold that actual reliance is estab..
lished when the issuer shows that "'it \\'ould not have approved the loan in the absence of debtor's promise
to pay (through card use)." Id. at 415. But approval of the loan means only that the debtor actually used
the card (and mere use of the card constitutes the promise to repay). Thus, the Fifth Circuit is saying that
an issuer establishes its actual reliance on a representation by the debtor whenever the debtor simply uses
the card. Or, in other words, the creditor must show that it approves credit card charges only when a
card is used. The upshot is that the important fraud element of actual reliance is shown, in the credit card
context, by the fact that the issuer has a claim against the debtor. The absurdity is patent, as is the
mockery made of Fidd v. Mans.
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debtor"s representations.
The first major case to focus on the role of credit card issuers, the Elev..
enth Circuit"s decision in First N.ational Ban~ of Mobile v. Roddenberry,202 is
also credited with (blamed for?) originating.the much..maligned w,assumption
of the risk"" approach. The case presented a classic W,loading..up"" fact pattern.
Debtors, husband and wife, applied for a joint account and were issued two
cards. The original credit limit of $400 (this was 1975!) was increased to
$600 pursuant to an across..the..board increase given by the creditor to all its
cardholders and, in May of 1978, increased to $1000 at the debtors" request.
The debtors, however, already had a balance of $1620; the creditor, in the
same month the increase was granted, sent a form letter notifying the debtors
that their credit limit had been exceeded and asking them not to use the card
until the balance was reduced to a permissible level. Payments in May and
June reduced the balance by almost $600, but it began creeping upward again
in August. Another letter was sent in late August and, in September,
Mr. Roddenberry talked with a bank officer on the telephone and promised
not to use the card again. He kept his promise, but Mrs. Roddenberry sepa"
rated from him in October, taking both cards. She ""embarked on what can
only be characterized as a credit card spending spree."203 Between September
and November she obtained $1300 in cash advances from the automatic teller
machine. The bank telephoned the debtors, obtaining a promise that the full
balance of $2583 would be paid by November 28. 204 Nothing was paid. On
December 11 the bank programmed its automatic teller machine to keep the
card if it was used for a cash advance and, on the 12th, notified merchants
calling for authorization required for purchases over $50, to pick up the card.
WiThe requirement of justifiable reliance, as opposed to some other quantum of reliance, is derived
from Field v. Mans. The court in AT&T Universal Card Services v. Alvi (In re Alvi), 191 B.R. 724
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996), explained:
-

-

~

There is no suggestion in Justice Souter's majority opinion that the facts of Field
made it uniquely entitled to a "'justifiable reliance'" analysis. Rather, the Court's
analysis focuses aimost exctusiveiy on what the drafters of the 1978 Bankruptcy
Code had in mind for section 523(a)(2XA) a3 a general matter. Because the Su,
preme Court vacated the First Circuit judgment and remanded, the Supreme Court
never even applied the test to the particular facts of Field. The most logical inter,
pretation of the Supreme Courfs holding is that "'justifiable reliance'" is an element
of all "'fraud'" actions brought by creditors under section 523(a)(2)(A).... Thus,
"'justifiable reliance'" is an element of all 523(a)(2XA) actions to be proved by all
plaintiffs in section 523(a)(2XA) proceedings, regardless of the theory of the case.

Id. at 730. Accord AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Totina (In re Totina), 198 B.R. 673,676 n.2
(Bankr. E.D. La. 1996).
202
701 F.2d 927 (11th Cir. 1983).
203Id. at 928.
204The court reported only that a call was made to "'the Roddenberrys,'" ide at 928, but they had
separated by then. Mr. Roddenberry might have promised to pay obligations incurred by his estranged
wife, but one might doubt that.
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After that time, Mrs. Roddenberry did not try to obtain cash advances or to
use the card for large purchases. 20s Instead, "she engaged in the creative prac'"
tice of purchasing items less than $50 in value.'"206 She made ninety.. one sepa'"
rate charges in January of 1979 and, by the 22nd, had raised the balance to
$5,222. She later testified that she bought items for friends who reimbursed
her in cash that she used for her support. The debtors filed bankruptcy in
March of 1979, when the balance was $7,051; Mrs. Roddenberry, however,
continued to use the card even after the bankruptcy petition was filed.
The case was governed by § 17a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act, which ex..
cepted from discharge debts "for obtaining money or property by false pre'"
tenses or false representations.'" The court"s interpretation of that subsection
was governed by the Eleventh Circuit"s earlier decision in Davison.. Paxon Co.
v. Caldwell,207 which involved merchandise purchased by a debtor, over a
three.. year period, directly from the merchant.. creditor. The creditor argued
in the debtor"s ensuing bankruptcy that discharge should be denied on the
grounds that she had intentionally concealed her insolvency and her intent
not to repay. The district court rejected that argument, however, pointing
out that "the account had been running under the eyes of an expert credit
man for a period of two years and eleven months without this fact having
been discovered or, apparently, even suspected until the filing of the bank..
ruptcy proceedings.'"208 The Court of Appeals held that § 17a(2) "does not
except from discharge, debts created by obtaining credit through concealment
of insolvency and present inability to pay.'"209 Rather, only debts obtained by
overt false pretenses or misrepresentations were excepted from discharge.
The Fifth Circuit recently overruled Davison.. Paxon, reasoning that
..[w]hen one has a duty to speak, both concealment and silence can constitute
fraudulent misrepresentation; an overt act is not required.""21o Roddenberry,
however, did not rest on any assumption, now rendered erroneous by Davis..
Paxon"s demise, that silence notwithstanding a duty to speak insulates a
debtor from nondischargeability. Roddenbelry did not read Davison.. Paxon as
re~Yarding a debtor"s fraudulent concealment of insolvency. R2ther, "it
sought to deny a particularly improvident creditor the special privilege of an
exemption from a general discharge.'"211
205Mrs. Roddenberry must have become aware of the bank~s actions, but the court did not say that she
was or, if she was, how she found out.
206
701 F.2d at 928.
207 115 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1940), cat. denied, 313 U.S. 564 (1941), overruled by AT&T Universal Card
Servs. v. Mercer (In re Mercer), 246 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2001) (en bane).
208In re Caldwell, 33 F. Supp. 631, 633 (N.D. Ga. 1941).
209
115 F.2d at 191.
21OAT&T Universal Card Servs. V. Mercer (In re Mercer), 246 F.3d 391,404 (5th Cir. 2001) (en
bane).
211Roddenberry, 701 F.2d at 930.
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Notwithstanding factual differences between the cases,212 the court felt
itself constrained to follow the principles of Davison,Paxon-namely, "'that
discharge exceptions are to be narrowly construed and that improvident
creditors are not to be afforded special protections in bankruptcy for the
assumption of common business risks..... 213 The court identified the "'common
business risks"" it believed credit card issuers undertake:
Once credit cards are issued (if not fraudulently obtained),
the bank has agreed to trust the cardholder and to extend
credit, and once credit is extended, the bank must decide
when and if credit will be revoked. It is not the function of
courts to determine when a bank ought to revoke credit. It
also is of little consequence that the bank can show that the
terms and conditions said to apply to use of the card have
been violated. The mere breach of credit conditions is of
minimum probative value on the issue of fraud because banks
often encourage or willingly suffer credit extensions beyond
contractual credit limits. Indeed, banks have a definite inter'
est in permitting charges beyond established credit limits be'
cause of the high finance charges typical in such transactions.
Banks are willing to risk nonpayment of debts because that
risk is factored into the finance charges. Because the risk is
212

Roddenberry described these differences:
Caldwell [the debtor in Davison..Paxon] purchased merchandise directly from her
creditor. The relationship was "'one on one'" and occurred within a controlled envi..
ronment in which the creditor knew what was purchased, when it w~ purchased
and where it was purchased. This is very different from credit arrangment [sic]
involving bank credit where a third party creditor has far less control over the use
of its cards. This distinction is illustrated in the present case by the bank's inability
to recover the credit cards in the Roddenberrys' possession. Recovery was impeded
not only by Mrs. Roddenberry's attempts to avoid detet:tion, but also by the bank's
inability to determine where she would use the cards next.
The nature of the debtor..creditor relationship also relates to the significance of
the concealment. When CaldweH purchased merchandise she was presenting her..
self to the creditor with whom she had direct and continuous dealings. With each
transaction, the creditor had both the opportunity and the incentive to take some
precaution in assuring her creditworthiness. Conversely, when Mrs. Roddenberry
purchased merchandise she did not present herself to her creditor, and arguably
took affirmative steps to avoid such a confrontation. Moreover, the merchants
with whom she had direct contact had no incentive to perform a credit check be..
cause they were assured payment from the bank so long as the charge was less than
$50.00. Indeed, to have performed a credit check would have resulted in a lost sale.
The concept of intentional concealment, therefore, loses its significance when third
parties provide credit services.

Id.

at 931.
~ 13Id. at

932.
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voluntary and calculated, § 17a(2) should not be construed
to afford additional protection for those who unwisely per'
mit or encourage debtors to exceed their credit limits. 214
Given the credit card issuer"s assumptions of these business risks, Rod,
denberry held
that the voluntary assumption of risk on the part of a bank
continues until it is clearly shown that the bank unequivo,
cally and unconditionally revoked the right of the cardholder
to further possession and use of the card, and until the card,
holder is aware of this revocation. A card issuer, acting
upon its own judgment, may elect to continue to extend
credit; it shall be presumed to do so until clear revocation
has taken place. Only after such clear revocation has been
communicated to the cardholder will further use of the card
result in liabilities obtained by "'false pretenses or false repre'
sentations"" within the meaning of section 17a(2rs exemption
from discharge. Purchases made with knowledge that one is
not entitled to either use or possession constitute the type of
deception intended to be exempted from discharge. 215
The overruling of Davison,Paxon does nothing to diminish the relevance of
Roddenberry"s risk analysis.
The credit card issuer in Roddenberry never delivered the type of revoca..
tion the court found necessary, despite the number of communications the
creditor had with the debtors and the clarity of its message to stop using the
cards until the balance was reduced. Very few credit card issuers, even after
Roddenberry, seem to deliver such revocations to their cardholders. 216 If the
court is saying that all prerevocation charges are absolutely dischargeable,
then virtually every debtor will be able to discharge credit card obligations
no ffiettter how fraudulently incurred. Whether Roddenberry in fact stands
for that proposition is a matter of some debate,21 7 but critics of the case
2Hld. at 932 (citations omitted).
2Hld. at 932 (original emphasis).
216The reason may have something to do with the fact that credit cards are extremely lucrative for
issuers. Set: infra note 274 and accompanying text.
21'The court in FCC National Bank v. Branch (In 1t: Branch), 158 B.R 475 (Bankr. W.D.lv1o. 1993),
noted this debate:
[T]he Eleventh Circuit held that any and all charges, incurred after the fact of
revocation of a card by the issuer is communicated to the debtor, are nondischarge,
able. Unfortunately, that case is repeatedly cited for the converse, i.e., "that all
charges incurred before communication of revocation are dischargeable.... Actually
the Court recognized that the underlying facts in any case needed to be analyzed
carefully to determine if there had been fraud.
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certainly read it that way.218
If Roddenberry is read to permit discharge of all prerevocation charges,
without regard to the debtor"s intent at the time the charges were incurred,
then the accusation that it shelters bad.. a ctor debtors is entirely justified.
The case would be impossible to square either with Field v. Mans or with
sound bankruptcy policy. It is simply unacceptable-as a matter of statutory
interpretation, probable congressional intent and undisturbed digestionthat debtors using their credit cards with the actual intent to defraud dilio'
gent 219 issuers be able to discharge those obligations. If Roddenberry stands
for such a proposition, therefore, it must be distinguished or otherwise reo'
jected.220 Subsequent courts outside the Eleventh Circuit have had little
trouble dismissing the case; they have simply pronounced it unacceptable and
have refused to follow it. 221 Courts inside the Eleventh Circuit have had to
Id. at 478. The court gave no citation for the proposition that Roddenberry called for a careful search for
fraud, and review of Roddenberry brings nothing to mind. The Eleventh Circuit did remand the case, but
only for determination of whether the creditor revoked the debtors" right to use and possession of the card
and, if so, when that revocation was communicated to Mrs. Roddenberry.
218
The "assumption of the risk'" theory is also unsatisfactory, primarily because dishon'
est debtors may manipulate its mechanical distinction between debts incurred
before and after credit privileges are revoked. It is quite possible that a debtor
might intentionally defraud a credit card company, yet not exceed his credit limit or
otherwise engage in behavior which would result in the revocation of card privi'
leges. While the bankruptcy code is to be construed liberally in favor of the debtor,
it is also to be fair to creditors. The creditor does not "assume the risk.. . that the
debtor is dishonest. Rather, the credit card transaction (like any other lending reta,
tionship) is premised upon the notion that both parties will act in good faith. Thus,
the debtor is expected to make "bona fide.. . use of the card and not engage in fraud.
Chevy Chase Bank, FSB v. Briese (In re Briese), 196 B.R. 440, 449 (Bankr. W.D~ Wis. 1996) (citations
omitted). See also Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Jacobs (In re Jacobs), 196 B.R. 429, 433 (Bankr. N.D.
Ind. 1996) (noting that assumption of risk theory "places the creditor in the difficult position of being
responsible for all pre.. revocation charges"'); American Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. McKinnon (In
T( McKinnon), 192 B.R. 768, 772 (Bankr.N.D. Ala. 1996) \only post..revocation charges may be deemed
non.. dischargeable under the assumption of the risk theory"'); Hecht's, A Division of the May Dep"t Stores
Co. v. \'aldes (In Te Valdes), 188 B.R. 533, 536 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995) ("During the pre,revocation period,
a.ll charges would be discharged regardless of the debtor"s intent.......); FCC Nat"l Bank v. Branch (In re
Branch), 158 B.R. 475, 478 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1993) (Roddenberry"s view ~is analogous to the merchant
who sells someone a gun and then is told he cannot complain if the buyer uses the gun to rob him at gun
point....).
The court in Citibank South Dakota, N.A. v. Dougherty (In re Dougherty), 84 B.R. 653 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 1988), apparently tried to have it both ways. In text, the court said, "We note that the Roddenberry
court stated that pre,revocation charges may be dischargeable.'" Id. at 656 (original emphasis). In a foot ..
note to that very sentence, however, the court said that under Roddenberry"s analysis, "prerevocation
charges will be discharged.... Id. n.2 (emphasis added).
219No matter how badly the debtor behaved, the creditor must have justifiably relied. For a discussion
of justifiable reliance, se( infra notes 239,55 and accompanying text.
22°See AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. Mercer (In re Mercer), 246 F.3d 391,419..21 (5th Cir. 2001)
(en bane).
221The view taken by the court in Citibank (South Dakota), NA. v. Senty (In re Senty), 42· B.R. 456 .
(Bankr. S.DN.Y. 1984), is typical:
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be a bit more artful, however, given that Roddenberry has never been
overruled. 222
Most courts seeking to distinguish Roddenberry have seized upon changes
made in the statutory language, pointing to the addition in 1978 of "'actual
fraud'" as a ground for nondischargeability.223 Roddenberry itself invited such
a distinction by noting the statutory change. 224
The debate over the significance of 1978~s rewording has already been
noted,225 along with the conclusion of most courts that "'false representa,
tions'" and "'false pretenses'" require overt misrepresentations. 226 That view
Nor does the Roddenberry court"s reliance upon [the] issuer's applying a risk
factor when setting finance charges support the rule it attempts to create. Indeed,
that practice provides all the more reasons for courts to enforce § 523(aX2XA)
with great diligence. A failure to enforce this section could result in significantly
higher finance charges by encouraging debtors to engage in shopping sprees prior to
seeking relief in bankruptcy. Debtors by behaving in this manner would not be
using the Bankruptcy Code as the shield it was intended to be, but rather, as a
sword with which to slay their creditors. In the final analysis, honest credit card
holders would be saddled with the fraudulent debtor's shopping bill in the form of
higher finance charges. Therefore, the wording of the Code, the goals of bank,
ruptcy (one of which is to give good faith debtors a fresh start and a second chance
to succeed in our society), and public policy all militate against allowing a debtor to
discharge fraudulently incurred debts in bankruptcy irrespective of the issuer's mere
negligence in failing to revoke the card.

ld. at 461. See also Citibank South Dakota, NA. v. Dougherty (In re Dougherty), 84 B.R. 653, 656 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 1988); Colonial Nat"1 Bank USA v. Leventhal (In re Leventhal), 194 B.R. 26, 29 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1996); The GM Card v. Cox (In re Cox), 182 B.R. 626,634 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995); ).C. Penney Co. v.
Shanahan (In re Shanahan), 151 B.R. 44, 47 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1993). For a criticism of the assumption
that credit losses are passed along to borrowers who pay their debts, see Howard, supra note 91, at 106?:.
68.
2221f anything, the Eleventh Circuit reinforced Roddenberry by its observation that "'[s]ince the differ,
ences between § 523(aX2XA) and its predecessor, § 17(aX2) of the Bankruptcy Act, are negligible, case
law construing § 17(aX2) serves as a useful guide in applying § 523(a)(2XA)." Birmingham Trust Nat"l
Bank v. Case, 755- F.id 1474, 1476 (11th eire 1985).
-_.
223Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Ford (In re Ford), 186 B.R. 312, 318,19 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995);
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Blackburn (in re Blackburn), 68 B.R. 870, 879 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1987); Cha5e
Manhattan Bank (U.SA.) N.A. v. Carpenter (In re Carpenter), 53 B.R. 724, 729 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1985);
City Nafl Bank of Baton Rouge v. Holston (In re Holston), 47 B.R. 103, 107 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1985).
224The court, however, noted that, while the two provisions are "'substantially identical,'"
Congress has incorporated certain modifications which may alter the outcome in
certain cases where debtors obtain credit without a present intention of repayment.
Indeed, one commentator suggests that Congress' addition of the term "'actual
fraud" to the "'false pretenses and false representation" language of section 17a was
intended to eliminate the distinction between overt and implied misrepresentation
drawn in Davison,Paxon. At this time, we express no opinion with respect to this
construction of section 523(a)(2){A).
701 F.2d at 929,30 n.3 (citations omitted).
22SSee supra notes 54,67 and accompanying text.
2261n General Electric Capitol Consumer Card Co. v. Janecek (In re Janecek), 183 B.R. 571 (Bankr. D.
Neb. 1995), however, the court believed that ""resort to the fiction of an implied representation" is \,,·hat
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grows out of Davison~Paxon,which provided the precedent for Roddenberry,
and Roddenberry itself recognized that the addition of actual fraud, if it cre~
ated any difference at all, may have been ~intended to eliminate the distinc~
tion between overt and implied misrepresentation drawn in Davison~
Paxon."227 The addition of ~actual fraud,"" therefore, may have broken the
analytical link to overt misrepresentations, which are difficult if not impossi~
ble to identify in credit card cases, and opened an avenue for barring the
discharge of prerevocation charges made by cardholders who do not intend to
repay the issuers of their cards, upon a showing of implied representations. 228
To conclude that Roddenberry remains binding precedent in the Eleventh
Circuit is not to cast reason to the wind. The court in F.C.C. N..ational Ban~
results in "'application of the theories of false pretenses and false misrepresentation.... Id. at 574. In that
court"s view, use of the third alternative, actual fraud, makes resort to such fictions unnecessary. Instead,
the court required that actual fraud be shown - that is, a lack of intent to repay amounts charged, at the
time the charges are made-and used the factors of the totality of the circumstances approach. See supra
notes 146..50 and accompanying text.
227 701 F.2d at 930 n.3. The court in City National Bank of Baton Rouge v. Holston (In re Holston),
47.B.R. 103 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1985), reviewed Dat,·ison..Paxon, as well as other cases, and concluded that
false pretenses or false representations require an overt act:
The addition of "actual fraud'" in the ne\v statute, however, expands the scope of
non'dischargeable debts to include those that arise from acts or omissions that are
intentionally or consciously used to deceive or to trick another; an overt act is not
necessary to actual fraud because an intentional or conscious omission can consti,
tute fraud....
Although it may be true both that "false pretenses and representations require
bad faith'" and that "actual fraud requires bad faith"', it does not follow that "actual
fraud''' is not different from false representations and false pretenses. This Court
believes that a conscious omission can result in fraud; the Fifth Circuit 'in Davison'
Paxon has ruled that false representations and false pretenses require an overt act.
Thus, contrary to the conclusion in Collier, the addition of "actual fraud"" may have
extended non'dischargeability to debts arising from omissions involving moral turpi'
tude or intentional wrong and to acts other than false representations and false
pretenses involving moral turpitude or intentional wrong.

Id. at 107 (original emphasis).
228The courts do not agree that a focus on actual fraud, rather than on false representations or pre"
tenses, permits the use of implied misrepresentations:
[R]esort to the fiction of an implied representation, and the resultant application of
the theories of false pretenses and false representations, is unnecessary in credit card
cases. I reach this conclusion because there is an alternative, more direct way to
approach the problem through the application of a theory of actual fraud. Pursuant
to § 523(aX2)(A), a debt is determined nondischargeable if it arises from "false pre..
tenses, a false representation, or actual fraud..... ...
I conclude that the approach of In re Dougherty [84 B.R. 653 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
1988)], which avoids the fiction of an implied representation, is the preferable ap'
proach in § 523(aX2)(A) credit card cases ....
Mercantile Bank v. Hiemer (In re Hiemer), 184 B.R. 345, 347,48 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1995) (original
emphasis).
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v. Gilmore (In re Gilmore),229 found Roddenberry binding precedent:?30 and
explained its meaning in reliance,like terms:
Under Roddenberry, a credit card company that assumes
the risk of non'payment, by providing unsolicited credit, by
exhorting and encouraging its customers to make maximum
use of that credit, and does not properly monitor or accu,
rately assess the abilities to pay of those to \vhom such
credit is extended, should not be allowed unlimited recourse
to correct the self,inflicted damage caused by such irrespon'
sibility. A creditor who recklessly bestows credit, should
not benefit from such a lack of caution, especially when the
exercise of rudimentary precautions could have prevented
the loss.231

Roddenberry's assumption of the risk is closely related to reliance, which is a
fundamental element of common law fraud. In other words, a creditor that
has assumed the risk of the debtor's insolvency or nonrepayment is relying,
essentially, on its own judgment and information and not on anything the
debtor has communicated regarding creditworthiness. Roddenberry, there'
fore, is best viewed, today, in reliance terms.:?3:?
Ironically, Roddenberry's argument that creditors assume the risk that
debtors will exceed their credit limits has only become more realistic and
sensible as technology has advanced. Issuers are able to protect themselves
much more easily today than was the creditor in Roddenberry.233 Debtors
229

221 B.R. 864 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1998).
gave three reasons:

2~oGilmore

One, precedent from both the Supreme Court of the United States and the
Court of ApPeals for the Eleventh Circuit dictate that great deference is to be given
to decisions made under the provisions of the Ban~ruptcy Act, and that those deci,
sions, absent express Congressional intent otherwise, should control the same issues
that arise under the Bankrupt:jO Code....
Two, the legislative history of section 523(a)(2)(A) indicates that the term "'ac,
tual fraud"" was included in that section ... to clarify and emphasize the fact that
only debts resulting from fraud intended to deceive, or frauds involving moral turpi,
tude, are non,dischargeable, and not debts resulting from constructive fraud or
fraud implied in la\v....
Three, there is no substantive difference between section 17(a)( 2) and section
523(a)(2)(A).

Id. at 871 (original emphasis).
1
23 Id. at 875.
::!3::!For a discussion of Roddenberry in that context, see supra notes 202,32 and accompanying text.
~33These technological changes have been given as a reason to discount both the implied representa,
tion and assumption of the risk theories. These theories

were develOPed at a time when there was a significant lag bet\veen the time the
card was used and the transaction was actually recorded \vith the issuer. Neither
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can no longer run up balances exceeding their credit limits unless creditors
permit them to do so. Technological advances since Roddenberry are not a
reason to dismiss the case, however. Quite the contrary. Now that creditors
are better able to protect themselves, Roddenberry"s concern that careless
creditors should not find shelter in the bankruptcy laws becomes even
stronger. Evolving technology is not a reason for distinguishing the case;
rather, it is a reason for embracing the court"s underlying concern. That con'
cern centered around
a reluctance to allow credit card companies to drench the
public with credit cards, charge high rates of interest to pro'
teet themselves from loss when the cards are used impru'
dently or mendaciously, and then badger debtors with claims
of misrepresentation when they inevitably find themselves
forced to invoke the protection of the bankruptcy statute. 234

Roddenberry was motivated by a concern for careless lending practices. 235
Implicit within Roddenberry is the requirement that a credit card issuer ~take
reasonable steps to protect itself from abuse of the cards by its customers."236
The Eleventh Circuit, however, did not describe any facts whatsoever re'
garding the type of pre,issuance investigation, if any, made by the issuer in
the case". We simply do not know from the reported decision whether the
creditor issued the cards without making a sensible investigation into the
Roddenberrys" creditworthiness.
Credit card lending is different from other kinds of unsecured lending not
only because of the remoteness, already noted, between issuers and cardhold'
ers;237 it is also different because of the extent to which it makes credit avail,
able to debtors who otherwise are not creditworthy. Credit card issuers
routinely give cards to individuals who would be laughed out of any reputa,
theory is as relevant today when most credit transactions are automatically re..
corded electronically at the instant the card is used. The issuer has the technology
to refuse to accept the transaction before the merchant completes the sale. In fact,
most merchants today will not complete the sale until they receive a code accepting
the card. Likewise, if an issuer wishes to terminate the use of a card it can do so
automatically. It does not have to inform the debtor to stop using the card, and
then wait for it to be mailed back.
AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Ellingsworth (In re Ellingsworth), 212 B.R. 326, 33~ (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1997).
:!3-4AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Pakdaman (In re Pakdaman), 210 B.R. 886, 888 (D. Mass.
1997).
:HRejection of Roddenberry and its assumption of the risk approach should not lead a \:ourt to con..
elude that no investigation is necessary. This is, however, what the court did in AT&T Universal Card
Ser'\"i\:es Corp. v. Burdge (In re Burdge), 198 B.R. 773, 777,,78 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996).
:~6Citibank F.S.B. (Florida) v. Cox (In re Cox), ISO B.R. 807, 810 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1992).
:~7&e supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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ble bank if they walked through the doors and made a face,to,face application
for an unsecured loan in an amount equivalent to the card'ls credit limit:
Assume you are a loan officer for a large metropolitan bank.
A woman walks in one day and says she. wants to borrow
$60,000 on her signature. She willingly fills out a financial
statement which shows that she already has $300,000 in un,
secured debt, but she needs these additional funds for a busi,
ness trip. She also shows one asset, a heavily encumbered
apartment building that is being foreclosed. Of course, she
promises to repay the loan if one is made to her. Would a
bank that makes such a loan be found to have justifiably re,
lied on her promise? Of course not. But, what if, instead,
the bank made the loan without bothering to ask her basic
information about assets, liabilities, and income? And what
if she did not make an express promise to repay the loan?
Should this bank be allowed to claim that it justifiably relied
on her implied promises to pay? One would think not.
However, those are the very facts of a recent bankruptcy
opinion, except that rather than a face to face encounter
with a bank officer, the debt was incurred through use of a
credit card. . .. If no lender would have made that loan in a
face to face transaction, why are [the creditor"s] unreasona,
ble lending practices afforded special protection under the
Bankruptcy Code? Is there something in the Bankruptcy
Code that treats credit card loans differently from face to
face loans?238
A sensible application of the reliance requirement may be the only way
that credit card lenders can be prevented from achieving a virtually auto'
matic nondischargeability of credit card debt- and, thus, from effectively opt..
ing GU~ of the. bankruptcy system.. Y~t some courts have been entirely too lax
in completing this final step in the analysis, either by ignoring it altogether 239
238AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Ellingsworth (In re Ellingsworth), 212 B.R. 326, 329.. 30
(Bankr. W.O. Mo. 1997). The court~s reference was to American Express Travel Related Services Co. v.
Hashemi (In re Hashemi),104 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 1996), cct. denied, 520 U.S. 1230 (1997), in which the
debtor charged over $60,000 to his American Express card while vacationing in France with his family.
239The court in F.C.C. National Bank v. Cacciatore (In re Cacciatore), 209 B.R. 609 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1997), revtd on other grounds, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11246 (E.DN.Y. 199M), observed that although
reliance is central to fraud, id. at 614, "some courts have dispensed with the element of reliance in applying
common..la\v fraud standards to nondischargeability claims under section 523(aX2XA) involving credit
card debt, focusing instead on the debtor~s intent and representations (actual or implied)." Id. at 613
(citing Citibank South Dakota, NA. v. Dougherty (In re Dougherty), 84 B.R. 653 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988),
Colonial Nat-l Bank USA v. Leventhal (In rc Leventhal), 194 B.R. 26 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996), and le.
Penney Co. \'. Shanahan (In re Shanahan), 1S1 B.R. 44 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1993».
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or by finding it easily satisfied. 240 Either of these approaches results in inap'
propriate risk shifting.
A reliance requirement can be given sensible content in credit card
cases,241 and the initial inquiry centers, again, on Field v. Mans. 242 The
In American Express Travel Related Services, Inc. v. Dorsey (In re Dorsey), 120 B.R. 592 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1990), the court expressed incredulity regarding the creditor's lending decision:
It is absolutely appalling to this Court and it is difficult, if not impossible, to com"
prebend how a responsible business enterprise like American Express would grant
seven credit cards to a widow with two minor children who had no gainful employ..
ment since 1978 and whose sole regular income was, and still is, the munificent sum
of $480 per month from Social Security. In defense of this astounding practice, the
representative of American Express stated that as long as the cardholder meets the
payment obligations, regardless of how many, they have no problem and do not
care. This explanation obviously only begs the question and never furnishes a satis..
factory answer to the question, \vhy on earth American Express issued initially
seven credit cards to a person like this Debtor or any other person in a similar
financial situation. Card issuers, including American Express, should not be sur..
prised that from time to time individuals who are bombarded with unsolicited
credit cards decide that so long as they have the card, they can use them and go on
a charging spree without giving any thought to the fact that one day they will be
called upon to repay the charges incurred.

Id. at 595. The court held the debt nevertheless nondischargeable because the debtor lacked an intent to
repay, effectively reading out the reliance requirement. The decision was pre.. Field, however, so the court
may not have understood that all five elements of common law fraud must be found.
240S0me couns find reliance in the fact that the card was used. This approach effectively eliminates
the reliance requirement, since it will be automatically satisfied in every case. (Indeed, there could be no
debt subject to a dischargeability dispute if the card had not be used.) Other courts have found reliance in
the obligation of the credit card issuer to reimLurse the merchant who accepted the card, in exchange for
goods and services, from the cardholder:
[T]he issuer, having paid the charges incurred by the card holder has become subro..
gated to the debt and is entitled to claim the reliance of the provider of goods and
services. Furthermore, the credit card system functions upon the user's guarantee
of payment for charges on its cards. The Debtor, in presenting the card and thereby
forcing the issuer to honor its guarantee to merchants necessarily compelled reliance
by the issuer.
Citibo.ck (Soata DClk<Jta), ~~A. v. St:nt> (In re ~nlY), 42 n.R. 456, 460 (13dnkr. S.D.N.Y. 19S4). See also
First Card Servs., Inc. v. Flynn (In re Flynn), 184 B.R. 8 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995); Citicorp Credit Servs. v.
Hinman (In re Hinman), 120 B.R. 1018, 1022 (Bankr. DN.D. 1990). This approach finds reliance on the
debtor's representations, for purposes of fraud in the transaction between debtor and creditor, in the
existence of an independent contractual obligation owed by the creditor to a third party. It is, of course,
the existence of that contractual obligation to the merchant that satisfies the fifth element of fraud that
the creditor suffered a loss as a result of the reliance in every case. For the fourth and fifth elements of
fraud to have any substance, they must be directed toward different facts.
241 The contrary position, which leads to the conclus~on that reliance is never present and, therefore,
that § 523(aX2XA) cannot apply to credit card cases, was taken in The GM Card v. Cox (In re Cox), 182
B.R. 626 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995). The court found that a creditor never relies on any implied representa..
tion of intent to repay obligations incurred through use of a credit card:
GM did not rely, much less reasonably rely, upon an implied representation by
the Debtor that he intended to pay. This is so for a number of reasons. First of all,
reliance by one contracting party upon the other's implied representation of intent
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Court attempted to give some content to the concept of "'justifiable reliance,~
to determine how much of an investigation a creditor must undertake before
extending credit. The Court stated that w'a person is justified in relying on a
representation of fact "although he might have ascertained the falsity of the
representation had he made an investigation.''r'243 It does not follow that a
creditor need do no investigation, however. The Court was careful to point
out that "'justification is a matter of the qualities and characteristics of the
particular plaintiff, and the circumstances of the particular case, rather than
of the application of a community 'standard of conduct to all cases.~244 The
to pay is an unrealistic concept. A party extending credit under a contract relies
upon the other~s express promise to pay contained in the contract, not a later im'
plied representation of intent to pay flowing from performance. Here, GM fur,
nished the Debtor with an elaborate cardholdefs agreement. The agreement
includes a promise by the Debtor to pay for all card charges, including charges in
excess of the card~s limit, plus interest and attorney"s fees. With GM in possession
of that express promise, it would be irrational for a fact finder to conclude GM
relied upon a later implied representation of intent to pay emanating from use of the
card. Use of the card did not create a separate contract. The debtor was merely
exercising his rights under the parties" contract.
GM's credit investigation also belies any reliance, and certainly reasonable reli,
ance, upon an implied representation by the Debtor of intent to pay flowing from
use of the card. Prior to issuing the card, GM reviewed a credit bureau report on
the Debtor. That report presumably disclosed the Debtor was sufficiently credit,
worthy to justify issuance of the card. GM obviously relied on this report. Other'
wise it would not have obtained it. In light of that reliance, it is improbable that
GM relied upon any later implied representation of intent to pay.
Courts purporting to require reliance ignore all these considerations. The deci,
sions are Kafkaesque. Many courts state reliance is necessary ,and then ignore the
requirement altogether in concluding fraud has been committed. Other courts find
reliance in a fashion which pays mere lip service to it.... Still others acknowledge
that a credit card transaction is sui generis and find reliance from the fact charges
were made under the card. These decisions attempt to fit a square peg into a round
hole. A credit card transaction involves no reliance upon an implied representation
cf in~e:lt t~ pay.

Id. at 636,37 (footnotes omitted). The problem, of course, as later courts have recognized, is that Cox's
reasoning virtually precludes application of § 523(aX2)(A) in credit card cases. AT&T Universal Card
Servs. Corp. v. Pakdaman (In rt Pakdaman), 210 B.R. 886, 887 (D. Mass. 1997); AT&T Universal Card
Servs. Corp. v. Nguyen (In re Nguyen), 208 B.R. 258, 261 (D. Mass. 1997); AT&T Universal Card Servs.
Corp. v. Feld (In re Feld), 203 B.R. 360, 368 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996). That result is unwarranted.
242Field clearly . . changed the landscape in credit card cases.... Is Reliance Becoming The Issue in Credit
Card Dischargeability Actions?, 28 BCD \VEEKLY NEWS & CoMMENT No. 16 at A7, A8 (March 26,
1996). The extent of that change as far as justifiable reliance is concerned is much less clear.
243
516 U.S. at 70 (quoting RESTATE~fE~T (SECOND) OF TORTS § 540).
244Id. at 71 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 545A). The Court relied on Prosser: It
"is only where, under the circumstances, the facts should be apparent to one of his knowledge and intclli,
gence from a cursory glance, or he has discovered something which should serve as a warning that he is
being deceived, that he is required to make an investigation of his own.... Id. (quoting W. PROSSER, L.-\\v
OF TORTS § 108 at 718 (4th ed. 1971».
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Court quoted Comment a to § 541 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
which states that a person is
required to use his senses, and cannot recover if he blindly
relies upon a misrepresentation the falsity of which would be
patent to him if he had utilized his opportunity to make a
cursory examination or investigation. Thus, if one induces
another to buy a horse by representing it to be sound, the
purchaser cannot recover even though the horse has but one
eye, if the horse is shown to the purchaser before he buys it
and the slightest inspection would have disclosed the
defect. 245
Reasonableness is not irrelevant to justifiable reliance,
for the greater the distance between the reliance claimed and
the limits of the reasonable, the greater the doubt about reli,
ance in fact. Naifs may recover, at common law and in bank'
ruptcy, but lots of creditors are not at all naive. The
subjectiveness of justifiability cuts both ways, and reasona,
bleness goes to the probability of actual reliance. 246
While the distinction between justifiable and reasonable reliance may not
be crystal clear, a justifiable reliance standard is the lower of the twO. 247
That is one thing when the purchase of a horse is at issue;248 it is something
else altogether when credit cards are involved. 249 Field's requirement of ac,
tual 250 and justifiable reliance means that the card issuer may rely on a repre'
sentation of fact even though investigation would have revealed the falsity of
the representation. 251 This proposition is not without ambiguity in the
credit card context, however. It applies much more comfortably to the initial
representations made by the cardholder in applying for the credit card in the
first instance than it does to recurrent use of a credit card.
The Court did not leave everything uncertain. Field requires something
5
24 Id. at 71 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 541, Comment a.) The Court added that
...[a] missing eye in a "sound' horse is one thing; long teeth in a "young' one, perhaps, another.~ Id.
24 6 Id. at 76.

247Id. at 77. See also AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Pakdaman (In re Pakdaman), 210 B.R.
886, 890 (D. Mass. 1997).
8
24 See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
249Por a discussion of the elements of fraud, which include reliance, see supra notes 104,11 and accom..
panying text.
25<lThe requirement of actual reliance is not toothless. In AT&T Universal Card Services Corp. v.
Feld (In re Feld), 203 B.R. 360 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996), the court found no proof of actual reliance and,
therefore, held in the debtor's favor despite its finding of intent to defraud. Id. at 371 ..72.
251
516 U.S. at 70.
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of creditors,252 so a reliance requirement cannot be deemed satisfied by a
debtor's mere use of the card.2s3 Nor can it be satisfied when the creditor
has done little or nothing by way of investigation before issuing a card. In a
surprising number of cases, a credit card issuer has done nothing before issu,
ing a card, including not paying attention to available information, and occa,
sionally such a case is widely publicized. 254 Courts faced with such fact
patterns usually have little difficulty in reaching the imminently sensible con,
elusion that reliance is missing. 2ss
2S2

The question here is what, if any, level of justification a creditor needs to show
above mere reliance in fact in order to exempt the debt from discharge under
§ 523(aX2XA).... No one, of course, doubts that some degree of reliance is re'
quired to satisfy the element of causation inherent in the phrase "'obtained by," but
the Government, as amicus curiae (like petitioners in a portion of their briet), sub,
mits that the minimum level will do. . .. But this argument is unsound.

Id. at 66,67.
253The analysis urged by the creditor in American Express Travel Related Services Co. v. Christensen
(In re Christensen), 193 B.R. 863 (N.D. Ill. 1996), would have made a mockery of the requirements of
common law fraud. The creditor argued "'that mere use of a credit card by the debtor satisfies the card
issuer"s showing that it not only relied on the debtor"s misrepresentation but also that its reliance was
reasonable (not simply justifiable, which is what is required)." Id. at 867. Recall that mere use of the card
constitutes the debtor"s representation. See supra notes 104'45 and accompanying text. If mere use of the
card also satisfies the element of justifiable reliance, then any debt created by use of a credit card by an
individual who subsequently files bankruptcy is automatically nondischargeable; mere use, without more,
would satisfy the elements of fraud. Such an approach would fail to capture the policies behind
§ 523(aX2XA) and would overwhelm the normative understanding that risk should be borne by the party
in the best position to avoid its occurrence.
2HThree,year,old Alessandra Scalise was recently issued a Platinum Visa card with a $5000 credit
limit after her mother,"'as a joke," responded to a. solicitation sent in the child's name. Alessandra"s occupa,
tion was listed as "'preschooler" and the lines for her Social Security number, salary and employer were.left
blank. On the line asking why she wanted the card, Mrs. Scalise wrote, "'Thanks for the great offer but
I'm only 3 and I'd like to buy more toys but Mom says not "til I'm older." To her parents" astonishment,
the card arrived two weeks after they mailed in the response. The issuers admitted to being embarrassed
by-the incident and attributed it to human error. Anna Cock, She May Be 3. But You Gotta Give Her
Credit, N.Y. POST, Aug. 10, 1999, at 3.
25~S;;e, e.g., Cdonial Nat"i Bank, fJSA v. Carrier (In re Carrier), 181 B.R. 742, 750 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1995); First Card v. Leonard (In re Leonard), 158 B.R. 839, 844 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1993). The court in
Manufacturer"s Hanover Trust Co. v. Ward (In re Ward), 857 F.2d 1082 (6th eire 1988), seemed almost
incredulous that a card had been issued under the circumstances found in the case:
The fact is that this company, Manufacturers Hanover, one of the largest banks
in the United States, issued two thousand dollars in preapproved credit to a person
who was not only hopelessly insolvent, but who had recently been convicted of an
embezzlement offense.
While the testimony of the bank officer, the assistant manager in charge ofretail
credit cards indicated that a credit check must have been made, indeed, the contrary
must be true. A credit check could never have been made, because if it had been
made credit would not have been issued. If, in fact, the credit check was made,
someone didn"t heed it.... So as far as rm concerned, there could not have been [aJ
credit check.

Id. at 1083,84.
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To assert that justifiable reliance is absent when an issuer passively ex'
tends credit without investigating the prospective cardholder"s creditworthi,
ness before issuing the card, however, serves merely to repeat that Field v.
Mans requires something of creditors-that the requirement of justifiable re,
Hance has teeth. It does not address the daunting question-what exactly
are the "'red flags'" Field cautions us not to ignore?2S6 (Some teeth are sharper
than others, after all.)
Occasionally a court has permitted an issuer to engage in a virtually can'
scious effort not to be aware of information at its fingertips. In AT&T
Universal Card Services Corp. v. Burdge (In re Burdge),2S7 for example, the
issuer increased the cardholder"s credit limit without conducting any investi,
gation into the cardholder"s financial status. The court found, first, that pre'
Field authority required no investigation in either event-initial issuance or
credit increases. 2S8 It then decided that Field did not change that rule, at
least as far as credit increases are concerned, because the issuer ~was not
aware of any circumstances to trigger doubt.'"2s9 The court reached this con,
elusion despite the fact that the balance on the card exceeded the debtor's
2S6Courts often note that "'red flags~ are not to be ignored. See, e.g., Anastas v. American Sa\'. Bank (In
Anastas), 94 F.3d 1280, 1286 (9th Cir. 1996). These same courts are not as quick to recognize the
extent to which their admonitions merely beg the question.
The card issuer in F.C.C. National Bank v. Cacciatore (In Te Cacciatore), 209 B.R. 609 (Bankr.
f.D.N.Y. 1997), argued the lack of "'red flags~ when it issued a credit card to a student \\'ithout any
reported source of income. The court held that the creditor had failed to establish justifiable reliance:
T~

Seizing upon the term "'red flags~ as if it were a talisman, FCC argues here that
it justifiably relied on Defendanfs implicit misrepresentation because neither FCC's
credit checks prior to issuing the card nor Defendant's use of the card raised any
"'red flags"'. The trouble with FCC's argument is that FCC defined its' own, mini,
mal, set of red flags for credit approval purposes and ignored a large "'red flag" on the
face of Defendanfs completed Invitation....
Defendant responded to FCC's Invitation to accept a $5,QQO li.l}e of cre9it by
informing FCC (1) that he wanted the credit and (2) that he was a 21'year,0Id
student. He listed no employer nor any business telephone number. Notwithstand..
ing this information, Cind without funher inquiry as to whether Defendant was
employed or had any resources that might enable him to repay $5,000 in charges in
accordance with FCC's credit terms, FCC chose to give Defendant a $5,000 pre'
approved line of credit based on the absence of prior bankruptcies, assumed names
and the like in Defendant's history.

Id. at 616. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment, finding that such a minimal ~r~dit check
could not constitute the justifiable reliance necessary for nondischargeability. Id. at 616.. 17. Th~ district
court reversed, ho\vever, believing it impossible, on the record before it, to conclude as a matter of law
that the cardholder's representation of intent to repay was obviously false. At most, in the district courfs
view, the record raised an issue of fact as to whether the issuer could claim actual reliance on th~ card..
holder~s promise to repay when the record suggested his inability to make minimum payments. 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11246, *6'*7 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
257
198 B.R. 773 (BA.P. 9th Cir. 1996).
:s8Id. at 777.
259Id. at 778.
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$4000 credit limit by more than $1500. Creditors are not actually put off by
such facts, as we have seen,260 but the court added the astonishing observa..
tion that the issuer was not aware of the excessive balance and thus had no
information that would trigger a duty to investigate. An issuer unaware of
such facts is almost certainly engaged in a conscious effort not to know,
which Field does not sanction. 261 That effort to remain ignorant is not made
more acceptable by the fact that the credit increase at issue in Burdge ~was
provided automatically as part of a promotion.'"262
The court in Burdge believed its conclusion in harmony with the policy of
§ 523(a)(2)(A) to provide a discharge only to honest debtors: ~Accordingly,
the focus should not be on the improvident actions of a creditor, but on the
improper actions of the debtor. Requiring a card issuer to investigate each
time it increases a credit limit would inappropriately provide debtors with an
escape device to their improper actions.'"263 Clearly, the court overlooked the
fact that the elements of common law fraud focus on both the debtor and the
creditor. It is not enough that a debtor has made misrepresentations, even
knowingly and with intent to mislead; in addition, the creditor must have
relied. The Burdge court, in its zeal to identify misbehaving debtors, elimi..
nated the element of fraud that focuses on creditors-the requirement of
justifiable reliance-thereby betraying Field v. Mans while purporting to ap"
ply it.
Most credit card cases subsequent to Field have understood that Field
does impose obligations on credit card issuers. 264 The nature of those obliga..
tions can only be understood in light of industry practices, however.
Credit card issuers usually decide whether to issue a card to a particular
debtor on the basis of that debtor"s credit w,score.'"26.5 W.Scoring'" is a financial
model, first developed by Fair, Isaacs & Co., designed to assess the likelihood
that a debtor will pay his or her bills on time. It is based on a variety of
factors, including:
260St:e .iuprc;; n0tes 17G'9~ and accompar.>·ir.g :e:~t.
'2(\1516 U.S. at 76. See also Chevy Chase Bank, FSB v. Briese (In re Briese), 196 B.R. 440,454 (Bankr.
W.D. \Vis. 1996) r-A plaintiff may not recover for fraud if he ignores a known or obvious risk:}
262
198 B.R. at 778.
263Id. (citations omitted).
264The court in AT&T Universal Card Services v. Alvi (In re Alvi), 191 B.R. 724 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1996), made that point very clearly:

Passively extending credit hardly constitutes reliance on individual instances of
card usage, nor can this Court conceive why such reliance, if it did exist, should
ahvays be justifiable. A creditor cannot sit back and do nothing and still meet the
standard for actual and justifiable reliance when it had an opportunity to make an
adequate examination or investigation.

Id. at 731. See also AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Richards (In re Richards), 196 B.R. 481, 482
(Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1996).
26~But see Manufacturer"s Hanover Trust Co. v. Ward (In rt Ward), 857 F.2d 1082 (6th Cir. 1988).
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(1) payment history; (2) public record and collection items;
(3) delinquencies; (4) outstanding debts; (5) number of bal,
ances; (6) average balances across all trade lines; (7) relation'
ship between total balances and total credit limits; (8) credit
history; (9) age of oldest trade line; (10) applications to ob,
tam additional credit; (11) number of applications and ac,
count openings; (12) time between applications; and (13)
types of credit in use. 266
Obviously, the credit score focuses almost exclusively on the debtor"s pay'
ment history and the absence of negative information. 267 It does not include
information one might reasonably think important to a lending decision. It
does not, for example, include information regarding income 268 or assets. 269
Nor does it include information as to car loans, medical bills, mortgages, bank
accounts, job history or marital status. 270 Nothing in the score reflects the
critical factor of the debtor"s solvency.27 1
Credit scores are developed from information in the files of credit report'
ing agencies; most of the information omitted from the score is omitted pre,
cisely because it is not routinely available in credit files. Creditors, moreover,
are. prevented by Federal Trade Commission regulations from obtaining the
credit files of persons to whom they have not offered credit. 272 Thus, a credit
card issuer cannot make preliminary decisions on the basis of the score and
:!(,(lAT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Ellingsworth (In re Ellingsworth), 212 B.R. 326, 331 (Bankr.
W.O. Mo. 1997). See also Colonial Nafl Bank, USA v. Carrier (In re Carrier), 181 B.R. 742, 749..50
(Bankr. S.ON.Y. 1995).
267AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Ellingsworth (In re Ellingsworth), 212 B.R. 326,330..31
(Bankr. W.O. Mo. 1997); The Gl\1 Card v. Cox (In re Cox), 182 B.R. 626, 637 (Bankr. D. ~1ass. 1995).
68
2 Information as to income may be requested on the application that must be submitted in response to
the "preapproved~ offer. See Colonial Nafl Bank, USA v. Carrier (In re Carrier), 181 B.R. 742 (Bankr.
S.D.N .Y. 1995).
269AT&T Universal Care! Servs. v. Bermingham (In re Bermingham), 201 B.R. 808, 818 (Bankr. W.O.
Mo. 1996),
0
27 AT&T Universal Card Sen's. Corp. v. Ellingsworth (In re Ellingsworth), 212 B.R. 326, 330..31
(Bankr. W.O. Mo. 1997).
27 1Id. at 338.
272 Ironically, one of the fe\v pieces of consumer"protective legislation applicable in the credit card
context, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FRCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681..1681u, was interpreted for several
years in a way that exacerbated the risk..shifting and over..reaching of card issuers. A further irony is that
the credit industry lost its argument against such an interpretation. How legislation designed to benefit
consumers can actually become part of the problem, rather than part of the solution, is a les:>on in unin..
tended consequences. The Federal Trade Commission, which is charged with interpreting the FCRA,
§ 621(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a), \vas the culprit.
Section 604(3) of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(3), provides that a "'consumer reporting agency" may
only furnish a "'consumer report'" (\,'hich is ,'ery broadly defined in § 603(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d» to a
person who
(A) intends to use the information in connection with a credit transaction invoh'"
ing the consumer on \,'hom the information is to be furnished and involving the
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then obtain and review credit reports on individuals with acceptable scores
extension of credit to, or revie\\' or collection of an account of, the consumer;
or
(E) otherwise has a legitimate business need for the information in connection with a business
transaction involving the consumer.
The FTC first addressed the question of the FCRA ~s applicability to prescreened lists in 1973. Its
interpretations stated that prescreening was permissible as long as creditors "have a present intention to
have a business transaction with every person on the prescreened list" and "can certify that every person
listed will be the subject of an offer to enter into the particular business relationship involved.... 38 Fed.
Reg. 4945 (Feb. 23, 1973), codified at 16 C.F.R. § 600.1 et seq. Cf Yonter v. Aetna Finance Co., 777 F.
Supp. 490, 492 (E.D. La. 1991).
That interpretation left unclear the issue of "'postscreening'" - that is, whether creditors could, after
mailing a solicitation to debtors on the prescreened list, decline to issue credit cards in light of negative
credit information acquired subsequently, either from a credit report or from the debtor~s answers to
questions posed on the application form.
In 1978, a staff interpretive letter took the position that even creditors who send "preapproved'" credit
card offers to prescreened prospective cardholders can ask for additional information on application forms
that interested debtors are asked to return or can obtain credit reports, and, on the basis of this later..
acquired information, refuse to issue the card. FTC Staff Interpretive Letter from C. Lee Peeler, Division
of Credit Practices (April 21, 1978).
Then, in 1988, the FTC backed away from that position in a Proposed Comment stating that
"'[p]rescreening is permissible under the FRCA if the client agrees in advance that each consumer whose
nam(. is on the list after prescreening will receive an offer of credit.... Fair Credit Reporting Act: State..
ments of General Policy or Interpretation; Proposed Official Commentary, 53 Fed. Reg. 29,696 (Aug. 8,
1988). Under the Comment,
a creditor cannot impose a minimum income requirement on the credit application it
mails to consumers whose names it has taken from a prescreened list. Nor can the
creditor, except in rare and unforeseeable instances, withdraw the offer based on
new information it learns about the consumer. In other words, the creditor cannot
condition its offer of credit on the consumer remaining as creditworthy several
months later as the consumer was when his or her credit report was accessed.
Scott A. Cammarn, Prescreening Revisited: Is the FTC's •Firm Offer of Credit" Requirement Supported by
the Fair Credit Reporting Act?, 45 CoNSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 365, 365..66 (Fall 1991) (quoting an address
by FTC Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga before the Associated Credit Bureaus Oan. 17, 1991».
Creditors reacted strongly to this position and expressed concern that the proposed Comment would
force them into riskier loans than they might otherwise unde~take:
Those public commenters made strong practical arguments that the prescreening
process would be more helpful if creditors were permitted to mail consumers an
application form, and in return get income and employment information (and per..
haps order a full consumer report), before deciding whether or not to grant credit.
Creditors argued that the prescreening process was a very efficient method of
targeting would..be customers, but \vas not sufficiently precise to enable them to
make firm offers of credit to all consumers who survive the screen.

SS Fed. Reg. 18,807 (May 4, 1990). Despite these arguments, the FTC implemented the Proposed Com"
ment as drafted, in the belief that "'the presence of an intent by the user of the prescreening service to grant
credit provides a sufficient nexus between creditor and consumer to meet the statutory requirement that
the creditor ·intends to use the information in connection with a credit transaction ... involving extension
of credit to the consumer; whereas an intent by the creditor to send promotional material does not.... 55
Fed. Reg. 18,807 (May 4,1990) (footnote omitted) (original emphasis). The FTC permitted an "'out'" only
in the event of "'rare'" and "'isolated" changed circumstances that do not negate the underlying intent to
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before offering credit cards only to them. Issuers have but two choices,
therefore: they may offer ~preapproved't\ credit on the basis of the score
alone; or they may engage in a modest amount of ~postscreening.'t\273
Creditors who proceed on the basis of the score alone may very well have
difficulty demonstrating justifiable reliance. 274 A creditor proceeding with a
extend credit, such as a change of address indicating that the consumer had moved outside of the creditor's
service area or had been imprisoned. Id. at n.15.
Under this view, credit decisions hinging on after'acquired information such as income or employment
status would very likely be interpreted by the FTC as violating the FeRA. This represents a retreat
from the position expressed in the original Staff Letter, under which credit information acquired in a
postscreening process could be used as a basis for denial of a credit card.
Since the 1996 Amendments to the FCRA, however, postscreening is not completely unavailing.
Under § 603(1) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(1), as amended by Pub. L. No. 104,208 § 2402, 110 Stat.
3009 (Sept. 30, 1996), a creditor is permitted to obtain verification
(A) that the consumer continues to meet the specific criteria used to select the
consumer for the offer, by using information in a consumer report on the con'
sumer, information in the consumer's application for the credit ... , or other
information bearing on the credit worthiness ... of the consumer; or
(B) of the information in the consumer's application for the credit ... to determine
that the consumer meets the specific criteria bearing on credit \vorthiness ....
Because creditors may use information in a full credit report or in the application to tailor their lending
decisions to the consumer's particular circumstances, proper risk analysis should require that credit card
issuers take such information into account when opening and maintaining credit card accounts. See Mer'
cantile Bank v. Hoyle (In re Hoyle), 183 B.R. 635 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995) (issuer who offered a preapproved
Visa Gold card to consumer, with a stated minimum credit limit, reduced it by 75% after reviewing the
consumer's credit report).
The FTC's views may put credit card issuers in the position of assuming risks that a different interpre..
tation would enable them to avoid. Once faced with those risks, however, credit card issuers should not
be permitted to shift the risks to cardholders in bankruptcy.
2731n Mercantile Bank v. Hoyle (In re Hoyle). 183 B.R. 635 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995), the creditor sent
the prospective cardholder a ...preapproved.. . application \vith a credit limit of $7500, but, upon receiving
the completed application, reduced the cardholder's credit limit to $1800. Although his debt load was
high in proportion to his income, the cardholder made all of his minimum monthly payments. That \vas "'a
factor that would have made his credit history appear favorable.... Id. at 639. The court found that the
creoitor's reliance was r~asonable.
274FCC Nafl Bank v. Etto (In re Etto), 210 B.R. 734, 740 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1997), quoting Manufac,
turer's Hanover Trust v. Ward (In re Ward), 857 F.2d 1082, 1085 (6th Cir. 1988) (when creditor sends
debtor an unsolicited, preapproved card and debtor signs no application form, creditor "has made a calcu'
lated business decision to assume the risk of nonpayment.. . and "'cannot now ~urn to this Court and ask for
special consideration because the debt owed is being discharged in bankruptcy.. . ).
The same result applies when the creditor has elaborate procedures, but fails to follow them in the
specific case. In Colonial National Bank, USA v. Carrier (In re Carrier), 181 B.R. 742 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1995), the creditor, Colonial, introduced testimony as to elaborate "'backend screening" procedures when a
prospective cardholder responds to a preapproved offer. Those procedures involved checking the applica'"
tion form for completeness and verifying income if any discrepancy appeared. If an applicant \vere self..
employed, ho\vever, Colonial would do nothing and the debtor at issue had in fact stated she was self,
employed. The court found that in such a case Colonial "makes its credit decision based upon disparate
and unverified information..... Id. at 745. The court concluded that a credit check would have revealed
expenses in excess of income and debt of $30,000, $16,000 of which was credit card debt. Thus, Colonial
had not demonstrated the requisite reliance: "Under the circumstances, if Colonial is correct that the
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semblance of an application may not fare much better as far as justifiable
reliance. is concerned. In case after case, creditors have proceeded despite
receiving application forms that request very little information, omit re..
quested information or provide information that should signal caution. In

AT&T Universal Card Services Corp. v. Ellingsworth (In re Ellingsworth),275
the debtor responded by telephone to the creditor"s offer of a preapproved
card, made on the basis of her Fair, Isaacs score. She never signed an applica..
tion form and only verified income and employment on the phone. The credi..
tor did not obtain a credit report on the debtor until it began preparations for
the nondischargeability proceeding, and it never obtained a second credit
score. The court concluded that

[0 ]ffering this customer a pre..approved card, without mak..
ing any individual inquiry into her financial status, is the
equivalent of buying a horse with one eye. If the credit card
issuers choose to continue this profitable technique to in..
crease their customer base, they cannot claim that they justi..
fiably relied upon any representation the customer made at
the time the card was issued. In other words, a creditor can'
not justifiably rely on any representation, or the absence
thereof, made by a card holder if the card was pre'approved,
and no direct financial information was obtained by the
issuer. 276
Issuers often argue justifiable reliance on the basis of the debtor"s record
of making minimum payments. This argument, which has met with mixed
success, may apply at the issuance stage, when the debtor"s record of paying
other creditors is pertinent, or at a later stage, when the creditor seeks to rely
on the debtor"s payment history on the card at issue. A record of timely
payments is particularly important when the debtor is engaged in credit card
kiting, because maintenance of payments obscures the scheme. The court in
Citiban~ (South Da~ota) N.A. v. Eashai (In re Eashai)277 dealt with the prob,
lem of determining justifiable reliance in the context of credit card kiting:
The debtor, who is kiting his credit cards, creates the
illusion that he intends to pay his credit card debts and
honor his credit agreements. . .. If the creditor had \varning
debtor could not have had a reasonable basis to believe that she could pay the Colonial charges, then
neither could Colonial.... Id. at 750.
275 212 B.R. 326 (Bankr. W.O. Mo. 1997).
6
27 Id. at 338..39 (footnotes omitted). Cf First USA Bank v. Hunter (In re Hunter), 210 B.R. 212, 213
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997) (creditor offered debtor a new card during pendency of the nondischargeability
proceeding).
277
87 F.3d 1082 (9th eire 1996).
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that the debtor's account was in danger of default, the credi,
tor will not be able to establish justifiable reliance. We will
not allow a creditor, who has been put on notice of the
debtor's intent not to repay, to extend .credit and then later
claim nondischargeability on the basis of fraud. Unfortu,
nately, the true deceit of kiting is that by making minimum
payments the debtor almost guarantees that his account will
never raise a red flag. 278
Given that maintenance of payments plays a role in the kiting scheme by
contributing to concealment of the activity, creditors may have a stronger
argument for· reliance on the basis of minimum payments when kiting is at
issue. In the ordinary case, however, identification of debtors who make their
payments is one of the primary purposes of scoring. Proceeding on the basis
of a record of minimum payments is substantively equivalent to proceeding
on the basis of the score alone, and the former should achieve no more success
than the latter.
Debtors who maintain large balances and make minimum payments are
particularly attractive prospects because they are especially profitable card,
holders. 279 By paying minimum amounts, but not defaulting, these cardhold,
ers enable issuers to realize the highest possible rates of return. In fact, the
industry has for many years become more and more focused on financially
marginal debtors:
One anomalous effect of the [fraud] exception is to create a
disincentive for creditors to investigate carefully the
creditworthiness of high,risk borrowers. Most. creditors
profit by turning over a large volume of credit transactions
quickly and efficiently, rather than by carefully establishing
and monitoring the creditworthiness of individual debtors.
Since the exception works to the advantage of the creditor
who '4innocently relies't' on the debtor"s representations, the
rule encourages creditors not to look beyond those represen'
tations to other sources of information about the debtor's
ability to repay. In appropriate cases, a creditor may decide
that the possible benefit of having her claim excepted from
discharge outweighs the risks of not investigating further.
By reducing the level of credit investigation, the fraud excep'
~7RId. at 109l.
279The court in AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Ellingsworth (In re Ellings\vorth), 212 B.R.
326 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997), noted that some banks actively encourage cardholders to maintain large
balances. "For example, VISA and MASTERCARD issuer Citibank offer [sic] credit car~ that gi\'e a 2
percent interest rate break to customers who keep a balance of more than $2,500.'" Id. at 331.
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tion encourage~ many debtors to overextend themselves,
bringing them closer to the possibility of bankruptcy.28o
Despite this reality, some courts are willing to find that creditors can
justifiably rely on the debtor"s history of making minimum payments.2Si A
more sanguine approach was taken by the court in Chevy Chase Ban~, FSB v.
Briese (In re Briese),282 which also painted a vivid picture of industry prac"
tices. In that case, the creditor solicited a list of potential customers fitting a
desired profile, within a designated range of credit scores, from a national
credit reporting service. The debtors" names were on that list. The creditor
then sent the debtors, among others on the list, a preapproved credit card
solicitation offering a credit limit of up to $10,000. The debtors returned the
form and the creditor obtained a credit report on them. It learned that the
debtors had a debt..to..income ratio of sixty..six percent, i.e., that their un"
secured debt exceeded two..thirds of their annual income. It also learned that
the debtors had a history of making timely, minimum payments. Although
the debtors had never had a credit card with a credit limit above $5000, the
creditor issued a card with a limit of $11,500, which was more than the
solicitation offered.
The debtor..wife used the card to fund a gambling habit. At the time
bankruptcy was filed, she owed $7800 to this creditor and approximately
$30,000 in overall credit card debt. The creditor contested dischargeability
of the debt, but the court held in favor of the debtor. First, the court found,
under a subjective standard, that the debtor had no intent to defraud.
Rather, the debtor ~had an honest, if questionable and undoubtedly foolish,
belief that she cquId win enough to pay her debts.""283 Second, the court
found no justifiable reliance. 284
28ONote, The Fraud Exception to Discharge in Ban~ruptcy: A Reappraisal, 38 STAN. L. REV. 891,907
(1986) (footnotes omitted).
281AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Samani (In re Samani), 192 B.R. 877, 880 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1996) r[T]he court finds that reliance by the creditor was justified based on debtors' prior sporadic
raYr.:lent of a: !east thc minimuIL monthly amOUlll. dut:"'); lvlercantile Bank v. Hoyle (In re Hoyie), 183 B.R.
635, 639 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995) (Although debtor·s "high debt load and relatively low income made him a
questionable candidate for additional credit[,] ... he always kept his monthly obligations current, a factor
that would have made his credit history appear favorable....). In American Express Travel Related Ser'
vices, Inc. v. Dorsey (In re Dorsey), 120 B.R. 592 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990), the creditor argued that
extension of credit was justified on the basis of the debtor·s payment history. The court seemed to find
the argument incredible, in a passage quoted supra note 239. Nevertheless, the court held the debt nondis'
chargeable because of the debtor·s lack of intent to repay.
282 196 B.R. 440 (Bankr. \\'.D. Wis. 1996).
28 3Id. at 453.
28..
The plaintiff chose to send a "preapproved" solicitation to the debtors because they
fit within its desired customer profile. After receiving their application, it con..
ducted a credit check which revealed their large outstanding debts, including un,
secured credit debts which totalled 66% of their annual income. The plaintiff knew
they made little more than minimum payments; arguably, it knew that they were
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The creditor attempted to justify the amount of credit extended to the
debtors by asserting that their past payment history merited it, but the court
was not persuaded:
However, as debtors" counsel suggested in argument, it is un'
clear exactly how a history of making little more than mini..
mum payments can account for the' extension of such large
sums of credit, unless the creditor"s goal is simply to perpetu'
ate the existence of large balances subject to inflated interest
rates. 28S
Even if the debtor has a history of making regular minimum payments, at
some point that is simply not enough on which a sensible creditor can justifia,
bly rely. Granted, these may be unusual cases, but what of debtors who have
dozens of cards and debt service obligations that threaten to over\vhelm their
resources? What claim to justifiable reliance can be made by the issuer of the
next card? To claim that creditors need look no further than a record of
minimum payments is to assert that creditors may turn a blind eye to realities
that are well understood in every other lending context-debtors can take
on too much, and creditors have a legitimate monitoring function. The issuer
who sends the next card becomes complicit at some point, and should not be
able to resort to protests of a regular payment history.286
financially incapable of making payments any larger than the minimum amount.
The plaintiff relied upon this investigation in extending the debtors a sizeable credit
allotment, and in permitting the continued use of the card. The debtors" actions or
representations \vere largely irrelevant to the plaintiffs chosen course of action.

Id. at 454 (original emphasis).
28SId. at 444 n.6. See also Citibank (New York State) v. Davis (In re Davis), 176 B.R. 118 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 1994):
The concept of actual fraud is particularly troublesome in the context of third
party consumer credit. With little regard to levels of financial sophistication, the
credit card industry has deluged virtually every adult American with invitations to
bc~Oill':' " ~h;,u·g~ ~ustomel. :viciUY of these solidtatiotls uffer "'pleappro,,~d'" cre~it,
whose extension requires nothing but a signature. Lending practices almost en..
courage the misuse of credit, such as to finance existing debt service.

Id. at 120 (footnote omitted).
286Although it involved § 707(b) rather than § 523(aX2)(A), see supra note 5, In re Wolniewicz, 224
B.R. 302 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1998), presents just such a fact pattern. In that case, the debtors owed over
$336,000 on fifty ..nine cards, \vith interest accruing annually in excess of the familis gross income. Most
of the issuers had given these debtors multiple cards; two had issued six and seven cards, respectively, and
the debtors owed each of them more than their gross annual income. The court observed that no objection
to discharge had been filed, perhaps because
the creditors themselves recognized that their practices have contributed mightily
to the disturbing state of the debtors~ financial affairs.... In allowing the accumula..
tion of these unsecured balances, did the creditors give any consideration to the
ability of this family to pay not anyone particular card, but their total obligation?
[The debtor..husband] testified that he and his wife still had not exceeded their
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Creditors have repeatedly argued that fraud is indicated when a debtor
has exceeded the credit limit. This argument, discussed above in relation to
intent to defraud,287 is also belied when the industry's practices are taken
into account. In Bank One Columbus, J\{A. v. Fulginiti (In re Fulginiti),288
the debtor had a credit limit of $7600 and owed the creditor $7638.07 at the
time of filing bankruptcy. The creditor sought to prevent discharge of the
entire obligation, but its representative testified that all customers were al..
lowed to exceed their credit limits by twenty percent before further credit
would be refused. For that reason, the court held the debt dischargeable. 289
Although one might wonder why sophisticated financial institutions issue
credit cards on so nebulous a basis, the reason is no mystery-profit. The
credit card business is extremely lucrative. Profits from credit card opera"
tions are so high that lenders can relax lending requirements, suffer increased
default rates, and still make a generous return. 290
credit limits when they stopped using their cards approximately four months prior
to the bankruptcy filing. Indeed, he stated that even during that four month period,
he received increases in his credit lines....
As in the present instance, creditor conduct may contribute to the creation of
an environment which allows or perhaps even induces the misuse of credit. For this
reason, the mere magnitude of indebtedness does not necessarily establish substan"
tial abuse. Nonetheless, section 707(b) speaks to the propriety of conduct of debt..
ors, not to that of their creditors. Even if misguided, the lending practices of
creditors cannot excuse conduct which rises to the level of substantial abuse.

Id. at 305..06. One difference between §§ 707(b) and 523(a)(2XA), of course, is that the role of creditors
is not ignored under the latter.
287See supra notes 176..92 and accompanying text.
288
201 B.R. 730 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996).
289
[Creditor"s] candid admission that the Debtor"s "real'" credit limit was twenty
(20%) percent in excess of his Wonominal'" credit limit of $7,600 causes us to refrain
from holding that the amount charged in excess of the Debtor"s credit limit must be
deemed nondischargeable . . .. Therefore, we will declare that the Debtor~s entire
liability to the Plaintiff is dischargeable.
Id. at 735. See also AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Chinchilla (In re Chinchilla), 202 B.R. 1010
(Baukc. S.D. FIef. 1996), Vvhi~h criticized the creciitor's emphasis 011 the fact that the debtor exceeded the
credit limit. But see Household Bank. NA. v. Touchard (In re Touchard), 121 B.R. 397,402,,03 (Bankr. D.
Utah 1990), holding nondischargeable the amount in excess of the credit limit because the debtor knew or
should have known her credit limit had been exceeded, but not otherwise explaining how exceeding the
credit limit had affected the debtor"s intent.
290In a review of credit card profits for seven large issuers, Professor Lawrence Ausubel found that
"'extraordinary'" profits have been earned on credit cards since the credit card market was functionally
deregulated by the Supreme Court"s decision in ~1arquette National Bank v. First of Omaha Service
Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978). Lawrence M. Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits, and Ban~,
ruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. LJ. 249, 257..64 (1997) (hereinafter Credit Card Defaults). Professor Ausubel
found that all seven banks in 1985, and six out of the seven in 1986, "attained (pretax) returns on equity
exceeding 100 percent per year!'" Failure of Competition, supra note 97, at 63. This extraordinary profit..
ability also held true when a larger number of issuers \vere considered, including smaller ones, and when
the time period was extended:
[T]he ordinary (pretax) return on equity in banking is on the order of 20 percent
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The lending practices of credit card issuers are largely responsible for the
current high default rate. 291 In an environment in which the profit on every
good customer is sufficient "'to yield extranormal profits,'" issuers have a
strong incentive to attract new customers. Several of the possible ways to do
that-increased advertising, generous introductory offers, and accepting an
increasingly risky customer base-are observable in the market. 292 As the
market becomes saturated, advertising and "'teaser'" rates become less effective
means to attract new customers and "'credit card issuers may be increasingly
drawn to reducing their standards of creditworthiness.'" The default rate,
therefore, should be expected to continue to rise. 293
Justifiable reliance cannot be shown each and every time a debtor uses a
per year. Credit card businesses earned annual returns of 60.. 100 percent or more
during the years 1983.. 1988. Plastic earned strongly positive economic profits: the
credit card business earned 3.. 5 times the ordinary rate of return in the banking
industry.

ld. at 63..64. Professor Ausubel attributes these profits to three factors:
First, a substantial portion of credit card borrowing still occurs at post,introduc,
tory interest rates, and the spread between post.. introductory rates and the cost of
funds remains substantial. Thus, finance charges paid to credit card issuers have
not dropped as much as the introductory offers might suggest. Second, issuers in
the 199<fs have dramatically increased ·hidden fees' such as late.. payment and over..
limit fees .... Third, issuers' operating expenses as a percentage of outstanding
balances has continued to decline in the 1990's.

Credit Card Defaults, supra at 263.
2911d. at 250.. 51 (....[T]he extranormal profitability of credit card lending has been an important factor
contributing to the high current levels of delinquencies and chargeoffs....).
29 2 So me of these marketing techniques were detailed in F.C.C. National Bank v. Gilmore (In re Gil..
more), 221 B.R. 864 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1998). In that case, the issuer sent the debtor a pre.. approved offer
with a $5000 credit limit, no annual fee and a low introductory interest rate. The letter touted the
. . fantastic buying power'" the cardholder would "'command,'" and praised her "'excellent credit history....
When the debtor obtained the card but did not use it, the issuer sent her a letter urging her to do so.
Messages encouraging her to use the card were also included on three consecutive monthly statements,
eve!" though :>he h~d ren the ~ccour.t bahnce frc~ :ero to $250~ in tLo~ mvnths:
The conclusions are inescapable that the plaintiff induced [the debtor] to receive
the credit card, persuaded [her] to use the credit card, and encouraged her to bor..
row the full amount of her credit line, and it did so, according to the letter of
solicitation first sent by the plaintiff to [the debtor], with full knowledge of her
"'excellrnt credit history..... How should this Court now perceive the plaintiff's com"
plaint that the same funds that it begged and encouraged the debtor to borrow
were fraudulently obtained, where the plaintiff voluntarily initiated the credit
relationship with supposedly full knowledge of the risks involved and where the
plaintiff fostered the debtor's participation in that relationship?

Id. at 877 (footnote omitted) (original emphases). The court applied the common law doctrine that one
cannot complain of the consequences of acts-done at one"s own request, and held the debt dischargeable.
293Professor Ausubel concluded that "the long term increase in the rate of defaults is clearly consistent
with enhanced profitability from the average non defaulting customer.'" Credit Card Defaults, supra note
290, at 264.
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credit card. 294 That would impose an impossible standard, leading to dis'
chargeability of all credit card obligations without regard to the extremity of
the debtor"s fraud. An appropriate balancing of risk would clearly be jet..
tisoned by such an approach. Interestingly, however, courts rarely differenti..
ate between the requirement that a creditor undertake an appropriate credit
investigation at the time the card was issued, and an obligation that the credi..
tor maintain current information on cardholders by updating their records. 295
Such a distinction seems particularly vital given the contractual theory on
which credit card liability is based-namely, that issuance of a card consti..
tutes a continuing offer that is accepted from time to time as the card is
used. 296
Even if the card was issued prudently, justifiable reliance is not thereafter
permanently immutable. Indeed, many years may pass between the time of
the card's issuance and the debtor"s bankruptcy.297 Yet research reveals not
294Cf AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. Mercer (In re Mercer), 246 F.3d 391,415 n.32 (5th Cir. 2(01)
(en banc).
295Such a differentiation was made in Colonial National Bank, USA v. Carrier (In re Carrier), 181 B.R.
742 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995), although the distinction between reliance at the time of card issuance and
reliance at the time of card use was not at issue: "'In the case of credit card transactions, \vhere the issuer
and the cardholder do not ·deal' on each transaction, the cases recognize a twofold inquiry: (I) did the
issuer have a reasonable basis to issue the card, and (2) did the issuer act reasonably in monitoring the card
user' Id. at 749. Because the debtor in that case had only had the card a short time, the court found the
second question inapplicable.
The court in Ohio Citizens Bank v. Satterfield (In 're Satterfield), 25 B.R. 554 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982),
also seems to have made such a differentiation:
Whereas reliance in the normal credit transaction contemplates that the issuer of
credit make personal inquiry of the debtor at the time of each credit transaction,
credit card cases involve a continuing relationship between debtor and creditor and
only infrequent inquiry as to the continuing state of the debtor's financial affairs.
As a result, reliance, or lack thereof, cannot be shown as it is in the normal credit
transaction by the creditor's conduct in response to the debtor's statement of his
affairs ina financial statement. For this reason, actual reliance is evidenced by the
fact that the card holder actually purchased the goods on credit.
Id. at 560,61. l'he court is clearly right in recognizing tnat a showing oi reiiance cannot be mandated each

time a card is used. It does not follow, however, that reliance is automatically established by the card,
holder's success in using the card. See also AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Ellingsworth (In re
Ellingsworth), 212 B.R. 326, 330, 338,39 (Bankr. W.O. Mo. 1997) ("'[The creditor] cannot justifiably rely
on any representation made by [the debtor] when [the creditor] issued a pre,approved card to her unless
(the creditor] first obtained information as to her assets, liabilities, income, and expenses, and periodically
updated that infcmnation. . .. Moreover, if [the creditor] did not justifiably rely upon [the debtor's]
representations at the time the card was issue~ reliance cannot then attach when the card is used....)
(emphasis added).
296See supra notes 30,32 and accompanying text.
2971n Mercantile Bank v. Hiemer (In 're Hiemer), 184 B.R. 345 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1995), most of the
debtor's cards were issued between ten and thirty years before bankruptcy. The court in AT&T Univer'
sal Card Services Corp. v. Ellingsworth (In re Ellingsworth), 212 B.R. 326 (Bankr. \V.D. Mo. 1997), is one
of the few even to address this issue:
Credit card debt represents on average about 15 percent of a debtor's debt at the
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one case in which a creditor who issued a card in accordance with prudent
lending procedures was later found not to have justifiably relied because of its
failure to update its records. Furthermore, only scant authority stands con'
trary to the proposition that a creditor who makes an appropriate credit,
worthiness investigation has met the requirement of justifiable reliance in
perpetuity.298 This seems decidedly odd, since the representations upon
which creditors rely are made at the time a card is 'used. 299 And, while no
one is arguing that credit investigations are required each and every time
debtors pull plastic out of their wallets, justifiable reliance cannot have much
meaning if a credit card issuer can sit back and never do anything else. The
initial investigation is designed to assure that a horse represented as sound
does not in fact have but one eye. 3OO Eyesight can dim over time, however,
and everyone knows it. Therefore, justifiable reliance should require that a
card issuer not only make an appropriate credit,worthiness check before a
card is issued, but also that the creditor conduct follow,up investigations at
reasonable intervals. The form a follow,up should take cannot be specifically
determined, but a creditor could be reasonably expected to obtain new credit
reports every year or two and to send questionnaires to their cardholders
asking about current income and expenses at similarly reasonable intervals.
One of the most recent cases makes one of the most serious muddles of
these justifiable reliance principles. In A 'T&'T Universal Card Services v.
time of the bankruptcy filing. But this is rarely recently..acquired debt in anticipa"
tion of the filing. At least 25 percent of discharged debt is from consumers \vhose
accounts had been current just prior to the filing. Moreover, 50 Percent of consum..
ers filing bankruptcy have had an account with the same bank for more than four
years. Given these numbers, it is illogical for the issuer to assume it has no continu..
ing duty to monitor accounts, update users" income, and track other debt to antici..
pate when an individual is no longer a good credit risk.

Id. at 332 (footnotes omitted).
298The proposition is supported by First Deposit National Bank v. Pursley (In re Pursley), 158 B.R.
664.669 (Rankr. N.D. Ohio 1(93). In addition, one of the leading cases in this area, Anastas v. American
Savings Bank (In re Anastas), 94 F.3d 1280 (9th Cir. 1996), has been interpreted not to "'require a creditor
to investigate the credit,worthiness of its credit card holder beyond the initial revie\v conducted at the
time it extended credit to demonstrate justified reliance upon the implied representations made for ea~h
subsequent transaction of the customer." Rembert v. AT&T Universal Card Servs., Inc. (In re Rembert),
141 F.3d 277, 284 (6th Cir.) (Krupansky,}., concurring) cat. denied, 525 U.S. 978 (1998).
The contrary view is well stated by the court in AT&T Universal Card Services Corp. v. Ellings
worth (In r~ Ellingsworth), 212 B.R. 326 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997). The court observed that t\.vcnty..fi\·e
percent of discharged debt is from consumers whose accounts were current at the time of filing anJ ~hat
fifty percent of filers have had an account with the same bank for more than four years. On the basis of
these facts, the court, in the passage quoted supra note 297, concluded that creditors have an ongoing
monitoring obligation. The card at issue in Ellingsworth was issued less than a year before the debtor filed
bankruptcy, ho\vever, so admonitions to creditors regarding their monitoring obligations can be viewed as
so much dicta.
2995« supra notes 112,45 and accompanying text.
3<X'This passage from Fidd v. Mans is quoted supra note 245.
l
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Mercer (In re Mercer),301 the en bane Fifth Circuit approached justifiable
reliance by examining the Restatement, just as Field v. Mans teaches, but
ended up essentially wiping out any obligation on the part of credit card
issuers to do anything whatsoever. The court began with the Restatement"s
rule that, when representations of intention are at i~sue, reliance is justifiable
"'if the existence of the intention is material and the recipient has reason to
believe that it will be carried out.""302 This rule imposes a two'part testmateriality and reason to believe that the intention will be carried out-and
the Fifth Circuit gutted both of them.
The court found materiality present as a matter of law, because 404oin deter,
mining whether to approve the loan requested by card,use, a reasonable is,
suer would attach importance to the existence of a cardholder"s represen,
tation of intent (promise) to pay that loan.""303 On one level, this statement is
tautological: since the cardholder represents an intent to pay by using the
card, the statement may simply mean that issuers only approve credit when
credit cards are used. Given more benefit of the doubt, however, the state,
ment may mean that issuers take cardholders" promises to repay seriously. If
so, the reason seems to relate to the creation of contract liability-promises
carry contract,formative significance and, thus, are important for liability pur,
poses. The problem is that, as we have seen, nonpromissoryliability exists
under a restitution theory.304 Promises are not, in fact, essential to liability.
The second part of the Restatement test for justifiable reliance-that the
recipient has reason to believe that the intention will be carried out-is the
element that raises issues about what sort of investigation, if any, is neces,
sary. The Fifth Circuit repeated Field's conclusion that justifiable reliance
mandates no investigation 305 and moved on to other parts of the discussion.
Interestingly, the Fifth Circuit nowhere noted the critical caveat of Field v.
Mans: 404oNaifs may recover, at common law and in bankruptcy, but lots of
creditors are not at all naive.""306 By this comment, Field recognized that
creditors are not homogeneous; some are quite sophisticated, and justifiable
reliance should be tailored to take account of the context and the relative
sophistication of the parties involved. Mercer missed that point entirely.30?
If no investigation is necessary for justifiabl~ reliance, then it follows that
301

246 F.3d 391 (5th eire 2001) (en bane).

3021d. at 416 (original emphasis), (quoting RESTATEMENT
3031d. at 416.
304 See supra notes 34,38 and accompanying text.
305

(SECOND) OF TORTS,

§ 544).

246 F.3d 391, at 417,18.
)()6516 U.S. at 76. For the more complete quote, see supra 246 and accompanying text.
)07Arguably, this observation by Field is relevant only to actual relianc.e, and not to the justifiability of
reliance, given that actual reliance is mentioned in the very next sentence. If so, Mercer missed that point,
too, since it reduced the requirement of actual reliance to an absurdity - whether the credit card \\'as used.
See supra note 108.
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failure to ask sensible preissuance questions cannot doom a creditor's nondis'
chargeability action. The bankruptcy court in Mercer had found the issuer's
creditworthiness investigation inadequate, even though the issuer had done
more than most,308 because the issuer failed to ask questions about other
credit cards, gambling debts, and the like. Predictably, the Fifth Circuit
found that justifiable reliance . . does not require such due diligence."309 The
court, however, did not ignore that some steps had been taken by the issuer.
It said that the focus of justifiable reliance should be on whether the issuer,
. . based on its credit screening and its relationship with [the debtor] during her
brief card,use, had reason to believe she would not carry out her representa,
tion ... of intent to pay."310 Pertinent facts include the issuer's . . decision to
offer the pre,approved card, based on an examination of [the debtor's] credit
his tory." 311 These remarks may suggest that an issuer is expected to look at
credit bureau reports before issuing a credit card. Or, as seems more likely,
the remarks simply assert that whatever an issuer does or does not do (and in
this case, the issuer looked at credit bureau reports) is enough for justifiable
reliance, as long as no disqualifying information is uncovered. If so inter'
preted, Mercer requires absolutely nothing of credit card issuers, notwith,
standing Field's admonition that naivete, or its absence, is relevant to
justifiable reliance.
When Mercer's analysis of justifiable reliance is added to its treatment of
the other elements of fraud,312 it is clear that the case eviscerates the fraud
)()8The issuer in Mercer obtained a list of prospects from a credit bureau, based on the credit scores,
eliminated names on the basis of its internal standards, and obtained a second credit bureau screening of
the remaining names, to check for changes in credit history. It then offered a preapproved card to each
remaining name, including Ms. Mercer. The application form Ms. Mercer signed asked her income and
Social Security number (along with other, unspecified, questions). After receiving the form, the issuer did
a third credit bureau screening before issuing the card with a $3000 limit. The problem with these steps,
from the· bankruptcy court's viewpoint, was that they all focused on the credit score and iI,!forma~ion
contained in credit bureau files.···
.
)0<)246 F.3d 391, 422.
:Hoid. at 423 lemphasls added).
31l1d. at 423 (emphasis added).
312The first three elements of fraud are those that relate to the debtor. Mercer found the first ele'
ment-a representation-automatically satisfied when a credit card is used. The second element-fal..
sity-is established by showing that the debtor used a credit card while aware of his or her current
inability to repay the debt. The third element-intent to deceive-automatically follows from a finding of
falsity. Thus, the three elements reduce to a determination that the debtor was aware of his or her
financial jeopardy. See supra note 108.
Under Mercer~s view, the fourth element-actual and justifiable reliance-is established by the fact
that the charge was made and the creditor did not have disqualifying information at hand. No steps need
be taken by the creditor to learn facts known in the industry to be determinative of a debtor~s ability to
pay credit card obligations, such as current income, the number of other credit cards held by the debtor,
and amount of outstanding credit card debt. The fifth element-that the creditor suffered a loss-is
automatically satisfied. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
Thus, the only element not presumed or implied under Mercer~s approach is that the debtor~s represen'
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standard despite its claim of following Field v. Mans. Mercer comes within a
hair of making credit card debts automatically nondischargeable, condemning
not only scheming debtors who time bankruptcy petitions to follow luxury
vacations, but also desperate debtors who use their cards to tide themselves
over while hoping for better days to come. The Fifth Circuit is unable to see
the difference, but the difference is everything.
Too ready a finding of nondischargeability of credit card debt, through
misapplication of § 523(a)(2)(A)"s fraud standard, inappropriately shifts lend,
ing risks from credit card issuers to debtors. This externalizes risks that cred,
itors have themselves created through their lending practices. It also permits
creditors, already compensated for the risk of default and discharge, to then
escape the risk itself. This shifting· of risk can only be expected to reduce
monitoring by creditors. That, in essence, encourages a continuation or exac,
erbation of the risky lending practices that have led so many cardholders into
hopeless credit card debt. The vehicle by which bankruptcy"s monitoring
policy is implemented is discharge; any narrowing of its availability to debt..
ors, through application by courts of a less,than,rigorous fraud standard, will
constitute a nudge (nay, a leap) in a direction that courts ought to deplore.

V. THE FAILURE OF SECTION 523(D)
Section 523(d) was designed to police the behavior of creditors in connec'
tion with nondischargeability proceedings. It authorizes an award of reasona'
ble attorney"s fees and costs to a debtor if the creditor makes an attempt that
was ~not substantially justified't'l to establish nondischargeability of a can'
sumer debt under § 523(a)(2).313
tation was false, and it is subjected to a minimal, watered,down standard. One is left to wonder what
became of the notion that § 523(aX2)(A) applies only to actual fraud, as opposed to implied fraud, because,
if Mercer is right, actual fraud is established \\'ithout having to prove much of anything \vith admissible
evidence.
Some impli('at;on,; are 'Pl'scapahle-, if ~ 523(a)(2)(A) is to a!,>ply in credit card cases. For example, most
courts hold, and rightfully so, that the use of a credit card constitutes a representation of intent to repay.
And the fifth element, regarding resulting loss, is obvious. But these realities do not justify Mercer's
approach, under which the only inquiry pertinent to fraud in a credit card dischargeability case is whether
the debtor was aware of his or her financial jeopardy. Rather, these realities make it all the more impor,
tant that the elements of intent to deceive and of actual and justifiable reliance have substance.
313The converse case is one in which a creditor who has successfully prosecuted an action under
§ 523(aX2)(A) seeks to recover attorney's fees. The statute does not expressly treat this situation, but
some courts allow recovery. The court in Transouth Financial Corp. of Florida v. Johnson, 931 F.2d 1505
( 11 th Cir. 1991), held that the successful creditor may recover attorney's fees, despite the statute's silence,
when the parties' contract so provides. See also MBNA America v. Parkhurst (In re Parkhurst), 202 B.R.
816 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996) (a prevailing creditor in a nondischargeability action under § 523(a)(2XA)
will be denied recovery of attorney's fees and costs in the absence of proof of a contractual basis for the
a\vard). In American Express Travel Related Services Co. v. Hashemi (In re Hashemi), 104 F.3d 1122
(9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1230 (1997), ho\vever, the court prohibited recovery of attorney~s
fees provided for under the parties' contract because a 4olodischargeability claim is not an action on the
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The provision has utterly failed adequately to control a particular type of
creditor abuse-namely, utilization of § 523(a)(2)(A) complaints to extract
settlements or reaffirmations from debtors. In AT&T Universal Card Ser,
vices Corp. v. Grayson (In re Grayson),314 for example, AT&T objected to
discharge of credit card obligations in two separate cases. In one of them,
AT&T filed its complaint without attending the § 341 meeting or con'
ducting a Rule 2004 examination. At the pretrial conference, the parties
stated that they were discussing a settlement under which AT&T would be
granted a nondischargeable judgment for the full amount of the debt and exe..
cution would be stayed while the debtor made payments. When the court
expressed concern that the debt appeared to be dischargeable and that a hear..
ing would have to be held in order to determine whether the settlement
should be approved, AT&T stated that it would dismiss the complaint and,
instead enter into a reaffirmation agreement with the debtor. The court re"
minded AT&T that such an agreement would have to be approved by the
court. AT&T responded by withdrawing the complaint because conducting
a hearing would be "'unduly burdensome.~ In the other case, after the matter
was set for trial, AT&T withdrew the complaint because ""the amount of
money involved in the case did not justify the cost of sending a \vitness from
another city to testify.~
The court held both debtors entitled to recover attorney'ls fees under
§ 523(d) because, without examining either debtor, AT&T could not deter,
mine whether its complaints were substantially justified:
As acknowledged by counsel, AT&T had no plans to ever
prove that the allegations in its Complaints were true. In'
stead, these Complaints were filed solely to extract" a settle'
ment from debtors. Once AT&T realized that the cases
~ould not settle, and that it would actually be required to
offer evidence to support the allegations in the Complaints,
it mov~d to diEmiss. 315
In a similar case, AT&T Universal Card Services Corp. v. Chinchilla (In
re Chinchilla),316 the court found the creditor'ls investigation inadequate be..
cause it had not attended the § 341 meeting, contacted the debtors before
contract." Id. at 1126. The court did permit recovery of attorney's fees attributable to litigating the
question whether the debtor breached his agreement with the creditor. ~The costs of litigating this is,
sue-however small they might be because the breach was not disputed-do fall within the letter of the
cardmember agreemenfs fee provision.~ Id. at 1127. Whether the creditor had "'incurred any segregable
fees prosecuting its breach of contract claim, and the amount of any such fees,~ were questions left for
determination on remand. Id.
314
199 B.R. 397 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1996).
31sld. at 403.
316
202 B.R. 1010 (Bankr. S.D. Pia 1996).
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filing the complaint, or even carefully read the debtors" schedules. The court
was unpersuaded by the creditor"s argument that discovery takes place after
the filing of a complaint. Even if generally sound, that approach is inadequate
when the statute requires that a complaint be "substantially justified.'" The
court then provided what surely deserve to become several of the most
quoted lines in bankruptcy:
AT&T"s case is analogous to a gunslinger in the wild west
without ammunition. It does not survive. This Court is not
closing the 523(a)(2)(A) "town gates'" to credit card issuers.
Just don"t ride into town firing blanks and kicking up dust in
the hope of rustling up a settlement. Come in armed with
facts to prove fraud or you may be driven out of town with
a 523(d) bullet in your tail. 317
Bankruptcy courts bear some responsibility for this, because of the inco..
herence of the case law pertaining to discharge of credit card obligations.
Use of the analytical approach advanced in this Article may help reduce this
incoherence and keep the proper balance of risks between cardholders,
whether foolhardy or devious, and credit card issuers.

CONCLUSION
Credit card companies, motivated by profit, are inundating the market
with credit cards that promise the good life on an easy payment plan. Indi..
viduals who ultimately file bankruptcy are not unlike the rest of us, in that
they are susceptible to the enticement. When they amass large credit card
obligations and find themselves unable to pay, however, the issuers of those
cards often challenge the dischargeability of the debts in bankruptcy on the
grounds of fraud.
Courts have struggled to apply § 523(a)(2)(A), which bars the discharge
of obligations incurred by fraud, in credit card cases. Those courts seem to
believe that the lack of face..t:o..face dealings between cardholders and issu~rs
is an obstacle to analysis of the subsection. They also seem to believe that
the various approaches developed for handling these cases-implied represen"
tations, totality of the circumstances and assumption of the risk-are true
alternatives, distinct and mutually exclusive. Thus, courts have spent enor..
mous energy in comparing and critiquing the approaches, explaining why one
is to be selected over the others.
This process is entirely wrong..headed. The task should be approached,
instead, as a process of risk analysis. The beginning principle ought to be the
fundamental notion that risk should be placed on the party best able to antic..
~171d.

at 1018 (footnote omitted).

A-SO

2001)

CREDIT CARDS IN BANKRUPTCY

143

ipate and avoid the risk or to insure against expected losses. From there,
determination of the existence of fraud depends on showing that the debtor..
cardholder made misrepresentations with an intent to deceive, and that the
card issuer relied on those representations to its detriment. Each of the pre"
viously..developed . . approaches,'" rather than being an alternative to the
others, relates to a different element of fraud. Each of them helps fill in the
analysis. The implied representations approach supplies the necessary repre"
sentation, despite the distance between the parties. The totality of the cir..
cumstances approach applies to determinations of the debtor..cardholder's
intent to mislead the issuer. And the assumption of the risk approach, which
focuses on risk allocation and the issuer"s appropriate monitoring role, is im.. ,
ported into fraud analysis through the requirement that the creditor actually
and justifiably relied on the debtor"s representations.
Mass credit card issuers are making a great deal of profit from their satu"
ration of the market, despite the risk and reality of default. The technological
tools on which issuers have built their businesses afford them tremendous
capacity to protect against improvident use of their cards. Issuers, however,
have been reluctant to use that capability to avoid such risks, presumably
because prudence comes at a cost to profit. Rather than using the technology
at hand, issuers argue in courtroom after courtroom that the requirements of
the common law must get in step with the way they choose to conduct their
business. The question is the extent to which longstanding common law doc..
trines should be adjusted, distorted, or entirely cast aside in order to aCCOffi'
modate the industry"s effort to impose its business practices on the
bankruptcy system. Bankruptcy law has no say in the way the credit card
industry conducts its business-that is, until the dischargeability of a particu..
lar credit card claim is at issue. At that point, the bankruptcy system has a
legitimate stake in requiring the card issuer to show that prudent lending
practices were followed and ·that the specific debtor intended to deceive.
Anything less will make bankruptcy courts complicit in the indenturing of
financiaily undereducated and vulnerable consumers.
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Section
Details

Area

Issue

Ch7

Means testing

102

Test uses average monthly income (over 6 months) less (I) IRS collection standards, with up to 5% increase in food and clothing, but
w/o debt repayment; (2) expenses for protection from family violence; (3) continued contributions to care of nondependent family
members; (4) actual expenses of administering a Chapter 13 plan, as determined by the EOUST; (5) expenses for grade and high school
(up to $1500 annually, per minor child), w/documentation of need; (6) additional documented home energy costs; (7) 1I60th of all
secured debt due in the five year after filing (and past due on property necessary for support); (8) 1I60th of all priority debt; and (9)
[current law] continued charitable contributions, up to 15% of gross income. Presumes abuse (I) if at least $100, less than $166.67,
and enough to pay at least 25% of general unsecured debt over 5 years or (2) if ~ $166.67. Presumption overcome only by showing of
unavoidable special circumstances, detailed and sworn to by debtor. Debtor must file calculations as to presumption. UST must file
statement regarding presumption; court must serve on creditors. UST must file motion or statement in all presumption cases where
income exceeds a defined median. Median income limits all invocation of the presumption and limits general standing (for bad faith).

Sanctions imposed on
debtor's counsel

102,319

Fees for trustee's 707(b) motion shifted to debtor's counsel if bankruptcy filing found to violate Rule 9011. Rule to include schedules:
certification of no knowledge, after inquiry, of inaccuracy in schedules; violation by debtor's counsel requires civil penalty.

Support priority

212

Support obligations made first priority, ahead of administrative expenses.

Reaffirmations

203

Extensive disclosure statement (with broad safe harbors for creditors); hardship hearings in some cases of apparent inability to pay.

Secured claims: stripdown,
adequate protection;
valuation

306,
309(c),
327 326

Motor vehicle loans within 5 3 years of bankruptcy and all other secured debts within I year not subject to stripdown. Preconfirmation payments must be made by debtor (w/ proof to trustee) in amounts payable under the plan, which must be in equal amounts
sufficient for adequate protection. Retail value to be used in all individual Chapter 7 and 13 cases in determining 506(a) valuation.

Superdischarge

314,707

No discharge for 523(a)(1 )(B)(C), (2), (3), (4), or willful personal injury/wrongful death damages.

Disp. income; plan length

102,318

For debtors with more than income median, "disposable income" determined according to 707(b) standards; 5-year plan required

Tax returns/budget

315(b)

In all cases, (l) debtor must provide a copy oftax return or transcript for prior tax year to trustee and any requesting creditor within 7
days of 341 meeting, subject to showing circumstances beyond debtor's control; dismissal otherwise; and (2) on request of any party in
interest orjudge, debtor must file currentfederaltax returns or transcript while case is pending, and (in chapter 13 only) annual budgets.

Ch 11

Individuals

321

If any unsecured creditor objects, a 5-year best efforts test applies; estate termination and discharge at end of case.

General

Successive discharge

312

No discharge in Chapter 13 if prior discharge in (a) any Chapter 7, II, or 12 case filed within 5 3 years of pending filing or (b) except
for extreme hardship, in any Chapter 13 case filed within 2 years. Section 727(a)(8) extended from 6 to 8 years (prior 7/11 discharge).

Audits

603

Random audits of 0.4% of all consumer filings and of all schedules "reflecting greater than average variance" from district norms,
conducted conducted (a) under GAAS by independent certified or licensed public accountants or (b) under Attorney General regulations.

Debtor education
Counseling

lOS, 106

Completion of education program a condition for discharge in Ch 13; failure to complete grounds for denying discharge in Ch 7; pilot
programs concurrent with mandatory. Counseling a §109 eligibility requirement; 5-day exigency exception.Phone or internet okay.

Automatic stay

302,311

30-day termination of stay in first repeat filing in one year; no automatic stay in second repeat filing (subject to good faith showing
by party in interest). Conflicting provisions for terminotion of stoy os to resident/til leoses.

Notice

315(a)

Creditors must be served at addresses filed with the court or listed on two communications with the debtor within 90 days of filing.

Exemptions

307,308
322

730-day residency required for state exemptions; $125K cop on all homestd exemptions. 7-yr exclusion of value frauduleDtly
added to homestd; 2-year $100K cap OD value added to homestd (uDless from prior homestd iD same state).

Expedited bankruptcy
appeals

1233
1235

Direct appeal ofbankruptcy court decisions to circuit if authorized by the circuit on certification by any lower court or all parties.
No direct appeal, but 30-day appeal iD the district court uDless order eDtered extending the period,

Effective date

14011501

180 days after enactment; provisions generally inapplicable to cases filed before the effective date.

Ch 13

.-l
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Changes to the Bankruptcy Code Affecting Consumer Bankruptcy
Practice Included in The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001

Prepared by:
Henry E Hildebrand
Chapter 13 Trustee
Nashville, Tennessee
NOTE:

The listing below is intended to outline most of the
changes made to general consumer bankruptcy cases by the
Reform Act of 2001. It is not intended that the language
used to describe the change is totally consistent with
the language of the law, references are accordingly made
to the section of the code, as amended and readers are
encouraged to consult those sections directly.

PRE-PETITION MATTERS
1.

No individual may be a debtor under Title 11 unless, within
180 days prior to the filing of the petition, the debtor has
received an individual or group briefing that outlined
opportunities for credit counseling and assisted the debtor
in performing a personal budget analysis. 109(h) (1)

REPRESENTING DEBTORS
2.

bankruptcy petition preparer is specifically prohibited
from advising a debtor whether to file, what chapter to file
under, whether the debtor will receive a discharge and the
debts that would be covered by such discharge, whether the
debtor may retain property after the filing, the
dischargeability of tax obligations, whether the debtor can
or should reaffirm any debt, the characterization of any
debt, or information relating to any bankruptcy procedure.
110(e) (2)

3.

Professionals may clearly be compensated on a fixed fee or
percentage fee basis, and are not limited to fees determined
on a lodestar basis. 328(a)

4.

Whether a professional is board certified is a factor which
may be considered in fixing the compensation of such

A
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professional. '330 (a) (3) (E)
5.

The automatic stay would expire 30 days after the filing of a
case if the debtor had been in another case within one year
and that prior case had been dismissed.
The court could
extend the stay, after a hearing that must be completed within
the 30 days after the filing of the petition, if the filing of
the second case is held to be in good faith. There is a
presumption of a lack of good faith if the debtor were in more
than one prior case within the year, if the debtor failed to
file documents in the earlier case, failed to provide adequate
protection, failed to perform under a confirmed plan or there
were not a substantial change in the debtor=s circumstances.
'362 (c) (3)

6.

No automatic stay would arise at all if the debtor filed a
case and was a debtor in two cases within the previous year.
In such case, upon request of any party, the court could enter
an order confirming that no stay is in effect. Within 30 days
of the filing of the petition, any party can request the court
to impose a stay if the party demonstrates that the filing is
in good faith. There is a presumption that the filing is not
in good faith if the debtor were in two previous cases, the
debtor failed to file required documents, failed to pay
adequate protection payments, or failed to comply with the
terms of a confirmed plan. The debtor must demonstrate that
there has been a substantial change in the debtor=s
circumstances in order for the court to impose the stay.
'362 (c) (4)

7.

The stay terminates as to personal property if the debtor
fails to file a statement of intent in a timely fashion and
fails to take action to implement to statement of intent
within the time prescribed - 30 days after filing for the
statement of intent and 45 days after the meeting of
creditors to perform. Upon motion of the trustee, made
within the 30 day period after the meeting of creditors, the
court may prevent the automatic termination of the stay.
[NOTE: there appears to be some conflict between
'521(a)(2)(8) and '521(a)(6).] '362(h)

8.

A debtor=s exemptions are determined by examining state law
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and the state applicable is the state where the debtor has
been located for 730 days prior to the filing of the petition.
If the debtor has not been located in a single state for that
two year period, the exemptions are determined by the debtor=s
domicile for the majority of the 180 days that preceded the
730 period. '522 (b) (3) (A)
9.

Homestead exemptions would be limited to $125.000 in the
Senate bill and could be reduced by the amount that the debtor
had put into the homestead within 7 years from the proceeds of
property that the debtor disposed of in an effort to hinder
creditors in the House bill. '522(0)

10.

ADebt relief agencies~ are prohibited from making misleading
statements about its services and cannot advise a debtor to
incur more debt in contemplation of bankruptcy or to pay a
fee. '526

11.

Debt relief agencies must disclose the costs of their
services, must provide to all clients a written notice of
their rights, must enter into a written contract with their
clients, must provide a copy of the contract to the client,
must disclose that an attorney may not be necessary to file
a bankruptcy, and must maintain copies of disclosures given
to any person for 2 years. ~27

12.

A debt relief agency must disclose in advertising: AWe are

a debt relief agency. We help people file for bankruptcy
relief under the Bankruptcy Code.~ Advertising must not
mislead a consumer to believe that credit counseling is
offered rather tha·n bankruptcy assistance. '528

FILING AND NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
13.

The names of a debtor=s minor children need not be disclosed
in any document that will become a part of the public
record, but such children=s identities maybe maintained in
a nonpublic record, available to the judge, the trustee,
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the US Trustee, or an auditor. [NOTE: The Bankruptcy
Administrator appears to be excluded] 212
14.

Notice to be given by a debtor to a creditor must be to the
address designated by the creditor in at least two
communications sent to the debtor within 90 days of the filing
of the petition. '341(d)(2)

15.

Notice provided by a debtor to a creditor must include the
account number used by the creditor if at least two
communications sent to the debtor in the 90 days prior to
the filing of the petition contained the account number.
'341 (d) (2)

16.

In all chapter 7 cases in which the presumption of abuse
under '707(b) is triggered, the clerk must provide notice of
such a trigger to all creditors within 10 days of the filing
of the petition. '341(d)

17.

Any entity may file a preferred address with the court for
all notices given by the court thereafter in chapter 7 or
chapter 13 cases, letting the court thereafter substitute
the creditor=s preferred address with the address listed by
the debtor on the matrix or the schedules. A creditor could
thereafter change such address in an individual case by
filing a case specific notice of preferred address. '342(f)

18.

Notice provided to a creditor, inconsistent with the address
and account number obligations (presuming the creditor
included such on two mailings within 90 days prior to the
filing) shall not be effective until the notice has been
brought to the attention of the creditor. If a creditor has
a person to whom bankruptcy notices are to be provided and
has a reasonable procedure to get notices to such person,
then a notice has not been brought to the attention of the
creditor until the notice is received by the designated
person. '342 (g)

19.

No sanctions under '362(k) [formerly '362(h)] or sanctions
fora failure to turnover property upon the filing of a
petition may be imposed unless the action or failure takes
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place after the creditor has received notice as prescribed
in the notice provisions of the Code. 342(g)(2)
20.

Debtors must file with the court copies of all payment advices
received by the debtor in the 60 days prior to the filing.
'521 (a) (1) (B) (iv)

21.

Debtors must file a statement of Amonthly net income~ (not,
apparently, Current Monthly Income) which shows how that
amount was calculated. '521 (a) (1) (B) (v)

22.

Debtors must file a statement showing any anticipated
increase in income or expenditures anticipated within the
year after fil ing. '521 (a) (1) (B) (vi)

23.

Debtors must file a certificate from the budget and credit
counseling agency describing services proved to the debtor and
the debtor must file a copy of the debt repayment plan if one
were developed. ~21(b)

24.

The debtor must deliver to the trustee a copy of the
debtor=s latest tax return or a transcript at least 7 days
prior to the meeting of creditors or the debtor=s case
Ashall~ be dismissed. '521(e)(2)(A)

25.

The debtor must provide a copy of the tax return or
transcript to any creditor that requests a copy at the same
time the debtor provides such to the trustee. ~21(e)(2)(B)

26.

Debtors must file all tax returns no later'than the day before
the meeting of creditors is first scheduled. If the return is
not filed, the trustee may hold open the meeting for a
reasonable period of time to allow the filing of the returns
but no longer than 120 days. 1308

POST-PETITION OBLIGATIONS
27.

A person whose primary activity is the owning or operating
of real estate would need to file periodic reports on
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28.

profitability, cash receipts and disbursements, the debtor=s
compliance with the code and whether the debtor has filed
all tax returns. [NOTE: While obviously intended to be
applicable to chapter 11 cases, nothing in the statute
restricts the application of this obligation to cases under
that chapter.] '308(b), 101(510)
Debtors must perform the statement of intent as to secured property
within 30 days after the date first set for the meeting of
creditors (see &7 above). '521 (a) (2) (B)
29.

Debtors may no longer retain possession of personal property
if the obligation is not reaffirmed or the property is not
redeemed within 45 days of the meeting of creditors
date. [NOTE: See &31, above] 'S21(a)(6)

30.

On the anniversary of the confirmation of a chapter 13 plan,
a debtor must file a new statement of income and
expenditures along with the source of the debtor=s income at
that time. '521(f)(4)

31.

If requested by the trustee or the US Trustee, a debtor must
provide a photographic ID and other personal identifying
information that establishes the debtor=s identity. '521(i)

32.

A debtor can be denied a discharge if the debtor fails to

complete an educational course concerning personal financial
management. '727(a) (11)
33.

At the time a discharge is entered, the trustee must notify

the holder of a support claim and the applicable state child
support agency the last known address of the debtor, the
address of the debtor=s employer, the name of each creditor
holding a debt not dischargeable under '523(a)(2),(4), or
(14), and all debts reaffirmed. A support creditor may
request the last known address of a debtor from any
creditor. 2302(d)
34.

Within 60 days of the filing of a petition, a Chapter 13
debtor must provide to lessors or secured creditors
reasonable evidence of insurance on the property that the

B -8

debtor retains. The debtor must continue to provide proof
of such insurance for as long as the debtor retains
possession of the property."326(a)(4)
CHAPTER SEVEN ISSUES

35.

The compensation to be paid to a Chapter 7 trustee is in the
nature of a commission, arguably eliminating the position that
a trustee is to be compensation based on an hourly rate capped
by the amounts specified in 1326. '330(a)(7)

36.

A chapter 7 debtor may personally assume a lease of personal
property if the trustee does not assume such lease and the
creditor consents to the assumption. Such an assumption only
imposes 1iabil ity upon the debtor, not upon the estate.
'36S(p) (2)

37.

Domestic support obligations are a first priority, trumping
even the costs of administration. To the extent such
support claims have been assigned to a governmental entity,
such assigned claims are subordinated to the support claims
that are not assigned. 'S07(a)(1)

38.

Retirement funds that are recognized as such by the IRe are
exempt. '522 (b) (4)

39.

A trustee can not avoid a payment made to a creditor in
accordance with an alternative repayment plan created by a
credit counseling agency. ~47(h)

40.

Dismissal of a chapter 7 case for abuse based upon a
presumption of abuse can be requested by the US Trustee, the
Bankruptcy Administrator, or the court if the debtor=s
income is less than the median income. In addition, the
trustee, or any creditor can bring a motion to dismiss based
upon a presumption of abuse if the debtor=s income is
greater than the median income. 707(b)(1)

41.

Abuse is presumed the debtor=s current monthly income, less
secured contract payments due over five years divided by
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sixty, less arrearages which would need to be cured in a
chapter 13 plan divided by sixty, less priority debts
divided by sixty, less the allowed expenses permitted by the
IRS in its financial analysis standards - national,
regional, and local, less other actual expense~ as permitted
by the IRS, less charitable contributions not to exceed 15%
of the debtor=s income, less an additional 5% allowance for
food, less the actual monthly costs of caring for an
elderly, ill or disabled family member, even if not a
dependent, less the expenses of administering a chapter 13
case, less $125 per month for each child in school, less
additional costs for utility expenses is greater than $167
or is greater than $100 and is greater than 25% of the
debtor=s non-priority, unsecured debts. 707(b)(2)
42.

chapter 7 debtor could not receive a discharge if the
debtor received a discharge in a case'commenced within 8
years of the filing of the petition. 727(a)(8)

A

CREDITOR ISSUES
43.

The representation of a creditor at a chapter 7 or chapter
13 meeting of creditors need not be by counsel but may be
through an employee or agent of the creditor, which agent is
permitted to represent multiple creditors. Such
authorization may not be limited by any local or state rule
governing the unauthorized practice of law. 341(c)

44.

Upon conversion of a case from chapter 13 to chapter 7
valuations of property established in the chapter 13 would
no longer apply and the entire debt of a secured creditor
would be secured by the collateral and its lien would remain
until the entire debt to the creditor is satisfied.
'348(f) (1) (C) (i)

45.

Only if a prebankruptcy default were fully cured in a
chapter 13 case prior to a conversion to chapter 7 would
such default not be given its non-bankruptcy effect in the
chapter 7. Thus, upon conversion a default that has not
been cured could continue to be treated as a default.
348(f) (1) (C) (ii)

B ·10

46.

The automatic stay would not apply with respect to the
withholding of income that is property of the estate or
property of the debtor for the payment of a domestic support
obligations, which would include support obligations
accruing both before or after the filing, so l~ng as such
obligations were in the nature of alimony, maintenance or
support, even where such obligation has been assigned to a
governmenta1 uni t . '362 (b) (2) (C)

47.

The automatic stay would not be appl icable to the suspension
of a drivers, professional, occupational and recreation
licenses as such is permitted by 42 USC '666(a)(16) which is
effective upon the nonpayment of support. '362 (b) (2) (D)

48.

The automatic stay would not apply to the interception of
tax refunds for the purpose of collecting support
obl igations. '362 (b) (2) (F)

49.

The automatic stay would not impair the creation or
perfection of a statutory lien for ad valorem taxes on
personal property or taxes upon real property when the taxes
are assessed by a governmental unit after the filing of the
petition. '362 (b) (18)

50.

The automatic stay would not halt the withholding of income
from a debtor=s wages in order to repay a loan incurred by a
debtor from the debtor=s retirement or pension account.
This would appear to overturn Harshbarger from the Sixth
Circuit. (In re Harshbarger, 66 F3d 775 (6th Cir. 1995».
'362 (b) (19)

51

The court may grant in rem relief from the automatic stay as
t~ real property, thus precluding the application of the
stay in any subsequent bankruptcy case, if the bankruptcy
were filed as part of a scheme to hinder, delay or defraud
creditors which also included the unauthorized transfer of
the real estate or involved multiple bankruptcy filings.
''362 (d) (4) and 362 (b) (20)

52

The automatic stay would not apply in any action to enforce
a lien against real property if the petition were filed by
an ineligible debtor, made ineligible by virtue of a prior
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dismissal, or where such a filing were made in violation of
a court order that prohibited the filing. 362(b)(21)
53

The stay would not prevent or halt a detainer action if the
debtor had failed to pay rent on the debtor=s residence
after the petition were filed or failed to pay rent due ten
days prior to the filing. The landlord seeking to pursue
the detainer action would be required to certify that the
payment had not been made or that the debtor only had a
tenancy that was month to month. '362 (b) (23)

54

The stay would not act to prevent or halt the eviction of a
debtor if, during the two years prior to the filing of the
petition, the debtor had been in another bankruptcy where
the debtor or another occupant of the leased premises failed
to pay rent. '362(b)(24)

55

The stay would not prevent the setoff of a prepetition tax
refund against a prepetition tax liability. '362(b)(26)

56

Creditors are protected from the imposition of punitive
sanctions if the creditor acts in a good faith belief that
the automatic stay has been terminated due to the failure of
a debtor to perform his or her statement of intent.
'362(k) (2)

57

The stay is not violated by a lessor contacting and
negotiating with a debtor relative to the debtor=s proposed
assumption of a lease of personal property. '365(p)(2)(C)

58

If a lease of personal property is not assumed in a Chapter
13 plan, at the conclusion of the meeting of creditors the
stay and the codebtor stay are terminated as to the
property. 365 (p) (3)

59

Granting a utility an administrative expense priority is not
sufficient to provide adequate assurance of payment under
'366 and the stay does not prevent a utility from setting
off a prepetition deposit against a prepetition liability.
'366 (c)
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60

The bar date for tax claims is extended to 60 days after the
filing of the return if the filing of the return in question
occurs after the filing of the petition. ~02(b)(9)

61

The court may reduce a dischargeable unsecured claim by 20%
if the creditor unreasonably refused to negotiate an
alternative prepayment schedule proposed by an approved
credit counseling agency. To be reasonable, a repayment
proposal must have proposed to pay at least 60% of the debt
and have been made at least 60 days propr to the filing of a
petition. ~02(k)(1)

62

Values of personal property securing claims shall be
determined upon the replacement value standard, determined
as of the date of the bankruptcy filing with no deduction
permitted for marketing costs. For household goods,
replacement value would be the price a retail merchant would
charge for such property given its age and condition.
'506(a) (2)

63

The priority Alook back period~ of 210 days from assessment
of taxes would be suspended for any period in which an offer
in compromise was pending or a stay was in effect.
'S07(a) (8) (A).

64

The three-year look back period for priority treatment of
taxes would be suspended for any period in which collection
was prevented by the existence of a confirmed plan plus an
additional 90 days. '507(a) (8)

6S

DUI claims for death or personal injury would become
priority claims. ~07(a)(lO)

66

The definition of Ahousehold goods~ for purposes of lien
avoidance are limited to clothing, furniture, appliances, 1
radio, 1 television, 1 VCR, 1 personal computer (so long as
the computer is used primarily for the education or
entertainment of minor children), and medical equipment and
supplies. AHousehold goods~ specifically does not included
works of art, other electronic entertainment equipment,
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antiques, jewelry (except a wedding ring) [NOTE: that
jewelry is excluded from the definition of a household good
has little impact, since liens can be avoided on jewelry,
irrespective as to whether the jewelry is a household good],
motorized vehicles or recreational devices, and tractors.
'522 (f) (4)
67

The presumption that an unsecured debt was incurred with
fraud is lowered to debts incurred within 90 days of the
filing that aggregate at least $750 for luxury goods or
services ($250 in the House bill). ~23(a)(2)

68

The exception to discharge for student loans is expanded to
encompass all student loans as defined by the IRe
'221(e) (1) , expanding non-dischargeable student loans to for
profit and non-governmental entities. ~23(a)(8)(B)

69

Debts incurred to pay taxes to any governmental unit, not
simply Federal taxes, are non-dischargeable. ~23(a)(14A)
Loans to a pension fund are non-dischargeable. ~23(a)(18)

70
71

Reaffirmations will require extensive disclosures, outlining
detailed rights that the debtor has and specifying the
amount of the debt being reaffirmed,additional charges or
costs imposed upon the debtor, the annual percentage rate,
the simple interest rate applicable to the amount
reaffirmed, if elected by the creditor, a statement of the
repayment schedule, a description of the debtor=s repayment
obligations with some specificity, the right to consult an
attorney, the need to file the reaffirmation with the court
before it becomes effective, the right to rescind the
reaffirmation within 60 days of the filing of the
reaffirmation agreement with the court. A debtor must file a
statement in support of the reaffirmation agreement and the
debtor=s attorney must certify that the agreement does not
impose an undue hardship upon the debtor. A reaffirmation
agreement is presumed to impose a hardship upon a debtor if
the debtor=s expenses including the payments on the
reaffirmed debts are greater than the debtor=s income. If
such presumption exists, the debtor=s attorney must affirm
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that in the attorney=s op1n10n, the debtor can make the
payments. All reaffirmation agreements, the payment of
which creates a presumption of undue hardship, must be
reviewed by the court except for debts reaffirmed with a
credit union. The court must review all reaffirmations
proposed by a pro se debtor. Although reaffirmation
agreements must be executed prior to the entry of a
discharge, there is no deadline for filing the reaffirmation
agreement - it just cannot be enforced until the 60 day
period has passed. ~24(k)
72

The willful failure of a creditor to credit the payments
made to the creditor pursuant to a reorganization plan in
acc~rdance with the plan constitutes a violation of the
discharge injunction if the failure to properly credit the
payments caused a material injury to the debtor. '524(i)

73

The post discharge injunction is not applicable to a
creditor with a lien on the debtor=s residence seeking or
obtaining periodic payments associated with a lien in lieu
of in rem relief to enforce its rights. ~Z4(j)

74

Funds deposited in an education individual retirement
account or in a tuition credit or certificate more than a
year prior to the filing of the bankruptcy would not be
property of the estate. '541 (b) (5) and (b) (6)

75

Pawned property is not property of the estate.

76

The period for alien perfection to rel ate back under '547
is expanded from 20 days to 30 days. ~47(c)(3)(B)

77

A debtor may redeem property only by satisfying the lien in
full at the time of redemption. 722

~41(b)(9)

COURT PROCEDURES
78

The Court may dispense with the need for a meeting of
creditors if the debtor has solicited acceptances to a plan
prior to the commencement of a case. [NOTE: Although clearly
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intended to
prepackaged
the statute
12, or 13)]

apply only to Chapter 11 cases - mindful of the
chapter lIs that have been somewhat successful applies to any reorganization case (chapter II,
'341(e)

79

Final resolution of a motion for relief from the stay must be
rendered within 60 days of the request. '36Z(e)(Z)

80

The court must provide a copy of a debtor=s chapter 13 plan
within 5 days after receiving the request and may impose a
reasonable cost for providing it. '5Z1(e)(3)(B)

81

Upon the request of any party, the debtor must file with the
court a copy of the Federal tax return or transcript thereof
for any tax period after the filing of the petition or, if
tax returns were not filed by the time of the filing of the
petition, for the tax periods within three years prior to
the filing of the petition. '521(f)

82

If a debtor fails to file the documents required under '521
within 45 days of the filing of the petition, the case will
be automatically dismissed on the 46~ day. Any party may
request an order of the court recognizing the automatic
dismissal and the court must enter such an order within five
days of a request. The court may permit additional time to a
debtor to file the documents if request is made in the first
45 days. 'S21(j)

83

The United States Trustee must review all materials filed by
a chapter 7 debtor ,and, not later than ten days after the
initial meeting of creditors date, file a statement as to
whether the presumption of abuse is triggered. The court
must serve this statement within five days of filing.
Within 30 days of filing the statement, for cases in which
the debtor=s income exceeds the median income, the United
States Trustee must either file a motion to dismiss or
convert or file a statement setting forth the reasons why
the motion is not appropriate. The US Trustee may decline to
file a motion if the debtor=s income is less than 150% of
the median income. 704(b)
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84

chapter 7 or chapter 13 trustee must notify the holder of
a support claim of its rights to use the services of a
support enforcement agency, must disclose the address and
phone number of the agency to the support creditor, must
provide an explanation of the rights of the support creditor
and must notify the support assistance agency in the state
in which the holder resides of the name, address and
telephone number of the holder of the claim. '704(c)(1) and
1302 (d)
A

CHAPTER 13 ISSUES
85

If a chapter 13 debtor fail s to file a tax return in a timely
fashion, the court shall dismiss or covert the case. 1307(e)

86

If a debtor is proposing to pay all disposable income for a
period of five years, then the plan may provide for payment
of less than 100% to the holder of a claim under
'507 (a) (1) (B) [assigned support cl aims]. 1322 (a) (4)

87

A chapter 13 plan may provide for the payment of interest
accruing post petition on any unsecured claim that is nondischargeable, if the debtor has proposed a plan that pays
all allowed claims in full. 1322(b)(lO)

88

If a chapter 13 debtor=s income is greater than the
applicable median income, the plan proposed by the debtor
must be for at least five years. 1322(d)(1)

89

A

90

A hearing on confirmation of a chapter 13 plan must take
place no sooner than 20 days and not. later than 45 days
after a meeting of creditors. 2324(b)

91

A

chapter 13 plan may not materially alter the terms of a
pension loan and the amounts required to pay such loan are
not to be construed as disposable income. 2322(f)

chapter 13 plan must provide that a secured creditor
retain its lien until the payment of the entire underlying
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debt, not simply the secured portion of the debt.
'l3ZS(a) (S) (B) (i)

92.

Periodic payments to be made to a secured creditor must be
made in equal monthly amounts, and such monthly amount must
be sufficient to provide to the holder of the claim adequate
protection. 'l32S(a) (S) (B) (ii)

93.

A chapter 13 plan cannot be confirmed unless the debtor
demonstrates that all post petition support payments have
been made. 'l3ZS (a) (8)

94.

A

95.

The prOV1S1ons of '506 shall not apply to a claim treated
under '1325(a)(5) if the creditor holds a purchase money
security interest in a motor vehicle that was incurred
within 3 years [5 years in the House version] or a purchase
money security interest .in any other thing of val ue incurred
within 1 year of the filing. '1 325 (a)

96.

For debtor=s with income greater than the applicable median
income, the amount which must be paid in a plan to unsecured
creditors is determined by applying the means test of
'707(b) (2). '1 325 (b)

97.

A chapter 13 debtor must commence payments under a plan

chapter 13 plan cannot be confirmed unless the debtor has
filed all tax returns. 'l325(a)(9)

within 30 days of the filing of the petition but may reduce
the payments to the trustee by the amounts that the debtor
pays directly to lessors of personal property or purchase
money secured creditors. 'l326(a)(1)
98.

A chapter 13 debtor must pay directly to the lessor of
personal property the lease payments that become due after
the filing of the petition and must provide to the trustee
proof that such payments were made. '1 326(a) (1) (B)

99.

A

chapter 13 trustee must pay directly toa purchase money
secured creditor payments that are sufficient to .p·rovide
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adequate protection and must provide to the trustee proof
that such payments were made. 1326(a)(1)(C)
100.

chapter 13 plan must provide payments to a chapter 7
trustee awarded compensation for successfully dismissing· or
converting a case pursuant to '707(b) , and the payments to
the trustee should be prorated over the plan in amounts of
5% of the payments to unsecured creditors divided by 60 or
$25 per month. '1326(b) (3)

101.

A chapter 13 debtor may not receive a discharge unless the

A

debtor certifies that all amounts due to a support
obligation are fully paid. '1328(a)
102.

No discharge would apply to support claims, taxes the debtor
should have withheld, unfiled or late filed tax obligations,
fraud claims, unlisted debts, defalcation debts, long term
debts, student loan obligations, DUI obligations criminal
restitution and criminal fines, restitution or damaged from
a civil action due to willful or malicious injury to a
person. '1328(a)

103.

A debtor may not receive a discharge in a chapter 13 if the
debtor received a discharge in a chapter 7, 110r 12 case
filed within three years of the filing of the chapter 13.
1328(f) (1)

104.

chapter 13 debtor may not receive a discharge if the
debtor received a discharge in a previous chapter 13 case
filed within two years. of the filing of the current case.

A

1328(f) (2)
105.

The court may not grant a chapter 13 discharge unless the
debtor has completed an educational course concerning
personal financial management as approved by the United
States Trustee. 1328(g)

106.

A debtor may modify a plan to reduce payments if the
debtor=s health insurance costs have increased. 1329(a)(4)
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PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 523 OF THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE AS MADE BY H.R. 333 OR 8.420
S~420

H.R. 333
§ 523(a)(2)l£lill. for purposes of subparagraph (A) --(I)

§ 523 (a) (2) (C) (i) for purposes of subparagraph (A) ---

consumer debts owed to a single creditor and 0)

consumer debts owed to a single creditor and

aggregating more than $250 for luxury goods or aggregating more than $750 for luxury goods or
services incurred by an individual debtor on or within services incurred by an individual debtor on or within
90 days before the order for relief under this title are 90 days before the order
presumed to be nondischargeable: and
(II)

fo~

relief under this title are

presumed to be nondischargeable: and

cash advances aggregating more than $750 that (II)

cash advances aggregating more than $750 that

are extensions of consumer credit under an open end are extensions of consumer credit under an open end
credit plan obtained by an individual debtor on or credit plan obtained by an individual debtor on or
within 70 days

befo~re

the order for relief under this within 70 days before the order for relief under this

title, are presumed to be nondischargeable; and

title, are presumed to be nondischargeable; and

(ii) for purposes of this subparagraph ---

(ii)

(I)

the term "extension of credit under an open end (I)

for purposes of this subparagraph --the term "extension of credit under an open end

credit plan" means an extension of credit under an credit plan" means an extension of credit under an
open end credit plan.. within the meaning of the open end credit plan. within the meaning of the
Consumer Credit Protection Act (15 U.S.C. 1601 et Consumer credit Protection Act (15 U.S.C. 1601 et
~

lli11
(I)

the term "open end credit plan" has the (II)

the term "open end credit plan" has the

meaning Qiven that term under section 103 of meaning given that term under section 103 of
Consumer Credit Protection Act (15 U.S.C. 1602); and
(III)

Consumer Credit Protection act (15 U.S.C. 1602): and

the term "luxury goods or services" does not (III)

the term "luxury goods or services" does not

include goods or services reasonably necessary for the include goods or services reasonably necessarY for the
support or tnaintenance of the debtor or a dependent of support or maintenance of the debtor or a dependent of
the debtor.

the debtor.
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§ 523(a)(8) unless excepting such debt from discharge § 523(a)(8) unless excepting such debt from discharge
under this paragraph would impose an undue hardship under this paragraph would impose an undue hardship
on the debtor and the debtor's dependents, for-

on the debtor and the debtor's dependents, for-

(A)(i) an educational benefit overpayment or loan CA)Ci) an educational benefit overpayment or loan
made, insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit, made, insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit,
or made under any program funded in whole or in part or made under any program funded in whole or in
by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution: or

party by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution:

!.iil-an obligation to repay funds received as an or
educational benefit, scholarship.. or stipend: or

!.iil-an obligation to repay funds received as an

(B) any other educational loan that is a qualified educational benefit, scholarship.. or stipend: or
education loan.. as that term is defined in section (B) any other educational loan that is a qualified
22l(e)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, education loan.. as that term is defined in section
incurred bv an individual debtor;

221(e)(I) of the Internal revenue code of 1986,
incurred bv an individual debtor;

§ 523(a)(9) for death or personal injury caused by the § 523(a)(9) for death or personal injury caused by the
debtor's operation of a motor vehicle, vesseL or debtor's operation of a motor vehicle.. vessel.. or
aircraft. if such operation was unlawful because the aircraft if such operation was unlawful because the
debtor was intoxicated from using alcohol, a drug, or debtor was intoxicated from using alcphol, a drug, or
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another substance;

another substance;

§ 523(a)(14A) incurred to pay a tax to a governmental § 523(a)(14A) incurred to pay a tax to a governmental

unit, other than the United States, that would be unit, other than the United States, that would be
nondischargeable under paragraph (1);

nondischargeable under paragraph (1);
(148) incurred to pay fines or penalties imposed under

Federal election law:

§ 523(a)(15) to a spouse. former spouse or child of the § 523(a)(15) to a spouse, former spouse or child of the
debtor and not of the kind described in paragraph (5) debtor and not of the kind described in paragraph (5)
tl1at is incurred by the debtor in the course of a divorce that is incurred by the debtor in the course of a divorce
or separation or in connection with a separation or separation or in connection with a separation
agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of
record or a determination made in accordance with record or a determination made in accordance with
State or territorial law by a governmental unit:

State or territorial law by a governmental unit;
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§ 523 (a)(18) owed to a pension, profit-sharing. stock § 523 (a)(18) owed to a pension, profit-sharing, stock

bonus. or other plan established under section 401, bonus, or other plan established under section 401,
403. 408, 408A, 414. 457, or 501Cc) of the Internal 403, 408, 408CA), 414, 457, or501Cc) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, under --(A)

Revenue Code of 1986, under ---

a loan permitted under section 408Cb)(I) of the CA)

a loan permitted under section 408Cb)Cl) of the

employee Retirement Income security Act of 1974, or Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, or
subject to section 72(p) of the Internal revenue Code subject to section 72(p) of the Internal revenue Code
of 1986: or
(B)

of 1986: or

a loan from the thrift savings plan described in CB)

a loan from the thrift savings plan described in

subchapter III of chapter 84 of title 5. that satisfies the subchapter III of chapter 84 of title 5, that satisfies the
requirements of section 8433Cg) of such title,

requirements of section 8433(g) of such title; or

but nothing in this paragraph may be construed to
provide that any loan made under a governmental plan
under section 414Cd), or a contract or account under
section 403Cb), of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
constitutes a claim or a debt under this title.
(19) that results from any judgment. order. consent
order. or decree entered in anv Federal or State Court,
or contained in any settlement agreement entered into
bv the debtor. including any court-ordered damages,
fine. penalty. citation, or attorney fee or cost owed by
the debtor, arising fromeA)

an action alleging the violation of any Federal,

State.. or local statutorY law. includine but not limited
to violations of sections 247 and 248 of title 18, that
results from the debtor's (i) harassment of.. intimidation of, interference
with.. obstruction of, injury to, threat to, or violence
against, any person(I)
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because that person provides or has

provided lawful goods or services;

all

because that person is or has been

obtaining lawful goods or services; or
(III)

to deter that person, any other person,

or .a class of persons from obtaining or
providing lawful goods or services: or
(ii) damage or destruction of property of a facility
providing lawful goods or services: or

(Bl

a violation of a court order or injunction that

protects access to a facility that provides lawful goods
or services or the provision of lawful goods or
services.
Nothing In paragraph (18) mav be construed to
provide that any loan made under a governmental plan
under section 414(d), or a contract or account under
section 403Cb), of the Internal Revenue code of 1986
constitutes a claim or a debt under this title. Nothing
in paragraph (19) shall be construed to affect any
expressive conduct (including peaceful picketing or
other peaceful demonstration) protected from leQal
prohibition bv the first amendment to the constitution
of the United States.
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SECTIONC

REAFFIRMATION - THE ETHICAL ROLE OF THE DEBTOR'S ATTORNEY

Marianne B. Culhane and Michaela M. White
Professors of Law, Creighton University School of Law
INTRODUCTION

The term "ethics" has at least two generally recognized meanings. The first meaning is
"the study of the general nature of morals;" the second is "the rules or standards governing the
conduct of the members of a profession."l Ethics, in the first sense, involves choices between
right and wrong.

Ethics, in the second sense, is a kind of guide to "excruciatingly correct

professional behavior.,,2 Lawyers tend to comparmentalize the concepts of ethics and ethical
behaviors within the second definition. However, bankruptcy, especially the rules and policies
relating to discharge and reaffirmation, is rich terrain in which to explore ethics in both senses of
its meaning.
Is it "wrong" to file bankruptcy? Is it "wrong" to avoid paying one's debts? Does the
debtor have a moral obligation to repay debts discharged in bankruptcy? Does the fresh start
policy even concern itself with the debtor's moral obligation, if any there be, to repay discharged
debts? Although these are fascinating questions, we confine our efforts here to ethics in the
second sense and discuss the applicable rules and recent cases in which courts have sanctioned or
admonished counsel for the role they played (or failed to play) in the reaffirmation process.
However, we hope that by summarizing the procedural

require~ents

of reaffirmation under the

Code and the 2001 bankruptcy bills (Part I), the pertinent findings of our empirical study of
reaffirmation (Part II), and rules and recent cases concerning the debtor's lawyer's role in

1 AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Houghton Mifflin 3d ed. 1996); see also
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (Meriam-Webster 1986); THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Random House 1968).
2 Our apologies to Miss Manners. See Judith Martin, Miss Manners' Guide to Excruciatingly Correct Behavior.
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reaffirmation (Part 11I), our materials will facilitate a discussion of the ethical responsibilities of
the debtor's lawyer in both senses.

I. THE PROCEDURE OF REAFFIRMATION
A.

The Present
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Chapter 7 debtors often were persuaded to reaffirm so

much debt that the benefit of the discharge was lost. To remedy this problem, the Code of 1978
placed strict limitations on reaffirmation in section 524.

Section 524 makes "[R]eaffirmation

agreements...unenforceable unless they are entered into before...discharge and are approved by the
Court. These measures are necessary to prevent the debtor from being coerced into signing a .
reaffirmation agreement and to enable the debtor to be fully aware of its consequences." In re
Smurzynski, 72 B.R. 368,370 (Bankr. N.D. TIL 1987).

Section 524 requires a valid reaffirmation to:
~

Be enforceable under non-bankruptcy law.

~

Be made before discharge.

~

Contain a clear and conspicuous notice of the debtor's right to rescind and that the
debtor is not required by law to reaffirm any debt.

~

Be filed with the court.

~

Be accompanied by an affidavit from debtor's counsel which states:
~~

that the agreement is an informed and voluntary decision by the debtor;

~~

that the agreement will not be an undue burden for the debtor or his
dependents; and
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~~

that counsel has advised the debtor of the legal effect of the agreement and
of default under the agreement.

Be approved by the court. If the debtor was not represented by counsel during the
negotiation of the reaffirmation agreement, the court must hold a hearing and
approve the agreement. To approve it, the court must find that it is not an undue
hardship and is in the best interest of the debtor (no court approval is required if the
debt is secured by the consumer's real property); and
Not be rescinded by the debtor before the later of the date of discharge or sixty days
after the agreement is filed with the court.
11 U.S.C. § 524(c).

B.

The Future?
A useful resource on the 2001 bankruptcy bills is Davis Polk & Wardwell's "Side-by-Side

Comparison of Entire Bankruptcy Code

. . . ,"

available

for

free

download at

http://www.dpw.com/bankruptcyreform.This gives the full text of the Bankruptcy Code as it .
would appear if proposed legislation were enacted, with House and Senate versions side-by-side on
each page. References below to "DPW" refer to this document.
NO RIGHT TO RIDE-THROUGH. Chapter 7 debtors would no longer have the right,
now recognized in four circuits, to retain collateral without reaffirmation or redemption if they are .
current on the debt. Under the proposed bills, the debtor must state an intent to surrender, reaffirm
or redeem (or assume a lease) and then perform the stated intention within forty-five days after the
§ 341 meeting.

If the debtor fails to comply, the stay automatically terminates as to affected
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personal property on the forty-sixth day.

No motion or hearing is required; the creditor may

proceed to repossess.
Exceptions: The stay does not automatically terminate: 1) as to real estate; 2) if the debtor
intends to reaffirm but the creditor refuses to reaffirm on the original contract terms; or 3) if the
trustee moves to retain because, and the court finds, the collateral is of value to the estate.
A creditor who violates the stay "in the good faith belief' that the stay had terminated will
be liable only for actual, not punitive, damages.

Apparently, a creditor can have this good faith

belief even without asking the court to confirm that the stay has terminated. See §§ 304-05 of H.R.
333 and S. 420, amending Code §§ 362 and 521. See DPW at 91,145-46.

POST-DISCHARGE BILLING ON NON-REAFFIRMED MORTGAGES.

While

debtors would have no right to impose ride-through on creditors, creditors could allow it. Home
mortgage creditors have often done so. The proposed bills would allow mortgagees to send bills
and other communications to non-reaffirming debtors after discharge, if their intent is to seek
periodic payments. There is no similar exception to the discharge injunction for other types of
creditors, but the remedies for discharge violations are not very effective. See § 202 of H.R. 333 and
S. 420, amending Code § 524. See DPW at 137.

REAFFIRMATION.

The reform bills leave most of the current reaffirmation

requirements in place, but add lots of new paperwork. Debtor's counsel will still be gatekeepers of
reaffirmation, with the court acting for unrepresented debtors. The "undue burden" and "best
interests" standards are retained, as is the right to rescind until the later of discharge or sixty days
after filing with the court. The changes are:

»

The creditor must give the debtor a lengthy disclosure statement, which includes
Truth-in-Lending-type information and legal advice in a "Frequently Asked
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Questions" format. If the disclosures are wrong, they are still sufficient, that is, the
reaffirmation is binding, unless the debtor proves the creditor made the false
statements in bad faith.
The debtor must fill out an updated income and expense statement at the time of
reaffirmation. If that statement shows too.little money for reaffirmation payments,
the reaffirmation is presumed an undue hardship (unless the creditor is a credit union
-- credit unions are apparently free to impose undue hardships). As Judge Wedoff
noted at this year's ABI annual meeting, nothing requires this statement of income
and expenses to be consistent with the original schedules. If the debtor and creditor
fudge it to make the payments appear affordable, that is unlikely to come to the
court's attention. Of course, if the debtor's attorney approves a reaffirmation based .
on a faulty income statement, the attorney could be sanctioned. There is no express
good faith defense for debtor's counsel.
The presumption of undue hardship lasts until sixty days after a reaffirmation
agreement is filed with the court (and the court may extend the time for cause, after
notice and hearing). If the court does not act within sixty days, apparently the
presumption disappears and the reaffirmation becomes fully effective.

The

presumption may be rebutted if the debtor explains in writing where the money to
pay will come from. The court "may" disapprove a reaffirmation if the presumption
is not satisfactorily rebutted, but only upon notice and hearing to the debtor and
creditor, and that hearing must be concluded before discharge.
Reaffirmations certified by debtor's counsel become effective as soon as they are
filed with the court, unless the undue hardship presumption applies. However, there
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is no time limit for filing with the court and there are few real sanctions for failing to
file, except that the debtor's time to rescind does not begin to run until filing.
However, a creditor may accept payments from the debtor 1)

before the

reaffirmation agreement has been filed, and 2) under an otherwise invalid
reaffirmation agreement, if the creditor "believes in good faith" that it is effective.
The debtor may have difficulty proving bad faith here.
The proposed legislation leaves section 524 silent on remedies for discharge
violation, and does not directly address the use of class actions and contempt in that
context. However, as Judge Wedoff has opined, making the creditor's mental state
an element will make class actions difficult.
The bankruptcy court apparently has no power to disapprove a reaffirmation which
debtor's counsel has approved, unless the undue hardship presumption applies.
See § 203 ofH.R. 333 and S. 420. See DPW at 168,175-83.

II. A SUMMARY OF DEBT AFTER DISCHARGE: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
REAFFFIRMATION3
A.

The Reaffirmation Project
In 1995 we set out to study reaffirmation practice.

No government agency tracks

reaffirmation, and there are few recent studies of the practice. We hoped to fill that void. With
funding from the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, we examined a sample of 1043
Chapter 7 cases filed by individual and joint debtors in 1995, from seven districts across the
nation. In "Debt After Discharge," we reported what we found in the files.

3 The full article summarized here can be found at 73 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL 709-74 (1999). The
research was supported by generous grants from the Endowment for Education of the National Conference of
Bankruptcy Judges, the Bankruptcy Section of the Nebraska State Bar Association and Creighton Law School.
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Our report understates the total number of reaffirmation agreements signed by debtors.
Because our data is drawn from court files, we captured only reaffirmations that were filed with
the court. However, major creditors such as Sears, GE Capital and Discover Card have confessed
to collecting tens of thousands of reaffirmations which they deliberately failed to file during the
period of our study. These "rogue reaffs" were not legally enforceable, but misled many debtors
into believing they were bound. These rogues remained under our radar.

B.

How Much Did the Sample Debtors Agree to Repay?
While most sample debtors entered into no valid reaffirmation agreements, there were

293 cases (28%) in our sample with one or more reaffirmations in their files. This group took on
significant amounts of debt, reaffirming over $3 million in aggregate principal,4 for an average
per case of $10,300, nearly 15% of the average total debt for sample cases. 5 Debtors in 28% of
the reaffirming cases took on more than $10,000 each, and 15% reaffirmed more than $20,000.
The $10,300 per case average, however, was clearly impacted by forty-six high-dollar
home loan reaffirmations. It may be more useful to compare debtors who reaffirmed housing
debt to those who reaffirmed only nonhousing debt.

Debtors whose reaffirmations include

housing debt averaged $41,350 in total reaffirmations, with a median of $35,860. Those who

4Where the reaffirmation agreement did not state a principal amount, but merely referred to the underlying
contract, we used the scheduled claim amount as the principal for aggregate reaffirmation purposes.

SIn a study of reaffirmation practice under the old Bankruptcy Act, Brookings Institute researchers found that
reaffirming debtors revived an average of $1,000, or about one-fifth of what the typical nonbusiness debtor's total
debt. See David Stanley & Marjorie L. Girth, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEMS, PROCESS, REFORM 61-62 (Brookings
Institute 1971).
By 1995, average total debt for Chapter 7 cases had risen dramatically. In our sample, it was $74,329. Of
course, the 15% amount reaffirmed in 1995 included only reaffirmation agreements filed with the court. It is
possible, if one were able to count unfiled reaffirmations as well, that debtors in 1995 were still reaffirming in one
way or the other, 20% of their average debt.
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reaffirmed only nonhousing debt reaffirmed a much lower average of $4,670, with a median of
$2,150.
About a third of our reaffirming debtors reaffirmed more than one debt; we found 446
separate reaffirmation agreements among the 293 in the sample. The average principal amount
per agreement was $6,771, and the median was $1,646. The range was very broad, from $28
(unsecured debt to be paid in two installments of $15), to $100,230 (home mortgage), both from
Georgia.
Reaffirmations were not filed in the majority of cases where debtors wished to keep cars
and homes used as collateral. This pattern prevailed even in districts which deny debtors a right
to retain collateral without reaffirmation. Almost half the reaffirmations filed were of household
goods debt, even though such collateral loses value quickly and is less likely to be repossessed.
Just under 10% of the reaffirmations were of wholly unsecured debt.

Aggressive creditor

solicitation, with offers of new credit at very high (but undisclosed) effective interest rates, may
explain these reaffirmations of household goods and unsecured debt.
Table 1 divides reaffirmations by type of collateral, and shows the mean and median
amounts per reaffirmation agreement in our sample.
Table 1
Principal Amount Reaffirmed by Collateral Type
Type
Household Goods
Motor Vehicles
Homes
Other Collateral
Unsecured

Mean
$ 1,060
7,607
34,877
6,398
2,155

Median
$ 624
7,265
33,068
5,029
1,015

Range
28-5,531
159-23,112
993-100,230
680-20,538
89-32,955

$

Aggregate
$ 233,605
1,026,918
1,604,361
76,770
88,350

The dollar amounts above are merely the principal amounts reaffirmed. The debtors, of
course, also promised to pay interest. Many of our sample reaffirmation agreements did not
disclose the interest rate, but merely referred to the original contract, which was often not
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attached. Interest rates that were stated in our sample's reaffirmation agreements are displayed in
Table 2.
Table 2
Reaffirmation Interest Rates by Type of Collateral*

Secured
Household Goods
Motor Vehicles
Primary Residence
Traditional
Mobile Homes

Median

Mean

Highest

N=

18.00%
10.25%
10.81%
9.90%
13.25%

19.18%
11.01%
11.28%
10.18%
12.64%

35.76%
25.00%
18.00%
18.00%
14.00%

85
83
20
11
9

13.25%
Unsecured
20.08%
60.00%
*Includes only reaffirmation agreements with stated interest rate and only categories with five
or more such reaffirmations.
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As shown in Table 2, the interest rates our debtors agreed to pay are in double digits.
Only reaffirmations secured by nonmobile homes had a median rate below 10%, and those
barely made the cut at 9.9%. Interest rates for debts secured by household goods equalled and
even exceeded those for completely unsecured debt.

Household goods debt is typically held by

retailers whose house credit cards carry rates of 18% or more. The goods in question would
typically be expensive to repossess and of little net resale value. The interest rates seem to
reflect that, for practical purposes, these debts are mostly unsecured.
Reaffirmation agreements typically state a monthly payment amount, but seldom disclose
how long it will take to payoff the debt at the required payment rate. Low monthly payments
may seem to make it easy on the debtor. However, at double-digit interest rates, a lengthy
amortization raises the total cost of reaffirmation to surprisingly high levels. A long repayment
period also threatens to leave the debtor still owing thousands of dollars on an old car when it
foreseeably wears out and needs replacement. A debtor who had trouble paying for one car will
clearly be hard-pressed to pay for two, especially when one no longer runs.
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A particularly

egregious example appeared in the 1997 Report of the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission:
The Hon. John Akard of Texas wrote to submit a reaffirmation agreement signed
by debtors in his court. The agreement committed them to repay a loan on a
pickup truck that cost $18,027.71 over fifteen years. With compounded interest,
the debtors would pay a total of $42,861.84. Judge Akard asked ... the debtor's
attorney about the lenfth of the payout, at which time "the attorney admitted
overlooking that fact."
We did not find any nonhousing reaffirmations requiring payments for fifteen years in
our sample. However, the periods we did find convince us that the hapless Texas attorney is far
from the only one overlooking how long the debtors commit to making payments. For example,
a Colorado debtor agreed, with his attorney's approval, to make seventy-four more monthly
payments on a car that was already four model years old in 1995. 7 The car would be more than
ten years old, before it was paid off. A Georgia debtor, also with benefit of counsel, promised to
pay for four and a half more years on a five-year old vehicle at 19.65% interest. Finance charges
would add $6,700 to this $13,000 debt. 8 Certainly, cars are necessary to enable many debtors to
earn a living, but there is competition in car sales even for those just out of Chapter 7.
Almost half of the reaffirmations (47%) in the sample were of debt purportedly secured
by household goods. Six- to eight-year payout periods, at interest rates of 19-22% or higher,
were typical for such reaffirmations. Our sample showed many examples like one described
below by Judge Stan Bernstein,

6NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, BANKRUPTCY:
(hereinafter NBRC Report).

THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 155 (1997)

7Colorado is in the Tenth Circuit, and that circuit had already recognized a right to ride-through, that is, retain
without reaffirmation, if the debtor was current on the debt. See Lowry Fed. Credit Union v. West, 882 F.2d 1543,
1544-46 (10th Cir. 1989) (noting that the debtor may retain property without reaffirming or redeeming). In Lowry,
the debtor was in arrears and a relative had cosigned the claim. Except to protect the cosigner, reaffirmation on
these terms seems of doubtful benefit. [d.

8Amounts rounded to nearest $100.
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What Sears did not disclose and what the debtor's attorney did not explain to his
client is that, ... it would take 76 months to satisfy this amount .... [S]he would
pay ... $3,269.02, of which the aggregate interest would be $1,469.02. Query:
Even if the debtor could afford to ... , would ... a rational decision-maker have
agreed to carry this debt for seven years? Other credit card issuers charge a far
lower actual annual percentage rate. . . even to persons who have received a
recent discharge in ... bankruptcy.
In re Bruzzese, 214 B.R. 444, 449 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1998) (debtors' counsel violated fiduciary

duty through disregard of the true costs of reaffirmation to obtain new credit).
Many of these retailers would not repossess the goods and, in the few cases where they
would, it is possible that the debtors could replace the goods at a lower total cost. These
reaffirmations may be motivated more by a desire to obtain new postbankruptcy credit than by
fear of repossession. 9 The National Bankruptcy Review Commission gave a good illustration of
the cost of new credit obtained only through reaffirming old debt.
Take, for example, a debtor that reaffirms $1,500 of debt to receive a credit line of
$2,000 (including the $1,500 of pre-bankruptcy debt) at 15%. Purely on
economic terms, that debtor would be better off discharging the $1,500 of past
debt and borrowing $500 of new credit at 22%. The reaffirmation cannot be
justified as a bargain for the debtor. In addition, extensions of credit in exchange
for reaffirmations are not necessarily at advantageous rates when some lenders
still charge 21 % or higher, even with a reaffirmation. 10

c.

Can the Debtors Afford to Pay That Much?
We also tried to determine whether the sample debtors were financially able to make the

payments to which they are committing. Recall that section 524(c) requires the debtor's counsel
or the court to approve only those reaffirmations which will "not impos[e] an undue hardship on

9NBRC

Report, supra note 5, at 154-55.
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the debtor or a dependent of the debtor .... ,,11

The undue hardship provision focuses on

whether the debtor can afford to make the payments required by the agreement. If the debtor
reobligates herself to pay more than she can afford, then her fresh start is impaired and repeated
financial failure is likely. Our sample indicates some debtors' attorneys pay too little attention to
affordability.
Attorneys almost always signed the no-undue-hardship declaration for reaffirmations in
our sample. Four hundred thirty-seven (437) of the 446 reaffirmations in our sample were filed
in cases where debtors had counsel, and the attorneys signed off on 97% or all but 11 of those
agreements.
Given this 97% attorney approval rating, one might expect strong evidence that our
debtors had the ability to repay their reaffirmed debts. Presumably, decisions on affordability are
based on evidence from the schedules, especially Schedules I and J on debtors' income and living
expenses. At first glance, the income figures seem reassuring. For example, sample debtors
with filed reaffirmation agreements had incomes 10-14% higher than those whose files contained
no reaffirmation agreements, and thus appeared more able to repay. See Table 3.
Table 3
Income of Reaffirming and Non-Reaffirming Debtors*
Net Income

Reaffirmine Debtors
Non-Reaffirming Debtors
N=293
N=748
$13,056
25 th Percentile
$11,350
19,740
17,040
50th Percentile
th
28,856
24,240
75 Percentile
*The income figure used here is the annualized version of Total Combined Monthly Income from Schedule I. It
includes net income from wages plus income from other sources. In joint cases, the figure includes income from
both spouses.

1111 U.S.C.' § 524(c)(3)(B) (1994).
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We tried several measures of ability to pay. For each we used the income and expense
figures from the unaudited schedules filed by debtors, usually with assistance of counsel. By
several of these measures, reaffirmation payments will constitute a substantial and possibly
undue burden. 12
1.

Median Income Test

We put our reaffirming and nonreaffirming debtors through the median income test in a
simulation of proposed means testing legislation. 13

We found that 81 % of the sample's

nonreaffirming debtors had gross incomes below the national medians for their family size.
However, the reaffirming debtors were not in much better financial shape. Nearly three-quarters
(74%) of the reaffirming debtors had gross incomes below the relevant national median
incomes. 14
2.

Net Disposable Income

Another measure of repayment capacity is whether net income exceeds living expenses
by enough to cover reaffirmation payments. We first tried this on a macro level, aggregating
averages by district for 258 of the cases which reaffirmed nonhollsing debt. A positive balance
indicates reaffirmation payments did not exhaust available income. A negative balance, on the
contrary, shows there was not enough income to cover both living expenses and reaffirmation

12 The methods used to make our calculations are set forth in detail in Debt After Discharge, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J.
at 760-65.
13The median income test we used here was that set forth in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, 105th
Congo § 102(1) 1998. H.R. 3150's median income test is described in detail in Marianne Culhane & Michaela
White, Taking the New Consumer Bankruptcy Model for a Test Drive: Means-Testing Real Chapter 7 Debtors, 7
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 27, 35-39 (1999).
14Seven debtors who reported zero income nevertheless signed, and counsel, by written declaration, approved a
total of ten reaffirmation agreements. We hope the debtors' incomes and prospects had markedly improved in the
few weeks since the schedules were filed.
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payments. In such a case, the debtors must either increase income or reduce expenses to make
the payments.
Table 4
Ability* to Make Non-Housing Reaffirmation Payments**
N=258
CA
CO
GA
MA
NE
NC
WI
Total
Monthly Income
$2,630 $1,544 $1,810 $2,026 $1,614 $1,711 $1,627
$1,796
Minus Living Expenses
2,485
1,375
1,734
1,988 1,511
1,690
1,511
1,704
Available Income
145
169
76
38
104
21
116
92
Minus Reaffirmed Mo. Payout
155
86
199
98
190
96
289
172
Balance
-$10
$84 -$123
-$61
-$87
-$75
-$173
-$80
*Includes only reaffirming debtors whose total income, living expenses and monthly obligation were available.
**Amounts rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table 4 displays the results of this computation. Colorado was the only sample district to
show a positive balance. For the other six districts, average monthly deficits ranged from -$10 in
California to -$173 in Wisconsin. On an annual basis, Wisconsin reaffirmers as a group were
$2,076 in the red after making nonhousing reaffirmation payments.
average monthly deficit of -$80 (-$960 per year).

Overall, there was an

Thus, the schedules indicate the sample

reaffirmers would have to reduce living expenses or increase income by $80 a month just to
break even on reaffirmation payments.
Next, we ran a case by case analysis. Using each reaffirming case's individual schedules,
we found first that 39% had no dollars at all available for reaffirmation payments. See Table 5.
Living expenses on Schedule J equaled or exceeded Schedule I income.

Nevertheless, the

debtors had signed and attorneys had approved reaffirmations as not an undue hardship for this
group.
Table 5
Ability to Pay - Debtors With Zero or Negative Cash Flow Before Non-Housing Reaffirmation Payments
N=258
% With Zero or Negative Cash Flow

CA
54%

CO
38%

GA
49%
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MA
33%

NE
25%

NC
45%

WI
38%

Total
39%

The debtor-by-debtor results were as dismal as the district aggregates. Fully 52% of the
reaffirming debtors had either zero income or a monthly deficit after reaffirmation payments, and
for 16% of the reaffirming debtors, the monthly deficit exceeded $500. The worst case was a
North Carolina debtor in the hole $2,710 a month on this basis. We hope the schedules were
inaccurate in that case, or that the situation they reflected had markedly improved by the time the
attorney approved this reaffirmation.
Fewer than half of the reaffirming debtors had any income remaining after expenses and
reaffirmation payments, and only a third had more than $100 per month left. Thus, many with a
positive balance had very little margin for unexpected expenses. See Table 6.
Table 6
Ability to Pay - Income After Non-Housing Reaffirmation Payments
N=258

> $500.01
$100.01 to $500.00
$0.01 to $100.00
$0.00 to -$100.00
-$100.01 to -$500.00
< -$500.01

CA

CO

GA

MA

17%
25%
0%
4%
25%
29%

8%
42%
8%
4%
33%
4%

5%
26%
12%
10%
24%
22%

5%
19%
29%
10%
29%
10%

NE
5%
25%
21%
11%
23%
14%

NC
18%
8%
21%
13%
29%
11%

WI
8%
22%
14%
14%
30%
14%

Overall
9%
23%
16%
10%
27%
16%

3. Reaffirmed Debt to Income Ratio
Another indication of affordability results from a comparison of the total principal
amount reaffirmed to each debtor's annual take-home pay. This reaffirmed debt to income ratio
sheds light on the size of the total obligation, rather than focusing just on current monthly
payments as above. For this measure, we excluded reaffirmations of housing debt and seven
debtors reporting zero income who nonetheless reaffirmed nonhousing debt.
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Table 7
Reaffirmed Non-Housing Debt to Income Ratios
N=268
Annual Net Income
Amount Reaffirmed
Reaffirmed Debt/Income

Median
$19,872
2,384
13%

Mean
$22,262
5,198
26%

Even when we excluded the high dollar housing reaffirmations, the average debtor in our
sample reaffirmed a principal amount equal to 26% of annual take-home pay, and half reaffirmed
at least 13% of income. More than one in five (22%) signed reaffirmations totaling more than
40% of annual income. Twelve cases involve debtors whose nonhousing reaffirmation totals
exceeded their annual income.
4.

Reaffirmation Payment to Monthly Income Ratio

Finally, we compared the debtors' nonhousing reaffirmation payments to gross monthly
income. We did this because bankers and consumer credit counselors develop rules of thumb on
maximum percentages of gross monthly income that may safely be devoted to housing, car
payments and revolving credit. Omaha's Consumer Credit Counseling Service, for example,
counsels debtors not to exceed 15% of gross income for car payments or 10% of gross for
revolving credit such as retail charge card and general purpose credit card payments. If we use
those guidelines, it adds up to a limit of 25%. We compared the monthly payments for each
debtor's nonhousing reaffirmations to the debtor's gross monthly income.
This ratio indicated that most reaffirming debtors were well below the 25% maximum.
The average was 8% of gross and the median was 5%.15 There were, of course, exceptions.

15We had sufficient data to run the analysis on 230 cases with nonhousing reaffirmations and above zero income.
The standard deviation for its mean percent of gross income was 8.42%.
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Seven percent of the cases devoted 25% or more of monthly gross income to nonhousing
reaffirmation payments alone, with more than half of that group exceeding 30%.
If the schedules are to be believed, by three of the four measures, the great majority of

reaffirming debtors will find the reaffirmation payments a substantial burden.

D.

Debtor's Lawyer as Creditor: Reaffirmation of Attorney Fees
Given the status of unpaid fees for prepetition attorney services as dischargeable claims, 16

debtors' attorneys17 extended fee credit in a surprising number of our sample cases: 319 (or 38%)
of the 850 qualified cases with Form 2016(b) on file. As Table 8 (Chapter 7 Debtor's Mean and
Median Attorney Fee Credit) shows, there are large regional variations in these numbers. Fee credit
was extended in more than half of the eligible sample cases from Colorado, Georgia and Wisconsin.
In California and Massachusetts, on the other hand, less than 20% were credit cases. Perhaps the

more widespread use of lower cost petition preparers in California and Massachusetts explains the
difference.

16 However cleverly the debtor's postpetition repayment obligations may be structured, the majority of courts hold that
the debtor's Chapter 7 attorney fees remaining unpaid at the petition date are dischargeable debts. In re Symes, 174 B.R.
114, 117 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994) (unpaid fees to be paid postpetition by cashing debtor's post-dated checks); Hessinger
& Assoc. v. United States Trustee (In re Biggar), 110 F.3d 685, 686 (9th Cir. 1997) (unpaid fees to be paid in
postpetition installments); In re Martin, 197 B.R. 120, 127 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1996) (same); In re Haynes, 216 B.R. 440,
442-44 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1997) ("skeletel" case arrangement in which debtor and attorney agree prepetition that bulk of .
work will be performed postpetition). A small minority, largely for public policy reasons, holds that the debtor's unpaid
Chapter 7 attorneys fees represent nondischargeable debts. In re Perry, 225 B.R. 497, 500 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998); In re
Mills, 170 B.R. 404,410 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994). In one recent case, the court bifurcated unpaid Chapter 7 debtor's
attorneys fees arising from prepetition fee agreements into two components: a dischargeable debt attributable to work
performed prepetition and a non-dischargeable quantum meruit claim for fees arising from services actually performed
postpetition. In re Jastrem, 224 B.R. 125, 132 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1998). See also Gordon v. Hines (In re Hines), 147
F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 1998).

17 Debtors were represented by an attorney in 91 % of our sample cases, assisted by petition preparers in 4% of the
cases and filed pro se in the remaining 5%.
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Table 8
Chapter 7 Debtor's Mean and Median Attorney Fee Credit

CA
94
16
17.0%

CO
130
66
50.8%

GA
124
65
52.4%

MA
119
22
18.5%

NE
137
52
38.0%

NC
120
27
22.5%

126
71
56.3%

Total
850
319
37.5%

$733
$292
$322

$553
$163
$438

$522
$170
$384

$740
$209
$605

$495
$187
$371

$673
$303
$365

$620
$176
$450

$612
$193
$418

Avg. Fee w/Credit
Avg. Fee w/o Credit

$613
$758

$598
$508

$552
$488

$814
$723

$555
$459

$667
$674

$626
$611

$609
$614

Mdn. Total Atty Fee
Mdn. Paid @ Filing*
Mdn. Unpaid Balance*

$600
$300
$300

$550
$145
$423

$500
$190
$325

$750
$138
$585

$450
$200
$300

$650
$250
$260

$600
$140
$400

$550
$200
$380

Mdn. Fee w/Credit
$600
$600
Mdn. Fee w/o Credit
$650
$500
*Computed Only in Nonzero Unpaid Balance

$500
$500

$750
$720

$500
$440

$500
$700

$600
$540

$600
$550

Cases with 2016b Form
Cases with Unpaid Balance
Percent Cases w/Unpaid
Balance
Avg. Total Atty Fee
Avg. Paid @ Filing*
Avg. Unpaid Balance*

WI

It seems logical that attorney fees would be higher in credit cases to cover the risk of
nonpayment. This was true of median fees in our sample. Median fees were lower in non-credit
cases ($550) than in credit cases ($600). However, the mean fee in non-credit cases was $614,
higher than the mean fee of $609 in credit cases.
Despite the frequency of fee credit, we found no cases where the debt to bankruptcy counsel
appeared on Schedules F or D. Several cases listed the bankruptcy representation agreement as an
executory contract on Schedule G. The practice of not scheduling debts for prepetition fees may
mislead debtors as to the dischargeability of these debts.
We found only one filed reaffirmation agreement covering fees owed to the debtor's
Chapter 7 counsel in our sample cases. In that case, despite the obvious conflict of interest, the
debtor's counsel signed the undue hardship affidavit. As far as we could determine, the court did
not hold a hearing on the matter.
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However, several cases from our home District of Nebraska give ethical and procedural
guidance to debtors' attorneys who extend fee credit to clients and seek reaffirmation of the debt.
Chief Judge Timothy J. Mahoney registered support of installment fee agreements and of
reaffirmation of such debts in In re Perez, 177 B.R. 319,321 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1995) because they
secured representation for those "who cannot otherwise afford an attorney but do require bankruptcy
relief." Judge Mahoney made clear that the attorney extending fee credit cannot represent the
debtor in connection with the reaffirmation agreement or sign the affidavit that the agreement does
not pose an undue hardship, due to the obvious conflict of interest between attorney and client.
Thus, the debtor must either consult with independent counselor the court must approve the
agreement after a hearing.
In 1998, Judge John C. Minahan, Jr., twice revisited the issue and held that reaffirmation of

prepetition attorney fees requires: 1) debtor's counsel to make it clear to the debtor that the attorney
is not representing the debtor respecting the reaffirmation agreement; and 2) unless the debtor is
represented by another attorney in connection with the reaffirmation agreement, an evidentiary
hearing and court approval of such an agreement are required. Although Judge Minahan observed
that reaffirmation of unsecured debts is not generally in the debtor's best interest, he nevertheless
approved reaffirmation of an unsecured debt for prepetition fees in In re Nidiver, 217 B.R. 581
(Bankr. D. Neb. 1998). Judge Minahan ruled that a debtor's attorney who extends fee credit is not
otherwise disqualified from representing the debtor in the bankruptcy case even though the attorney
is not "disinterested" under 11 U.S.C. sections 327 and 328 of the Code, because these sections do
not apply to a Chapter 7 debtor's attorney. Nidiver 'at 583. Judge Minahan found "identifiable
benefits to ... debtors by reaffirming [debts] for prepetition bankruptcy related legal services,"
specifically "continuity of counsel."
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In In re Leitner, 221 B.R. 502 (BanIa. D. Neb. 1998), Judge Minahan commented on

reaffirmation of a prepetition debt for fees which was secured by a mortgage on the debtors'
homestead.

He observed that the mortgage could be enforced after discharge even if the

reaffirmation agreement was not approved assuming the fee agreement and lien passed judicial
scrutiny under Bankruptcy Rule 2017. Id. at 505-06.
Colorado attorneys now have similar guidance. In In re Pasco, 220 B.R. 119 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1998), Judge Brooks, citing Judge Mahoney's Perez decision, with approval, set forth
guidelines for the reaffirmation of bankruptcy-related attorney fees.

See also Kerry Ducey,

Bankruptcy, Just for the Rich? An Analysis ofPopular Fee Arrangements for Pre-Petition Legal
Fees and a Call to Amend, 54 VANDERBILT L. REv. 1665, 1682-86 (2001).

III. BANKRUPTCY COURTS AS "ETHICAL" WATCHDOGS
A.

May Bankruptcy Courts Review and Disapprove Reaffirmation Agreements
Approved by Debtor's Counsel?
The 1994 amendments to section 524 make it clear that the court is not required to hold a

hearing on any reaffirmation agreement that is accompanied by an affidavit or declaration from
debtor's counsel approving the agreement. See § 524(d). But the question remains whether the
court has residual power to review sua sponte and disapprove reaffirmation agreements which
debtor's counsel has approved. Robert Hessling in his treatise Reaffirmation and Redemption
(Michie 1994) states that a majority of courts have recognized a lack of power to approve or
disapprove of reaffirmations in these circumstances. Hessling at 204. In re Pendlebury, 94 B.R.
120 (Bankr. B.D. Tenn. 1988), is an example of that view:
Congress' intent that the court rely upon the declaration and affidavit filed by
counsel is made manifest under the 1984 amendments by removal of the
requirement of court approval except as to reaffirmation agreements entered into
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by pro se debtors. In practice reaffirmation hearblgs presently serve no useful
purpose except for debtors filing pro see Attorneys are rightly charged with the
responsibility for advising their clients during the reaffirmation process.
Pendlebury, 94 B.R. at 124.

Other cases holding that the bankruptcy court has no power to override counsel's approval
of a reaffirmation agreement include In re Sweet, 954 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1992); In re Bauer, 1997
WL 752652 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997); In re French, 185 B.R. 910 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995); In re
Grinnell, 170 B.R. 495 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1994); In re Dabbs, 128 B.R. 307 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1991);
In re Wallace, 102 B.R. 54 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 1989). See also Cox v. Zale Delaware, 239 F.3d 910

(7th Cir. 2001) Gudge cannot disallow reaffirmations that debtor's counsel approved) (dicta).
However, revelations of widespread abuse of the reaffirmation process, plus concern that
some attorneys do not adequately protect debtors from ill-advised reaffirmations, have recently led
many bankruptcy courts to review reaffirmation agreements even if they have the blessing of
debtor's counsel. Only two years after the Grinnell decision above, the bankruptcy court in Rhode
Island revisited the issue, saying "The absence of court oversight may be resulting in overreaching
by certain creditors, misrepresentation by certain debtors and/or their attorneys and the perversion of
the reaffirmation provisions of the Code." In re Izzo, 197 B.R. 11, 12 n. 2 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1996).
Among the other courts asserting power to override approval of reaffirmations by debtor's counsel
are BankBoston N.A. v. Nanton, 239 B.R. 419 (D. Mass. 1999) (listing cases on both sides of the
issue); In re Vargas, 257 B.R. 157 (Bankr. D. N.J. 2001); In re Collins, 243 B.R. 217 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 2000); In re Melendez (Melendez 11),235 B.R. 173 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999); In re Lindley,
216 B.R. 811 (Bankr. N.D. TIL 1998); In re Melendez (Melendez 1),224 B.R. 252 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1998); In re Turner, 208 B.R. 434 (Bankr. C.D. TIL 1997); In re Hovestadt, 193 B.R. 382 (Bankr. D.

Mass. 1996).
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These courts locate the source of their authority to review such reaffirmations and monitor
debtors' attorneys' compliance with section 524(c) in section 105 and Bankruptcy Rule of
Procedure 9011. See, e.g., In re Vargas, 257 B.R. at 165-66; Melendez II, 235 B.R. at 188-90;
Melendez 1,224 B.R. at 259-60; In re Bruzzese, 214 B.R. at 450; In re Hovestadt, 193 B.R. at 386.

Review is authorized under section 105 because it allows the court to make any determination and
take any action to ensure compliance with the Code, including the statutory predicates to a valid
reaffirmation under section 524(c). Moreover, Bankruptcy Rule 9011 (making Fed. R. Civ. P. 11
applicable to bankruptcy proceedings) authorizes review of such agreements in order to monitor the
conduct of the debtors' attorneys who may file pleadings or other papers with the court without an
adequate factual foundation. Id.
The consequences of a judicial determination of debtors' attorneys' noncompliance with the
statutory prerequisites to a reaffirmation have included annulling the reaffirmation agreement after
striking the attorney's declaration (In re Bruzzese; Melendez II; In re Vargas) and ordering a return
of the debtor's attorney's fees to the debtor (In re Vargas; In re Bruzzese) under the authority of
section 329(b). Courts have also considered whether to impose Rule 9011 sanctions on debtors'
attorneys for signing the section 524(c) attorney declaration without adequate factual investigation
and support (Melendez II; In re Bruzzese; In re Izzo).

B.

Bankrt;lptcy Court Guidance on Debtors' Attorneys' Obligations in the Reaffirmation
Process
The Hovestadt, Bruzzese, Melendez I and II, Nanton and Vargas line of cases have fleshed

out, sometimes in great detail, the obligations of a debtor's attorney under section 524(c).
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1.

Counsel Must Decide Whether to Fish or Cut Bait

In In re Vargas, 257 B.R. at 163, the court admonished debtors' counsel to make a

conscious, deliberate decision whether to involve themselves in the reaffirmation process.
Debtors' attorneys have a choice to make when presented with their clients'
reaffirmation agreements. They may remain strictly advocates and decline to sign
the requisite declaration attached to the reaffirmation agreement. The court
recognizes that attorneys' execution of these certifications may place some attorneys
in a position of conflict * * * Specifically, attorneys may not wish to undertake the
reaffirmation process because they would be taking on roles akin to in loco parentis.
If this is the case, then attorneys are not obligated to take on the duties of
independently assessing their clients' financial status.
Accordingly, the debtor's attorney may wish to limit the scope of her representation of the
debtor by expressly excluding reaffirmation from the retainer agreement. Model Rule 1.2(c) of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides:

"A lawyer may limit the objectives of the

representation if the client consents after consultation." If the attorney later decides not to represent
the debtor concerning a reaffirmation, the Model Rules appear 18 to allow the attorney to withdraw
from the representation. Model Rule 1.16(b)(3) allows withdrawal if "a client insists upon pursuing
an objective that the lawyer considers ... imprudent." The Model Rules further require the
withdrawing attorney "to take steps to the extent reasonably practicable" to protect the client's
interests. Model Rules of ProfI Conduct R. 1.16(d).

18 This assumes that bankruptcy practitioners generally regard reaffirmations, unless expressly excluded, to be one
of the multiple services they provide to Chapter 7 clients. If reaffirmations are not so regarded, withdrawal would
be unnecessary since counsel never undertook to represent the debtor in connection with a reaffirmation.
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Having undertaken to represent a debtor in connection with a reaffirmation, Rule 9011
requires the attorney to conduct an objectively reasonable investigation into the facts supporting the
attorney's representation that the reaffirmation is voluntary, will not constitute an undue hardship
for the client and her dependents and that the client has been fully informed as to the legal
consequences of the agreement and any default under the agreement. It is not enough that the
attorney have "some evidence" as to the truth of these statements. Rather, it is only where the
"attorney undertakes an appropriate investigation and considers the totality of the surrounding
circumstances [that] the attorney will have complied with Rule 9011 in making the § 524(c)(3)
declaration." Melendez II, 235 B.R. at 195. Accord, In re Vargas, 257 B.R. at 164; In re Bruzzese,
214 B.R. at 451.
Given the possibility that the debtor's attorney will be unable to sign off on the
reaffirmation, counsel might be well advised early on to explain to her client the in loco parentis
role that section 524(c) requires her to play. Model Rule 1.2(e) provides: "When a lawyer knows
that a client expects assistance not permitted by the rules of professional conduct or other law, the
lawyer shall consult with the client regarding the relevant limitations on the lawyer's conduct."
(Emphasis added.) Model Rules of Profl Conduct R. 1.2(e). Moreover, Model Rule 1.16(a)(l)
requires counsel to withdraw from representation of a client if the "representation will result in
violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law." Model Rules of Profl Conduct R.
1.16(a)(l).
2.

What Constitutes a Reasonable Inquiry Under Rule 9011 ?

Undue Hardship
One frequently cited description of a reaffirmation which poses an undue hardship is one
that "would result in a significant, but otherwise avoidable, obstacle to the attainment or retention of
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necessaries ·by the debtor or the debtor's dependents." Melendez I, 224 B.R. at 261 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1998).
The "tests" of undue hardship focus largely on the debtor's and the debtor's dependents'
postpetition ability to pay the reaffirmed debt.

Thus, "payment of a reaffirmed debt cannot

constitute an undue hardship where funds come from disposable income," Melendez 1,224 B.R. at
270 n. 23.

Reaffirmations by debtors whose postpetition monthly income exceeds monthly

expenses have been approved as not an undue hardship. Melendez II, 235 B.R. at 200.
However, where Schedules I and J reveal that the debtor's postpetition expenses exceed
income and there have been no subsequent improvements in the debtor's financial circumstances,
courts entertain "serious doubts" about the burden posed by the reaffirmation payments. In re
Strong, 232 B.R. at 924 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1999); Melendez 11,235 B.R. at 197; Melendez 1,224
B.R. at 261; In re Hovestadt, 193 B.R. at 386 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996). Interestingly, the Melendez
II court suggested that a monthly deficit is not necessarily dispositive of the undue hardship issue
for the attorney considering whether to certify the debtor's reaffirmation. In making the undue
hardship assessment, the attorney must
be fully conversant with the financial circumstances of both the debtor and the
debtor's dependents. An attorney should analyze the income and expenses of the
debtor's household, including a review and update of the information contained in
the debtor's Schedules I and J. If it appears that the debtor's expenses will exceed
his or her postpetition income, and if reaffirmation of the debt is not necessary to
retain an item which the debtor or his or her dependents require for their wellbeing-or if the item itself is not necessary-then payment of the reaffirmed debt in
addition to the debtor's existing expenses would clearly jeopardize the debtor's
ability to pay for necessary living expenses and impose an undue hardship on the
debtor or his or her dependents.
Melendez 11,235 B.R. at 197.
Several recent decisions hold that where the reaffirmation is before the court for a
determination whether it poses an undue hardship and is in the best interests of the debtor, the
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analysis is not solely a function of a debtor's income and expenses. In BankBoston, N.A. v. Nanton,
239 B.R. 419, 425-26 (D. Mass. 1999), the district court held that the debtor's Schedules I and J
(showing a monthly deficit) raised only a prima facie concern about her ability to pay.
While the standards of "undue hardship" and "best interest" may involve an
evaluation of debtor's ability to pay, they may possibly implicate several other
factors, including 1) what alternatives, other than reaffirmation, are available to a
debtor who wishes to retain an interest in property, 2) whether the underlying debt is
secured or unsecured, 3) if the debt is secured, the threat of repossession of and the
amount of equity in the collateral, and the extent to which the collateral is a necessity
to the Debtor, see Melendez, 224 B.R. at 259 n. 9,260, and 4) the debtor's payment
history on the collateral.

Nanton, 239 B.R. at 425-26. Accord, In re Claflin, 249 B.R. 840, 847 (BAP 1st Cir. 2000); In re
Strong, 232 B.R. 921,924 (Bankr. B.D. Tenn. 1999).
Fully Informing the Debtor
In Melendez II, the court summarized the minimum obligations of debtor's counsel before
certifying that the debtor has been fully informed of the legal effect and consequences of a
reaffirmation agreement and any default thereunder.
At a minimum, debtor's counsel must:

****
(2) review the security agreement, charge slips, payment history and other
documentation constituting the security interest claimed by the creditor in order to
verify the amount of the creditor's claim, the validity, extent and perfection of the
alleged security interest and the non-avoidability of the alleged lien under the
Bankruptcy Code;
(3) question the value placed on the goods by the secured creditor and
independently estimate that value;
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(4) evaluate the risk of replevy by the creditor, in light of the age, condition
and value of the goods versus the need of and cost to the debtor to retain the items at
risk; and demand a replevy decision from the secured creditor prior to execution of
the reaffirmation agreement;
(5) discuss relevant financial disclosures with the debtor;
(6) ensure that the agreement was entered into voluntarily and without

creditor misrepresentations or coercion;
(7) ensure that the debtor understands the effect and consequences of the

agreement and the consequences of default;
(8) ensure that the debtor is informed as to his or her options with respect to

the collateral under the Bankruptcy Code; and
(9) advise the debtor as to alternative sources of credit.

Melendez II, 235 B.R. at 203. Accord, see, e.g., In re Vargas, 257 B.R. at 165-66; In re Bruzzese,
214 B.R. at 452-55; In re Hovestadt, 193 B.R. at 386-87.
Several items on this "to do" list deserve further comment.

The "relevant financial

disclosures" concerning the reaffirmation agreement (item 5 on the Melendez II list) are akin to the
disclosures required by the Federal Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601, and similar applicable
state law. These include the "annual percentage rate, a statement on when the payments are due, the
applicable grace period, the method for determining finance charges and late payments or over-thelimit charges" as well as "the amount of the prepetition claim; the principal amount of the
reaffirmed debt; the minimum monthly payment on the reaffirmed amount; and the amount, if any,
of an extension or renewal of the debtor's credit line." Melendez II, 235 B.R. at 198-99. See also In

re Bruzzese, 214 B.R. at 451.
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Unfortunately for present purposes, Truth-in-Lending's disclosure requirements have been
interpreted not to apply to reaffirmation agreements. Regulation Z exempts changes in credit terms
that are due to "an agreement involving a court proceeding." 12 CPR §§ 226.9(c)(2); 226, 20(a)
(1998).

Federal Reserve Staff Interpretations have extended this exemption to reaffirmation

agreements. Perhaps exemption made sense when bankruptcy courts were required to approve each
reaffirmation. Court's oversight could protect debtors from deceptive and unduly burdensome
reaffirmations. However, the 1984 amendments made debtor's counsel, if any, the reaffirmation
gatekeeper. Under this regime, the great majority of reaffirmations are never seen by the judge;
they are simply lodged in the debtor's court file. Thus, the reasons underlying the reaffirmation
exemption have arguably ceased to prevail.
Two recent cases addressing the need for standard disclosure of credit terms and the
application of Truth-in-Lending to reaffirmation agreements are In re Kamps, 217 B.R. 836,848-50
(C.D. Cal. 1998); In re Bruzzese, 214 B.R. 444,458 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1997).
In Melendez II, 235 B.R. at 203, the court observed that such information is not "necessarily
at the disposal of the debtor's attorney. Some of this information is exclusively within the control of
the creditor. However, where a creditor refuses to provide that information, the debtor's attorney
has no option. The attorney must decline to execute the § 524(c)(3) declaration." (Emphasis
added.)
With respect to item 8 on the Court's list, counsel should consider the availability of
"ride-through" in her jurisdiction.

By "ride-through" we refer to the judicially developed

nonstatutory variant of voluntary payment. Some courts allow a debtor who is current on a debt
to retain the collateral without reaffirmation or redemption. The circuits are presently evenly split,
with four circuits on each side of the question whether the debtor has this option. Circuit court
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cases allowing the debtor to retain without reaffirming include In re Parker, 139 F.3d 668,672-73
(9th Cir. 1998); In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d 43,53 (2d Cir. 1997); In re Belanger, 962 F.2d 345,34748 (4th Cir. 1992); Lowery Fed. Credit Union v. West, 882 F.2d 1543, 1546-47 (10th Cir. 1989).
Circuit court cases requiring reaffirmation or redemption in order to retain include In re Burr, 160
F.3d 843 (1st Cir. 1998); In re Johnson, 89 F.3d 249,250-52 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Taylor, 3 F.3d
1512,1516-17 (11th Cir. 1993); In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383,1385-87 (7th Cir. 1990).19
Assuming ride-through is not an available option, counsel must assess whether the liens
in question can be avoided under section 522(f)(I)(B) (authorizing avoidance of non-purchasemoney security interests in exempt household goods). Counsel should also inform debtors of the
possibility of redeeming the collateral at fair market value as well as of the availability of a
judicial valuation determination. Finally, attorneys must again tell clients

abo~t

the availability

of Chapter 13 as a method of retaining the collateral. Melendez II, 235 B.R. at 199-200. See
also In re Vargas, 257 B.R. at 165-66.

19 An equally unsettled question is what happens after discharge when the debtor has retained collateral without
reaffIrmation or redemption. In that case, the creditor retains a valid lien on the collateral but the debtor's personal
liability has been erased. Many creditors may be happy enough to allow a debtor to keep collateral as long as the
debtor maintains payments. However, is a creditor required to do so if the loan documents provide that bankruptcy
itself is a default (ipso facto clause) or include an insecurity clause? May the creditor repossess the property even if the
debtor is willing and able to repay? The provisions of section 365 invalidating ipso facto clauses for executory .
contracts would seem not to apply and some courts have held the similar provisions of section 541 (c) are also
inapplicable in the post-discharge context. See, e.g., Judge Leif Clark's discussion in In re Castillo, 209 B.R. 59
(Bankr. W.O. Tex. 1997) (creditor may rely on ipso facto clause) (Castillo was subsequently reversed by the district
court as to the existence of the fourth option, but Judge Clark's views on creditors' rights after discharge absent
reaffirmation are still worthy of consideration). In re Lair, 235 B.R.1 (Bk. M.D. La. 1999). See also In re Gerling, 175
B.R. 295 (Bankr. W.o. Mo. 1994), suggesting in dicta that absent reaffirmation, a creditor could use an insecurity
clause to justify post-discharge repossession even when the debtor is current on payments. The court noted that the
release of personal liability would justify the creditor's belief that the prospect of payment was impaired.
There is authority to the contrary. Just last year, the Second Circuit held, in In re Sololowski, 205 F.3d 532
(2d Cir. 2000), that the decision to allow retention without reaffirmation in Boodrow required a holding that
creditors could not rely on bankruptcy default clauses to justify foreclosure on collateral. In re Winters, 69 B.R. 145
(Bankr. D. Or. 1986) holds that section 541(c)(1)(B) and the discharge injunction bar use of an ipso facto clause to
justify post-discharge repossession from debtor who is current in payments.
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CONCLUSION

Viewed as a manual for "good behavior in bankruptcy," the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct are most helpful when the lawyer is acting as the client's advocate. They are of less utility
when the lawyer acts as counselor to the client. The Rules provide even less guidance to the lawyer
required to act as the client's parent in the reaffirmation process. However, many bankruptcy courts
have filled this vacuum by providing a long and detailed list of the debtor's attorney's
responsibilities when representing a client in connection with a reaffirmation agreement.
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I.

The constitutionality of provisions regulating the practice of law

A.

Does the power of Congress to enact uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies
encompass the regulation of the practice of law?

Section 413 of the bill, amending §341(c), appears to permit a non-attorney representative.
of a creditor to participate in meetings of the creditors, including permitting non-attorney
representatives to examine the debtor. Is this within the scope of Congress's powers?

B.

Do the provisions regulating advertising by lawyers violate the First Amendment?

The legislation would mandate the use ofthe phrase "Debt Relief Agency" in the commercial
advertising of all entities that for compensation assist debtors in filing for relief under the
Bankruptcy Code. Is this a constitutional regulation of commercial speech, especially as applied to
attorneys?

II.

Is allowing private school tuition as an allowable expense for determining the eligibility for
relief under Chapter 7 a violation of equal protection or the First Amendment?

H.R. 333 and S. 420 amend §707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code to add a new paragraph,
(2)(A)(ii)(V) which, for the purposes of determining an individual debtor's eligibility for reliefunder
Chapter 7, would permit the debtor to deduct as an expense up to $125 a month for the cost of each
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dependent child under the age of 18 to attend a private elementary or secondary school. There is no
comparable deduction for children who attend public schools. Does this violate equal protection or,
because it rewards parents whose children attend parochial schools, the First Amendment?

ill.

Does compulsory Chapter 13 violate the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against
involuntary servitude?

Section 318 of the bills would amend § 1325 of the Code to mandate that, as a condition for
confimiation, in some instances plans must extend for three to five years. It has been suggested that
requiring Chapter 13 might violate the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition against involuntary
servitude and federal laws that prohibit holding a person in a condition of peonage. (18 U.S.C.
§1581). See House Report No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); In re Fluharty, 23 B.R. 426, .
428 (N.D. Ohio 1982). Do the new provisions violate the Thirteenth Amendment?

IV.

Do provisions of the law violate equal protection or the uniformity requirement?

A.

Are there constitutional issues with respect to IRS National and Local Financial
Collection Standards, ifthe standards are incorporated by reference in the Bankruptcy
Code?

The National Standards base the allowable amount of the debtor's household expenses on the .
debtor's monthly income. For example, the total allowance for a debtor with a four-person family
for food, apparel, personal care and miscellaneous expenses is $726 for a debtor whose monthly .
income is $830, whereas for a debtor with the same family size whose income is $5,830 or greater
per month it is $1,473 per month, or more than twice as much. Does this violate equal protection?
Does it violate the provision of Article I, §8 of the Constitution which empowers Congress to
establish "uniform laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States"?
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B.

Is it constitutional to mandate a standard for valuing personal property of individual
debtors who file for relief under Chapter 7 or 13 different from the standard
prescribed for valuing personal property of individual debtors who file for relief
under chapters 11 and 12 and other entities (corporations and partnerships) who file
for relief under chapters 7, 11, and 12?
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I.
Administrative Issues
A.

Amendments that Affect Non-Residential Real Property Leases

1.

Extension of Assumption/Rejection Period

H.R. 333 and S. 420 1 (collectively, the "Bills") significantly amend Bankruptcy
Code section 365(d)(4), making it impossible to extend the time within which a debtor in
possession may assume, assume and assign, or reject an unexpired lease ofnonresidential real property beyond seven months after the commencement of a voluntary
chapter 11 case, unless the lessor consents in writing. In short, the debtor-lessee has the
earlier of (1) 120 days (about 4 months) after the order for relief is entered or (2) the date
the confirmation order is entered, to assume, assume and assign or reject its leases of
nonresidential real property. For cause, the court can extend that period by 90 days
(about 3 months). After the court grants that first 90-day extension, it cannot further
extend the assumption/rejection period without the consent ofthe lessor. 2
These amendments will change the course of many chapter 11 cases, where a
debtor often seeks to postpone the decision on what to do with its leases until the very
end of the case or at least until it detennines the size of the reorganized entity. Those
debtors will be forced to prematurely assume or reject their leases ofnomesidential real

I

S. 420 is now H.R. 333 as passed by the Senate.

2

Revised section 36S(d)(4) provides:

4)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B)~ in any case under any chapter ofthis title. an unexpired lease of
nonresidential real property under which the debtor is the lessee shall be deemed rejected, and the trustee
shall immediately surrender that nonresidential real property to the lessor, if the trustee does not assume or
reject the unexpired lease by the earlier of(i) the date that is 120 days after the date of the order for relief; or
(ii) the date of the entry of an order confmning a plan.
(B)(i) The court may extend the period determined under subparagraph (A), prior to the expiration of the 120day period, for 90 days upon motion of the trustee or lessor for cause.
(ii) If the court grants an extension under clause (il, the court may grant a subsequent extension only upon
prior written consent of the lessor in each instance.

Bills, § 404 (emphasis added).
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2.

Administrative Claim Upon Rejection of Lease Previously Assumed
by the Debtor

In Nostas Assoc. v. Costich (In re Klein Sleep Products, Inc.), 78 F.3d 18 (2d Cir.
1996), the debtor in possession assumed a lease of nonresidential real property. A
chapter 11 trustee was appointed when the debtor's reorganization efforts failed. The
chapter 11 trustee promptly rejected the lease and the lessor sought recovery of future
rent under the lease. The trustee argued that the rejection of a previously-assumed lease
should be treated as a breach entitling the lessor to a general unsecured claim. The
Second Circuit disagreed and held that the lessor's claim for future rent gave rise to an
administrative expense claim entitled to priority under Bankruptcy Code section S03(b).
Id. at 30. The Second Circuit further held that the section 502(b)(6) cap did not apply to
the lessor's claim. Id. at 33.

The Bills overmle that portion ofKlein that held that the lessor was entitled to an
unlimited administrative expense claim. Under the revised law, a lessor with respect to a
lease that was previously assumed and then rejected will have an administrative expense
claim for future rent "[f]or the period of2 years following the later ofthe rejection date or
the date of actual turnover ofthe premises ...." Damages for"going dark" and penalties
are expressly excluded from the administrative claim under revised Bankruptcy Code
§ 503(b)(7). Bills, § 445. Mitigation principles will apply only to the extent that the
lessor actually receives rent from a nondebtor.
The Bills also overrule that portion ofKlein that held that the 502(b)(6) cap does
not apply to these claims, although the cap will apply on a more limited basis. The cap
will apply to the lessor's claim for future rent after the fIrSt 2 years: "[t]he claim for
remaining sums due for the balance of the term of the lease shall be a claim under section
S02(b)(6)." Bills, § 445.
These amendments will affect most seriously chapter 11 debtors that operate retail
chains. In those cases, a debtor often has many leases that it may want to assume or
reject, depending on how the retail stores operate during heavy shopping seasons. Under
the new law, many ofthose debtors will not have the benefit of waiting to decide. Either
the debtor assumes its leases and takes the chance that it ultimately will have to reject the
leases and be subject to the lessor's administrative claim under revised section 503(b)(7)
or the debtor immediately rejects the leases possibly to the detriment of its future
business operations.

B.

Amendments that Affect Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases
1.

Cure of Nonmonetary Defaults

In Worthington v. General Motors Corp. (In re Claremont Acquisition Corp.,
Inc.), 113 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit would not allow a chapter 11
debtor to assume and assign its franchise agreements due to its inability to cure certain
nonmonetary defaults arising from its failure to operate the franchise in accordance with
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the \agreement's "going dark" clause. Id. at 1035. The Ninth Circuit began with the
proposition that Bankruptcy Code section 365(b)(1) requires the debtor to cure all
monetary and nonmonetary defaults before it can assume or assign an executory contract
or unexpired lease. The Ninth Circuit noted that although section 365(b)(2) contains a
list of items that need not be cured before assumption and assignment, a nonmonetary
default was not one ofthose items. Id. at 1033. The dispute in that case was over the
construction of the language of section 365(b)(2)(D):
Paragraph (1) of this section [365(b)] does not apply to a default that is a
breach of a provision relating to - . .. (D) the satisfaction of any penalty
rate or provision relating to a default arising from any failure by the debtor

to perfonn nonmonetary obligations under the executory contract or
unexpired lease.
11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(2)(D) (emphasis added).
The debtors and proposed assignees took the position that the phrase "penalty rate
or provision" meant "penalty rate or other provision" relating to a default arising from
any failure by the debtor to perfonn nonmonetary obligations under the executory
contract or unexpired lease. In re Claremont Acquisition Com., Inc., 113 F.3d at 1033.
The franchisor took the position that the phrase meant "penalty rate or penalty provision"
relating to a default arising from any failure by the debtor to perform nonmonetary
obligations under the executory contract or unexpired lease. Id. The Ninth Circuit
agreed with the franchisor. Id. at 1034. Taking the position that the nonmonetary default
was a "historical fact" which could not be cured, the Ninth Circuit would not allow the
debtor to assign the franchise agreement. Id. at 1033-34.
Under revised section 365(b)(2), the trustee need not cure defaults that relate to a
breach of a nonmonetary obligation if it is impossible to do so. However, with respect to
real property leases, the trustee must begin perfonning all nonmonetary obligations under
the lease at or after the time of assumption. Moreover, if a lessor ofnonresidential real
property suffers and pecuniary losses as a result of the debtor's failure to perform its
nonmonetary obligations under the lease, those losses must be compensated as part ofthe
cure. H.R. 333, § 328; S. 420, § 327. Revised section 365(b)(I)(A) provides:
(b) (1) If there has been a default in an executory contract or unexpired lease of
the debtor, the trustee may not assume such contract or lease unless, at the time of
assumption of such contract or lease, the trustee (A) cures, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will
promptly cure, such default; other than a default tbat is a breach of
a provision relating to the satisfaction of any provision (other than
a penalty rate or penalty provision) relating to a default arising
from any failure to perform nonmonetary obligations under an
unexpired lease of real property, if it is impossible for the trustee
to cure such default by· performing nonmonetary acts at and after
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the time of assumption, except that if such default arises from a
fallure to operate in accordance with a nonresidential real
property lease, then such default shall be cured by performance at
and after the time of assumption in accordance with such lease,
and pecuniary losses resulting from such default shall be
compensated in accordance with the provisions of paragraph .
(b)(1); and

H.R.333, § 328; S. 420, § 327.
In re Claremont Acquisition is no longer good law with respect to leases of real
property. However, to fix the ambiguity under current section 36S(b)(2)(D), as pointed
out by the Ninth Circuit, the Bills revise section 36S(b)(2)(D) to provide that the cure
requirement does not apply to the satisfaction of any "penalty rate or penalty provision."
H.R. 333, § 328; S. 420, § 327. As a result, Claremont is codified for personal property
leases and executory contracts other than unexpired leases ofreal property. This may
create problems for debtors that have defaulted on going dark obligations under franchise
agreements. Under revised section 36S(b)(2)(D), those debtors may not be pennitted to
assume and assign their agreements.

2.

Impairment of Claims or Interests Related to Nonmonetary Defaults

The Bills amend section 1124(2) to correspond with the amendments to section
365(b)(1) & (2). Revised section 1124(2)(A) & (D) provide:
Except as provided in section 1123(a)(4) of this title, a class of claims or
interests is impaired under a plan unless, with respect to each claim or
interest of such class, the plan - ...
(2) notwithstanding any contractual provision or applicable law
that entitles the holder of such claim or interest to demand or
receive accelerated payment of such claim or interest after the
occurrence of a default -

(A) cures any such default that occurred before or after the
commencement ofthe case under this title, other than a
default ofa kind specified in section 365(b)(2) ofthis title
or of a kind that section 365(b)(2l of this title expressly
does not require to be cured •••

CD> if such claim or such interest arises from anI
failure to perform a nonmonetary obligation, other than
a default arising from failure to operate a nonresidential real property lease subject to section
365(b)(1)(A), compensates the holder of such claim or
such interest (other than the debtor or an insider) for
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any actual pecuniary loss incurred by such holder 8S a
result of such failure ••••
H.R. 333, § 328; S. 420, § 327.
This section appears to prevent "going dark" clauses in loan agreements from
preventing reinstatement ofthe loan as unimpaired. A technical error in the cross
reference to section 365(b) however suggests that penalty clauses associated with
monetary defaults may be subject to cure as a condition of treating a claim as unimpaired.
Compare revised § 1124(2) with In re Southeast Co., 868 F.2d 33S (9th Cir. 1989); In re
Entz-White Lumber & Supply, 850 F.2d 1338 (9th eire 1988).
0

3.

Provisions Affecting Air Carriers

Current Bankruptcy Code section 365(c)(4) and (d) includes expired provisions
that specifically protect and relate to air carriers and lessors of aircraft terminals. The
Bills delete all those provisions.

of

c.

Utilities

The Bills practically rewrite Bankruptcy Code section 366. These amendments
give a significant amount ofpower to the utilities, making it possible for a utility to alter,
refuse or discontinue utility service without relief from the automatic stay and without
court approval.
To begin with, section 366 will include a definition ofthe term "assurance of
payment:"

(A) For purposes of this subsection, the term 'assurance ofpayment' means -(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)

a cash deposit;
a letter of credit;
a certificate of deposit;
a surety bond;
a prepayment of utility consumption; or
another fonn of security that is mutually agreed on
between the utility and the debtor or the trustee.

Bills, § 417.
Note that the above list does not include administrative expense priority as an
acceptable form of adequate assurance. In fact, revised section 366 provides that
administrative expense priority does not constitute adequate assurance. This resolves an
ambiguity in the legislative history and conflicting case law.
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Turning to a utility's ability to terminate service without court approval and
without relief from the automatic stay, it appears that a utility can do so if the form and
amount of adequate assurance payment is not "satisfactory" to the utility. Specifically,
revised section 366 allows a utility to:

[a]lter, refuse, or discontinue utility service, if during the 30-day
period beginning on the date of.filing of the petition, the utility
does not receive from the debtor or the trustee adequate assurance
ofpayment for utility service that is satisfactory to the utility.
Bills, § 417.
Revised section 366 contains no requirement that the utility seek court approval
before terminating service in accordance with the new provision. Although revised
section 366 authorizes the court to modify the amount of the proposed adequate
assurance payment, there simply is no requirement that the utility seek court approval
before terminating service in accordance with the new provision. Moreover, although it
might be suggested that a utility would need to seek relief from the automatic stay before
terminating service, the provisions ofthis section that specifically authorize the utility to
terminate service probably will control.
Given the utilities' ability to terminate service, debtors that cannot reach
agreements with utilities will have to attempt to preempt termination by seeking relief
from the bankruptcy court within the first 30 days of the case. It may not be easy for
debtors that successfully preempt termination to have the court modify proposed
adequate assurance payments, however. The section sets forth certain facts that the court
cannot consider when determining whether to modify an adequate assurance payment:
In making a determination ... whether an assurance of payment is
adequatet the court may not consider ... (i) the absence of security before
the date of filing of the petition; (ii) the payment by the debtor of charges
for utilities service in a timely manner before the date of filing of the
petition; or (iii) the availability of an administrative expense priority.
Bills, § 417.

In addition to the revisions discussed above, the utility will be permitted to
U[r]ecover or set off against a security deposit provided to the utility by the debtor before
the date of filing the petition without notice or order of the court. n Bills, § 417.

D.

Preferences
1.

The Deprizio Fix

The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 (the "1994 Reform Act") amended
Bankruptcy Code section 550 to overrule Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (In re
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Deprizio), 874 F.2d 1186, 1187 (7 Cir. 1989). De.prizio addressed the issue of the
appropriate preference period for payments to third party lenders on account of debts
guaranteed by insiders.
Deprizio extended the preference avoidance period from 90 days to 1 year for
non-insider creditors that received payments that benefited an insider. Specifically,
Deprizio allowed a trustee to recover loan payments that the debtor made to its noninsider lender within 1 year preceding the bankruptcy filing because those payments
benefited the debtor's controlling shareholders who guaranteed the loan. The Court in
Deprizio reasoned that the payments were made for the benefit of a insider creditors
because: (1) the insider guarantors benefited from the payments because their obligations
under the guarantees were reduced and (2) the insider guarantors were creditors ofthe
debtor because they had contingent claims against the debtor's estate.
The 1994 Refonn Act added subsection (c) to section 550. Subsection (c)
provides:
(c) If a transfer made between 90 days and one year before the filing ofthe
petition -

(1) is avoided under section S47(b) of this title; and
(2) was made for the benefit of a creditor that at the time of
such transfer was an insider; the trustee may not recover under subsection
(a) from a transferee that is not an insider.
After the 1994 amendment, several decisions held that section 550(c) did not
overrule Deprizio in some circumstances. One of the decisions that highlighted the
loophole was Roost v. Associates Home Equity Servs., Inc. (In re Williams), 234 B.R.
801 (Bankr. D. Or. 1999). In In re Williams, a chapter 7 debtor and his wife signed a
note to finance the purchase oftheir mobile home. The note was secured by the mobile
home and the real property upon which the mobile home was situated. The lender
perfected its security interest more than 90 days but less than 1 year before the
commencement of the debtor's chapter 7 case. Under the Deprizio rationale, the trustee
sought to avoid the security interest, based upon the fact that the transfer benefited the
Debtor's wife, who was an insider.

The Debtor did not dispute that the transfer benefited his wife. Rather, the Debtor
argued that Bankruptcy Code section S50(c) prohibited any recovery by the trustee. In
response, the trustee argued that it was not attempting to "recover" any property because
the Debtor's interest in the mobile home became property ofthe Debtor's estate upon the
commencement ofthe bankroptcy case. The trustee was not seeking to "recover" any
property under Bankroptcy Code section 550(a). Rather, the trustee merely sought to
avoid the lender's security interest under Bankruptcy Code section 547(b).
Relying upon canons of statutory construction and those decisions that have
recognized that the Bankruptcy Code separates the concepts of avoidance and recovery,
see Congress Credit Corp. v. Ale Int'I (In re Congress), 186 B.R. 555, 558 (D.P.R.
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1995), the Court held that the security interest was avoidable under the'Deprizio doctrine
even though recovery of a payment would be precluded by section 550(c). The Court

suggested that had Congress intended to add an exception or defense to section S47 it
would have done so.
Congress has done so by adding subsection (i) to Bankruptcy Code section 547:

If the trustee avoids under subsection (b) a transfer made between 90 days
and 1 year before the date of filing of the petition, by the debtor to an
entity that is not an insider for the benefit of a creditor that is an insider,
such transfer shall be considered to be avoided under this section only
with respect to the creditor that is an insider.
Bills, § 1213.
Note that this "De.prizio Amendment" applies to any case that is pending or
commenced on or after the date of enactment of the 2001 Refonn Act. It is unclear
whether the fix will apply to adversary proceedings pending on the date of enactment.

2.

Modification of Ordinary Course Defense Under Section 547(c)(2)

The Bills modify the ordinary course defense under Bankmptcy Code section
547(c)(2), creating a less rigorous standard for establishing the defense. Bil1st § 409.
Current law provides that a transfer may not be avoided:

(2) to the extent that such transfer was (A) in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the
ordinary course ofbusiness or financial affairs ofthe debtor
and the transferee;
(B) made in the ordinary course ofbusiness or financial
affairs of the debtor and the transferee; and
(C) made according to ordinary business tenns[.]

11 U.S.C. § S47(c)(2) (emphasis added).
As the law currently stands, the requirements of subparagraphs (A),(B), and (C)
must be satisfied in order to establish an ordinary course defense. The new law changes
that standard by making (2)(B) and (2)(C) disjunctive, as opposed to conjunctivet
requirements. Thus, a preference defendant need only establish (2)(A) and either (2)(B)
or (2)(C). In general, this will allow defendants to protect payments that though were not
made in accordance with ordinary business tenns were nevertheless ordinary as between
the parties. This largely follows the construction placed on the existing statute by Judge
Posner in In re Tolona Pizza Products Com., 3 F.3d 1029 (7th Cir. 1993).
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3.

Monetary Limitation for Corporate Debtors

Under current law, there is no monetary limit on a business debtor's ability to
pursue a preference. Under the new law, a business debtor will not be permitted to avoid
transfers of less than $5,000. Oddly, this "jurisdictional minimum" is made an
affirmative defense rather than an element ofthe trustee's case in chief. Paragraph (9)
will be added to subsection 547(c):
(c) The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer-

(9) if, in a case filed by a debtor whose debts are not primarily consumer
debts, the aggregate value of all property that constitutes or is affected by
such transfer is less than $5,000.
Bills, § 409.

4.

Venue in Preference Proceedings

The Bills amend 28 U.S.C. § 1409(b) to provide that a preference action for a
non-consumer debt of less than $10,000 can only be commenced in the district in which
the non-insider creditor resides. Bills, § 410. Note that business defendants are given
more home court protection than consumer defendants.

5.

Expansion of Time to Perfect a Transfer

Bankruptcy Code section 547(e)(2) governs when a transfer is made for purposes
of Bankruptcy Code section 547(b). Current law provides that a transfer is made at the
time the transfer takes effect between the parties, provided the transferee properly
perfects its interest within 10 days. If the transferee does not perfect within the 10-day
"grace period," the transfer is deemed to have occurred on the date ofperfection. Late
perfection may make a transfer otherwise outside the preference period, within the period
and deny the defendant protection under the contemporaneous exchange for value
defense.
The Bills change the IO-day grace period to a 3D-day grace period. Bills, § 403.
This makes it unlikely that administrative delays in recording financing statements or in
obtaining certificates of title will cause preference problems.

6..

E m .8slon of Time to Perfect a Purchase Money Security Interest

The Bills expand the time period within which a creditor can perfect a purchase
money security interest. Under current law, a trustee may not avoid a transfer that creates
a security interest in property acquired by the debtor "[t]hat is perfected on or before 20
days after the debtor receives possession of such property." 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3)(B).
The Bills change the 20-day to a 30-day period. A trustee will not be pennitted to avoid
a transfer that creates a security interest in property acquired by the debtor that is
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perfected on or before 30 days after the debtor receives possession of such property.

S. 420, § 1222; H.R. 333, § 12.23.
E.

Postpetition Transfers

Bankruptcy Code section 549 empowers the trustee, with certain limitations, to
avoid unauthorized postpetition transfers of estate property. Section 549(c) provides one
ofthose limitations. Section 549(c) limits the trustee's ability to avoid postpetition
transfers of real property to good faith purchasers for present fair equivalent value and
without knowledge ofthe bankruptcy :filing, unless a copy or notice of the petition was
properly recorded before the transferee perfects its interest in the property. 11 U.S.C. §
549(c).
The Bills amend Bankruptcy Code section 549(c), overruling Thompson v.
Margen (In re McConville), 110 F.3d 47 (9th Cir. 1997). Bills, § 1214. In McConville,
lenders that did not have any knowledge of the commencement of the debtor's bankruptcy
case made a postpetition mortgage loan to the debtor without obtaining a court order. In
addition to holding that the lenders violated Bankruptcy Code section 364(c)(2) by
making a secured loan without prior bankruptcy court approval, the Ninth Circuit held
that Bankruptcy Code section 549(c) was inapplicable because the postpetition creation
of the lien on the debtor's real property was not a "transfer ofproperty" within the
meaning of section 549(c).
The Bills correct the problem created by In re McConville by replacing the phrase
"transfer of,real property" with "transfer of an interest in real property." Under the
revised law, the creation of a lien will fall under the 549(c) exception.

To accompany the amendmentS to section 549(c), the Bills amend the definition
of the word "transfer" to include the "creation of a lien:"
(54) The term "transfer" means-(A) the creation of a lien;
(B) the retention of title as a security interest;
(C) the foreclosure of a debtor's equity of redemption; or
(D) each mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional,
voluntary or involuntary, of disposing ofor parting with-(i) property; or
(ii) an interest in property
Bills, § 1201.
In addition to the above-amendments, the House Bill amends section 362(b),
precluding the stay "[o]f any transfer that is not avoidable under section S44 and that is
not avoidable under section 549." H.R. 333, § 311. The Senate Bill deletes this
language.
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F.

Reclamation
Bankmptcy Code section 546(c) protects a seller of goods' right to reclamation

under state law. Under current law, a seller of goods can seek to reclaim goods that the
debtor received while it was insolvent, provided that the seller makes a written
reclamation demand n[b]efore 10 days after receipt of such goods by the debtor; or ... if
such 10 day period expires after the commencement of the case, before 20 days after
receipt of such goods by the debtor .... rr 11 U.S.C. § 546(c)(1).
The Bills revise section 546(c) to provide that a seller can seek to reclaim goods

if:
(1) the debtor received the goods while it was insolvent and not later than
45 days before the bankmptcy filing and
(2) the seller makes a written reclamation demand on the debtor:
a. not later than 45 days after the date the debtor received the
goods or
b. not later than 20 days after the commencement of the case if
the 45 day period expires after the commencement of the case.
H.R. 333 § 1228(a); S. 420, § 1227(a) (emphasis added).
As drafted, revised section 546(c) will not accomplish its intended goal.
As set forth above, revised section 546(c) provides that in order for the seller to be
able to reclaim the goods, the debtor must have received the goods "not later than
45 days" prior to the commencement ofthe case. Thus, reclamation is not
possible if the debtor received the goods between the 44th day before the
bankruptcy and the petition date. Moreover, since the goods subject to
reclamation must be received by the debtor at least 45 days before the bankmptcy,
proposed section S46(c)(2)(B) appears to be a nullity since the 45 day period can
never expire postpetition.

With respect to a seller's reclamation rights, note the revision to Bankmptcy Code
section 503(b). Section 503(b)(10) allows sellers to recover "[t]he value of any goods
received by the debtor not later than 20 days prior to the date of commencement of a case
under this title in which the goods have been sold to the debtor in the ordinary course of
such debtor's business." H.R. 333, § 1229(b); S. 420, § 1227(b). This section maybe
unworkable for the same reasons discussed above. However, the subparagraph is
intended to allow sellers that do not properly seek reclamation in accordance with section
546(c) to have an administrative expense claim for the value of such goods. This is good
for sellers if the estate is not administratively insolvent and especially bad for other
administrative claimants if it is.
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Revised section 546(c) provides that a seller's reclamation rights are limited by
Bankruptcy Code section 507(C)2 and the prior rights ofholders of security interests in
the goods or the proceeds thereof:

G.

Statutory Liens

1.

Purchasers for Adequate and Full Value

The Bills section 711 add a somewhat obscure "except" clause to section 545(2),
the section authorizing the trustee to strong-ann certain statutory liens. Under existing
law unrecorded tax liens may be avoided, of course, but even recorded federal tax liens
may under some court decisions lose to a trustee because section 6323 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, allows (with respect to certain kinds ofproperty listed in 26
u.s.c. § 6323(b» "[a] person who for adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth, acquires an interest (other than a lien or security interest) in property
which is valid under local law against subsequent purchasers without actual notice" 26
U.S.C. § 6323(h)(6), to defeat a recorded tax lien if he is without actual notice of the lien.
The intent of the amendment appears to be to prevent the bankruptcy trustee from
"stepping into the shoes" of this kind of purchaser under his statutory lien strong-ann
power.
It is unclear whether the amendment will accomplish this assumed objective.
Revised section 545(2) provides:
The trustee may avoid the fixing of a statutory lien on property of the debtor
to the extent that such lien (2) is not perfected or enforceable at the time of the
commencement ofthe case against a bona fide purchaser that
purchases such property at the time of the commencement ofthe
case; whether or not such a purchaser exists, except in any case in
which a purchaser is a purchaser described in section 6323 of the

Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or in any other similar provision
of State or local law;
Bills, § 711 (emphasis added).

The Bills probably should say section S07(b) instead ofS07(c). Section S07(b) provides: (b) If the trustee, under
section 362,363, or 364 of this title, provides adequate protection ofthe interest ofa holder ofa claim secured by
a lien on property ofthe debtor and if, notwithstanding such protection, such creditor has a claim allowable under
subsection (a)(I) ofthis section arising from the stay of action against such property under section 362 of this title,
from the use, sale, or tease of such property under section 363 of this title, or from the granting of a lien under
section 364(d) ofthis title, then such creditors claim under such subsection shall have priority over every other
claim allowable under such subsection. (Bankruptcy Code section 507(c) provides that "[a] claim of a
governmental unit arising from an erroneous refund or credit of a tax has the same priority as a claim for the tax to
which such refund or credit relates" 11 U.S.C. § S07(c».

2
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It is very difficult to parse revised section 545(2). The new "except" clause
appears to be referring to an actual purchaser and may be interpreted as creating a kind of
safe harbor for such persons. Ofcourse, actual purchasers ofproperty subject to properly
recorded federal tax liens and ofthe type described are few and far between, and would
in any event unquestionably defeat both the government and the bankruptcy trustee under
current law. On the other hand, certainly there are much clearer ways for the Congress to
state that a properly recorded tax lien can not be defeated by a bankruptcy trustee, if
indeed that is what is intended.
The amendment would not appear to change current law with respect to a tax lien
properly recorded against accounts receivable, inventory and other types ofproperty
protected by 26 U.S.C. § 6323(c) (dealing with certain types of commercial financing
agreements).
Note that most courts draw a strong distinction between "bona fide purchaser" as
the tenn is understood in the context of current section 545(2) and "purchaser" as it is
defined and understood under Internal Revenue Code section 6323. Those courts
generally point out that the distinction lies between the meaning of "value" and "adequate
and full consideration." See e.g., Battley v. United States (In re Berg), 121 F.3d 535 (9th
eire 1997); United States v. Hunter (In re Walter), 45 F.3d 1023, 1030 (6th Cir. 1995).

2.

Warehouseman's LieDs

Under current law, a trustee's power to avoid statutory liens includes the power to
avoid certain warehouseman's liens. 11 U.S.C. § 545(2) and (3). The Bills limit the
trustee's ability to avoid a warehouseman's lien for storage, transportation, or other costs
incidental to the storage and handling of goods, notwithstanding the provisions of section
545. Bills, § 406. These amendments are contained in section 546, the Bankmptcy Code
provision that limits the trustee's avoidance powers.
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II.
Small Business Provisions
A.

Dermitions Relating to Small Business Debtors
Under current law, "small business" is defined in Bankruptcy Code section

lOl(51)(C). The Bills delete the definition of small business, replacing it with definitions
of "small business case" and "small business debtor:"

(SIC) small business case means a case filed under chapter 11 ofthis title
in which the debtor is a small business debtor;
(510) small business debtor(A) subject to subparagraph (B), means a person engaged in

commercial or business activities (including any affiliate of such
person that is also a debtor under this title and excluding a person
whose primary activity is the business of owning or operating real
property or activities incidental thereto) that has aggregate
noncontingent, liquidated secured and unsecured debts as of the
date ofthe petition or the order for relief in an amount not more
than $3,000,000 (excluding debts owed to 1 or more affiliates or
insiders) for a case in which the United States trustee has not
appointed under section 1102(a)(I) a committee of unsecured
creditors or where the court has determined that the committee of
unsecured creditors is not sufficiently active and representative to
provide effective oversight ofthe debtor; and
(B) does not include any member of a group of affiliated debtors
that has aggregate noncontingent liquidated secured and unsecured
debts in an amount greater than $3,000,000 (excluding debt owed

to 1 or more affiliates or insiders).
Bills, § 432 (emphasis added).

B.

Issues Affecting Plan Confirmation
1.

New Exclusivity Period in Small Business Cases

Under current law, a small business debtor (of which there are at present virtually
none, since the current small businesses provisions are both unattractive and elective) has
the exclusive right to file a plan until 100 days after the date of the order for relief. 11
U.S.C. § 1121(e)(1). In small business cases, a plan must be filed in any event, be it by
the debtor or another party in interest, within 160 days after the date of the order for
relief: 11 U.S.C. § 1121(e)(2). Only the exclusivity deadline can be extended for cause
under Bankruptcy Code section 1121(e)(3)(B) ifit is demonstrated that n[t]he need for an
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increase is caused by circumstances for which the debtor should not be held
accountable." 11 U.S.C. § 1121(e)(3)(B).
Under the Bills, the small business provisions are no longer optional. All
business debtors with less than $3 million in debt (other than single asset real estate
debtors who are treated separately) must comply with the special small business
provision.
The Bills extend the small business debtor's exclusivity period to 180 days and the
absolute plan-filing deadline to 300 days after the date of the order for relief. The court
will not be permitted to extend those periods unless: (1) it is demonstrated by
preponderance ofthe evidence that it is more likely than not that the court will confinn
the plan within a reasonable period of time; (2) a new deadline is imposed at the time the
extension is granted; and (3) an order is signed before the existing deadline expires.
Bills, § 437.
The new law changes the standard and may make it more difficult for the debtor
to successfully extend the exclusivity period. The preponderance of the evidence
standard places the burden on the movant (usually the debtor in these instances) to show
that it will propose a confirmable plan. The current standard only requires the debtor to
establish that it should not be held accountable for its failure to file a plan. Moreover,
small business debtors will need to ensure that they move quickly to seek to extensions
before the expiration ofthe statutory periods.

2.

Deadline for Confirmation of a Plan

The Bills add a new subsection to 11 U.S.C. § 1129, which specifies a time period
within which a small business debtor's plan must be confmned. The House version
requires a small business debtor to confirm a plan within 175 days after the order for
relief, unless the period is extended pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1121(e)(3). H.R. 333 § 438.
This provision appears to be inconsistent with the House Bill's exclusivity provision for
small business debtors.
The Senate version, on the other hand, requires a small business debtor to confinn
a plan no later than 45 days after it is filed with the court. S. 420, § 438. The Senate
version provides for an extension of that period if the debtor can demonstrate that it is
more likely than not that the court will confirm a plan within a reasonable period of time.
If the period is to be extended, a new deadline must be imposed at the time the period is
extended and the order must be signed before the statutory period expires. S. 420, § 438.

3.

Standard Form of Disclosure Statement and Plan

The Bills direct the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules of the Judicial
Conference of the United States and to propose a standard form disclosure statement and
plan ofreorganization for small business debtors. These fonns are supposed to strike a
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balance between the needs ofthe courts, creditors, and other parties in interest to receive
complete information, and economy and simplicity for debtors. Bills, § 433.
4.

More Flexible Rules for Plan and Disclosure Statement

Under current law, a court can conditionally approve a disclosure statement in a
small business case. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(t)(1). Thereafter, the debtor can solicit
acceptances or rejections to the plan, provided that holders of claims and interests are
mailed a copy ofthe conditionally approved disclosure statement within 10 days before
the confinnation hearing. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(f)(2). Moreover, the court can hold a
combined hearing on the disclosure statement and plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(f)(3).
The Bills amend section 1125(f) to authorize a court to detennine that the plan
itselfprovides adequate information, making it unnecessary to file a separate disclosure
statement. Moreover, the section will authorize the court to approve a form disclosure
statement. The Bills preserve the court's ability to (1) conditionally approve a disclosure
statement and (2) combine the plan and disclosure statement hearing. The small business
debtor still can solicit acceptances to a conditionally approved disclosure statement,
provided that the disclosure statement is mailed to holders of claims and interests within
20 days before the confirmation hearing. Bills, § 431.

c.

Duties of Trustee or Debtor in Possession in Small Business Cases

1.

Duties of Debtor in Small Business Cases

The Bills add a new section to chapter 11. New section 1116 sets forth the duties
of a trustee or debtor in possession in small business cases. Bills, § 436. Section 1116
requires a small business debtor to attach additional infonnation to its voluntary petition
and requires management to attend meetings and hearings. Section 1116 provides:
In a small business case, a trustee or the debtor in possession, in addition to the
duties provided in this title and as otherwise required by law, shall-

(1) append to the voluntary petition or, in an involuntary case, file not later
than 7 days after the date ofthe order for relief-(A) its most recent balance sheet, statement of operations, cashflow statement, Federal income tax return; or
(B) a statement made under penalty of perjury that no balance
sheet, statement of operations, or cash-flow statement has been

prepared and no Federal tax return has been filed;
(2) attend, through its senior management personnel and counsel, meetings
scheduled by the court or the United States trustee, including initial debtor

interviews, scheduling conferences, and meetings ofcreditors convened
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under section 341 unless the court waives that requirement after notice and
hearing, upon a finding of extraordinary and compelling circumstances;
(3) timely file all schedules and statements offinancia! affairs, unless the
court, after notice and a hearing, grants an extension, which shall not
extend such time period to a date later than 30 days after the date ofthe
order for relie~ absent extraordinary and compelling circumstances;
(4) file all postpetition financial and other reports required by the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure or by local role of the district court;
(5) subject to section 363(c)(2), maintain insurance customary and
appropriate to the industry;
(6)

(A) timely file tax returns and other required government filings;
and

(B) subject to section 363(c)(2), timely pay all administrative
expense tax claims, except those being contested by appropriate
proceedings being diligently prosecuted; and

(7) allow the United States trustee, or a designated representative of the
United States trustee, to inspect the debtor's business premises, books, and
records at reasonable times, after reasonable prior written notice, unless
notice is waived by the debtor.

2.

Increased Debtor Reporting Requirements

The Bills add a new section to chapter 3 (section 308) which requires a small
business debtor to file periodic financial and other reports containing information with
respect to debtor's profitability and the debtor's projected cash receipts and
disbursements. In addition to that information, the small business debtor must report
whether it is in compliance with the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code and the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and whether it has paid its taxes and filed its tax
returns. Bills, § 434.
It is unclear whether these periodic reports will take the place of the monthly
operating reports that currently are required to be filed and served upon the Office of the
United States Trustee.
The effective date ofthe amendments with respect to the increased debtor
reporting requirements is 60 days after the date on which "[r]ules are prescribed under
section 2075 of title 28, United States Code, to ~stablish forms to be used to comply with
section 308 oftitle 11, United States Code .... "
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The Bills also direct the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules of the Judicial
Conference of the United States to propose a corresponding Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure to implement new section 308.

3.

Increased Supervision by Office of the United States Trustee

The United States Trustee ("UST") will have increased monitoring
responsibilities in small business cases. Bankruptcy Code section 586(a) will set forth
the UST's increased monitoring functions in small business cases. In small business
cases, the UST will be required to conduct an initial debtor interview "as soon as
practicable" after the entry of the order for reliet: but before the first meeting of creditors
under Bankruptcy Code section 341 (a). During the initial debtor interview, the UST will
(i) begin to investigate the debtor's viability; (ii) inquire about the debtor's business plan;
(iii) explain the debtor's obligations to file monthly operating reports and other required
reports; (iv) attempt to develop an agreed scheduling order; and (v) inform the debtor of
other obligations. Bills, § 439.
In addition to investigating the debtor's viability during the initial debtor interview
and making other inquiries, the UST may visit the debtor's business to "[a]scertain the
state of the debtor's books and records and verify that the debtor has filed its tax
returns .... ft Bills, § 439. Moreover, the UST will monitor the debtor's activities to
determine "[w ]hether the debtor will be unable to confirm a plan ...." Bills, §439
(emphasis added). This represents a potentially important shift toward involving the UST
in business operations as well as case administration.
It is difficult to determine how the UST's increased monitoring function in small
business cases will affect a small business debtor's ability to conduct its normal business
operations. However, many contend that requiring the UST to have that much
involvement in a small business debtor's business affairs will only hinder the small
business debtor's reorganization efforts.

D.

Automatic Stay Does Not Apply to Serial Filers

Unless a small business debtor can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
(1) its bankruptcy resulted from circumstances beyond the debtor's control that were not
foreseeable at the time the case was filed and that (2) it is more likely than not that the
court will confinn a plan of reorganization (as opposed to a liquidating plan), the
automatic stay will not apply in a case in which the debtor:

"(A) is a debtor in a small business case pending at the time the petition is filed;
(B) was a debtor in a small business case that was dismissed for any reason by an
order that became final in the 2-year period ending on the date of the order for
relief entered with respect to the petition;
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(C) was a debtorin a small business case in which a plan was confinned in
the 2-year period ending on the date of the order for relief entered with
respect to the petition: or
(0) is an entity that has succeeded to substantially all ofthe assets or
business of a small business debtor described in subparagraph (A), (B), or
©,"

Bills, § 441.
At first glance, it would appear that the automatic stay does not apply in a small
business case. That is incorrect. These provisions were added to prevent serial filing.
Note that the serial filer provision will not apply to an involuntary case, provided that
there was no collusion by the debtor with creditors. Given the new limitation on the
automatic stay, the preferred course of action for a small business debtor that has
confirmed a plan or reorganization within the past 2 years and subsequently wishes to
liquidate in chapter 11 is to reopen the prior case. It is unclear why Congress appears to
prefer a failed reorganization to be followed by another attempt at reorganization than by
orderly liquidation under chapter 11.
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III.

Single Asset Real Estate
A.

Definition

Single asset real estate ("SARB") cases have been of little significance so far
because the $4 million cap excluded most significant projects, at least in California. The
Bills eliminate the $4 million cap:
(SIB) "single asset real estate" means real property
constituting a single property or project, other than residential
real property with fewer than 4 residential units, which
generates substantially all of the gross income of a debtor who is not a family
farmer and on which no substantial business is being conducted by a debtor
other than the business ofoperating the real property and
activities incidental;

Bills, § 1201.
The elimination of the cap means that for the first time the SARB rules will apply
in large cases. Note however that the definition will still exclude real estate projects upon
which the debtor operates a "real" business - hotels, farms, health care and so forth.
Also there will be significant pressure on defining exactly what is a single "project" for
purposes of application of the SARB roles as multiple project entities remain excluded.

B. Monthly Payments
Revised section 362(d)(3) provides:
(d) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court
shall grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section,
such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay (3) with respect to a stay of an act against single asset real
estate under subsection (a), by a creditor whose claim is secured
by an interest in such real estate, unless, not later than the
date that is 90 days after the entry ofthe order for relief (or
such later date as the court may detennine for cause by order
entered within that 90-day period) or 30 days after the court determines
that the debtor is subject to this paragraph, whichever is later-

(A) the debtor has filed a plan ofreorganization that has a
reasonable possibility ofbeing confinned within a reasonable
time; or
(B) the debtor has commenced monthly payments that -

(il may, in the debtor's sole discretion, notwithstanding section
363(c)(2), be made from rents or other income generated before or
after the commencement ofthe case by or from the property to
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each creditor whose claim is secured by such real estate (other than
a claim secured by a judgment lien or by an unmatured statutory
lien); and
(ii) are in an amount equal to interest at the then applicable
nondefault contract rate ofinterest on the. value. ofthe creditor's
interest in the real estate:

Bills, § 444.
To date there is little·case law or experience with section 362(d)(3) because of the
cap. It remains to be seen how significant the SARB roles will be in practice in light of
this limited experience. But at least in theory, the debtor will have to pay to play, that is
stay current on monthly payments to secured creditors. Application of those monthly
payments will depend on whether the creditor is over or undersecured. If the creditor is
undersecured, under United Save Ass'n ofTexas v. Timbers efmwood Forest Associates,
Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988), the payments should be applied to reduce principal. Bills, §
444. Alternatively, the debtor can avoid foreclosure by getting a confirmable plan on file
within 90 days.

As under existing law, revised (d)(3) will allow the debtor (or presumably any
party resisting relief from stay) to move to extend the time period for commencement of
payments within the 90 days for "cause." The Bills further loosen up the time frame for
the commencement of monthly payments by allowing the debtor to contest the
applicability of the SARB rules and only requiring payments to commence within 30
days after a determination that SARB is applicable. Bills, § 444. Especially in the larger
cases, debtors may well take advantage ofthese provisions to defer payment.

c.

Monthly Payments From Pledged Rents

Current law allows a creditor whose claim is secured by single asset real estate
relief from the automatic stay unless (1) the debtor has filed a confinnable plan of
reorganization or (2) the debtor is making monthly payments "to each creditor whose
claim is secured by such real estate ... which payments are in an amount equal to interest
at a current fair market on the value of the creditor's interest in the real estate." 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(d)(3).
There is a split of authority under current law on whether rents may be a source of
required adequate protection payments. The Bills revise section 362(d)(3)(B), making it
possible for debtors to commence making payments to secured creditors from pledged
rents. Bills, § 444. Since rents are the only likely source of cash payments in a SARB
case, this is a major concession to debtors.

I
II
i
~

tj

.

i
iI

II
II
i
I!
I

I
I

E - 23

D. Rate of Interest
Under current law, a single asset real estate debtor can commence making
monthly payments "equal to interest at a fair market value of the creditor's interest in real
estate." 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3)(B) (emphasis added). The Bills change the applicable rate
of interest to U[a]n amount equal to interest at the then applicable nondefault contractrate
of interest on the value of the creditor's interest in the real estate ...." Bills, § 444
(emphasis added). This should simplify administration of the statute and under current
market conditions of falling rates probably works to the advantage of lenders.
Note that the payments are measured in the amount of interest; they are not
interest payments. Whether they will be attributable to interest or principal probably
should depend on whether the property is over or undersecured.

E.

Creation or Perfection of Liens for Special Taxes or Assessments on Real
Property

The Second Circuit in Lincoln Save Bank, et at v. Suffolk County Treasurer (In re
Parr Meadows Racing Ass'D, Inc.), 880 F.2d 1540, 1542 (2d Cir. 1989) held that the
automatic stay prohibited "[t]he creation of a local tax lien upon real property unless the
county has a prepetition interest in the real property ...." The 1994 amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code overruled Parr Meadows by creating an additional exception to the
automatic stay for "[t]he creation or perfection of a statutory lien for an ad valorem
property tax imposed by the District of Columbia or a political subdivision of the State, if
such tax comes due after the filing ofthe petition." 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(18).
The Bills expand the overruling of Parr Meadows by clarifying that the exception
to the stay applies to all special taxes and assessments on real estate, whether or not ad
valorem:
(18) under subsection (a) of the creation or perfection of a statutory lien
for an ad valorem property tax, or a special tax or special assessment on
real property whether or not ad valorem., imposed by a governmental unit,
if such tax or assessment comes due after the filing of the petition

H.R. 333, § 1226; S. 420, § 1225 (emphasis added).
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IV.
Chapter 11 Plan Issues
A.

Exclusivity

The Bills contain amendments to Bankruptcy Code section l12l(d) that will
affect the debtor's ability to seek unlimited extensions ofthe plan exclusivity and
solicitation periods. Current Bankruptcy Code section lI2l(d) permits a party in interest
to seek to reduce or increase (1) the 120-day period within which the debtor has the
exclusive right to submit a plan ofreorganization and (2) the 180-day period within
which the debtor must obtain acceptances to its proposed plan ofreorganization. ,
Currently, section 1121(d) does not limit the debtor's ability to continue to seek extension
after extension, provided that the requisite cause is established each time.
The Bills add a new paragraph to section 1121(d), which limits the debtor to a 14month extension in the case ofboth the exclusivity and plan solicitation periods:
(2)(A) The 120-day period specified in paragraph (1) may not be extended beyond
a date that is 18 months after the date of the order for relief under this chapter.
(B) The l80-day period specified in paragraph (1) may not be extended
beyond a date that is 20 months after the date ofthe order for reliefunder
this chapter.

Bills, § 411.
These revisions will have the most serious impact on the larger and more
contentious chapter 11 cases, and may encourage creditors to :file more competing plans
in such cases.

B.

Revised Definition of "Adequate Information"

The Bills add some additional language to the definition of "Adequate
Infonnation" that currently is contained in Bankruptcy Code section 1125(a). The
revised definition includes the following language:
"[I]n detennining whether a disclosure statement provides adequate
information, the court shall consider the complexity of the case, the
benefit of additional infonnation to creditors and other parties in interest,
and the cost ofproviding additional information ...."
Bills, § 431.
Moreover, adequate information also will include "[a] discussion ofthe potential
material Federal tax consequences ofthe plan to the debtor, any successor to the debtor,
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and a hypothetical investor typical of the holders of claims or interest in the case ...."
Bills, § 717.

c.

Discharge

1.

Individual Chapter 11 DebtorsPlan Payments Most be Made Before Discharge is Effective

The Bills add a new paragraph to subsection 1141 (d) that requires a chapter 11
individual debtor to complete all payments under a plan before a discharge will become
effective. The amendments to section 1141(d) simply clarify that an individual must
confirm a plan and complete all ofthe payments under the plan before a discharge will
become effective. The amendment gives the court discretion to grant a discharge to an
individual chapter 11 debtor that has not completed all of the payments under a plan if:
(i) for each unsecured claim, the value, as of the effective date of the plan,
ofproperty actually distributed under the plan on account of that claim is

not less than the amount that would have been paid on such claim ifthe
estate ofthe debtor had been liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on
such date; and
(ii) modification of the plan under 1127 ofthis title is not practicable.
Bills, § 321(d) (emphasis added).

The House Bill revises section 1141(d)(2):
A discharge under this chapter does not discharge a debtor from any debt
excepted from discharge under section 523 ofthis title.
H.R. 333, § 321(d).
The Senate leaves § 1141(d)(2) unchanged. It is unclear whether the House

version simply removes a redundancy in the current Bankruptcy Code or whether it is
meant to have any substantive effect. It is difficult to discern what possible substantive
effect this provision ofthe House Bill might have since section 523(a) is expressly
limited to the debts of individuals.

E -26

2.

Corporate Chapter 11 Debtors Limitation on Discharge of Certain Fraud and Tax Claims

in Chapter 11
The Bills add a new paragraph (6) to section 1141(d) to circumscribe the scope of
the chapter 11 discharge. Bills, § 708. The House Bill subjects corporate debtors to an
exception from discharge for certain false and fraudulent taxes and also probably
intended to make applicable to corporate debtors the section 523(a)(2) exception to
discharge for certain debts incurred by fraud.

H.R. 333, § 708. 1141(d)(6), as revised by the House, provides:
(6) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the confirmation of a plan does not

discharge a deptor that is a corporation from any debt described in section
523(a)(2) or for a tax or customs duty with respect to which the debtor-

(A) made a fraudulent return; or
(B) willfully attempted in any manner to evade or defeat that tax
or duty
H.R. 333, § 708.

As drafted, the House bill clearly excludes fraudulent tax or customs duty claims
from a corporate chapter 11 debtor's discharge if the debtor made a fraudulent return or
willfully attempted in any manner to evade or defeat the claim. Less clear, however, is
whether the amendment subjects corporate debtors to the section 523(a)(2) exception to
discharge for non-tax debts. The ambiguity concerns the absence of a comma after
"523(a)(2)." As drafted, the plain language of the amendment limits the 523(a)(2) debts
excepted from discharge to those "with respect to which the debtor made a fraudulent
return or willfully attempted in any manner to evade or defeat that tax or duty."
On the other hand, it could be argued that the drafters intended to place a comma after
"section 523(a)(2)," which would have made section 523(a)(2) applicable to corporate
debtors to allow creditors to pursue post-confirmation fraud actions against corporate
debtors. The problem with that outcome is that section 523(c) requires the bankruptcy
court to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over nondischargeability complaints under section
523(a)(2). Although the bankruptcy judge is not required to determine the amount of the
nondischargeable debt, most exercise their power to do so. It is unclear whether
bankruptcy courts will exercise exclusive jurisdiction over section 1141
nondischargeability complaints to the extent they involve debts "described" in section
523(a)(2).
Not surprisingly, the House version ofnew paragraph (6) raised a lot of concern
among bankruptcy practitioners by opening the door for any creditor to seek exception to
the chapter 11 discharge on grounds of fraud perhaps even after confirmation of the plan.
S. 420 fixes one potential problem created by H.R. 333 by making it clear that the
provision applies only to the claims of governmental units against corporate debtors
under certain limited circumstances:
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(6) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the confinnation of a plan does not
discharge a debtor that is a corporation from any debt described in
subparagraph (A) or (B) of section 523(a)(2) that is owed to a domestic
governmental unit or owed to a person as the result of an action filed
under subchapter In of chapter 37 of title 31, United States Code, or any
similar statute, or for a tax or customs duty with respect to which the
debtor(A)made a fraudulent return; or
(B) willfully attempted in any manner to evade or defeat that tax or
duty.
S.420, § 708.
In this section the comma after "similar statute" removes the ambiguity about the
scope extending to non-tax fraud debts. But the Sep.ate version creates additional
ambiguities. As drafted, the new provision might limit the government to claims under
Subchapter ill of title 37. Subchapter ill of chapter 37 of title 31 is entitled "Claims
Against the United States Government." 31 U.S.C. §§ 3721 et.~. Claims arising under
chapter 37 can be asserted only against the United States government. The various
sections chapter 37 authorize the Attorney General ofthe heads of various federal
governmental agencies to settle claims that are asserted against the United States. Such
claims include but are not limited to claims of or relating to government employees,
property damage and damages cause by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

B.

Tax Provisions
1.

Rate of Interest on Tax Claims

A new section has been added to chapter 5 ofthe Bankruptcy Code. Bills, § 704.
Section 511 relates to the rate of interest on tax claims. Section 511 provides that the rate
of interest on a tax claim is detennined under applicable nonbankruptcy law:

If any provision ofthis title requires the payment ofinterest on a
tax claim or on an administrative expense tax, or the payment of
interest to enable a creditor to receive the present value of the
allowed amount of a tax claim, the rate of interest shall be the rate
detennined under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
Bills, § 704.
It is unclear whether "the rate detennined under applicable nonbankruptcy law" is
the default rate. New section 511 further provides that if taxes' are to be paid under a
plan, "[t]he rate of interest shall be determined as of the calendar month in which the plan
is confirmed." Bills, § 704. This revision does not take into account that in some cases,
the effective date of the plan is long after confmnation.
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2.

Time and Manner of Payment of Tax Claims Under a Plan.

Under current law, one of the requirements for confirmation of a plan is that the
plan provide that the allowed unsecured claims of governmental units "[r]eceive on
account of such claim deferred cash payments, over a period not exceeding six years after
the date of assessment of such claim, ofa value,as of the effective date of the plan, equal
to the allowed amount of such claim." 11 U.S.C. § I 129(a)(9)(C). The Bills significantly
revise section 1129(a)(9)(C). Bills, § 710(2).
First, governmental units holding allowed unsecured claims must receive on
account of such claim, regular installment payments in cash n[ o]f a total value, as of the
effective date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim ...."
Second, payments to taxing authorities can no longer be stretched out for a period
of six years from the date of the assessment. Under revised section 1129(a)(9)(C), those
claims must be paid in full within five years after the date ofllie entry ofthe order for
relief.
Third, and perhaps most significant, a taxing authority must not receive less

favorable treatment than other non-priority unsecured claims provided for in the plan.
Thus, if a class (other than a convenience class) is paid on the effective date ofthe plan, it
is arguable that the taxing agency must be paid on the effective date as well. On the other
hand, iftrade claims are paid at a discount on the effective date, perhaps the payment in
full of the tax claim a few years later is not less favorable.
Finally, taxing authorities that hold secured claims which would otherwise meet
the description of unsecured priority claims will be entitled to cash payments in the same
manner and over the same period as described above.
3.

Taxes Incurred Before the Commencement of the Case

Under current law, the unsecured property tax claims of governmental units
qualify for priority under Bankruptcy Code section 507(a)(8) ifproperty taxes were
assessed before the commencement of the case. II U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(B). The Bills
revise section 507(a)(8) to provide that property taxes that have been incurred before the
commencement of the case receive priority treatment. Bills, § 706. Accordingly, taxes
that are mCUlTed prepetition but assessed postpetition will qualify for priority treatment
under Bankruptcy Code section 507(a)(8).
4.

Determination of Tax Liability

Under current law, a bankruptcy court may determine the debtor's tax liability
unless the matter was already contested and adjudicated before a court of competent
jurisdiction. 11 U.S.C. § 505(a). The Bills add a new subparagraph (C) to section
505(a)(2), preventing the bankruptcy court from detennining "[t]he amount or legality of
any amount arising in connection with an ad valorem tax on real or personal property of
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the estate, if the applicable period for contesting or redetermining that amount under any
law (other than a bankruptcy law) has expired." Bills, § 701.
Most states have statutes that provide a limited time period within which a party
may contest the assessment of an ad valorem tax. Under revised section 505(a), a
bankruptcy court is not authorized to adjudicate a dispute over the assessment of an ad
valorem tax after the expiration of the applicable period for contesting the assessment.

5.

Provisions Affecting Subordination of Tax Liens

Bankruptcy Code section 724(b) provides for the subordination of tax liens to pay
among other things, secured claims and administrative expenses. 11 U.S.C. § 724(b).
Current section 724(b)(1) grants first priority to holders of allowed claims that are
secured by a lien on the property that also is subject to a tax lien. 11 U.S.C. § 724(b)(1).
The Bills revise section 724(b)(1) to provide that tax liens arising in connection with ad
valorem taxes will not be subordinated to the payment of secured claims. Revised
section 724(b)(1) provides:
(b) Property in which the estate has an interest and that is subject to a lien that is not
avoidable under this title and that secures an allowed claim for a tax~ or proceeds of
such property, shall be distributed ...

(1) first, to any holder of an allowed claim secured by a lien
on such property that is not avoidable under this title (other than to the
extent that there is a properly perfected unavoidable tax Hen arising in
connection with an ad valorem tax on real or personal property of the
estate); and that is senior to such tax lien ...
Bills, § 701.
Perhaps more problematic is the section that essentially re-orders the priority for
the payment ofchapter 11 administrative expenses in cases that have been converted to
chapter 7. Current section 724(b)(2) grants second priority over tax liens to holders of
allowed administrative expense claims under section 507(a)(I). Such claims include
chapter 11 administrative expenses incurred during chapter 11 cases that are later
converted to chapter 7. The Bills make it clear that chapter 11 administrative expenses,
except for certain employee claims, will no longer receive second priority under section
724(b)(2). Revised section 724(b)(2) provides:
(b) Property in which the estate has an interest and that is subject to a lien that is not
avoidable under this title and that secures an allowed claim for a tax, or proceeds of
such property, shall be distributed ...

(2) second, to any holder of a claim of a kind specified in
section 507(a)(1) (except that such expenses, other than claims for wages,

salaries, or commissions which arise after tbe filing of a petition, shall be
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limited to expenses incurred under chapter 7 of this title and shall not
include expenses incurred under chapter 11 of this title), 507(a)(2), 507(a)(3),
507(a)(4), 507(a)(5), 507(a)(6), or 507(a)(7) of this title, to the extent of the
amount of such allowed tax claim that is secured by such tax
lien;
Bills, § 701.

Finally, the Bills add a new paragraph (e) to section 724 which provides:
(e) Before subordinating a tax lien on real or personal property of the estate, the
trustee shall-(1) exhaust the unencumbered assets of the estate; and
(2) in a manner consistent with section 506(c), recover from property

securing an allowed secured claim the reasonable, necessary costs and
expenses of preserving or disposing of that property.

6.

Setoff of Tax Refunds

The automatic stay will not preclude a taxing authority from setting off an income
tax refund under certain circumstances. According to the Bills, a governmental unit can
set off a tax refund with respect to a taxable period that ended before the commencement
ofthe case against an income tax liability for a taxable period that ended before the

commencement of the case. Bills, § 718.
However, if applicable nonbankruptcy law would not permit the setoff due to a
pending action to determine the amount of legality of tax liability, the government cannot
set offthe refund, but may hold it pending resolution of the action. The taxing authority
can be compelled to release the tax refund, but only if it is granted adequate protection
(within the meaning of section 361) for its secured claim under Bankruptcy Code section
506(a).

7.

Stay of Tax Proceedings Limited to Prepetition Taxes

Under current law, the automatic stay applies to n[t]he commencement or
continuation of a proceeding before the United States Tax Court concerning the debtor."
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(8). The Bills revise section 362(a)(8), to make the stay applicable to
"[t]he commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United States Tax Court
concerning a corporate debtor's tax liability for a taxable period the bankruptcy court may
determine .... ft Bills, § 709. Under the revised law, section 362(a)(8) is restricted to
corporations and excludes individuals.
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v.
PreDackaged BankruDtcies
A.

Prepetition Solicitation and Acceptance

Under current law, a debtor cannot solicit acceptances or rejections to a plan
postpetition until the holders of each claim or interest have received a bankruptcy courtapproved disclosure statement. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b). With respect to a prepackaged
plan, the debtor can solicit acceptances under section 1126(b) but apparently that
solicitation process cannot continue postpetition without the approval of a disclosure
statement. The Bills add subsection (g) to section 1125, making it clear that "an
acceptance or rejection ofthe plan may be solicited from a holder of a claim or interest if
such solicitation complies with applicable nonbankruptcy law and if such holder was
solicited before the commencement ofthe case in a manner complying with applicable
nonbankruptcy law." Bills, § 408.
B.

No Meeting of Creditors Required in Pre-Packaged Bankruptcy

Under the revised law, a party in interest may request that the UST refrain from
convening a meeting of creditors under Bankruptcy Code section 341(a) ifthe debtor has
solicited acceptances to a prepackaged plan. After notice and a hearing, and if there is
cause, the court may direct the UST to refrain from convening a 341(a) meeting. Bills, §
402.
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VI.
Creditors' Committees
A.

Reimbursement of Attorneys' Fees

The Third Circuit held that the 1994 amendment to Bankruptcy Code section
503(b)(3)(F), which authorized reimbursement of expenses incurred by creditors'
committee members, authorized reimbursement of attorneys' fees incurred by members of
a creditors' committee. See First Merchants Acceptance Corp. v. I.C. Bradford & Co. (In
re First Merchants Acceptance Com,), 198 F.3d 394 (3d Cir. 1999). But see In re
Firstplus Financial. 254 B.R. 888 (Bankr. N. D. Tex. 2000) (holding to the contrary); In
re County of Orange, 179 B.R. 195 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995) (same).
Overruling In re First Merchants Acceptance Corp., the Bills amend section

S03(b)(4), clarifying that committee members cannot be reimbursed for the attorneys'
fees that they incur in connection with committee activities. Bills, § 1208.
B.

Expansion of Committees

The Bills revise Bankruptcy Code section 1102(a) to make it clear that the
bankruptcy judge may change the composition of creditors' and equity security holders
committees that are appointed by the UST on request of a party in interest and after
notice and a hearing. Bills, § 405(a). In addition, the court can order the UST to add to
the committee a small business concern creditor if that creditor "[h]olds claims (of the
kind represented by the committee) the aggregate amount of which, in comparison to the
annual gross revenue of that creditor, is disproportionately large." Bills, § 405(a).
The Bills also revise section 11 02(b), increasing the committee members' duties
to non-member creditors. The committee will be required to provide non-member
creditors access to committee infonnation and solicit and receive comments from nonmembers. Bills, § 405(b). It is unclear how the committee members that have signed
confidentiality agreements with the debtor or other parties in interest will be able to carry
out these newly-created disclosure duties. It is also unclear whether giving non-member
creditors access to committee communications with counsel will waive the committee's
attorney/client privilege.

c.

Election of Trustee

The Bills amend Bankruptcy Code section 1104(b) to provide procedural
clarification regarding resolution of disputes over the election·of a trustee at a meeting of
creditors. The Bills also deem the elected trustee "appointed" so that exclusivity will
clearly tenninate under § 1121(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. Bills, § 416.

E· 33

VII.
Consumer Privacy
In the Toysmart.com chapter 11 case the question arose whether Toysmart.com
could sell its customer list (containing approximately 250,000 names, addresses, billing
information, shopping preferences and family profiles) free of its contractual obligation
to maintain customer privacy. Toysmart.com, a retailer of educational toys, was 60%
owned by Buena Vista Internet Group, a subsidiary of Walt Disney.

Shortly after the commencement of its chapter 11 liquidating case, Toysmart.com
filed a motion pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 363(b) seeking approval to sell
substantially all of its assets, including its customer list. Several parties objected to the
sale motion, including the Federal Trade Commission (the "FrCtt ) , attorneys' general of
39 states and TRUSTe, an organization that certifies companies that adhere to online

privacy guidelines.
Just before the hearing on the sale motion, Toysmart.com and the FTC reached a
settlement, which would have allowed Toysmart.com to sell its customer list to a buyer
that was willing to purchase Toysmart.com's entire Web site. The bankruptcy court did
not approve the FTC settlement. The matter was eventually settled when Buena Vista
Internet Group offered Toysmart.com $50,000 to destroy its customer list.
The Toysmart.com case began the debate over the protection ofconsumer privacy
in the context of Bankruptcy Code section 363 asset sales. The consumer privacy issue
raised many questions about how consumer privacy could be protected during the age of
Internet bankruptcies, where customer lists often constitute a major portion of the debtor's
assets.

The Senate Bill seeks to ensure that debtors sell "personally identifiable
information" in accordance with their prepetition privacy policies by revising Bankruptcy
Code section 363(b). "Personally identifiable infonnation" is defined in revised
Banlauptcy Code section 101 as follows:

"personally identifiable infonnation', ifprovided by the individual to the debtor in

connection with obtaining a product or service from the debtor primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes-(A) means(i) the individual's first name (or initials) and last name,
whether given at birth or adoption or legally changed;
(ii) the physical address for the individual's home;

(iii) the individual's e-mail address;

(iv) the individual's home telephone number;
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(v) the individual's social security nwnber; or
(vi) the individual's credit card account number; and

(B) means, when identified in connection with one or more of the items of
information listed in subparagraph (A)(i) an individual's birth date, birth certificate number, or
place ofbirth; or

(ii) any other information concerning an identified
individual that, ifdisclosed, will result in the physical
or electronic contacting or identification ofthat person;

s. 420, § 231.
Revised section 363(b) prohibits a debtor from selling personally identifiable
infonnation in a manner that is inconsistent with its prepetition privacy policy (unless the

court orders otherwise). In determining whether a debtor can sell personally identifiable
information in a manner that is inconsistent with its prepetition pnvacy policy, the court
is required to give due consideration to the facts and circumstances of the sale or lease.
S. 420, § 231. Ironically, these nominally privacy protective provisions appear to
broaden the authority ofthe debtor to use, and the court to authorize the sale ot customer
lists, in derogation ofthe debtor's prepetition contractual privacy obligations.
To further protect consumers' privacy in the context of section 363(b) sales, the
Senate Bill provides for the appointment of a consumer privacy ombudsman. The UST
will appoint a disinterested person to act as an ombudsman when a debtor attempts to sell
customer information in violation of its pre-petition nondisclosure policies. The
ombudsman will act as a friend ofthe court to assist the court in its consideration ofthe
facts, circumstances and conditions ofthe sale or lease. The ombudsman may present
infonnation to the court to assist the court in its decision. Such information could include
presentation of the debtor's priyacy policy, potential losses or gains ofprivacy to

consumers that the sale or lease is approved, potential costs or benefits to consumers if
the sale or lease is approved and potential alternatives which mitigate potential privacy
losses or potential cost to consumers. S. 420, § 232.
The ombudsman will be compensated under Bankruptcy Code section 330.
S. 420, § 232(c).
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VIII.
Auuellate Jurisdiction
The Bills revise 28 U.S.C. §158(d), making it possible for parties to bypass
district court or BAP review and appeal orders and decrees ofthe bankruptcy court
directly to the courts of appeals.
A.

House Bill

The House Bill provides that bankruptcy court orders appealed to the district court
will become final orders of the district court unless the district court determines the
matter or expressly extends the time within 30 days after the appeal is filed. The parties

can appeal directly to the court of appeals as soon as the order becomes a final order of
the district court. H.R. 333, § 1234. The House Bill raised concerns among some judge~
and practitioners that this proposed procedure would unduly further crowd the courts of
appeals. Accordingly, the Judicial Conference developed a proposal, which has been
incorporated into the Senate Bill, as set forth below. See generally, Judicial Conference
Asks Congress to Address Areas of Concern in Bankruptcy Reform Bill, The Third
Branch, March 2001.

B.

Senate Bill
The Senate Bill sets forth the standard for the direct appeal:

(d)(l) The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from
all final decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees entered under
subsections [1](a) and [1](b) of this section.
(2)(A) A court of appeals that would have jurisdiction of a
subsequent appeal under paragraph (1) or other law may authorize

an immediate appeal of an order or decree, not otherwise
appealable, that is entered in a case or proceeding pending under

section 157 or is entered by the district court or bankruptcy
appellate panel exercising jurisdiction under subsection (a) or (b),
if the bankruptcy court, district court, bankruptcy appellate panel,
or the parties acting jointly certify that (i)

the order or decree involves(I)
(II)

(III)

a substantial question of law;
a question of law requiring resolution of
conflicting decisions; or
a matter ofpublic importance; and
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(ii)

an immediate appeal from the order or decree may
materially advance the progress of the case or
proceeding.

s. 420, § 1233 (emphasis added).
That standard will apply to final and interlocutory orders entered by the
bankruptcy court. Final orders of the district court and bankruptcy appellate panel will
remain appealable as of right to the courts of appeals as under existing law.
Under current law, as a matter of right, a party can appeal to the district court or
the bankruptcy appellate panel final judgments, orders and decrees ofthe Bankruptcy
Court and interlocutory orders increasing or reducing plan exclusivity periods in
Bankruptcy Code section 1121. Under the new law, a party would not be permitted to
appeal those matters directly to the courts of appeals without meeting the above standard.
With respect to all other interlocutory orders, as the law currently stands, a party
must seek "leave court" before an appeal is allowed. Current section 158(a)(3) does
not set forth any standards for determining when leave of court is appropriate. However,
several courts have adopted the analogous provision of28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) as the
standard for determining when a party should be granted leave to appeal. An analogous
section authorizing certification of interlocutory appeals under the general jurisdictional
statutes ofthe courts of appeals is 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). It provides:

or

(b) When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not
otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such
order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the
order may materially advance the ultimate termination ofthe litigation, he
so shall state in writing in such order. The Court ofAppeals ... may
thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to by taken from such order .

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
In general courts have imposed a very high standard for certification of appeals
under section 1292(b) and certification is rarely granted. Some courts adopt the section
1292(b) standard for detennining when leave of court is appropriate, see 5 Collier On
Bankruptcy,' 5.07[4] (15th 00. rev.), but most courts appear to apply a less rigorous
standard. The ability of the parties or the bankruptcy court (in lieu of the district court) to
certify a direct appeal and the absence of section 1 292(b)'8 controlling question language
in the Senate Bill may allow a looser standard than that of section 1292(b) and more
analogous to the leave of court standard to develop.
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The Senate Bill also includes a set of temporary procedural roles that will apply to
direct appeals to the court of appeals until a Federal Rule ofBankruptcy Procedure is
promulgated or amended. These procedural roles are summarized as follows:
•

The district court, bankruptcy court or bankruptcy appellate panel may enter the
required certification;

•

Rule 5 ofthe Federal Rules ofAppellate Procedure will govern the procedure for

•
•

filing the appeal;
The appeal must be filed within 10 days after the bankruptcy court, district court,
or bankruptcy appellate panel issues the certification; and
A copy of the certification must be attached to the petition.
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IX.
Transnational
The Bills create chapter 15, which incorporates the Model Law on Cross-Border
Insolvency. Chapter 15 is designed to provide a means for bankruptcy courts to
effectively deal with cross-border insolvency cases. Chapter 15 includes several
subchapters that govern access of foreign representatives and creditors to the bankruptcy
court, recognition of foreign proceedings and relief, cooperation with foreign courts and
foreign representatives and concurrent proceedings. Bills, Title VID.

E· 39

x.
Conversion/Dismissal
The Bills significantly amend Bankruptcy Code section 1112(b) with respect to
how a party in interest can move for conversion or dismissal of a case. Under the revised
law, a court must convert or dismiss a case if the movant establishes "cause." The Bills
set forth several items that would constitute "cause":
(A) substantial or continuing loss to or diminution of the estate;
(B) gross mismanagement of the estate;
(C) failure to maintain appropriate insurance that poses a risk to the
estate or to the public;
(D) unauthorized use ofcash collateral harmful to 1 or more creditors;
(E) failure to comply with an order of the court;
(F) repeated failure timely to satisfy any filing or reporting requirement
established by this title or by any rule applicable to a case under this
chapter;
(G) failure to attend the meeting ofcreditors convened under section
341(a) or an examination ordered under rule 2004 of the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure;
(H) failure timely to provide information or attend meetings reasonably
requested by the United States trustee or the bankruptcy

administrator;
(I)
(J)

(K)
(L)
(M)
(N)
(0)

(P)

failure timely to pay taxes due after the date of the order for relief or
to file tax returns due after the order for relief;
failure to file a disclosure statement, or to file or confirm a plan,
within the time fixed by this title or by order ofthe court;
failure to pay any fees or charges required under chapter 123 of
title 28;
revocation of an order of confirmation under section 1144;
inability to effectuate substantial consummation of a confinned plan;
material default by th~ debtor with respect to a confirmed plan;
tennination of a confirmed plan by reason of the occurrence of a
condition specified in the plan; and
failure of the debtor to pay any domestic support obligation that first
becomes payable after the date on which the petition is filed.

Bills, § 442.
Note that under revised section 1112(b)(A), the movant need only establish
"substantial or continuing loss to or diminution of the estate." This is a change from
current law, where the movant must prove both a continuing loss to the estate and the
absence of areasonable likelihood of rehabilitation. See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(I).
Any party that opposes a motion to convert or dismiss must establish that there is

a reasonable likelihood that a plan will be confirmed. Moreover, the party opposing
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conversion or dismissal must show that while there were grounds to convert or dismiss
the case, there is reasonable justification for the debtor's act or omission that will be
cured within a reasonable period of time. Bills, § 442.
It is important to note that the House and Senate Bills differ with respect to the
standard for opposing a motion to convert or dismiss. The House Bill requires that the
objecting party establish "[b]y a preponderance of the evidence that ... a plan with a
reasonable possibility ofbeing confinned will be filed." HR. 333, § 442. The Senate
Bill, on the other hand, does not require the objecting party to bear the burden ofproof.
S. 420, § 442.
The revised law contains a requirement that the court hear any motion to convert
or dismiss within 30 days after the motion is filed and decide the motion no later than 15
days thereafter. The movant can consent to a continuance of the hearing on the motion.
The Bills also amend section 1104(a) to allow for the appointment of a trustee or
examiner if grounds for conversion or dismissal exist. Bills, § 442.
Dismissal or conversion appears to be mandatory under revised section 1112
unless cure is possible, even if the best interests of creditors are not served by dismissal
or conversion. This unfortunate result may be forestalled by the court's discretionary
appointment of a trustee or an examiner under revised section 1104(a)(3).
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XI.

Financial Contracts
The Financial Contract Provisions in Title IX amend the Federal Deposit.
Insurance Act ("FDIAtt), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of
1991 ("FDCIA"), the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 ("SIPAft) and the
Bankruptcy Code. Senator Gramm stated during the Senate Debate on March 15, 2001,
that the financial contract provisions have four principal purposes:

1.

To strengthen the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and the FDIA that
protect the enforceability of acceleration, termination, liquidation, closeout netting, collateral foreclosure and related provisions of certain
fmancial agreements and transactions.

2.

To harmonize the treatment ofthese financial agreements and transactions
under the Bankruptcy Code and the FDIA.

3.

To amend the FDIA and FDICIA to clarify that certain rights of the FDIC
acting as conservator or receiver for a failed insured depository institution
(and in some situations, rights of SIPC and receivers ofcertain uninsured
institutions) cannot be defeated by operation ofthe tenns ofFDICIA.

4.

To make other substantive and technical amendments to clarify the
enforceability of financial agreements and transactions in bankruptcy or
insolvency.

Cong. Roo. 82366 (daily ed. March 15,2001) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
The Financial Contract provisions concern various types of financial contracts,
including forward contracts, repurchase agreements, swap agreements, commodities
contracts and securities contracts. The Bills create definitions for the various agreements
that fall under the financial contract provisions, some portions ofwhich are controversial.
The definitions of financial contracts, including the definitions of "forward contract,"
"repurchase agreement," "swap agreement" and "securities contract," include guarantees
and reimbursement obligations. Bills, § 907. Thus, a debtor-guarantor that has provided
collateral under a financial contract will be subject to the netting protections that are
afforded to financial institutions under the revised law.

VariollS provisions of the Bankruptcy Code are amended to reflect the intent of
Congress "[t]hat nonnal business practice in the event of a default of a party based on
bankruptcy or insolvency is to tenninate, liquidate or accelerate securities contracts,
commodity contracts, forward contracts, repurchase agreements, swap agreements and
master netting agreements with the bankrupt or insolvent party." Cong. Rec. 82372
(daily ed. March 15,2001) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
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The provisions make the following amendments to the Bankruptcy Code:
•

Bankruptcy Code section 362(b) is amended to protect netting provisions
in swap agreements, security agreements and master netting agreements.
Bills, § 907(d). A corresponding amendment is made to SIPA to provide
that a SIPC stay does not operate as a stay against netting provisions.
Bills, § 911.

•

Bankruptcy Code sections 546 and 548(d) are amended to clarify that the
trustee cannot avoid transfers that are made in connection with a master
netting agreement, unless the transfer was made to hinder, delay or
defraud creditors. Bills, § 907(e) & (f).

•

Bankruptcy Code sections 555, 556, 559 and 560 are amended to expand
the contractual right to liquidate securities contracts, commodities
contracts, forward contracts, repurchase agreements and swap agreements
to the right to liquidate, tenninate or accelerate those contracts. Bills, §
907(g)-(j).

•

Section 561 is added to chapter 5 to protect the "[clontractual right to
tenninate liquidate, accelerate, or offset under a master netting agreement .
. .." Bills, § 907(k).

•

A new section is added to chapter 5 to govern the measure of damages in
connection with the rejection of a financial contract. Section 562 provides
that ifthe trustee rejects a financial contract or a financial institution
liquidates, terminates or accelerates a financial contract the damages are
measured as of the date of the rejection, liquidation, tennination, or
acceleration and treated as though the claim arose prepetition. Bills, §
910.

The principal substantive change in this area is to allow "cross-product" netting
pursuant to "master netting agreements" for the first time. Thus a net credit for the debtor
on a series of swaps can in effect collateralize the debtor's obligation on othervvise
unrelated repurchase obligations with the same financial countetparty under a master
netting agreement.

E· 43

XII.
Asset-Backed Securitizations
According to the Bills, estate property will not include assets that are transferred
prepetition to a bankruptcy remote vehicle in connection with an asset-backed
securitization. Bills, § 912. In an asset-backed securitization, a company transfers certain
of its assets, i.e., usually accounts receivable and other payment rights, to a "bankruptcy
remote vehicle," in exchange for a specified purchase price. The primary goal of an asset
securitization is to lower borrowing costs by ensuring that the transferred assets securing
the financing are not estate property in the bankruptcy of the transferor. There is little
case law regarding the ability of the debtor to remove assets from the bankruptcy estate in
this way.
The validity of such transfers recently was litigated in the LTV Steel case.
Prepetition, LTV's inventory and accounts receivable were transferred to bankruptcy
remote vehicles as part of an asset-backed securitization. Shortly after the
commencement of its bankruptcy case, LTV sought nonconsensual use of cash collateral.
LTV claimed that cash collateral was being generated from collection of accounts
receivable and inventory sales. The purchasers of those assets (and securityholders)
opposed LTV's efforts, claiming that the accounts receivable and inventory were not
estate property and their proceeds were therefore not cash collateral. The court disagreed
and entered an order authorizing the interim use of cash collateral. The parties settled the
matter before the final hearing perhaps because the purchasers did not want to risk setting
a precedent that undennined the legal basis for securitization.
The Bills validate asset-backed securitizations to the extent that they purport to
effectuate a prepetition transfer of the debtor's assets. The Bills amend Bankruptcy Code
section 541(b), making it clear that property ofthe estate does not include assets that
were transferred prepetition pursuant to an asset-securitization. According to revised
section 541(b)(8), property of the estate does not include:

"[a]ny eligible asset (or proceeds thereof), to the extent that such eligible asset
was transferred by the debtor, before the date ofcommencement of the case, to an
eligible entity in connection with an asset-backed securitization, except to the
extent such asset (or proceeds or value thereof) may be recovered by the trustee
under section 550 by virtue of avoidance under section 548(a)."
Bills, § 912.

In order to qualify for the exclusion, a transferred asset must be an "eligible asset"
within the meaning of the new definition that is included in revised section 541(f).
Interestingly, inventory is not included within that definition. Consumer and trade
receivables are, however, included in the definition. Revised section 541(f) provides the
definitions of "asset backed securitization," "eligible asset," "eligible entity," "insurer,"
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and "transferred" (in the context of an asset-backed securitization). At least one tranche
of the securities must be investment grade.

Even under the revised law, asset-backed securitizations can be subject to attack.
The bankruptcy remote vehicle itselfcould be placed into bankruptcy or subject to an
order of substantive consolidation. The prohibitions included in most ofthe agreements
governing asset-backed securitizations pose significant barriers to a bankruptcy filings by
such entities, but a bankruptcy remote vehicle was placed into an involuntary bankruptcy
in at least one instance. See In re Kingston Square Assoc., 214 B.R. 713 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1997).

Note that the amendments relating to asset-backed securitizations are effective on
the date ofenactment ofthe legislation. Bills, § 913.
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XIII.
Conmcts and Compensation
A.

Disinterestedness

The Bills amend the definition of "disinterested person" by deleting all references
to investment bankers in § lOl(14)(B), (C), & (E):
(14) "disinterested person" means person that-

(A) is not a creditor, an equity security holder, or an
insider;
(B) is not and was not, within 2 years before the date of the filing of the
petition, a director, officer, or employee ofthe debtor; and
(C) does not have an interest materially adverse to the
interest of the estate or of any class of creditors or equity
security holders, by reason of any direct or indirect
relationship to, connection with, or interest in, the debtor, or for any other
reason.
Bills, § 414.

Although this section removes investment bankers their employees and attorneys
from per se disqualification, it might cause courts to scrutinize more closely investment
banker retentions. Current law draws a 3 year line on per se disqualification for
investment bankers of securities that are not outstanding. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(14)(C).
To the extent some courts might have viewed the 3 year line as a safe harbor for older
transactions, the amendment could open the door to more serious scrutiny.
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B.

Compensation of Professionals

1.

Amendments to Section 328

Bankruptcy Code section 328 provides that n[t]he trustee or a committee
appointed under Bankruptcy Code section 1102 . . . with the court's approval, may
employ . .. a professional person . .. on any reasonable tenns and conditions of
employment, including on a retainer, on an hourly basis, or on a contingent fee basis. It 11
U.S.C. § 328(a).

I.
I.

-

The Bills confirm that a trustee may employ a professional person on a fixed and
percentage fee basis by adding "on a fixed or percentage fee basis" just before "or on a
contingent fee basis." Courts use the terms "percentage fee" and "contingent fee"
interchangeably. That addition is relatively unremarkable. The fixed fee alternative was
added to fix a problem often encountered by chapter 7 trustees. Chapter 7 trustees
routinely turn over estate funds to secured creditors on account of their secured claims.
Some courts have precluded chapter 7 trustees from receiving their statutorily authorized
fee in those circumstances b"ased upon the notion that a trustee should be compensated
only out of the proceeds of a sale of an estate asset, and not a mere disbursement to a
secured creditor. The fixed fee alternative was added to section 328(a) as an attempt to
fix that problem.

2.

Amendments to Section 330

The revisions to Bankruptcy Code section 330 are not controversial. However,
you should note the following amendment to encourage board certification:

•
I
I

:{

1.

I·

Factors for Compensation ofProfessional Persons: Current section
330(a)(3) provides that "[I]n determining the amount of compensation to
be awarded, the court shall consider the nature, the extent, and the value of
such services, taking into account ... " a total of five relevant factors. The
Bills add to that list of five factors one additional factor:
[W]ith respect the a professional person, whether the person is board
certified or otherwise has demonstrated skill and expertise in the
bankruptcy field ...."

Bills, § 415.
Moreover, a new paragraph is added to section 330(a), which is designed to
ensure that trustees do not receive a recovery from the estate in excess of the fee cap:
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(7) In determining the amount ofreasonable compensation to be awarded
to a trustee, the court shall treat such compensation as a commission,
based on section 326 of this title.
Bills, § 407.

c.

Jurisdiction

Current law provides that the district court (or the bankruptcy court if the case has
been referred) has exclusive jurisdiction of "[a]ll of the property, wherever located, of the
debtor as of the date of commencement of such case, and ofproperty of the estate." 28
U.S.C. § 1334(e). The Bills add to section 1334(e) a provision that grants that district
court exciusive jurisdiction "over all claims or causes of action that involve construction
of section 327 of title 11, United States Code, or rules relating to the disclosure
requirements under section 327." H.R. 333, § 324; S. 420, § 323.
The amendment is a weak remnant of a lobbying effort to prevent malpractice
suits against bankruptcy professionals from being tried before a jury in state courts. The
current amendment is ineffective to address the problem. It does not mention malpractice
suits at all. Moreover, the amendment will likely not affect fee disgorgement suits
because it fails to mention sections 101(14) and 328(c). The amendment only affects
construction of section 327 or rules relating to disclosure requirements under section 327.
Most suits do not involve construction of section 327 or the roles relating to disclosure
requirements. They involve determining whether a professional is disinterested under
section 101(14) for purposes of fee disgorgement under section 328.
Note that exclusive federal jurisdiction is conferred "[0]ver all claims or causes of
action that involve construction of section 327 ...." H.R. 333, § 324; S. 420, § 323
(emphasis added). It is unclear whether claims that "involve construction" must "arise
under" section 327 or whether the defendant's ability to raise a defense involving
construction under section 327 will be a sufficient basis for removal.
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XIV.
Miscellaneous
A.

More Complete Information Regarding Assets of the Estate

The Bills direct the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules ofthe Judicial
Conference ofthe United States to propose an amendment to the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure and Official Bankruptcy Forms that would direct a chapter 11
debtor to disclose information regarding the value, operations, and profitability of any
closely held corporation, partnership or of any other entity in which the debtor holds a
substantial or controlling interest. Pursuant to the new rule, debtors are required to file
and serve periodic financial and other reports. The purpose ofthe proposed amendment
to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure is to ensure that the debtor's interest in any
closely held cOlporations, partnerships or any other entity can be adequately valued and
used to pay allowed claims against the debtor's estate. Bills, § 419. Query whether
Congress has the power to direct the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules to do
anything?
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xv.
Health Care Provisions
The Bills amend various sections of the Bankruptcy Code to provide for increased
duties in health care bankruptcies. The amendments set forth a procedure for disposing
of patient records when the estate does not have enough funds to pay to store the records.
The Bills add section 351 to chapter 3, requiring the trustee to publish notice of its intent
to destroy patient records that are not claimed by either patients or their insurance carriers
within 365 days after the notice is published. After the 365 day period has run and if the
records have not been claimed, the trustee is required to either shred or bum written
documents or, if the records are stored electronically, to destroy the records such that they
can never be retrieved. Bills, § 1102.

i
II
.~

j

!

-

The Bills further provide for administrative expense priority under a new section
503(b)(8) for the costs associated with closing a health care business. Such costs can
include the costs associated with disposing ofpatient records and moving patients to
alternative facilities. Trustees and Federal agencies are entitled to such administrative
expense claims. Bills, § 1103.
The Bills provide for the appointment of a disinterested ombudsman to act as a
patient advocate. The ombudsman will be appointed within 30 days after the
commencement ofthe case. The role ofthe ombudsman is to monitor and report to the
court on the quality of patient care. The ombudsman is required to keep confidential all
infonnation relating to patient records. Bills, § 1104.
The trustee's duties under Bankruptcy Code section 704(a) (as amended by the
Bills) are expanded to include the duty to "[u]se all reasonable and best efforts to transfer
patients from a health care business that is in the process ofbeing closed ...." Bills,
§ 1105. It is of course unclear what constitutes "reasonable and best efforts" for an
administratively insolvent estate.
Many health care cases involve debtors that are not moneyed corporations and
these charitable entities are commonly regulated under state law often by the state
attorney general. Section 1221 ofthe Bills requires that any sale ofestate assets
involving a nonprofit debtor comply with otherwise applicable law. This may
significantly complicate disposition of assets in health care cases involving nonprofit
debtors. This provision is one ofthe few provisions ofthe Act immediately effective on
.
the date of enactment.
The Bills create an exception to the automatic stay, allowing the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to exclude the debtor from Medicare. Bills, § 1106.
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XVI.
Effective Dates and Applicability
A.

Effective Date in General

The Bills provide for an effective date of 180 days after the enactment of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of2001 (the "Act"). Except as specifically provided in the Act,
the amendments apply to only those cases that are commenced after the effective date.
H.R. 333, § 1401; S. 420, § 1501.

B.

Effective Date of Specific Sections
1.

Deprizio Amendments

The Deprizio Amendments apply to cases that are pending or commenced on or
after the date of enactment of the Act. Bills, § 1213(b).

2.

Financial Contract Provisions

The financial contract provisions will take effect on the date of enactment of the
Act. S. 420, § 913(a). The amendments are applicable to cases commenced on or after
the date of enactment of the Act. S. 420, § 913(b).

3.

11 U.S.C. § 308 (Small Business Debtor Reporting Requirements)

11 U.S.C. § 308 will take effect 60 days after the date upon which the Advisory
Committee on Bankruptcy Rules of the Judicial Conference promulgates the rules to
establish the forms that will be required under section 308. Bills, § 434(b).

4.

Exclusive Jurisdiction Over Matters Involving Professionals

The section that provides for the District Court (and bankroptcy court's) exclusive
jurisdiction over matters relating to disclosure obligations under Bankruptcy Code section
327 applies to cases filed after the date of enactment of the Act. H.R. 333, § 324(b); S.
420, § 323(b)

s.

Energy Emergency Response Act of 2001

The Energy Emergency Response Act of2001 ("Energy Act") is designed to
"[p]ro vide assistance to those individuals most affected by high energy prices and to
promote and accelerate energy conservation investments in private and Federal
Facilities." S.420, §1402. The Energy Act will constitute Title 14 of the United States
Code. The Energy Act takes effect that date of enactment of Title 14.
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6.

Transfers Made By Nonprofit charitable Corporations

The amendments made with respect to transfers made by nonprofit
charitable corporations apply to cases pending on the date ofenactment of the Act
or filed on or after the date of enactment ofthe Act. H.R. 333, § 1222; S. 420, §
1221 .

.7.
.~

i .

Bankruptcy Judges
The authorization of27 new bankruptcy judgeships and the extension of

certain existing temporary judgeships will be effective upon enactment.

.1
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INTRODUCTION
As the demise of dot.com's and other lessees and the terror of September 11
threaten the stability of the commercial real estate market, it is time to take a fresh
look at the insolvency of single asset real estate cases ("SARE"). It is time to
examine the extent to which the Supreme Court's decision in 203 N. LaSalle has
affected the ability of SARE debtors to reorganize under chapter 11. These materials
provide the inside story on what happened in the 203 N. LaSalle case on remand and
discuss how other cases have been decided in the wake of 203 N. LaSalle.
These materials are a compilation authored by Rick Bendix l , who represented
the 203 N. LaSalle general partnership, and lightly edited by me. In the interests of
full disclosure, I and my firm, Klee, Tuchin, Bogdanoff & Stem LLP, represented the
general partner of 203 N. LaSalle on remand from the United States Supreme Court.
The positions taken in these materials do not necessarily represent the positions of our
law firms or any particular client.

1 This

paper was originally prepared for a regional program of the American College ofBankruptcy held in

Miami, Florida on February 3,2001. The paper is reprinted with the permission of the author and the
American College ofBankruptcy,
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POST SUPREME COURT PROCEEDINGS
IN THE 203 NORTH LASALLE STREET CASE

Following the Supreme Court's decision in the 203 North LaSalle Street case, Bank of
America National Trust and Savings Ass'n. v. 203 North LaSalle Street Limited Partnership, 526

u.s. 434, 119 S. Ct. 1411, 143 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1999), the case returned to the Bankruptcy Court.
In response to the Supreme Court's ruling that there should have been a market test ofthe

value ofthe reorganized debtor's equity purchased by certain ofthe debtor's partners (the
"Investors") under the plan confirmed in 1995 (the "1995 Plan"), the debtor filed a motion asking
the Bankruptcy Court to entertain competing bids for the reorganized debtor's equity. and to leave
intact the other provisions of the 1995 Plan (none of which provisions the Bank of America (the
''Bank'') had challenged in the Supreme Court). The Bank responded with a request to vacate the
order confirming the 1995 Plan. Simultaneously, the Bank filed its own plan of reorganization
providing for a sale of the debtor's office building (the "Property") to a third party purchaser,
European American Realty ("EAR").
Rather than address the debtor's motion directly, the Bankruptcy Court asked the debtor
and the Bank to file written suggestions as to how the Court should proceed in light of the
Supreme Court's decision. After considering the parties' submissions, the Court entered an order
vacating its order confinning the 1995 Plan. In doing so, the Bankruptcy Court addressed
numerous actions which had been taken pursuant to, and in reliance on the 1995 Plan following
its confirmation. In particular, the Bankruptcy Court~s order provided as follows:
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(a)

The Bank was required to refund $5,632,651 to the Debtor

and its partners, an amount representing (i) all equity
contributions made by the Investors to the reorganized
debtor and (ii) cash which the debtor held at confirmation
and had used to fund plan payments, other than past due
real estate taxes, together with interest on the foregoing
sums compounded at 9.12%;
(b)

the Court vacated its prior $54.5 million valuation ofthe Property, thereby
requiring a new valuation ofthat asset;

(c)

unsecured trade creditors were allowed to retain the payments they had
received under the plan and were deemed to have voted for and accepted
any new plan filed by the debtor (whether those creditors were· deemed to
have voted for any new plan filed by the Bank was left unresolved);

(d)

the waiver and subordination of insider claims under the 1995 Plan was

vacated and the Bank was given leave to object to those claims;
(e)

a five year extension of a lease with the Rudnick & Wolfe law finn, a
major tenant ofthe Property, which lease extension had been contingent
upon confinnation ofthe 1995 Plan, was to remain in effect and the tenant
was allowed to retain a lump sum payment in excess of $1 million which it
had been paid on confinnation ofthe 1995 Plan in consideration of
extending its lease; and

(f)

local real estate tax authorities were allowed to retain the distribution
which they had received under the 1995 Plan in payment ofpast due prepetition real estate taxes.

In light of the foregoing ruling, the Bankruptcy Court denied the debtor's motion to

entertain competing bids for the equity ofthe reorganized debtor.
The Debtor appealed the Bankruptcy Court's order vacating the confinnation order to the
district court. The debtor's general partner joined in that appeal. The Bank moved to dismiss the
appeal on the grounds that (a) the order appealed from was not a final order, and (b) that the
debtor had not established grounds for the District Court to grant leave to appeal. Pending a

ruling on that motion, the debtor moved for a stay ofproceedings in the Bankruptcy Court on the
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grounds that its appeal had divested the Bankruptcy Court ofjurisdiction over the subject matter
of the appeal. The Bankruptcy Court denied the debtor's motion. The District Court ruled that

the order appealed from was not final, and that grounds did not exist for the district court to grant
leave to appeaL As a result, the District Court dismissed the Debtor's appeal.
The Debtor moved to extend the time in which it had the exclusive right to file a plan of

reorganization. The Bank opposed this extension. The Court denied the Debtor's motion.
As previously noted, the Bankruptcy Court's ruling vacating the order confinning the
1995 Plan restored a $6.8 million unsecured claim ofthe Debtor's general partner which had
been waived under the 1995 Plan, and also revived an $11.3 million second mortgage claim of
the general partner which the general partner had effectively converted to equity under the 1995
Plan. The Bank attacked both claims.
The general partner's $6.8 million claim arose from pre-petition loans which the general
partner had made to the Debtor after certain limited partners failed to honor capital calls. The
Bank argued that the general partner's claims should be "recharacterized" as equity. In an
unpublish~druling,

the Bankruptcy Court rejected the Bank's argument. The Court ruled that

Code Section 502(b) directs the Court to allow claims in the amount scheduled or :filed unless the
claim falls within one of the categories enumerated in subsections (1) through (9) of Section
502(b). The general partner's loan did not fit within any of those categories. Absent grounds for
equitable subordination, the Court detennined that there was no statutory basis under the Code to

treat a claim as equity. Although the Court invited the Bank to demonstrate that the general
partner's claim was invalid under illinois state law, the Bank declined to do so.
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The Bankruptcy Court's validation of the general partner's claim was significant. The
debtor held over $1 million available for distribution to unsecured creditors which the Bank had
refunded to the debtor pursuant to the Court's order vacating the order confirming the 1995 Plan.
This money represented pre-petition rents which the Debtor had not paid to the Bank. By
overruling the Bank's objection to the general partner's unsecured claim, the Court enabled the
general partner to claim entitlement to those funds under a new plan, whether filed by the Debtor
or the Bank, pursuant to the "best interests of creditors" test contained in Code Section

1129(a)(7)(A)(ii). Furthermore, if an equity auction became necessary in order to comply with
the Supreme Court's ruling, the general partner's claim would share in auction proceeds if and to
the extent that such proceeds were distributed to unsecured creditors.
The Debtor's general partner held a second claim arising from an $11.3 million second
mortgage loan to the Debtor. Based upon the Bankruptcy Court's valuation of the Property, this
second mortgage claim was unsecured. In connection with a pre-petition extension ofthe Bank's
non-recourse mortgage loan to the Debtor, the Bank and the general partner had entered into an
agreement which subordinated the general partner's second mortgage to the Bank's fIrst
mortgage, and which purported to give the Bank the right to vote the general partner's second

mortgage claim in any Chapter 11 case filed by the Debtor. After the Bankruptcy Court vacated
the order confinning the 1995 Plan, the general partner suggested that the subordination
agreement did not apply to any "artificial deficiency" claim ofthe B~ arising in the Debtor's
Chapter 11 by virtue of Code Section 1111(b)(1)(A) and the Bank's claim being undersecured.
The Bank responded with an adversary complaint to enforce the subordination agreement,
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including the provision purporting to grant the Bank's right to vote the general partner's claim on

any plan filed by the Debtor or the Bank.
The Bankruptcy Court ruled that the pre-petition subordination agreement between the
Bank and the Debtor's general partner operated to subordinate the general partner's second
mortgage claim to the Bank's Section 1111(b)(1) artificial deficiency claim. In re 203 North
LaSalle Street Partnership, 246 B.R. 325 (Bankr. N.D. TIL 2000). The Court found that the
provisions ofthe subordination were clear and unambiguous, and required that the Debtor's
liabilities to the Bank be paid in full before the general partner was entitled to receive or retain

any payment or distribution.
The Bankruptcy Court also invalidated the provision of the subordination agreement
granting the Bank the right to vote the general partner's claim in a Chapter 11 case. The Court
noted that Code Section 1126(a) provides that the "holder of a claim" may Yote to accept or
reject a Chapter 11 plan. The general partner was unquestionably the holder of its claim. The
Court went on to rule that the parties' pre-bankruptcy agreement could not override a contrary
Code provision. Finally, the Court held that, while Code Section 510(a) directs the enforcement

of subordination agreements, that section does not allow for waiver ofvoting rights under
Section 1126(a).
As a result of the Bankruptcy Court's rulings on the general partner's claims, the general
partner had the ability to Yote two substantial claims against any plan filed by the Bank. Such
votes would be significant when the Court considered the preferences of creditors pursuant to
Section 1129(c) in detetmining whether to confirm the Debtor's plan or the Bank's plan.

E· 62

Furthermore, as previously noted, the general partner's claim would give it a right to share in the
$1 million of estate funds and any proceeds from an equity auction.

As a predicate to proposing a new plan ofreorganization, the debtor filed a motion to
value the Property and Bank's secured claim. At the valuation hearing, the debtor relied upon
appraisal testimony for its position that (a) the Property was worth $68 million and (b) that,
accordingly, the Bank's secured claim should be valued at that amount. For its evidence of the
Property's value, the Bank relied upon the offer which it had received from EAR to purchase the
Property for $78 million. The Debtor attacked the Bank's valuation by showing that EAR had
not obtained either the debt or the equity financing needed to consummate the transaction.
However, the Bankruptcy Court found that EAR had paid a supposedly non-refundable $400,000
earnest money deposit to the Bank and was, therefore, likely to obtain the financing necessary to
consummate a purchase of the Property. As a result, the Bankruptcy Court found the value of the
Property and the amount of the Bank's secured claim to be $78 million. Thereafter, based upon

certain Udue diligence" adjustments, EAR reduced its purchase price to $75.9 million.
In connection with valuation of the Bank's secured claim, the Debtor also file a motion
for a determination of the total amount of the Bank's claim. Based upon (a) the Supreme Court's
decision in United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S.
365, 108 S. Ct. 626, 98 L. Ed. 2d 740 (1988), holding that an undersecured creditor, such as the
Bank, may not accrue interest on its claim during the ·pendency of a bankruptcy case and (b) the
Bankruptcy Court's prior decision in In re Addison Properties Limited Partnership, 185 B.R. 766
(Bankr. N.D. TIl. 1995) (in which the Court held that an undersecured creditor must reduce the

total amount of its claim by the amount of post-petition payments it receives from proceeds of its
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collateral), the Debtor asserted that all ofthe cash flow in excess of operating expenses, which
excess cash flow the Debtor had paid to the Bank since the beginning ofthe bankruptcy case in
1995, should be applied to reduce the total amount of the Bank's claim, a claim which had
totaled approximately $93 million on the petition date.
The Bank did not disagree with the Debtor's legal position. As a result, after resolving a
dispute over treatment ofthe $1 million lease e~tension payments made to Rudnick & Wolfe
under the 1995 Plan (a payment which Rudnick & Wolfe retained after the Bankruptcy Court
vacated the order confirming the 1995 Plan), the Court ruled that all of the nearly $25 million of

excess cash flow payments which the Debtor had made to the Bank after the petition date must
be applied to the principal portion of the Bank's claim. The effect of this ruling, together with

the Bankruptcy Court's $78 million valuation of the Property, was to completely eliminate the
Bank's deficiency claim. Because the Bank no longer held an unsecured claim which could be
voted against a new plan proposed by the Debtor, the Debtor's equity holders could retain their
interests in the reorganized debtor under such a plan without having to test the value ofthose
interests in the market. Ironically, therefore, the issue which the Supreme Court decided in the
203 case no longer existed in the case.

The Debtor determined that it could not raise the funds necessary to pay the Bank's
secured claim in full based upon a $75.9 million valuation of that claim. Nor could the Debtor
cramdown on the Bank's secured claim at that value. Accordingly, the Debtor filed a plan which
proposed to sell the 203 North LaSalle Street office building to EAR at the $75.9 million figure,
provided that EAR closed within three days after confinnation. The plan further provided that if

EAR failed to close, the Court would revalue the Property and, based upon that revised (and
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presumably lower value) give the Debtor an opportunity to either (a) pay the Bank's secured
claim in full in cash, (b) give the Bank a restructured note, the terms ofwhich complied with
Section 1129(b)(2)(A) (i) of the Code, or (c) surrender the Property to the Bank.
The Court scheduled a confirmation hearing for early April, 2000. Fortunately for the
Debtor, shortly before the confirmation hearing, EAR, which had apparently failed to obtain
financing for a $75.9 million purchase, reduced the purchase price it was willing to pay for the
office building to $70.5 million based on a "change in market conditions."
At that lower and more realistic value for the Property, the Debtor believed it would be
able to raise the money necessary to pay the Bank's secured claim in full in cash. The Debtor
prepared a plan proposing to do just that. Before filing that plan, however, the Debtor requested

a new valuation hearing based upon EAR's reduced purchase price for the Property. At that
hearing, the Debtor again demonstrated showed that, despite the passage of 3 months since the
first valuation hearing, EAR had still failed to raise all of the equity necessary to consummate its
proposed purchase of the Property. Nevertheless, the Bankruptcy Court again found that, rather
than forfeit its earnest money deposit, EAR would obtain the funds required to consummate its
proposed purchase of the Property. As a result, the Court valued the Property at the reduced
purchase price ofS70.5 million. Immediately after the announcement of that ruling, the Debtor
filed its "cash out" plan.
Shortly thereafter, in early April of2000, the Court conducted a confirmation hearing on
the competing plans filed by the Debtor and tlte Bank. After finding that both plans were
confmnable, the Court proceeded to analyze the factors specified in Section 1129(c) of the Code
in order to detennine which of the two plans to confirm. Both plans provided for payment of the
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Bank's secured claim in full, in cash. The Debtor's plan, however, preserved the equity interests
of the Debtor's partners while the Bank's plan eliminated that equity. As a result, taking into
account the preferences of the creditors and equity security holders, the Court confirmed the
Debtor's plan. The Debtor quickly raised the funds necessary to pay the Bank's claim in full
within the time allotted under its plan. Thus, despite the Supreme Court's ruling invalidating the
1995 Plan, the Debtor retained ownership of the Property.
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Recent Developments and Other Issues Relating to New Value Plans
I.

Supreme Court Decision

A.

Bank of America National Trost and Savings Ass'n. v. 203 North LaSalle Street
Limited Partnership, 526 U.S. 434, 119 S. Ct. 1411, 143 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1999):
equity holders exclusive right to contribute new value to a reorganized debtor over
the dissent of a class ofunsecured creditors, without market scrutiny of the
purchase price by means of competing bids or even a competing plan renders that
right a form ofproperty, receipt ofwhich violates Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) of the
Bankruptcy Code

II. Recent Decisions

1

A.

In re Zenith Electronics Corp., 241 B.R. 92, 106-7 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999), appeal
dismissed by, Nordhoffv. Zenith Electronics Corp., 250 B.R. 207 (D. Del. 2000)
(prepackaged plan which eliminated pre-petition equity did not violate absolute
priority role when plan gave creditor, which was also debtor's majority
shareholder, exclusive right to purchase 100% of reorganized debtor's equity in
exchange for $60 million of cash and waiver of $200 million of debt: right to
purchase reorganized debtor was extended to purchaser in its capacity as creditor)

B.

In re PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2000) (plan which released
fraudulent transfer claims against equity holders and others arising from leveraged
recapitalization did not violate Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) where (a) there was no
direct evidence that junior equity holders persuaded debtors to release them "on
account of' their interest in the debtors, (b) fraudulent transfer claims would be
costly to pursue as a result of high cost of defending and paying indemnification,
cross-claims and counterclaims arising from pursuit of fraudulent transfer claims
and (c) examiner found that fraudulent transfer claims had little or no value.
Examiner's finding held to be an "appropriate surrogate for a market test and an
acceptable safeguard" notwithstanding dissenting creditor's offer to purchase
fraudulent transfer claims for $100,000 plus a percentage of any recovery thereon.

_

c.

In re Global Ocean Carriers Limited, 251 B.R. 31 (Bankr. D. Del. 2000) (1) where
debtors would seek substantive consolidation of parent and subsidiaries, parent's
retention of stock in subsidiaries without paying subsidiaries' dissenting creditors
in full did not violate absolute priority rule; (2) right of stockholders corporate
parent to name 3 directors ofparent did not violate absolute priority role where
such right derives from parent's corporate charter provision granting fleet
manager, whoever that might be, the right to appoint board members and where

1
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debtor-parent assumed management agreement with fleet manager/shareholders;
(3) plan provision allowing existing controlling shareholder to detennine without
benefit of a public auction or competing plans who will own debtor's equity
(shareholder's daughter) and what the purchase price would be violated absolute
priority rule - plan gave said shareholder the exclusive right to determine identity
ofnew equity owner and price ofnew equity "on account of' shareholder's
position as controlling shareholder). But see, Beal Bank v. Waters Edge Limited
Partnership, 248 B.R. 668 (D. Mass. 2000) (plan which sold equity ofreorganized
debtor to third party plan sponsor who was an insider by virtue of familial .
relationship did not violate absolute priority rule where there was no evidence that
old equity was using insider as a straw man to retain its investment; no evidence
that sponsor was funded by, or acted on behalf of old equity; secured creditor with
mortgage lien on debtor's property did not have right to credit bid regarding sale
of equity). See also In re Woodscape Ltd. P'shp., 134 B.R. 165, 174 (Bankr. D.
Md. 1991) (no prohibition against private sale of equity to insider under plan; no
requirement that such sale be by public auction); cf. Troy Savings Bank v.
Travelers Motor Inn, 215 B.R. 485, 494-495 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (affirming
confinnation of equity sale to debtor's friend.
ill. Equity Auction Issues

A.

Credit Bidding By the Secured Creditor.

1.

Should not be permitted because the secured creditor does not have a lien
on the equity ofthe reorganized debtor. Beat Bank v. Waters Edge
Limited Partnership, 248 B.R. 668 (D. Mass. 2000); In re Homestead

Partners, Ltd.) 197 B.R. 706, 719 n. 15. (Bankr. W.. D.. Ga.. 1996); In re
Bjolmes Realty Trust, 134 B.R. 1000, 1010. n. 22 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991).
B.

"Roundhouse" Bidding

1.

In the typical single asset real estate case, the undersecured mortgagee's
deficiency claim will be the largest unsecured claim. Consequently,

assuming that all amoWlts bid in excess ofthe equityholders' opening bid
are distributed to unsecured creditors, most ofthe amount bid by the
mortgagee at an equity auction will be returned to the mortgagee as a
distribution on its deficiency claim. See, In re Homestead Partners, Ltd.,
197 B.R. 706, 719 n. 15~ (Bankr. N. D. Ga. 1996); In re Moonraker
Associates, Ud., 200 B.R. 950 (Bankr. N. D. Ga. 1996). Thus, a cash bid
by the holder of a large deficiency claim begins to look very much like
credit bidding.

2
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2.

Debtors' responses to roundhouse bidding
(1)

"Blocking" claims in the fonn ofrecourse insider claims.
These claims may be paid in full before a deficiency claim
created by Section 1111 (b)(2) receives any distribution.
Matter of 203 N. LaSalle Street Partnership, 126 F. 3d 955,
969 (7th Cir. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 119 S. Ct. 1411
(1999). Thus, equityholders themselves may be able to
roundhouse bid up to the amount of any recourse unsecured
claims they may hold against the estate.

(2)

Equityholders' attempts to use blocking claims to prevent
roundhousing by an undersecured mortgagee will lead to

litigation over whether insiders' recourse unsecured claims
should be recharacterized as equity or equitably
subordinated to the mortgagee's deficiency claim.

(3)

It has been held that the Code does not permit unsecured
claims to be recharacterized as equity. Pacific Express
Holding. Inc. v. Pioneer Commercial Funding Co~. (In re
Pacific Express, Inc.), 69 B.R. 112, 115 (B.A.P. 9 Cir.
1986). Section 502 of the Code, which enumerates various
claim objections, does not include an objection based on
recharacterization. There is contrary authority. Cases cited
in support ofrecharacterization include In re Fabricators,
Inc. v. Technical Fabricators, Inc. (In re Fabricators, Inc.),
926 F.2d 1458 (5 th eire 1991); Global Western Dev. Corp.

v. Northern Orange County Credit Svc., Inc., 759 F.2d 724
(9th Cir. 1985); In re Labelle Indus., 44 B.R. 760 (D.R.I.
1984); and Herzog v. Leigtitan Holdings, Ltd., (In re Kids
Creek Partners, L.P.), 212 B.R. 898, 932-33 (Bankr. N.D. n
1997). See also. In re Georgetown Building Associates
L.P., 240 B.R. 124 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1999) (contribution
which was originally intended as equity will be treated as
equity despite insiders' subsequent attempt to
recharacterize contributions as loans).
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c.

(4)

Insiders loans may not be equitably subordinated simply
because they were made by insiders. See United Stat4es v.
Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213,
227, 116 S. Ct. 2106, 2115 (1996); United States v. Noland,
517 U.S. 535, 536, 116 S. Ct. 1524, 1525 (1996)
(bankruptcy court may not equitably subordinate claims on
a categorical basis in derogation of Congress's scheme of
priorities).

(5)

Equitable subordination pursuant to section 510(c) requires
proof that (i) the claimant has engaged in some type of
inequitable conduct, (2) the misconduct resulted in injury to
creditors or confinned an unfair advantage on the claimant;
and (3) equitable subordination would not be inconsistent
with the provisions ofthe Code. See In re Lifeschultz Fast
Freight, 132 F. 3d 339, 344 (7th Cir. 1997); Benjamin v.
Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F. 2d 692, 699-700
(5 th Cir. 1977).

(6)

Debtor will want to consider whether the mortgagee
received any pre-petition transfers avoidable under Section
547 or 548 ofthe Code in order to argue that the
mortgagee's claim should be disallowed unless it repays the
voidable transfer. See Code Section S02(d).

Voting

1.

In re 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, 246 B.R. 325, 330-332 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 2000) (language in pre-petition subordination agreement which
provided that in the event of a mortgagor's insolvency, senior creditor
would have right to vote subordinated creditor's claim would not be
enforced to transfer subordinated creditor's voting rights in Chapter 11
case). See also, In re Hart Ski Mfg. Co., 5 B.R. 734, 736 (Bankr. D. MiIUl.
1980) (subordinated creditor entitled to adequate protection of its claim).

2.

1126(e) - disqualification of purchased claims

a) General Standards

4
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(1)

Under §1126(e), a court may designate, which under this
section of the Code means to disqualify, the votes of a
creditor for purposes of computing whether a class has
accepted a plan under §1126(c) if the court finds that an
entity's acceptance or rejection of a plan was not in good
faith. 11 U.S.C. §1126(e). Thetenn "good faith" is not
defined under the Code. Rather, Congress left the matter of
defining good faith to the courts interpreting the section.
Although the absence of good faith is a fact specific
determination, the cases have established certain broad
principles which serve to illuminate the meaning of good
faith.

Generally, a creditor does not act in good faith when it casts
its vote for the purpose of coercing payment ofmore than
the creditor's fair share of the debtor's estate or where the
creditor has some ulterior purpose. In re Three Flint Hill
Partnership, 213 B.R. 292, 301 (D. Md. 1997) (citing In re
Federal Support Co., 859 F.2d 17, 19 (4th eir. 1988». The
ulterior purpose of a creditor can include "pure malice,
'strikes,' and blackmail, and the purpose to destroy an
enterprise in order to advance the interests of a competing
business." Id. However, where a creditor seeks to protect
its own self-interest by voting to reject a plan, the creditor's
self-interested position is not considered to be an ulterior
purpose such as to warrant a finding ofbad faith. In re
DelucB, 194 B.R. 797, 80S (Bankr. B.D. Va. 1996) (citing

In re Federal Support Co., 859 F.2d 17, 19 (4th eire 1988»);

see also In re Figter Ltd., 118 F.3d 635, 639 (9th eire 1997)
(stating that there is no bad faith where a creditor purchases
the claims of unsecured creditors for the purpose of voting
those claims against the plan so long as doing so is within
the creditor's self-interest).

b) Representative Cases

(1)

In In re Figter Ltd., 118 F.3d 635 (9th Cir. 1997), the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that a creditor's vote of
twenty-one unsecured claims that it had purchased would
not be disqualified. The court noted that the concept of

5
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vi

good faith under §1126(e) does not prohibit the purchase
and voting.ofunsecured claims by a secured creditor even
where the creditor's purchase of the claims is for the

purpose ofblocking confirmation of the debtor's
reorganization plan. Id. at 639-40. Drawing on prior case

law, the Ninth Circuit also enumerated several instances in
which the purchase of unsecured claims may constitute bad
faith. Id. at 639. These instances include situations in
which: (I) a company which was not a preexisting creditor
purchased claims for the purpose ofblocking an action
against it; (2) creditors were associated with a competing
business and desired to destroy the debtor's business in
order to further their own; and (3) where the debtor enticed

insiders to purchase claims for the purpose of fostering or
blocking a plan. Id. In this instance the bankruptcy court
held, and the district and appellate courts affirmed, that the
creditor did not act with a motive other protecting its own
self interest as a creditor. Id. at 639-40. The bankruptcy
court found, and the appellate court agreed, that the creditor
was not the proponent of an alternate plan when it
purchased the unsecured claims and that the creditor did not
seek to purchase a small number of claims for the purpose
of blocking the debtor's plan. Id. at 640. Rather, the
creditor sought to purchase all the unsecured claims. Id.
Given these facts, the Ninth Circuit affinned the
bankruptcy court's finding that the creditor's purchase of
the unsecured claims was to protect the creditor's own selfinterest and therefore there was no bad faith on the part of
the creditor to warrant disqualification of the creditor's
votes. Id.

(2)

Similarly, no lack of good faith was found in In re Marin
Town Center, 142 B.R. 374 (D. N.D. Cal. 1992). In this
case, the bankruptcy court disqualified the votes of claims
which were purchased by a secured creditor ofthe debtor.
The bankruptcy court disqualified these votes by reasoning
that the creditor's interest in the case was really that of a
potential purchaser of the debtor's property rather than as a
true creditor who was interested in seeing the debtor
reorganize.. Id. at 377-78. Reversing, the district stated that
§1126(e) does not require that the creditor have an interest
in seeing the debtor reorganize. Id. at 379. Additionally,
6
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the court noted that the standard of good faith is not
infringed in instances where a party who was interested in
the debtor before acquiring controlling rights votes against
a plan because the creditor believes that confinnation ofthe
plan will be more injwious to its investmentthan would a
liquidation. Id.

I.

(3)

In contrast to the above cases, bad faith was found in In re
Allegheny International,
118 B.R. 282 (Bankr. w.o.

mc.,

Penn. 1990) and In re MacLeod Co., Inc., 63 B.R. 654
(Bankr. S.D. Oh. 1986). In MacLeod, the court held that
votes cast by creditors ofthe debtor would be disqualified
as being voted in bad faith. The court found that the votes
ofthese creditors should be disqualified. because the'
creditors, who were employees of the debtor, had
incorporated a business which was in competition with the
debtor. Id. at 654-55. These facts led the court to conclude
that the creditors' votes rejecting the plan were cast for the
ulterior purpose of destroying the debtor's business so as to
further the interests oftheir competing enterprise. Id. at
655-56.

(4)

Finally, in In re Allegheny International, Inc., 118 B.R. 282
(Bankr. W.D. Penn. 1990), the votes of Japonica Partners
("Japonica") rejecting the debtor's plan were disqualified as
being cast in bad faith. The finding ofbad faith was
premised on the facts that Japonica's purchase of slightly
over one-third ofthe claims necessary to block the debtor's
plan came after the debtor filed its disclosure statement and
after Japonica proposed a competing plan ofreorganization.
Id. at 289-90.

c) Number of Votes
(1)

Debtors who seek to have creditors' votes disqualified on
the grounds ofbad faith also often assert a fallback position
that a creditor who purchases multiple claims within a
given class should only be entitled to have those votes
constitute only one vote for the purpose of determining

whether the plan has been accepted. To support this
argument debtors often rely cases decided under the
7
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Bankruptcy Act of 1867, which held that a creditor holding
multiple claims is counted as only a single creditor. See
Fortgang, Chaim J. and Mayer, Thomas M., Trading
Claims and Taking Control of Corporations in Chapter 11,
12 Cardozo L. Rev. 1, 86-88 (1990); 7 Collier on
th
Bankruptcy (15 ed.) at '1126.02[3] n.16. However, cases
decided under the Code, which represent the preferred
view, indicate that a purchaser of claims is entitled to a vote
for each separate claim it holds. 7 Collier on Bankruptcy
th
(15 ed.) at'1126.02[3]. The cases reach this result by
focusing on the language of §1126(c). That section
provides that a class of interests accepts a plan when
creditors that "hold at least two-thirds in amount and more
than one-half in number ofthe allowed claims of such class
..." vote to accept the plan. 11 U.S.C. §1126(c). Courts
therefore reason that the language of §1126(c), which
speaks in terms ofthe number of claims, rather than the
number of creditors, mandates that a creditor who holds
multiple claims which are separate and distinct from one
another is entitled to a vote on each of those allowed
claims. See In re Gilbert, 104 B.R. 206,211 (Bankr. D.
Mo. 1989) (holding that creditor who purchased two claims
is entitled to a vote for each claim); In re Figler Ltd., 118
F.3d 635, 640 (9th Cir. 1997) (adopting the holding of
Gilbert); In re Crosscreek Apartments, 211 B.R. 641
(Bankr. B.D. Tenn. 1997) (no reasoning provided but
holding that purchaser of four claims would not be
disqualified, on the grounds of bad faith, from voting those
four claims); 7 Collier on Bankruptcy (15 th 00.) at
'1126.02[3] n.16 (stating that Gilbert represents the
preferred view).

D.

Securities Law Issues.
1.

Code section 1145(a)(1) exempts from registration under the Federal
Securities Act of 1933 and state registration laws securities offered or
given in exchange for a claim against or an interest in the debtor, an
affiliate participating in a joint plan, or a successor to the debtor under the

plan.
a)

Arguably, securities issued for fresh cash do not fall with the
exemption created by Code Section 1145(a)(1).

8
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b)

The absence of an exemption from registration may require
to be issued to the highest bidder at an
equity auction, or resort to the private offering exemption
contained in Section 4 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §
77(d)(2).
registr~tion of securities

2.

E.

Open Issues.
1.

2.

IV.

See Homestead Partners, 197 B.R. 706, 717-18 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996)
(discussing §1145 need for registration or exception when equity is sold
rather than exchanged for pre-petition debt or equity).

Can an equity auction be avoided if debtor exclusivity is terminated or
waived and competing plans are submitted to creditors and equity holders?
a)

But see In re Homestead Partners, 197 B.R. 706 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1996) (competitive bidding needed to establish "necessity" and
"reasonably equivalent value" elements of new value corollary, and
to demonstrate that old equity is receiving property "on account of'
new investment and not on account of status as prior equity
holders).

b)

Query whether competing plans which are not identical test the
market price to be paid by the debtor's partners under the debtor's
plan, or involve an attempt to compare apples and oranges.

Can a debtor avoid the need for an auction by pennitting creditors to
purchase equity ofthe reorganized debtor along with pre-petition equity
holders?

Exclusivity and Competing Plans

A.

Termination of Debtor's Exclusivity Period
1.

In re Situation Management Systems, Inc., 36 BCD 195 (Bankr. D. Mass.
2000) (debtor's proposal of a new value plan containing provision for sale
ofreorganized debtor's equity to individual who was an officer, director
and shareholder of debtor, with provision for competing bids, constitutes
cause for terminating debtor's exclusive period so as to pennit creditor's
committee and largest creditor to file competing plan.

9
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2.

B.

See In re Homestead Partners, Ltd., 197 B.R. 706 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996)
(filing of new value cramdown plan does not constitute grounds for
tenninating exclusivity if plan provides for equity auction at confinnation)

Competing Plans

1.

2.

Section 1129(c) provides that court "may confirm only one plan, unless
the confinnation order has been revoked under Section 1144. If the
requirements of subsections (a) and (b) of this section [1129] are met with
respect to more than one plan, the court shall consider the preferences of
creditors and equity holders in detennining which plan to confinn."

a)

The court must consider the preferences of creditors and equity
security holders, but does not have to obey those preferences. In re
River Village Associates, 181 B.R. 795, 807 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1995)

b)

Notably, Section 1 129(c) only mentions preferences of creditors
and equity security holders, but courts consider many other factors
as well. Nothing in Section 1129(c) precludes Court from
considering other factors.

In re Holley Garden Apartments Ltd., 238 B.R. 488 (Bankr~ M.D. Fla.
1999) (court should consider four factors in deciding between competing
plans: type ofplan, treatment of creditors and equity security holders,
feasibility, and preferences of creditors and equity security holders.
Applying these factors to a debtor's reorganization plan and a creditor's
competing plan of liquidating, the court confinned the debtor's plan. The
court detennined that (a) the debtor's reorganization plan was preferable to
the creditor's liquidation plan; (b) the debtor's plan paid allowed
unsecured claims in full and left interest holders unaffected, while the
creditor's plan could potentially have given nothing or less than full
payment to unsecured creditors; the debtor's plan was feasible, but the
creditor's plan was more feasible because it could be implemented
immediately; although a majority of unsecured creditors preferred the
creditor's plan, many of those creditors were related to the creditor
proponent while unrelated creditors preferred the debtor's plan)
a)

Court must consider preferences of creditors or equity security
holders but does not have to obey them.

b)

Votes of unrelated creditors are an important consi<;leration.
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c)

3.

Court should give preference to the plan which is more feasible.

In re Turner Engineering, Inc., 109 B.R. 956 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1989)
(court confinned debtor's plan preferred by creditors 31 to 17 even though

committee's plan provided for greater dividend than debtor's plan.
i

1 •

4.

In re Sound Radio, Inc., 93 B.R. 849 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988), rev'd on other
grounds 103 B.R. 521 (D.N.J. 1989) affd without opinion, 908 F.2d 964
(3d Cir. 1990) (court confinned third party plan over plan proposed by
debtor's alleged majority shareholder where third party plan (a) was
preferred by other shareholders and non-insider creditors, (b) provided
greater return to shareholders, and (c) could become effective immediately
without awaiting conclusion ofpending state court litigation.

5.

In re Greate Bay Hotel and Casino, 251 B.R. 213 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2000)
(utilizing the Holley Garden four factor test in a case where 2 different
groups of undersecured creditors filed competing plans, court disregarded
the majority view of undersecured noteholders because many ofthe claims
voted were controlled by the proponent ofthe plan favored by the
majority; court confmned plan which (a) gave higher recovery to old
noteholders and \ll1Secured creditors, (b) provided reorganized debtor with
less leveraged capital structure, greater cash, and substantially greater
opportunity for capital improvements, (c) was based on more realistic and
conservative projections, (d) avoided potential conflict of interest arising
from competitor's ownership of 3 other highly leveraged Atlantic City
casinos, and (e) avoided difficulties that competitor would have obtaining
license approval from state Casino Control Commission.

6.

Court invalidated non-debtor release provisions contained in both plans
based on authority orIn re Continental Airlines, 203 F.3d 203, 211 (3d

I

eir.2000).

v.

Impairment
A.

Section 1129(a)(10): at least one impaired class of claims accepts plan

1.

Impairment Defined - §1124
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; .
I

2.

a)

In re Barakat, 99 F.3d 1520, 1527 (9th Cir. 1996) (Congress
intended to broadly define impairment and any alteration of a
creditor's legal rights constitutes impairment)

b)

In re Atlanta-Stewart Partners, 193 B.R. 79, 82 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1996) (as a result of 1994 amendments to §1124, a class of
creditors which receives payment in full on confirmation is
impaired)

Artificial Impairment

a)

Beat Bank, S.S.B v. Waters Edge Ltd. Partnership, 248 B.R. 668,
690-91 (D. Mass. 2000) (class is artificially impaired when debtor
intentionally alters the class members' rights to manipulate voting
on the plan, but class is legitimately impaired if creditors' rights
are altered for proper business purpose)

b)

In re Global Ocean Carriers Ltd., 251 B.R. 31 (Bankr. D. Del.
2000) (debtor did not artificially impair secured creditor's claim
which had been unimpaired under earlier plan rejected by

unsecured noteholders where amended plan treated secured
creditor in manner more onerous to debtor than simply reinstating
loan and provided that debtor must (i) pay higher interest rate, (ii)
maintain collateral value equal to 130% of loan balance instead of
120% of loan balance, and (iii) repay principal balance of loan
more rapidly; debtor would also be given immediate access to
secured creditor's interest in restricted cash account to make plan
payments to other creditors. Impairment was not illusory or
artificial and affected cash account representing more than 10% of .
ou;tstanding loan balance; debtor had reasonable basis for
impairment; funds in previously restricted account were necessary
to fund plan payments to other creditors. "While the timing does
suggest that the modified treatment was proposed in order to meet
the requirements of Section 1129(a)(10), we are loathe to adopt a
rule which chills the ability of a debtor to make last minute deals
with creditors in order to achieve a consensual plan or otherwise
reduce opposition to the plan." 251 B.R. at 42).
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c)

In re 7 th Street & Beardsley Partnership, 181 B.R. 426, 431 (Bankr.
D. Ariz. 1994) (requirement of §1129(a)(lO) is met ifthere is an
impaired class that accepts the plan, however confinnation of plan
is subject to detennination that plan was proposed in good faith)
See, also, In re 203 North LaSalle St. L.P., 190 B.R. 567, 593
(Bankr. N.D. ill. 1995), ajJ'd, 195 B.R. 692 (N.D. TIL 1996), ajJ'd,
126 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 526 U.S. 434
(1999).

d)

In re Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 251 B.R. 213, 239 (Bankr.
D. N.J. 2000) Gaining courts (e.g. In re Atlantic-Stewart Partners,
193 B.R. 79 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996» that conclude that after the
1994 amendment which deleted Section 1124(e) and thereby
allows a class of claims which is paid in full without interest to be
considered impaired, a claim need not and cannot be artificially
impaired. Under the statutory scheme for classification and
treatment of claims, a proponent may impair a class of claims. If
an impaired class accepts, Section 1129(a)(10) is satisfied. But
classification and treatment of unsecured claims is always subject
to the good faith requirement of Section 1129(a)(3».

e)

In re Windsor on the River Assocs.. Ltd., 7 F.3d 127 (8th Cir.
1993) (classes of unsecured trade creditors and disallowed claims
found artificially impaired)

f)

In re Hotel Assocs. of Tucson, 165 B.R. 470 (9th Cir. B.A.P.
1993); In re L&J Anaheim Assocs., 995 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1993)
(impairment defmed in the broadest terms possible and abuses on
the part of plan proponent should be addressed with respect to
whether plan is proposed in good faith)

VI. The Under-Secured Creditor's Deficiency Claim
A.

Interplay of Sections 506(a), 510(a) and 111 1(b)(2).

1.

Under-secured creditor may not make the 1111(b)(2) election ifproperty is
sold under §363 or is to be sold under the plan).
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2.

B.

Interplay of Sections 510(a) and 1111(b)(2) - In re 203 North LaSalle
Street Partnership, 246 B.R. 325 (Bankr. N.D. Dl. 2000) (language of
subordination agreement subordinating all of junior mortgagee's rights to
those of senior under-secured non-recourse mortgage lender, required
subordination ofjunior mortgagee's deficiency claim to senior
mortgagee's deficiency claim notwithstanding non-existence of senior
mortgagee's deficiency claim outside of Chapter 11.

Classification

1.

In general

a)

2.

In re Greystone ill Joint Venture. 995 F.2d 1274, 1279 (5 th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 72 (1992) (similar claims may not
be classified separately in order to gerrymander an affmnative vote
on a reorganization plan). See also. In re Waterways Barge
Partnership, 104 B.R. 776, 784 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1989); In re
Pine Lake Village Apt. Co., 19 B.R. 819, 831 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1982).

Separate classification pennitted

a)

In re 203 North LaSalle Street L.P., 190 B.R. 567 (Bankr. N.D. lll.
1995), ajf'd, 195 B.R. 692 (N.D. Dl. 1996), ajf'd, 126 F.3d 955 (7th
Cir. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 526 U.S. 434 (1999)
(classification of undersecured creditor's unsecured deficiency
claim in class separate from that of unsecured trade creditors is
permissible where debtor is fully encumbered single-asset
partnership: because non-recourse under-secured creditor has no
deficiency claim outside of Ch. 11 and would be entitled to no
distribution in Ch. 7, different impact of best interest of creditors
test. recourse trade debt and "artificial" non-recourse deficiency
claim may require separate classification of trade and deficiency
claims)

on
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if

b)

Beat Bank, S.S.B. v. Waters Edge L.P., 248 B.R. 668,691 (D.
Mass. 2000) (classification of unsecured deficiency claim in
separate class from other unsecured claims upheld where
deficiency claim was non-recourse whereas other unsecured claims
were recourse, deficiency claim holder had different voting
motivation than other unsecured claim holders and there was no
evidence that the separate classification was based on an improper
business justification)

c)

In re Oreate Bay Hotel and Casino, Inc., 251 B.R. 213 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 2000) (court approved classification of undersecured
creditors' deficiency claim separate from trade debt under plan
which gave deficiency claimants a package of debt and equity
securities representing the entire enterprise value of the
reorganized debtor while unsecured creditors received cash payout
which was achievable and in line with expectations of all parties in
interest), citing In re New Jersey Medical Center, 817 F.2d 1055
(3d Cir. 1987) (In a cram down case, each class must represent a
voting interest that is sufficiently distinct and weighty to merit a
separate voice in the decision whether the proposed reorganization
should proceed. Otherwise the classification scheme would simply
constitute a method for circumventing the requirement of Section
1129(a)(10».

.

d)

In re Crosscreek Apartments, Ltd., 213 B.R. 521, 532-34 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. 1997) (concluding that Sixth Circuit would permit
separate classification of undersecured creditor's deficiency claim
in class separate from other unsecured trade creditors because
secured creditor's deficiency claim has substantially different
attributes than claims of unsecured trade creditors)

e)

In re Woodbrook Assocs., 19 F.3d 312 (7th Cir. 1994)
(classification of unsecured deficiency claim separate from other
unsecured claims is required if Debtor is fully encumbered singleasset partnership)

f)

In re 8M 104 Ltd., 160 B.R. 202 (Bankr.S.D.Fla. 1993) (classifying
undersecured creditors deficiency claim separately)
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! .

g)

In re Rivers End Apartments, Ltd., 167 B.R. 470, 478

(Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1994) (policy reasons support separate
classification of undersecured creditor's deficiency claim)

h)

In re U.S. Truck Co., 800 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1986) (court upheld
plan which classified claim arising from rejection of collective
bargaining agreement separate from trade creditors. Court
determined that Teamsters Union had a non-creditor interest, i.e.
bargaining with other employers, that gave union a different stake
in the viability ofthe reorganized company and union had other
means of protecting its interests). See also, In re Briscoe
Enterprises, Ltd. II, 994 F.2d 1160 (5 th Cir.), celt. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 550 (1993) (classification of undersecured deficiency claims
separately from trade creditors permitted where one undersecured
creditor was city which had a unique non-creditor interest in low
income housing project and second undersecured creditor could
protect its interests by naming one ofthree trustees for property.

i)

In re Chateaugay Com., 89 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 1996) (separate
classification of unpaid worker's compensation claims and
guarantee of full payment permitted over objection of insurance
company holding surety reimbursement claims which would be
paid with stock of reorganized company where debtor adduced
credible proof of legitimate business reason, i.e. interest in peaceful
labor relations that would be jeopardized if employees failed to
receive what they perceived to be a state law entitlement.); In re
Richard Buick, 126 B.R. 840 (Bankr. B.D. Pa. 1991) (separate
classification and full payment of dealer trade claims pennitted

where good relationship with other dealers which supplied large
percentage of vehicles sold was necessary for success of
reorganized business and franchisors required full payment of such
claims as a condition of continuing their relationship with debtor).

3.

Separate classification denied

a)

In re Holley Garden Apartments, Ltd., 223 B.R. 822, 824-25
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998) (debtor's classification of undersecured

creditor's unsecured deficiency claim in class separate from other
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unsecured creditor's claims found to be improper gerrymandering
where debtor could not articulate justifiable business reason for the
separate classification)

b)

In re Barakat, 99 F.3d 1520, 1524-26 (9th Cir. 1996) (affinning

bankruptcy court's refusal to allow debtor to separately classify
undersecured creditor's deficiency claim where debtor offered no
business or economic justification for such classification other than
to obtain acceptance ofthe plan)

c)

4.

Vll.

In re Cranberry Hill Assocs.! Ltd. Partnership, ISO B.R. 289
(Bankr.D.Mass. 1993) (undersecured creditor's deficiency claim
could not be classified separately from other unsecured claims)

Rule 3013

Section 1129(b) - Other Cram-Down Issues

A.

Section 1129(b)(1) Plan does not discriminate unfairly

1.

In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 705, 710 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999)

(rebuttable presumption of unfair discrimination arises when there is: (1) a
dissenting class; (2) another class ofthe same priority; and (3) a difference
in the plan's treatment of the two classes that results in either (a) a
materially lower percentage recovery for the dissenting class (measured in
terms of net present value of all payments), or (b) regardless of percentage
recovery, an allocation under the plan ofmaterially greater risk to the
dissenting class in connection with its proposed distribution); Accord, In
re Greate Bay Hotel and Casino. Inc., 251 B.R. 213 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2000)

2.

In re Salem Suede, 219 B.R. 922, 934 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998) (unfair

discrimination for a plan proponent to pay claims of equal, nonbankruptcy
priority a different distribution by providing one class of creditors with a
more favorable distribution than a class of the same legal rank without a
legitimate and rational basis for the disparate treatment ("if the plan
17
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protects the legal rights of a dissenting class in a manner consistent with
the treatment of other classes whose legal rights are intertwined with those
of the dissenting class, then the plan does not discriminate unfairly"
(quoting Kenneth N. Klee, "All You Ever Wanted to Know About
Cramdown Under The Bankruptcy Code," 53 Am. Bankr. L.J. 133, 142
(1979))

i·

1

II
!

3.

In re 203 North LaSalle Street L.P., 190 B.R. 567, 585-86 (Bankr. N.D. fil.
1995), aff1d, 195 B.R. 692 (N.D. TIL 1996), aff'd, 126 F.3d 955 (7 th eire
1997), rev'd on other grounds, 526 U.S. 434 (1999) (two step test for
measuring fairness of discrimination: (1) discrimination must be supported
by a legally acceptable rationale; and (2) extent of discrimination must be
necessary in light of the rationale)

4.

In re Crosscreek Apartments. Ltd., 213 B.R. 521, 536-38 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1997) (plan unfairly discriminated in amount ofpayment of claims
where unsecured trade debt would be paid in full within 180 days of
confirmation whereas undersecured creditor's unsecured deficiency claim
was to be paid approximately 50% of allowed unsecured claim over life of
the plan)

5.

In re Cranberry Hill Assoc. L.P., 150 B.R. 289 (Bankr.D.Mass. 1993)
(plan unfairly discriminated where trade creditors' claim fully satisfied and
undersecured creditor's deficiency claim was to be paid over nine years).

6.

In re Buttonwood Partners, Ltd., 111 B. R. 57 (Bankr. S. D. N. Y. 1990)
(four part test to detennine unfair discrimination between classes of
unsecured creditors: (1) discrimination has reasonable basis; (2) debtor
cannot confirm plan without discrimination; (3) discrimination is proposed
in good faith; and (4) degree of discrimination is directly related to the
basis or rationale for the discrimination)

7.

In re Aztec Co., 107 B.R. 585 (Bank-r. M.D. Tenn. 1989) (plan which
proposed to pay 3% of unsecured portion ofundersecured creditor's claim
while other unsecured creditors were to be paid in full constituted unfair
discrimination)
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8.

B.

In re Rivers End Apartments, Ltd., 167 B.R. 470 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1994)

Selection of the proper interest rate

1.

In re New Midland Plaza Assocs., 247 B.R. 877, 889 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
2000) (market rate of interest determined using the "coerced loan"
approach which looks to interest rates charged by a creditor making a loan
to a third party with similar terms, duration, capital and risk)

2.

In re Sagewood Manor Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 223 B.R. 756, 768-69
(Bankr. D. Nev. 1998) (while market rate of interest is appropriate, there
are two approaches used to calculate market cramdown rate: (1) current
market interest rate for similar loans in the region; or (2) a fonnula interest
rate where the court starts with a base rate, either the prime rate or treasury
obligations, and adds a factor based on the risk of default and the nature of
the security)

3.

In re 203 North LaSalle Street L.P., 190 B.R. 567 (Bankr. N.D. DI. 1995),
ajJ'd, 195 B.R. 692 (N.D. TIl. 1996), ajJ'd, 126 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1997),
rev'd on other grounds, 526 U.S. 434 (1999) (minimum discount rate for a
non-recourse loan with a 100% loan to value ratio is the discount rate
which an appraiser utilizes to reduce future cash flows to present value).

4.

In re SMI04, Ltd., 160 B.R. 202 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993); In re
Bloomingdale Partners. 155 B.R. 961 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993) (appropriate
interest rate is rate on U.S. Treasury bonds of comparable maturity years
plus additional amount for risk incurred by the creditor pursuant to the
plan.)

s.

In re Oaks Partners, Ltd., 135 B.R. 440 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991); In re IPC
Atlanta Ltd. Partnership; 142 B.R. 547 (Bankr.N.D.Ga. 1992); In re River
Village Assocs., 161 B.R. 127 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993); ht re Computer
Optics, Inc., 126 B.R. 664 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1991) (interest rate is
determined by the "formula approach" by taking risk free rate and adding
premium to take into account risks associated with the Debtor, the
security, and the plan.)
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6.

In re James Wilson Associates, 965 F.2d 160 (7th Cir. 1992) (interest rate
should compensate lender for the opportunity cost ofmoney and risk of
default).

c.

7.

In re Aztec Co., 99 B.R. 388 (Bankr. M.S. Tenn 1989) (interest rate of2%
over applicable treasury bill rate was least amount necessary given the fact
that property was aging, had significant vacancy problems and
maintenance problems)

8.

In re Monnier Bros., 755 F.2d 1336 (8th eire 1985) (interest rate should be
reasonable in light of risks involved, prevailing market rate for loans of
term similar to payout period with due consideration for quality of security
and risks ofdefault)

9.

In re 360 Inns, Ltd., 76 B.R. 573, 587 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987)

10.

In re Memphis Partners L.P., 99 B.R. 385 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn 1989) (use
ofrate charged by institutional lenders for similar commercial
transactions)

Negative Amortization

1.

Great Western Bank v. Sierra Woods Group, 953 F.2d 1174 (9th eire 1992)
(negative amortization plan, i.e., one wherein part or all of interest on
secured claim is not paid currently, but instead is deferred and allowed to
accrue, with acc(Ued interest added to principal, is not per se objectionable
under §1129(b). Rather, courts should decide on a case-by-case by basis
whether negative amortization under a given plan is fair and equitable, and
should treat the market rate ofinterest as a necessary but not sufficient
factor.

2.

In re Apple Tree Partners, L.P., 131 B.R. 380 (Bankr. W. D. Tenn.
1991)(court must consider plethora of factors in determining whether
negative amortization plan is fair and equitable)
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3.

In re McCombs Properties vm Ltd., 91 B.R. 907 (Bankr. C.D. Calif:
1988) (plan which defers part of interest payable to secured creditor is per
se not fair and equitable).

4.

In. re Club Associates, 107 B.R. 385 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989) (negative
amortization plan held to be fair and equitable where (i) original mortgage
note contained negative amortization provision so that negative
amortization was a risk originally bargained for by mortgagee, (ii) plan
extends maturity and mortgagee's risk for 5 years, but for a reduced
principal amount as a result of the allocation ofpost-petition payments and
for a slightly higher interest rate than that provided in the original note)

D.

Effect of Making Section 1111(b)(2) Election

1.

E.

In re Bloomingdale Partners, 155 B.R. 961 (Bankr. N.D. DI. 1993)
(cramdown payments to undersecured creditor which elected fully secured
status did "double duty" by serving as interest and also reducing principal
amount ofclaim)

Property is sold subject to 363(k). (§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii»

1.

363(k): at a sale by trustee of "property that is subject to a lien that
secures an allowed claim, unless the court for cause orders otherwise~ the
holder of such sale may bid at such sale..."

2.

Undersecured creditor loses artificial recourse granted by §1111(b)(I)(A)
ifproperty is sold under §363(k) or is to be sold under plan. See
§1111(b)(I)(A)(ii)

a)

Georgetown Park Apartments Ltd., 103 B.R. 248 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
1989) (court denied approval of debtor's disclosure statement for
plan which attempted to eliminate undersecured creditor's
deficiency claim by providing for sale of property 4 years after
confrrmation, with interest to be paid pending sale)
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1

F.

Indubitable equivalent (§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii»
1.

In re Pennave Properties Assocs., 165 B.R. 793, 795 (B.D. Pa. 1994)
(return of collateral to secured creditor provides creditor with indubitable
equivalent ofits claim). Cf. In re Arnold & Baker Farms, 85 F.3d 1415,
1421-23 (9th Cir. 1996) (for partial "dirt for debt" plan to constitute

indubitable equivalent, the partial distribution must insure the safety of or
prevent jeopardy to the principal) In re Sandy Ridge Development Corp.
v. Louisiana National Bank, 881 F.2d 1346 (5th Cir. 1989), rev'g, 77 B.R.
69 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1987); In re Elm Creek Joint Venture, 93 B.R. 105
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988) (surrender of collateral as indubitable

equivalent)
2.

Delayed returns ofcollateral as indubitable equivalent.

a)

approved - In re Freymil1er Trucking, Inc., 190 B.R. 913, 915-16
(Bankr. W.O. Okla. 1996) (no payments for six months, with
interest accruing thereon at contract rate, thereafter if collateral is
not sold it would be transferred to creditor) In re Pikes Peak Water
Co., 779 F.2d 1456, (10th Cir. 1985) (3 yr accrued ofprincipal and

interest, surrender thereafter ifproperty unsold; value debt).

b)

unapproved - In re Swiftco, 1988 Westlaw 143714 (B.C. S.D. Tex
11).
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Recent SARE Cases

by
Kenneth N. Klee*
Recent SARE cases from May 5, 1997 to present.
SHORT OUTLINE
1
I

II,

A. Statutory Interpretation of SARE
1. Single Property or Project
2. The Property Must Produce Substantially All of the Debtor's Gross
Income
3. No Substantial Business Other Than Operating the Property.
4. The $4,000,000 Secured Debt Cap.
B. A Fast Track for Single Asset Debtors
1. The Special Provisions for Lifting the Stay in Single Asset Cases
2. Courts have rejected the suggestion that 362(d)(3) provides
mortgagee's exclusive remedy in a single asset case.
3. If relief is granted on some basis, then it simply would not matter
whether the debtor had complied with the requirements of 362(d)(3).
4. Extension on 90 days.
5. Other Cases
LONG OUTLINE

A. Statutory Interpretation of SARE
1. Single Property or Project
In fa Philmont Dev. Co., 181 B.R. 220; In fa McGreals, 201
B.R.736.
In re 83-84 116th Owners Corp., alkla The Ivanhoe, 214 B.R.
530 (Nov. 24, 1997).
"There is not requirement that the single property or project
must be owned by a typical real estate investment entity.
Cooperative corporations or projects may qualify as single
asset real estate debtors if a single property or project is
involved."
In re Kaplan Breslaw Ash, LLC, 264 B.R. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)

Jun 20,2001

• Acting Professor, UCLA School of Law; Partner Klee, Tuchin, Bogdanoff & Stem LLP, Los
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This case gives the definition of SARE in a footnote (#49,
p321).
"That the Warehouse is SARE is undisputed." FN50, p321

In re In REM, LLC, 2001 WL 720638 (E.D. Va. Jan. 31,2001).
At *1: On January 18, 2001, debtor responded to plaintiff's
supplemental motion, asserting that this was not a single
asset real estate case because it fell within an exception to
the definition.
At *3: According to § 362(dl, "the court shall grant relief from
the stay" if there is no equity in the property and the property
is not necessary to an effective reorganization. 11 U.S.C. §
362{dl, (d)(2) (emphasis added). In summary, plaintiff
proved that there was no equity in the property. Debtor failed
to prove that the property was necessary to an effective
reorganization. The court, therefore, has no alternative butte
grant plaintiff's motion for relief from stay pursuant to §
362ld)(2). [FN6]
FN6. The court makes no ruling on plaintiffs supplemental
motion pursuant to § 362(d)(3).

2. The Property Must Produce Substantially All of the Debtor's Gross
Income
In ra Philmont Dev. Co., 181 S.R. 220; In ra Oceanside
Mission Assocs., 192 S.R. 232; In re Humble Place Joint
Venture, 936 F.2d 814; In re NattchaseAssocs. Ltd.
Partnership, 178 B.R. 409; In re Clinton Fields, Inc., 168

S.R.265.
In re Syed, 238 B.R. 133 (Aug. 16, 1999).
"Property in disrepair that generated little or no income
qualified for SARE treatment."
3. No Substantial Business Other Than Operating the Property.
In ra Kkemko, Inc., 181 B.R. 47; In re CBJ Dev., 202 S.R.
467; In ra LON Corp., 191 S.R. 320.

In re Larry Goodwin Golf, Inc., 219 B.R. 391 (Nov. 26, 1997).
"[H]eld that corporation that operated a golf course did not
fall within the scope of 11 U.S.C. § 101(518). In addition to
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running the golf course, the debtor operated a pro shop,
pool, cart rental, and concessions. The debtor, in short, was
using the property to conduct an active business rather than
holding it merely as an income-producing investment. In
addition, the debtor owned adjacent land that was currently
for sale, so that it was doubtful that there was only a single
property or project in any case."
In the Matter of Prairie Hills Golf & Ski Club, Inc., 255 S.R. 228
{Nov. 8, 2000).

.

"[T]he court held that the debtor was not a single asset real
estate entity. The debtor did not hold property simply as a
passive real estate investment. Rather, the property was the
site of various income-producing activities that the debtor
conducted, including the development and sale of residential
lots, the sale of alcoholic beverages at a clubhouse, active
farming operations, and the lease of golf and ski facilities to
a third party:'
•
In r. 83-84116th Owners Corp., alkla The Ivanhoe, 214 B.R.
530 (Nov. 24, 1997).

The reported cases on section 101(518) do not offer much
guidance to the determination of the precise issue before
this Court. Some focus on real estate holdings which are
found not to be "single asset" cases. See In re Philmont
Deve/ooment Co., 181 S.R. 220 (Bankr. E.D.Pa. 1995)(three
semi-detached single-family houses owned by a limited
partnership). Others focus on a range of different kinds of
commercial activities conducted at a single site, which defeat
categorizing the property as ·single asset real estate." See
, also In re Kkemko. Inc., 181 S.R. 47 (Bankr. S.D.Ohio 1995)

(270 slip marina, with substantial ancillary fee-tor-services to
boat owners leasing the slips).
In re Penslgnorkay. Inc., 204 B.R. 676, 678 n.1 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1997)

Failure to develop high production' water well prevents it from
constituting an asset that could represent "substantial other
business."

4. The $4,000,000 Secured Debt Cap.
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In re Midway Invs.! Ltd., 187 B.R. 382; In re Oceanside
Mission Assocs., 192 S.R. 232; Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S.
410; In re Standard Mills Ltd. Partnership, 1996 WL 521190;
In re Pensignorkav, Inc., 204 S.R. 676 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997)
Held: required use of the value of collateral to determine
whether the $4,000,000 limit had been exceeded. Conflicts
with:

In re Wus Corp., Civ. No. 97-6311 (WGB), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13754, August 14, 1998, Decided, August 18, 1998, Filed,
Entered, NOT FOR PUBLICATION.
"The court finds that the fact that the Property is valued at
less than $4,000,000 is not relevant to the question of
whether WUS's secured debt is less than $4,000,000." (@
*16 of case). What matters is the aggregate amount of the
claims secured by the property.

The court also finds that the secured debt should be
considered at the time a creditor seeks relief from the
automatic stay provision.
It is clear that other single asset provisions of the Bankruptcy Code,
particularly those governing the lifting of the automatic stay, do not
currently apply to entities that exceed the secured debt cap. Following
cases basically say that bad faith factors from Phoenix Piccadilly are no
longer applicable to SARE cases in light of Bankruptcy Act of 1994.

Ir re Jacksonville Riverfront Dev.! Ltd., 215 B.R. 239, 243 n.4
(Nov. 10, 1997).
Case summary: Creditor moved for relief from stay or, in
alternative, for dismissal of Chapter 11 case, on theory that
debtor had filed for bankruptcy in bad faith. The Bankruptcy
Court, George L. Proctor, J., held that: (1) automatic stay
could not be lifted, and bankruptcy case could not be
dismissed, simply because case was single asset real estate

case, and (2) Chapter 11 petition was not filed in "bad faith."
In ra Venice.Qxford Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 236 B.R. 805
(April 17, 1998).
Case summary: Mortgagee moved for relief from stay to

proceed with mortgage foreclosure sale of Chapter 11
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debtor's 180-unit apartment complex. The Bankruptcy Court,
Paul M. Glenn, J., held that: (1) no "cause" existed to lift
automatic stay to permit mortgage foreclosure sale to
proceed, based on debtor's alleged "bad faith" in filing its

"single asset" reorganization case solely in attempt to
preserve apartment complex, and (2) court could not
conclude, at that stage in proceeding, that debtor that had
successfully operated for past six months while earning a
stable and significant income had no reasonable possibility
of reorganizing, so as to permit lifting of stay to permit
mortgage foreclosure sale to proceed based on debtor's lack
of equity in property.

In fa Villamont.Qxford Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 230 B.R. 457

(April 17, 1998).
Case summary: Motion was filed for relief from stay to allow
mortgage foreclosure sale to proceed. The Bankruptcy
Court, Paul M. Glenn, J., held that: (1) "cause" did not exist
to lift stay to allow foreclosure sale to proceed, based on
debtor's alleged "bad faith" in filing for Chapter 11 relief on
eve of sale, and (2) court could not determine, at early stage
of Chapter 11 case, that there was no reasonable possibility
for debtor-mortgagor to reorganize, so as to permit lifting of
stay to allow foreclosure sale to proceed.
In re Katherine C. Wells, 227 B.R. 553 (Dec. 7, 1998).

Case summary: Chapter 11 debtor filed motion to reject
executory contract for sale of her real property. Would-be
purchaser of the property filed motion to dismiss, alleging
that debtor's case was not filed in good faith. The Bankruptcy
Court, George L. Proctor, J., held that: (1) would-be
purchaser had legal and pecuniary interest in outcome of
case and, thus, was "party in interest" with standing to file
motion to dismiss; (2) fact that debtor is individual, not
engaged in business, is not factor that court may consider
when determining whether Chapter 11 petition was filed in
bad faith; (3) evidence presented was insufficient to show
that debtor filed her petition in bad faith; (4) parties' contract
was executory and subject to rejection; and (5) debtor
established that rejection of contract served to benefit the
estate.
B. A Fast Track for Single Asset Debtors
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1. The Special Provisions for Lifting the Stay in Single Asset Cases
In fa Syed, 238 B.R. 133 (Aug. 16, 1999).

"362{d)(3), seeks to place the debtor on a fast track and to
permit the mortgage lender to foreclose unless the debtor
acts swiftly."
3. Courts have rejected the suggestion that 362(d)(3) provides
mortgagee's exclusive remedy in a single asset case.
In ra Duvar Apts.! Inc., 205 S.R. 196; In ra LON Corp., 191 S.R.

320.
In re Pacific Rim Invs., LLP, 243 B.R. 768, 772 (Jan. 24, 2000).

Pacific Rim's argument that § 362(d)(3) is the exclusive
provision by which relief from stay can be obtained in a
single asset real estate is without merit. [FN31 First, the
bankruptcy judge in the instant case stated the issue of
whether this qualified as a single asset real estate case
under the Code was unclear and made no finding in this
regard. (Tr. at 16.) Second, the word "or" between
subsections (2) and (3) reflects the statute creates
independent alternative bases upon which a bankruptcy
court may grant relief from stay.
6. If relief is granted on some basis, then it simply would not matter
whether the d·ebtor had complied with the requirements of 362(d)(3).
In ra Star Trust, and Trust 900, 237 B.R. 827 (Feb. 18, 1999).

"[Held] that Section 362(d)(3) does not preempt any other
basis for granting relief from the stay."
In fa 234-6 West 22nd St. Corp., 214 B.R. 751 (Nov. 14, 1997).

Upholds Duvar Apts, in that -'the availability of relief under
362(d)(3) does not preclude appropriate relief under any
other subsections of 362(d).
7. Extension on 90 days. See In fe LDN Corp., 191 S.R. 320 (finding that
relief was mandatory where provisions of § 362(d)(3) were not strictly
complied with where debtor filed plan two months after deadline and
failed to request a timely extension of the 90-day period); In ra

Archway Apts., Ltd., 206 S.R. 463: if plan is submitted a few days late
due to the purely innocent clerical error of the debtor's attorney, some
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lenience is in order. Delay was not due to bad faith or any effort to
abuse the bankruptcy system. The court also noted that, under
362(d)(3), some kind of relief from the stay is mandatory when the plan
has not been timely filed. But relief is not always synonymous with an
outright lifting of the stay. Cited by:
In re Planet 10, L.e., 213 S.R. 478, 481 (Sept. 16, 1997) (As
Amended Oct. 29, 1997).

"Although Congress meant for Section 362(d)(3) to hasten
the movement of single asset cases through reorganization,
there is no inherent reason why the statute should not apply
if a single asset debtor is in Chapter 7. ... The court agreed
that it had no discretion but to grant relief of some sort.
Rather than lifting the stay outright, however, the court
conditioned this step on the outcome of the trustee's efforts
to market the property."
In re Win Trucklna, Inc., 236 B.R. 774, 781 (July 27, 1999).

Not a SARE case but discusses time limits of SARE cases.
to In re LON Corp., 191 S.R.320.

Citing

In re Kaplan

Bre.law Ash. LLC, 284 B.R. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)

Jun 20,2001
*333: The Mortgageholder's second basis for relief from the
stay for cause is its argument that the Debtor filed this
bankruptcy case in bad faith. It is well settled, of course, that
the filing of a bankruptcy petition on the eve of a foreclosure
or eviction does not, by itself, establish a bad faith filing or
"cause" for relief from the stay. See, e.g., In 18 234-6 West
22nd St. Coro.. 214 B.R. 751.757 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1997)
(Brozman, C.J.) (so noting);/n re Eclair Bakery Ltd., 255
BrR. 121,137 (Bkrtcy.S.D.N.Y.2000) (Gerber, J.) (citing 2346 West 22nd St. Corp). Also see, In re Syndicom Corp.,
2001 WL 1230345, at *13 (Bkrtcy.S.D.N.Y.2001).
8. Other Cases
Prairie Cro••lna, L.L.C., 2000 U.S. Dlat. LEXIS 14588 (Sept. 29,

2000).

.
Debtor failed to make full payment by April 23, 1999, and the
deed passed automatically to the bank under the terms of

the agreement. Bankruptcy petition was filed before the
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payment due date, but the agreement was entered into
before the petition was filed. As matter of law, debtor had no
interest in the property as of April 23, 1999. Therefore
debtors argument that it had until May 20, 1999 to file a
reasonable plan of re-organization (362(d)(3)(A» fails.
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BANKRUPTCY AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AN UPDATE
By Michael H. Reed

. A.

The Automatic Stay v. The Regulatory Enforcement Powers of
Environmental Agencies

1.
Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code (the "Code"), the "automatic stay,"
provides for a comprehensive stay of pre-petition claims and litigation against the debtor. 11
U.S.C.A § 362(a) (West 1993 & Supp. 2001). Section 362(b) of the Code creates various
exceptions to the automatic stay, including the so-called "police power" exception found in
Section 362(b)(4). The automatic stay does not operate as a stay:
under paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (6) of subsection (a) of this section,
of the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding
by a governmental unit ... to enforce such governmental unit's ...
police and regulatory power, including the enforcement of a
judgment other than a money judgment, obtained in an action or
proceeding by the governmental unit to enforce such governmental
unit's ... police or regulatory power.
11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (West Supp. 2001).
2.
The police power exception clearly was intended to encompass the
environmental laws. See, H.R. Rep. No. 595, at 343, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) ("where a
governmental unit is suing a debtor to prevent or stop violation of ... environmental protection
... or similar police or regulatory laws, or attempting to fIX damages for violation of such a law,
the action or proceeding is not stayed under the automatic stay"); United States v. Nicolet, Inc.,
857 F.2d 202, 207 (3d Cir. 1988); Penn Terra, Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d
267, 278 (3d Cir. 1984); NLRB v. Edward Cooper Painting, Inc., 804 F.2d 934,943 (6th Cir.
1986).
3.
The Omnibus Consolidated Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act,
1999, Pub. L. 105-277, Div. I, Tit. VI, § 603(1), 112 Stat. 2681-886, effective Oct. 21, 1998,
deleted subsections (b)(4) and (5) of Section 362 and substituted a new subsection (b)(4) that, in
essence, combines the substance of former subsections (b)(4) and (5) into a single section.
Notably, former subsections (b)(4) and (5) specifically stated that they were exceptions to
subsections (a)(l) and (2) of Section 362, whereas the new combined subsection (b)(4) states that
it is an exception to subsections (a)(I), (2), (3) and (6) of Section 362. There is some uncertainty
as to whether the added references to subsections (a)(3) and (6) were intended to substantively
broaden the police and regulatory power exception beyond the scope of former subsections (b)(4)
and (5). In SEC v. Brennan, 230 F.3d 65, 73-4 (2d Cir. 2000), the Second Circuit rejected the
argument of the SEC, which was seeking to enforce an asset repatriation order, that the 1998
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amendment significantly broadened the scope of the police power exception. Referring to the
limited legislative history of the amendment, the Court stated:
The SEC's argument that these amendments are material to this
case is belied by the fact that Congress maintained the "exception
to the exception" for enforcement of money judgments. The SEC
would have us interpret the expansion of the governmental[**24]
unit exception to cover proceedings otherwise stayed by §
362(a)(3) to mean that a governmental unit has ''unqualified''
authority to seek custody of estate property outside the bankruptcy
proceedings. Brief of Appellee at 33. However, this proposed
"exception to the exception to the exception" would virtually
swallow whole the exception to the exception for enforcement of
money judgments. Moreover, it would run contrary to the limited
legislative history of the 1998 amendments, which provides in
relevant part that the amendments "should not be read to expand
the exceptions to the automatic stay to cases where governmental
units are merely seeking to exercise control of a debtor's property
to satisfy debt." 143 CONG. REC. E2305 (1998) (statement of
Rep. Conyers, Ranking Member of the Judiciary Committee); see
also 143 CONG. REC. HI095I (1997) (statement of Rep. Gilman
on behalf of Rep. Hyde, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee).
230 F.3d at 74.
4.
In addition to the automatic stay, the Code empowers the bankruptcy court
to issue specific injunctions when necessary or appropriate to' carry out the provisions of the
Code. 11 U.S.C.A. § 105(a) (West 1993); H.R. Rep. No. 595 at 175, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977).
5.
An action brought by an environmental authority to enforce compliance
with an environmental law which is being violated as a result of the debtor's on-going business
operations or conduct during the bankruptcy case arguably does not fall within the scope of the
automatic stay of Section 362(a); but even if such an action is deemed to fall within the language
of Section 362(a), it would clearly be excepted under the police power provision, Section
362(b)(4). See, Heidt, "The Automatic Stay in Environmental Bankruptcies," 67 Am. Bankr.
L.J. 69, 83-8 (Winter, 1993).
6.
One controversial issue is whether post-petition administrative or judicial
actions that seek to compel the "non-urgent" remediation of environmental hazards caused solely
by the debtor's pre-petition operations or conduct, as opposed to the post-petition conduct Of
operations of the debtor, should be deemed violations of the automatic stay Of, alternatively, may
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be enjoined under Section 105(a) of the Code. See, Heidt, 67 Am. Bankr., L.J. at 79, 99. See
also, In re Commerce Oil Co., 847 F.2d 291 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Mattiace Industries,
Inc., 73 B.R. 816 (E.D. N.Y. 1987).
In some cases, the representative of the bankruptcy estate may argue that a
7.
post-petition enforcement action by an environmental agency ''under the guise" of enforcing
post-petition compliance with the law is actually an attempt to recover on a pre-petition claim of
the agency in order to further the state's "pecuniary interests", as distinguished from its police
powers. See, e.g., In re Commerce Oil Co., 847 F.2d 291 (6th Cir. 1988); Smith-Goodson v. Cit
Fed Morg. Corp., 144 B.R. 72, 75 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992) (because notices sent to the debtor
about a public nuisance it was maintaining on its real property involved "public policy" instead
of "pecuniary gain," the automatic stay was inapplicable). See also, Heidt, 67 Am. Bankr. L.J. at
107-30. Compare the foregoing authorities, however, with In re FCC, 217 F.3d 125 (2d Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 298, 148 L. Ed. 2d 240 (2000), rehearing denied, 121 S. Ct. 609,
148 L.Ed.2d 519 (2000) (decision of the FCC to re-auction personal communications services
spectrum licenses because of debtor licensees' failure to make timely payment implicated the
conditions of licensure, and thus was regulatory and was outside the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court; accordingly, the automatic stay did not preclude the FCC from enforcing its
regulatory power by treating the debtors' failure to make timely payment for their licenses as
resulting in automatic cancellation of the debtors' licenses). See also, Board of Governors v.
Mcorp Financial, Inc., 502 U.S. 32, 112 S.Ct. 459, 116 L.Ed. 2d.358 (1991) (automatic stay did
not authorize the district court to enjoin prosecution of two administrative proceedings charging
bank holding company, a Chapter 11 debtor, with violating the Federal Reserve Board's "source
of strength" regulation). But see, NextWave Personal Communications, Inc. v. F.C.C., 254 F.3d
130 (D.C. Cir., 2001), discussed in paragraph B(2) infra.
.
In a recent decision, In re 229 Main Street Limited Partnership, 262 F.3d
8.
(1st Cir., 2001), the First Circuit held that the perfection of a state environmental "superlien" was
excepted from the automatic stay pursuant to Sections 362(b)(3) and 546(b)(I)(A) of the Code.
The debtor owned a shopping plaza in Natick, Massachusetts at which it leased space to a drycleaning business for many years. The property eventually became contaminated with chemicals
and other pollutants released from the dry cleaner. The Massachusetts Department of
Environmental Protection (the "Agency") determined that the contamination posed a significant
threat to the public's drinking water. To address this threat, the Agency spent a significant
amount of money on emergency cleanup activities. It then sought reimbursement for these
expenses, together with assurances regarding anticipated future expenses, from the debtor. The
Agency advised the debtor by letter that it intended to record a lien against the property to secure
present and future cleanup costs under the Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Materials
Prevention Act (the "state statute"). The debtor denied responsibility for the contamination and
contested the dollar amount of the cleanup costs sought by the Agency. The debtor invoked its
right to an adjudicatory hearing before an administrative hearing officer. Before the
administrative proceeding had concluded, the debtor filed its Chapter 11 petition. The debtor
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conceded that a principal objective of the Chapter 11 filing was to prevent the Agency from
obtaining a "superlien" under the state statute. The hearing officer, however, refused to adjourn
the administrative proceeding holding that it fell within an exception to the automatic stay. The
debtor then requested that the bankruptcy court hold the Agency in contempt for violating the
stay by continuing the administrative proceeding. The bankruptcy court denied the debtor's
request and both the district court and the First Circuit affnmed.
Section 362(b)(3) provides that the automatic stay of Section 362(a) does not
preclude "any act to perfect, or to maintain or continue the perfection of, an interest in property to
the extent that the trustee's rights and powers are subject to such perfection under section 546(b)
of [the Code], " 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3) (West Supp. 2001).
Section 546(b)(I)(A) provides that the rights and powers of a trustee under
Sections 544, 545 and 549 of the Code are subject to any "generally applicable law" that "pe~ts
perfection of an interest in property to be effective against an entity that acquires rights in such
property before the date of perfection". 11 U.S.C. § 546(b)(I)(A) (West Supp. 2001).
The First Circuit frrst considered what constitutes an "interest in property" within
the meaning of Section 362(b)(3). Based upon the "plain meaning" of the statutory language, the
Court concluded that "interest in property" is broader than "lien". In probably the most
interesting part of its analysis, the Court found that the events that had occurred before the
bankruptcy case was fued were sufficient to give the Agency an "interest" in the Debtor's
property under the state statute within the meaning of Section 362(b)(3) of the Code. It was
sufficient that (i) the Debtor, as the owner of the contaminated property, was liable to the Agency
for past and future cleanup costs; (ii) the Agency had a present right to record a lien against the
debtor's property; and (iii) the Agency "had set the process [of obtaining a lien] in motion by
notifying the debtor of its intentions and participating vigorously in the administrative hearing
process." 262 F.3d at *7.
The Court next considered whether the actions the Agency took after the Chapter
11 petition was fued fell within the "act to perfect" language of Section 362(b)(3). The Court
determined that a lien under the state statute could be created and perfected simultaneously and
that, based again on a plain meaning analysis, "an act that both creates and perfects in one fell
swoop is an act to perfect" within the meaning of Section 362(b)(3). 262 F.3d at *9. "Since
section 362(b)(3) says that the filing of a bankruptcy petition does not automatically stay an act to
perfect, the simultaneous postpetition creation and perfection of a lien may come within the
pertinent exception to the automatic stay so long as the creditor holds a valid prepetition interest
in the property." Id.
The First Circuit then considered the applicability of Section 546(b)(I)(A) of the
Code, fmding that it permitted the Agency to accomplish both the creation and the perfection of
the superlien without running afoul of Section 545 of the Code (the superlien was not be
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avoidable as a preference under Section 547 of the Code because the trustee may not avoid as a
preference "the flXing of a statutory lien that is not avoidable under section 545 of [the Code],"
11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(6)(West Supp. 2001). The Court further determined that the state statute was
a "generally applicable law" and a superlien obtained under it would be effective under
Massachusetts law against any entities that had previously acquired rights in the property. 262
F.3d at *9-*10. Thus, the environmental superlien satisfied all of the requirements of Sections
362(b)(3) and 546(b)(I)(A) of the Code.
This very interesting holding by the First Circuit is likely to be debated. In
essence, the Court held that a governmental unit can obtain a prepetition "interest" in a debtor's
property that is not a lien and then tum that "interest" into a "lien" and perfect that lien after the
bankruptcy filing without offending the automatic stay. I believe that the validity of the Court's
concept of "interest in property" may be challenged.

Moreover, such an expansive concept of "interest in property" could come back to
haunt an environmental agency which seeks to impose liability upon an entity that acquired
contaminated property from a bankruptcy estate in a sale free and clear of "interests" for cleanup
costs incurred by the agency prior to the sale. In addition to the other arguments that the
purchaser might make in response to such a claim, the purchaser may now have the additional'
argument that, based upon the First Circuit's decision in 229 Main Street Limited Partnership,
the cleanup costs gave the agency an "interest" in the debtor's property that was cut off by the
bankruptcy court's sale order. See, Reed, "Successor Liability and Bankruptcy Sales," 51 Bus.
Law. 563, 664-66 (May 1996).
If a state environmental "superlien" statute permits the lien to trump all other liens
and encumbrances no matter when ftIed (as apparently was the case in 229 Main Street Limited
Partnership) a "springing" environmental superlien that can be perfe~ted at any time could hang
over the bankruptcy estate indefmitely.

B.

The Bankruptcy Antidiscrimination Provision v. the Regulatory
Enforcement Powers of Environmental Agencies

1.
provides as follows:

Section 525(a) of the Code, the bankruptcy antidiscrimination provision,

Except as provided in the Perishable Agricultural Commodities
Act, 1930, the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, and section 1 of
the Act entitled "An Act making appropriations for the Department
of Agriculture for the flScal year ending June 30, 1944, and for
other purposes," approved July 12, 1943, a governmental unit may
not deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to renew a license, permit,
charter, franchise, or other similar grant to, condition such a grant
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to, discriminate with respect to such a grant against, deny
employment to, terminate the employment of, or discriminate with
respect to employment against, a person that is or has been a debtor
under this title or a bankrupt or a debtor under the Bankruptcy Act,
or another person with whom such bankrupt or debtor has been
associated, solely because such bankrupt or debtor is or has been a
debtor under this title or a bankrupt or debtor under the Bankruptcy
Act, has been insolvent before the commencement of the case
under this title, or during the case but before the debtor is granted
or denied a discharge, or has not paid a debt that is dischargeable in
the case under this title or that was discharged under the
Bankruptcy Act.
11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (West 1993).
2.
In NextWave Personal Communications, Inc. v. F.C.C., 254 F.3d 130
(D.C. Cir. 2001), the D.C. Circuit held that the Federal Communication Commission's
termination of various broadband personal communications services ("PCS") licences that the
Commission had sold at auction to the debtors by reason of the debtors' subsequent default in
payment of purchase price installments violated Section 525(a) of the Code, the bankruptcy
antidiscrimination provision, notwithstanding the FCC's contention that termination of the
licenses was an exercise of its police and regulatory powers not circumscribed by the Bankruptcy
Code. Seeking to comply with its statutory duty to ensure small business participation in
auctions of broadband PCS licenses, the FCC allowed winning bidders to pay for their licenses in
installments. As part of this scheme, the FCC took and perfected security interests in the licenses
and provided for license cancellation should a bidder fail to make timely payments. When the
debtors, winning bidders on several licenses, ftled for Chapter 11 and ceased making payments,
the FCC canceled their licenses. The D.C. Circuit, "applying the fundamental principle that
federal agencies must obey all federal laws, not just those they administer", held that the FCC
violated Section 525(a) of the Code, that prohibits governmental entities from revoking debtors'
licenses solely for failure to pay debts dischargeable in bankruptcy. 254 F.3d at 133. ''The
Commission, having chosen to create standard debt obligations as part of its licensing scheme, is
bound by the usual rules governing the treatment of such obligations in bankruptcy". Id.
3.
Whether and how the D.C. Circuit's holding in Next Wave might apply in
the environmental protection context is unclear. However, a debtor might seek to invoke Section
525(a) of the Code if the debtor could prove that an environmental protection agency treated the
debtor or an affiliate of the debtor differently than the agency usually treats nondebtors in
granting permits or licenses because of the bankruptcy filing or the debtor's fmancial obligations
to the state.
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C.

Allowance of Administrative Expenses for Environmental Clean-up Costs

1.
A fundamental principle of bankruptcy law is equal treatment for similarly
situated claims. An exception to this general principle is the priority afforded to certain
unsecured claims under the Code. See 11 U.S.C.A § 507(a) (West 1993 & Supp. 2001). As a
general matter, expansion of the claims entitled to priority under the Code has the effect of
diluting the equality of distribution and may make it more difficult to preserve the debtor's going
concern through reorganization.
2.
Sections 503(b) and 507(a)(I) of the Code establish a frrst-Ievel priority in
the bankruptcy distribution scheme for "administrative expenses," i.e., liabilities and expenses
incurred by the trustee or debtor-in-possession during the bankruptcy case, usually arising from
the operation of the debtor's business or preservation of the estate's assets. 11 U.S.C.A.
§§ 503(b), 507(a)(I) (West 1993 & Supp. 2001). A Chapter 11 reorganization plan must provide
for the payment in full in cash of all outstanding administrative expenses on the effective date of
the plan. 11 U.S.C.A § 1129(a)(9)(A) (West 1993 & Supp. 2001).
3.
In the absence of an enforceable statute granting lien or priority status to
such costs, it is uniformly agreed.that environmental response costs incurred by a governmental
unit or private party prior to the commencement of a bankruptcy case will be treated as general
unsecured claims. In re Chateaugay Corp., 112 B.R. 513,517 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), later proceeding
In re Chateaugay Corp., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5242 (S.D.N.Y. April 17, 1991), and affrrmed,
944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991). There is also general agreement that environmental response costs
incurred by a governmental unit or private party to remedy environmental hazards caused by the
post-petition operation of the debtor's business should be allowed as administrative expenses of
the estate. Id., at 525.
4.
Most of the controversy in the decisional law has involved situations in
which an environmental claimant has sought administrative expense priority for response costs
incurred during the bankruptcy case (or to be incurred in the future) to remedy environmental
hazards caused by the debtor's pre-petition conduct. See, e.g., In re Wall Tube & Metal Products
Co., 831 F.2d 118 (6th eir. 1987), in which the Court of Appeals held that the response costs
incurred by a state environmental agency while a Chapter 7 trustee remained in possession of a
site containing hazardous substances were recoverable as administrative expenses, even though
the hazards arose solely from the debtor's pre-petition operations. But see, In re R.F. Radandt,
Inc., 160 B.R. 323 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1993) (claim of agency for future response costs to address
pre-petition contamination not entitled to administrative priority although there were
unencumbered funds in the Chapter 7 estate). Accord, In re Mahoney-Troast Constr. Co., 189
B.R. 57 (D.N.I. 1995) (response costs incurred post-petition by lessor of real property whose
lease was rejected to remedy contamination caused by the debtor's prepetition use of the leased
realty were not entitled to administrative priority because the contamination posed no imminent
danger to the public). Compare Wall Tube with Pension Benefit Ouar. Corp. v. Sunarhauserman,
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Inc. (In re Sunarhauserman. Inc.), 126 F.3d 811, 822 (6th Cir. 1997) (where dissent argued that
Wall Tube should be applied to allow administrative priority to PBGC claim for unpaid
minimum funding contributions for debtors' employee retirement plan).
5.
In some cases the courts have held that administrative priority should not
be granted to response costs incurred post-petition to remedy pre-petition contamination where
the business is not being operated during the bankruptcy case. See. e.g., Southern R. Co. v.
Johnson Bronze Co., 758 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1985); In re N.P. Mining Co., 963 F.2d 1449 (11th
Cir. 1992); In re Dant & Russell. Inc., 853 F.2d 700, 706-09 (9th Cir. 1988); Gull Indus. v. John
Mitchell. Inc. (In re Hanna), 168 B.R. 386 (Bankr. 9th Cir. Or. 1994).
6.
In other cases, the courts have held that administrative priority treatment
may be allowed for response costs incurred post-petition to remedy pre-petition contamination
but only when the hazards present an imminent and identifiable threat of harm to public health or
safety. See. e.g., In re McCrory Corp., 188 B.R. 763,768-70 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995); In re FCX.
Inc., 96 B.R. 49, 55 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 1989).
7.
In other cases, the courts have taken a more expansive view of
administrative priority for remediation of hazards rooted in pre-petition events. See. e.g., In re
Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d at 1009; Department of Envtl. Resources v. Conroy, 24 F.3d 568 (3d
Cir. 1994); Coal Stripping v. Clarendon Nat'l Ins. Co. (In re Coal Striping), 222 B.R. 78 (Bankr.
W.O. Pa. 1998); In re Diamond Reo Trucks. Inc., 115 B.R. 559 (Bankr. W.O. Mich. 1990); In re
Stevens, 68 B.R. 774 (D. Me. 1987); In re Hemingway Transp., 126 B.R. 656 (D. Mass. 1991),
affrrmed, In re Hemingway Transp., 954 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992), vacated in part and remanded,
993 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 914, 126 L.Ed.2d 251, 114 S. Ct. 303 (1993);
In re Kent Holland Die Casting & Plating. Inc., 125 B.R. 493 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1991).
8.
In Pennsylvania Dept. of Environmental Resources v. Tri-State Clinical
Laboratories. Inc., 178 F.3d 685 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1075, 120 S.Ct. 790, 145
L.Ed. 2d 666 (2000), a state environmental enforcement agency [tled a proof of claim seeking
allowance of an administrative expense for a criminal [me imposed on a Chapter 7 debtor for its
postpetition conduct that violated Pennsylvania's Solid Waste Management Act. The bankruptcy
court sustained the trustee's objection to the proof of claim and the district court affrrmed. The
Third Circuit also affrrmed, holding that "based on the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code,
its purpose and legislative history, and the principles of fairness upon which the code is
grounded, punitive criminal [mes arising from postpetition conduct of the debtor are not
allowable as administrative expenses under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)." Id., at 698.

D.

Recovering Environmental Clean-up Costs From Encumbered Assets

1.
Another source for funding environmental clean-up costs that is
sometimes available to the trustee is the proceeds of property of the estate that is encumbered by
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a security interest or lien. Section 506(c) of the Code provides that ''The trustee may recover
from property securing an allowed secured claim the reasonable, necessary costs and expenses of
preserving, or disposing of, such property to the extent of any benefit to the holder of such
claim." 11 U.S.C.A. § 506(c) (West 1993).
2.
A significant recent decision under Section 506(c) is Hartford
Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 120 S.Ct. 1942 (2000). Known as the
"Hen House" case because it arose from the Chapter 11 bankruptcy case of a company named
Hen House Interstate, Inc., Hartford Underwriters held that only the trustee (or debtor-inpossession) has standing to assert a claim under section 506(c) of the Code to recover the
"reasonable, necessary costs and expenses of preserving, or disposing of' property encumbered
by a security interest or lien. The creditor who provided goods or services to the estate does not
have such standing. In Hartford Underwriters the debtor continued to operate its business after it
ftIed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. A bank held a security interest in essentially all of the
debtor's assets to secure a prepetition loan under which over $4,000,000 was outstanding on the
filing date. The Bank also lent the debtor an additional $300,000 as debtor-in-possession
fmancing pursuant to a loan agreement which authorized the debtor to use the loan proceeds and
cash collateral to pay designated expenses, including workers' compensation expenses. The
debtor obtained workers' compensation insurance from an insurance company which, at the time,
was unaware of the bankruptcy case. The policy required monthly premium payments which the
Debtor repeatedly failed to make. Nevertheless, the insurer continued to provide insurance. The
reorganization ultimately failed and the case was converted to Chapter 7. At the time of the
conversion, the debtor owed the insurer over $50,000 in unpaid premiums. The insurer learned
of the bankruptcy after the conversion. Recognizing that the estate lacked unencumbered funds
to pay the premiums, the insurer attempted to charge the premiums to the bank by filing with the
bankruptcy court an application requesting that it be allowed an administrative expense pursuant
to section 503 of the Code and be permitted to recover that expense from the collateral of the
bank pursuant to section 506(c) of the Code. The bankruptcy court ruled for the insurer and the
district court and a panel of the Eighth Circuit affumed. However, the Eighth Circuit
subsequently granted en banc review and reversed, concluding that section 506(c) could be
invoked only by the trustee (or the d-i-p, as the case may be), not by an administrative claimant.
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court affumed the decision of the Eighth Circuit, ~ bane.
3.
Several issues left undecided in Hartford Underwriters are noteworthy: (i)
whether a trustee's (or d-i-p's) recovery under section 506(c) goes into the estate to be distributed
according to the Code's priority provisions or must be distributed only to the entities who
provided the goods or services which were the basis of the trustee's or (d-i-p's) recovery under
that section; (ii) whether the trustee or d-i-p may use section 506(c) prior to paying the expenses
for which reimbursement is sought; and (iii) whether, upon motion, the bankruptcy court can
authorize a party-in-interest other than the trustee (or d-i-p) to represent the estate in pursuing
recovery under section 506(c). On the latter point, the Court noted that the bank had never
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requested that the trustee pursue a claim for its benefit under section 506(c) or sought authority
from the bankruptcy court to assert the claim as the estate's representative.
4.
In addition to having to overcome the "standing" hurdle erected by
Hartford Underwriters, private claimants seeking to recover environmental clean-up costs as
administrative expenses from property encumbered by a lien without the express consent of the
lienholder must also satisfy the substantive standard the courts have established for recovery
under Section 506(c) which, in general, is a challenging one. For example, in C.S. Assocs. v.
Miller, 29 F.3d 903 (3d Cir. 1994), the Third Circuit held that the City of Philadelphia could not
recover unsecured post-petition real estate taxes and water/sewer rents from the proceeds of the
sale of certain Philadelphia real estate encumbered by a mortgage because the City "did not
demonstrate that the taxes conferred a direct benefit to the [mortgagee] ...." 29 F.3d at 904.
The Court of Appeals held that, in order to prevail under Section 506(c), "a claimant must
demonstrate that (1) the expenditures are reasonable and necessary to the preservation or disposal
of the property, and (2) the expenditures provide a direct benefit to the secured creditors". Id., at
906, citing Eguibank. N.A. v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 884 F.2d 80, 84, 86-7 (3d Cir.
1989), and In re McKeesport Steel Castings Co., 799 F.2d 91, at 94-5 (3d Cir. 1986). See also,
In re Ona Com., 170 B.R. 257 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (case remanded to bankruptcy court for further
fmdings as to which services "directly benefitted the [secured creditor] and/or were ...
consented to by the [secured creditor] ..."). Compare C.S. Assocs. v. Miller with In re
McKeesport Steel Castings Co., 799 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1986) (held, unpaid gas utility bills
incurred by the d-i-p in operating business during Chapter 11 case benefitted a secured creditor
because the d-i-p's continued operation of the business facilitated the ultimate sale of a going
concern from which all of the sales proceeds were to be paid to secured creditors).
5.
Other noteworthy cases include In re Palomar Truck Corp., 951 F.2d 229
(9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, General Elec. Capital Corp. v. North County Jeep & Renault, 506
U.S. 821, 113 S. Ct. 71, 121 L. Ed. 2d 37 (1992); Williams v. Bank One Cleveland. N.A. (In re
Dyac Corp.), 164 B.R. 574 (N.D. Ohio 1994); In re Corona Plastics. Inc., 99 B.R. 231 (D.N.J.
1989); In re T.P. Long Chern. Inc., 45 B.R. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985); Guterl Special Steel
Corp. v. Economic Dev. Admin. (In re Guterl Special Steel Corp.), 198 B.R. 128 (Bankr. W.D.
Pa. 1996), wherein the court held that the EPA was entitled to recover post-petition response cost
from the proceeds from the sale of real property prior to any distribution to a mortgagee because
the EPA's remediation of the property made it marketable; In re Hubbard Power & Light, 202
B.R. 680 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1996) (Chapter 11 debtor was authorized to grant lien on real
property senior to preexisting lien to secure post-petition fmancing where the loan proceeds were
to be used to fund an environmental cleanup which would increase the value of the property and,
therefore, the junior lienholder's interest was adequately protected).
6.
Creditors other than those who hold liens on the contaminated assets
(where the bankruptcy estate has other unencumbered assets) and other PRPs will, of course,
benefit by having remediation costs deducted from the proceeds of any disposition of the
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contaminated assets. Whether the trustee or debtor can establish the requisite "direct benefit" to
the secured creditor may require proof that (i) the property has been disposed of with a net cash
benefit to the secured party, and (ii) the applicant can prove that the property could not have been
disposed of at that value without the remediation efforts.

E.

Bankruptcy Sales

1.
A purchaser of property from a bankruptcy estate will typically desire to
limit its liability for any pre-existing debts of the debtor associated with the property, such as
products and environmental liabilities. Such a purchaser will usually acquire the property in a
sale ''free and clear of 'interests'" in such property pursuant to Section 363(t) of the Code. 11
U.S.C.A. § 363(t) (West 1993). See generally, Reed, "Successor Liability and Bankruptcy
Sales," 51 Bus. Law. 563 (May 1996); Bodoh and Morgan, "Inequality Among Creditors: The
Unconstitutional Use of Successor Liability to Create a New Class of Priority Claimants," 4 Am.
Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 325 (Winter 1996).
2.
Several courts have held that section 363(t) grants bankruptcy courts the
power to convey assets free and clear of pre-conveyance claims, or in personam liabilities of the
transferor. See, e.g., In re All American of Ashburn, Inc., 56 B.R. 186, 189 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1986), later proceeding, In re All American of Ashburn, Inc., 805 F.2d 1515 (11th Cir. 1986); In
re New England Fish Co., 19 B.R. 323, 326-9 (Bankr. W.o. Wash. 1982). Cf. United Mine
Workers of Am. 1992 Benefit Plan v. Leckie Smokeless Coal Co. (In re Leckie Smokeless Coal
Co.), 99 F.3d 573 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1118,137 L.Ed.2d 332,117 S. Ct. 1251
(1997), statute subsequently held unconstitutional in Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 14
L.Ed.2d 451, 118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998). But see, In re White Motor Credit Corp., 75 B.R. 944, 948
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) (section 363(t) grants bankruptcy courts the power to convey assets free
and clear of property interests such as "liens" and "encumbrances", but not "claims").
3.
Other courts have held that bankruptcy courts do have the power to convey
assets free and clear of claims, but that power is rooted in the courts' general equitable powers
embodied in Section 105(a), not Section 363(t). See, e.g., In re White Motor Credit Corp., supra,
75 B.R. at 948.
4.
In several recent decisions involving products liability claims the courts
have declined to absolve a purchaser who had acquired assets in a bankruptcy sale free and clear
of "liens, claims and encumbrances" from successor liability to a tort claimant injured by a
product manufactured by the debtor and put into commerce prior to the sale. See, Lefever v. K.P.
Hovnanian Entemrises, Inc., 160 N.J. 307, 734 A.2d 290 (1999); Lemelle v. Universal Mfg.
Corp., 18 F.3d 1268 (5th Cir. 1994), reh'g. denied, Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d
1268 (5th Cir. 1994); Epstein v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of the Estate of Piper
Aircraft Corp. (In re Piper Aircraft Corp.), 168 B.R. 434 (S.D. Fla. 1994), affd, modified,
Epstein v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of the Estate of Piper Aircraft Corp. (In re
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Piper Aircraft Com.), 58 F.3d 1573 (11th Cir. 1995); Western Auto Supply Co. v. Savage Arms
(In re Savage Indus.), 43 F.3d 714 (1st Cir. 1994); Fairchild Aircraft Corp. v. Cambell (In re
Fairchild Aircraft Corp.), 184 B.R. 910 (Bankr. W.O. Tex. 1995) vacated on eguitable grounds
after settlement, 220 B.R. 909 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1998) (purchaser who acquired aircraft
manufacturing business in a sale free and clear pursuant to a Chapter 11 plan was not shielded
from successor liability for wrongful death or personal injury claims arising out of the postconfrrmation crash of an aircraft which had been manufactured prepetition where inadequate
steps were taken "to protect and provide for" the interests of such ''future claimants" in the plan,
such as the appointment of a "legal representative" in the bankruptcy proceedings). See also,
Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse Workers Union Pension Fund v. Tasemkin, Inc.,
59 F.3d 48 (7th Cir. 1995) (held, federal district court erred in holding that successor liability for
unpaid pension contributions of Chapter 7 debtor could not be imposed upon a corporation which
had purchased the debtor's assets because the acquisition occurred while the debtor was in
bankruptcy); R.C.M. Executive Gallery Com. v. Rolls Capital Co., 1995 WL 574654 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 25, 1995) (held, corporation which purchased assets of partnership pursuant to Chapter 11
plan was not insulated from successor liability for misrepresentation, fraud, usury and RICO
claims asserted by plaintiffs who had obtained an allegedly usurious loan from the partnership
prior to the bankruptcy); Royal Ins. Co. v. Smatco Indus., 201 B.R. 755 (E.D. La. 1996)
(purchase of assets through free and clear bankruptcy sale did not preclude imposition of
successor liability on purchaser); Zaretsky, "Successor Liability," N. Y. L. J. (Mar. 16, 1995), at
p.2. These decisions have raised doubt about the efficacy of using a bankruptcy sale free and
clear, whether under a Chapter 11 plan or in a Section 363 sale, to shield a purchaser from
successor liability for the debtor's pre-conveyance environmental debts.
5.
In several cases involving claims of other types, however, courts have
been willing to interpret the term "interest" in Section 363(t) broadly. See, e.g., WB o Ptnr. v.
Virginia Dep't of Medical Assistance Servs. (In re WB o Ptnr.), 189 B.R. 97 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1995), the court held that it could properly enjoin an agency of the Commonwealth of Virginia
from asserting a "statutory successor liability claim" for capital gain taxes against a corporation
which purchased the debtor's assets in a sale free and clear pursuant to Section 363(t) of the
Code. The purchasing corporation was owned by the manager of the debtor's nursing home
business. The court held that Virginia's right to assert a tax claim against the asset purchaser was
a species of "interest or charge on the [debtor's] property" for which the state could be compelled
to accept a "hypothetical" money satisfaction and it was, therefore, subject to divestiture pursuant
to Section 363(t). The court further held that under the Supremacy Clause, the court's power to
sell the assets free and clear took precedence over the tax claim and, therefore, the court could
properly enjoin the state from enforcing the claim against the purchaser pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 105(a). The same result was reached on similar facts in P.K.R. Convalescent Ctrs. v. Virginia
(In re P.K.R. Convalescent Ctrs.), 189 B.R. 90 (Bankr.E.D. Va. 1995). See also, In re Lady H.
Coal Co., 199 B.R. 595, 609 (S.D. W. Va. 1996) (buyer of debtors' assets free and clear under
Section 363(t) could take free of employee benefit claims); Virginia Dept of Med. Assistance
Servs v. Shenandoah Realty Partners, L.P. (In re Shenandoah Realty Partners, L.P.), 248 B.R.
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505 (W.O. Va. 2000) (buyer of debtor's nursing home assets in Section 363(t) sale could take
free of state law allowing agency to recapture depreciation payments made to debtor upon sale of
its assets for gain).
An entity whose rights or interests will be adversely affected by a Section
6.
363(t) sale must be given notice that comports with the fundamental requirements of due
process. Folger Adam Security, Inc. v. DeMatteislMacGregor N, 209 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2000)
(where debtor proposed to sell its assets, including accounts receivable, free and clear of all
"interests" pursuant to Section 363(t) and to thereby deprive its account debtors of their
contractual defenses, the notice of the sale given to an account debtor was constitutionally
inadequate because it failed to alert the account debtor that it might lose its contractual defenses
if it did not object to the sale).

7.
A purchaser may be able to negotiate an indemnity, but the value of such
an undertaking from a bankruptcy estate will be dubious unless the purchaser has obtained an
adequate indemnity escrow fund or the debtor is likely to emerge from Chapter 11 as a
fmancially viable reorganized entity and the debtor's indemnity obligation is "carved out" from
the bankruptcy discharge. See, e.g., In re Sterling Steel Treating, Inc., 94 B.R. 924 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1989) (bankruptcy court permitted purchaser to offset purchase price holdback against
claim of purchaser for reimbursement of costs of cleaning up hazardous wastes placed on the
property while the estate was owner).
8.
In Allen-Bradley Co. v. Commodore Business Machs. (In re Commodore
Business Machs.l, 180 B.R. 72 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995), the former owner of a contaminated site
which had incurred response costs pursuant to an administrative EPA cleanup order sought to
recover the costs by having a constructive trust imposed on a portion of the proceeds from the
sale of the assets by the bankruptcy estate. The court refused to impose a trust, fmding that the
estate was not unjustly enriched by the response costs which the claimant had incurred in order to
satisfy its own legal duties under CERCLA.
9.
Recently enacted state statutes and recent changes in regulatory
enforcement policy aimed at facilitating the development of environmentally contaminated sites
by new owners may enhance the prospects for disposing of such property through bankruptcy
sales.
10.
Various commentators, including this author, have proposed that the Code
be amended to explicitly permit the sale of property free and clear of successor liability claims.
See, National Bankruptcy Conference, Code Review Project, Reforming the Bankruptcy Code -Final Report, at 287 (Matthew Bender 1994). See also, Reed, "Interface of Environmental and
Bankruptcy Law, "Norton Annual Survey of Bankruptcy Law 1995/1996 Edition", at 765 (Clark
Boardman Callahan 1995).
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11.
Another issue on which the authorities are split is whether a purchaser of
assets in a sale free and clear should be permitted to seek injunctive relief in the bankruptcy court
to protect itself against successor liability claims asserted after the bankruptcy case is closed.
See, In re Paris Indus. Corp., 132 B.R. 504 (D. Me. 1991) (bankruptcy court which approved sale
may entertain such an action); Back v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 213 B.R. 633, 638
(S.D. N.Y. 1997) (bankruptcy court had "inherent jurisdiction" to enforce its orders by enjoining
state court successor liability actions against purchaser of debtor's assets). But see ZerandBernal Group v. Cox, 23 F.3d 159 (7th Cir. 1994) (bankruptcy court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction of such an action after plan was consummated).

F.

Abandonment of Contaminated Property

1.
Section 554 of the Code authorizes the trustee, subject to the court's
approval, after notice and a hearing, to abandon "any property of the estate that is burdensome to
the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate" 11 U.S.C.A. § 544(a)
(West 1993).
2.
Abandonment of contaminated property usually means that the public,
through the relevant enforcement agencies, will inherit the responsibility and some or all of the
cost of effecting any required remediation, an outcome clearly at variance with the policies and
objectives of the environmental laws.
3.
The proponent of a Chapter 11 plan may seek to separate and insulate the
debtor's "clean" assets and operations to be used in the reorganized business (hereinafter, the
"Clean Assets") from the operations and assets of the estate which are the sources of the debtor's
environmental liabilities (hereinafter, the "Contaminated Assets"). Continued ownership or
possession of Contaminated Assets after confmnation of a plan will expose the reorganized
debtor to new, post-confmnation environmental liabilities. See, Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274,
285, 83 L. Ed. 2d 649, 659-60, 105 S. Ct. 705, 711 (1985); In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d
997, 1008-9 (2d Cir. 1991); In re CMC Heartland Partners, 966 F.2d 1143, 1146-7 (7th Cir.
1992). A reorganized going concern that is freed from the cloud of its historical environmental
liabilities is likely to be a more viable entity. The estate may encounter difficulty, however, in
separating and insulating itself from liability for its Contaminated Assets.
4.
One method of "spinning off' the Contaminated Assets would be
abandonment of the assets pursuant to Section 554 of the Code. In Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New
Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 88 L. Ed. 2d 859, 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986), the
Supreme Court held that a trustee in bankruptcy may not abandon property pursuant to Section
554 of the Code "in contravention of state laws or regulations that are reasonably designed to
protect the public's health or safety." Id., at 507 (footnote omitted). The many court decisions
that have applied the rule of Midlantic usually have arisen in Chapter 7 or liquidating Chapter 11
cases. While the case law reflects mixed results, the bankruptcy courts have usually adopted a
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pragmatic approach, and they generally have been unwilling to saddle a cash poor estate with
clean-up costs absent a clear and imminent threat to public safety. See, e.g., In re St. Lawrence
Corp., 248 B.R. 734 (D.N.J. 2000) (trustee was authorized to abandon encumbered commercial
property in which debtor had no equity even though the trustee's abandonment, without
certification that there had been no discharge of hazardous substances at site, might violate New
Jersey environmental law); In re MCI, Inc., 151 B.R. 103 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (trustee having no
unencumbered assets to fmance clean up permitted to abandon property that did not present
imminent public health or safety threat); Department of Human Resources v. Witcosky In re
Allen Care Ctrs., 96 F.3d 1328 (9th Cir. 1996) (debtor permitted to abandon nursing home; state
not entitled to administrative claim for closure costs, including cost of patient transfer). Cf. In re
Reading Co., 115 F.3d 1111 (3d Cir. 1997).

G.

Adjudicating Disputes in the Bankruptcy Court vs. the
Administrative Agency Process
1.

Declaratorv Relief

(a)
The bankruptcy process places a premium upon the expeditious
and efficient resolution of disputes concerning the debtor's liability. One mechanism available
for the resolution of such disputes is a declaratory judgment action. Whether a declaratory
judgment concerning a debtor's future liability under CERCLA should be granted prior to EPA's
determination to bring an enforcement action against the debtor may depend upon the timing of
the request for declaratory relief in reference to the bankruptcy case.
(b)
In In re Combustion Equip. Assocs., Inc., 838 F.2d 35 (2d Cir.
1988), a company which had recently emerged from Chapter 11 pursuant to a confrrmed plan of
reorganization brought an action for a declaratory judgment as to whether its liability as a PRP
under CERCLA for response costs at certain landfills had been discharged pursuant to the order
of confrrmation. The Second Circuit held that the plaintiff's declaratory judgment action was not
yet ripe for review because the EPA had not yet decided whether to act, if at all, against the
plaintiff by ordering it to clean up the landfills. Noting that Congress had amended CERCLA in
1986 to clearly preclude pre-enforcement judicial review of EPA's liability determinations, the
Court held that the action had been properly dismissed, but the Court also pointed out that it
might have reached a different result if the debtor had sought similar relief during the bankruptcy
case as part of the reorganization process. Id., at 39-40.
(c)
In In re Chateaugay Corp, 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991), a more
recent case, the EPA and a state agency brought an action during the bankruptcy case (the
reference of which was withdrawn to the district court) seeking a declaratory judgment
concerning whether the agencies' enforcement rights were dischargeable claims under the Code.
The Second Circuit found that declaratory relief was appropriate, rejecting the EPA's contention
that the bankruptcy court's holding that unincurred CERCLA costs are bankruptcy claims
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violated CERCLA's prohibition of pre-enforcement judicial review. See, In re Chateaugay
Corp., 944 F.2d at 1002-6.

2.

Filing and Adjudicating Monetary Claims Against the. Estate

(a)
Under the police power exception, an agency may continue an
action or proceeding in a non-bankruptcy forum ''to fIX damages for violation of an
environmental protection law." H.R Rep. No. 595, at 343, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). See
also, United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 857 F.2d 202, 207-10 (3d Cir. 1984) (held, automatic stay
does not apply to action of governmental unit brought in federal district court to determine
liability of debtor for response costs under CERCLA even though action sought money judgment
for costs incurred in cleanup of contamination caused by debtor's pre-petition operations at its
hazardous waste site); Brock v. Morysville Body Works, Inc., 829 F.2d 383, 389 (3d Cir. 1987)
(held, automatic stay does not apply to action of governmental unit brought in the district court to
fIX damages for violations of health and safety law).
(b)
Sooner or later, however, regardless of where the claim is
"liquidated," an agency seeking to recover response costs from the debtor's estate will have to
fue the claim with the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy claim filing and allowance process can
sometimes present significant practical difficulties for environmental claimants:
(i)
In order for its claim to be allowed against the bankruptcy
estate, a creditor must fue a proof of claim with the bankruptcy court, with the exception that, in
a Chapter 11 case, a creditor's claim shall be "deemed fued" if the claim is listed in the debtor's
schedules and is not characterized therein as being disputed, contingent or unliquidated. See,
11 U.S.C.A. §§ 502(a), 1111(a) (West 1993).
(ii)
Subject to certain limitations in the case of individual
debtors and subject to the giving of such notice to the claimant as is required to comport with the
minimum requirements of procedural due process, the debtor's liability on a claim will be
discharged upon confmnation of a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization whether or not a proof of
claim for such claim is fuedor deemed fued under the Code. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1141(d)(I)(A)(i)
(West 1993).

For several years after the Supreme Court rendered its
decision in Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 83 L. Ed. 2d 649, 105 S. Ct. 705 (1985), many
environmental enforcement agencies were concerned that by filing a proof of claim with the
bankruptcy court they would be deemed to have made an election of remedies, thereby having
monetized their rights and waived any right that the enforcing agency might otherwise have to
enforce compliance with the applicable environmental law through equitable remedies. In LTV's
initial Chapter 11 bankruptcy case (fued in 1987), the EPA and the state environmental agencies
grappled with this dilemma after receiving a notice that all pre-petition claims would have to be
(iii)
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filed by the claims bar date of November 30, 1987 or be ''forever barred." The bar date order and
bar date notice made specific reference to environmental liabilities. All of the agencies
eventually [tled one or more proofs of claim, some for specific dollar amounts, some in an
''unliquidated amount," some "in the alternative," and some containing a combination of the
foregoing features. Similar notices have been sent in other large industrial bankruptcy cases.
See, e.g., the special procedures for notifying environmental claimants proposed by the debtors in
the Chapter 11 bankruptcy case of Armstrong World Industries as reported in Armstrong
Bankruptcy News (June 18, 2001).
(iv)
Large business debtors such as LTV Steel Co. which have
operated for many years at many different sites, present an especially difficult practical problem
for environmental claimants, particularly enforcement agencies, who are confronted with the
necessity to ftle bankruptcy claims.' It may be impossible or impracticable for an agency to assess
all of the debtor's actual or potential environmental liabilities incurred over several decades at
many geographically dispersed sites which mayor may not have been owned or occupied by the
debtor, may have been sold pre-petition and may contain environmental hazards unknown to
even the debtor but for which the debtor is responsible. In such circumstances, the agency may
nevertheless be deemed to have had sufficient notice or knowledge of the debtor's potential
liability to have all of its potential future response cost reimbursement claims deemed susceptible
to discharge under the Code. See, e.g., In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d at 1005-6.
Furthermore, the "knowledge" or "notice" of one state agency may be imputed to another agency
of the same state. See, In re Jensen, 995 F.2d 925, 931 (9th Cir. 1993).
(v)
In order to achieve an equitable allocation of liability for
response costs among responsible parties, CERCLA provides for contribution among PRPs. See
Section 113(t)(I) ofCERCLA which authorizes any person liable for response costs under
CERCLA to seek contribution from other responsible parties as to costs paid in excess of its
equitable share. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(t)(I) (West 1995). The disallowance of contingent
contribution claims pursuant to Section 502(e) of the Code may run counter to this goal. A coPRP's pre-petition claim against the debtor for indemnity or contribution will be disallowed
under Section 502(e)(I)(B) of the Code so long as it is contingent (i.e., unpaid by the co-PRP).
11 U.S.C.A. § 502(e)(I)(B) (West 1993). See In re Charter Co., 862 F.2d 1500 (11th Cir. 1989);
In re Eagle-Picher Indus., 144 B.R. 765 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992), aff'd, In re Eagle Picher Indus.,
164 B.R. 265 (S.D. Ohio 1994). Compare the foregoing authorities with In re Hemingway
Transp., 993 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, Kahn v. Juniper Dev. Group, 510 U.S. 914,
114 S. Ct. 303, 126 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1993), (held, that where EPA fails to file a claim for future
response costs, the debtor or the trustee in bankruptcy should be required to ftle a "surrogate
claim" for the agency under Code § 501(c) in order to set aside funds from the bankruptcy estate
for cleanup representing the debtor's CERCLA liability; the non-debtor PRP should also be
permitted to ftle a surrogate claim under Code § 501(b); if no direct or surrogate claim is ftled for
the EPA, then any objection to a co-PRP's contingent contribution claim based upon Code
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§ 502(e)(I)(B) should be dismissed and the co-PRP's claim should be allowed and estimated
under Code §502(c».
(vi)
The debtor may also seek to have the bankruptcy court
estimate the agency's future response costs claims under Section 502(c) of the Code, a prospect
which may be unattractive to the agency because of cases such as Bittner v. Borne Chern. Co.,
691 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1982) (held, bankruptcy court did not err in estimating the value of a
contingent claim at zero pending the resolution of state court litigation rather than basing the
estimation of the claim on an assessment of the probable outcome of the state court action),
particularly in view of the practical difficulties discussed in subparagraph (d) above. The agency
may prefer to seek to have the debtor's liability liquidated in a non-bankruptcy forum. See, e.g.,
Nicolet, 857 F.2d at 207-10 (held, automatic stay does not apply to action of governmental unit
brought in federal district court to determine liability of debtor for response costs under
CERCLA even though action sought money judgment for costs incurred in cleanup of
contamination caused by debtor's pre-petition operations at its hazardous waste site); Brock v.
Morysville Body Works, 829 F.2d 383, 389 (3d Cir. 1987) (held, automatic stay does not apply
to action of governmental unit brought in the district court to fIX damages for violations of health
and safety law).
(vii) In Envirodyne Indus. v. Viskase Corp. (In re Envirodyne
Indus.), 183 B.R. 812 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995), afterconfmnationofitsChapter 11 plan, the
debtor ftIed an objection and a counterclaim against a creditor which had flied a proof of claim.
The objection and counterclaim were based upon the debtor's alleged claim for contribution to
environmental response costs incurred by the debtor at a site which had been sold by the creditor
to the debtor prepetition. The creditor asserted that the debtor's objection and counterclaim were
barred, inter alia, by principles of estoppel because the debtor had failed to disclose the existence
of the claim prior to confmnation of the plan. The court rejected the creditor's estoppel
argument but granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the creditor on that portion of the
creditor's claim which had been listed in the debtor's schedules as liquidated, non-contingent and
undisputed, because that amount was deemed an "allowed claim" under the plan and,
accordingly, could not be objected to after confrrmation.
(viii) In Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick
Associates Limited Partnership, 507 u.S. 380, 395, 113 Sup. Ct. 1489, 123 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1993),
the Supreme Court established the standard for demonstrating "excusable neglect" for purposes
of determining whether a claimant should be permitted to ftIe a late bankruptcy claim. In Jones
v. Chemetron Corp., 212 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2000), the Third Circuit held that claimants seeking
monetary damages and other relieve for injuries allegedly sustained from exposure to radioactive
and other toxic and hazardous substances deposited by the debtor at a site located in their
residential neighborhood who had waited until four years after the claims bar date and two years
after the debtor's plan was confumed to attempt to ftIe late proofs of claim did not demonstrate
requisite "excusable neglect" in order to flie late claims. See also, Fogel v. Zell, 221 F.3d 955
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(7th Cir. 2000) (municipality which the trustee could have readily identified as a creditor of the
estate was entitled to actual notice of bar date, rather than publication notice; accordingly,
municipality was entitled to file a late claim).
(ix)
One technique that has been utilized to reconcile the
interests of environmental enforcement agencies and debtors is the establishment of a special
extended proof of claim bar date for environmental claimants. See, for example, the stipulation
between the debtor and the EPA in In re Armstrong World Industries, Inc. Case No. 0004471(JJF) (D.Del.), attached hereto as Exhibit "A."

H.

The Bankruptcy Discharee

1.
Both the reorganization and liquidation chapters of the Code provide for a
comprehensive discharge of the debtor's existing debts. See, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 727, 1141, 1228(a),
1228(b), 1328(a), 1328(b) (West 1993 & Supp. 2001). The comprehensive bankruptcy discharge
is intended to enable the debtor to obtain a ''fresh start" in its post-bankruptcy business or
fmancial affairs. In re Chicago, M., S.P. & Pac. R., 3 F.3d 200, 201 (7th Cir. 1993) (hereinafter,
"Chicago, Milwaukee II"); In re Taylor, 3 F.3d 1512, 1516 (11th Cir. 1993), reh'g, en banc,
denied, In re Taylor, 11 F.3d 169 (11th Cir. 1993); K. Heidt, Environmental Obligations in
Bankruptcy (Warren Gorham Lamont 1994), at 11 1.01-2.05.
2.
The comprehensive discharge provisions of the Code are complemented
by the Code's broad defmition of the term "claim":
(A)
right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fIXed, contingent, matured,
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or
unsecured; or
(B)
right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if
such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such
right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fIXed,
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or
'unsecured;
11 U.S.C.A § 101(5) (West 1993).
3.
In recent years, a number of courts have grappled with the thorny issues of
whether and when a debtor's obligations under the environmental laws constitute "claims" within
the defmition of Section 101(5) of the Code which are dischargeable under a Chapter 11 plan of
reorganization pursuant to Section 1141 of the Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 1141 (West 1993):
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(a)
There is general agreement that, in addition to the conduct of the
debtor or other circumstances (e.g., ownership of property) giving rise to the debtor's liability, a
necessary predicate to the existence of an environmental bankruptcy claim is that a "release or
threatened release of hazardous substances" or the equivalent thereof have occurred. See In re
Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991) (the EPA's contingent right under CERCLA to
recover unincurred response costs attributable to pre-petition releases of threatened releases of
hazardous substances is a claim dischargeable under a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization); In re
Chicago, M. & St.P. & Pac. R.R., 974 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1992) (hereinafter, "Chicago,
Milwaukee I") (state agency's right to recover response costs under CERCLA was a claim
discharged upon confrrmation of the debtor railroad's plan of reorganization under Section 77 of
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 where, prior to entry of the reorganization court's consummation
order, the agency had sufficient knowledge of contamination and knew that the debtor was a
potentially responsible party). See also, Louisiana Dep't of Envtl. Quality v. Crystal Oil Co. (In
re Crystal Oil Co.), 158 F.3d 291, 296 (5th Cir. 1998) (adopting 7th Circuit's Chicago,
Milwaukee I test, the 5th Circuit held that, for bankruptcy purposes, a regulatory environmental
claim arises when the potential claimant can tie the bankruptcy debtor to a known release of a
hazardous substance).
(b)
Some courts have held that the prospect of a breached legal duty
must have been ''fairly within the contemplation of the parties" at the time of the bankruptcy in
order for a "claim" to have arisen. See, In re CMC Heartland Partners, 966 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir.
1992); Hexcel Corp. v. Stepan Co. (In re Hexcel Corp.), 239 B.R. 564 (N.D. Cal. 1999); In re
National Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397 (N.D. Tex. 1992); Reynolds Bros. v. Texaco, Inc., 420
Mass. 115, 647 N.E.2d 1205 (1995); United States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal, 123 B.R. 831
(D. Minn. 1990); California Dep't of Health Servs. v. Jensen (In re Jensen), 995 F.2d 925 (9th
Cir. 1993); NCL Corp. v. Lone Star Bldg. Ctrs., Inc., 144 B.R. 170 (S.D. Fla. 1992). Cf.
Sylvester Bros. Dev. Co. v. Burlington N.R.R., 133 B.R. 648 (D. Minn. 1991) (debtor's liability
for response costs was not discharged even though liability was based upon a pre-confrrmation
release, the agency knew of the contamination and it knew that the debtor was a PRP prior to
confrrmation of the plan).
(c)
In one decision involving section 77 of the former Bankruptcy Act,
the Third Circuit held that claimants seeking indemnity or contribution from a reorganized debtor
for its alleged participation in a prepetition antitrust conspiracy were not barred by the section 77
discharge order because when the order was entered, they did not have "a legal relationship [with
the debtor] relevant to the purported [claim] from which [a dischargeable claim could] flow...."
See, In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 71 F.3d 1113, 1116 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, American
Premier Underwriters v. USX Corp., 517 u.s. 1221, 134 L.Ed.2d 951, 116 S. Ct. 1851 (1996).
But see, In re Reading Co., 115 F.3d 1111 (3d Cir. 1997) (although claim for contribution under
CERCLA held by successor to debtor that had reorganized under section 77 of Bankruptcy Act
was not discharged as a result of the debtor's reorganization, successor's claim was barred as a
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matter of law because the United States' direct claim against the debtor under CERCLA was
discharged).
(d)
In one decision, however, the court held that the putative
claimant's lack of knowledge of the release or threatened release did not preclude the existence
of a bankruptcy claim. See, Texaco Inc. v. Sanders (In re Texaco Inc.), 182 B.R. 937 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1995). In Texaco, various private landowners fued a state court action against Texaco
after it emerged from Chapter 11 seeking damages for groundwater contamination allegedly
caused by the migration of contaminants from water storage pits which had been constructed by
Texaco or its predecessor prior to Texaco's bankruptcy. On Texaco's motion, the bankruptcy
court enjoined the action on the grounds that the claims asserted had been discharged under
Texaco's Chapter 11 plan even though the contamination was unmanifested at the surface and
the landowners had no knowledge of the contamination at that time. Because"~ of the physical
events required to establish the elements of causation and damage" had occurred prior to
confmnation of the plan and the contamination "could have been detected and reasonably
quantified or evaluated" by testing, the claims arose prior to confmnation and were discharged.
182 B.R. at 952-7. Texaco's plan had waived the bankruptcy discharge as to governmental
environmental claims but not as to private environmental claims.
(e)
The courts have disagreed ·on whether the injunctive remedies of
environmental enforcement agencies are claims. See, In re Torwico Elecs., 8 F.3d 146 (3d Cir.
1993), cert. denied, Torwico Elecs. v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection & Energy, 511 U.S.
1046, 128 L. Ed. 2d 219, 114 S. Ct. 1576 (1994) (the New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection and Energy's administrative order directing a corporate debtor to remediate a site
contaminated- by the pre-petition manufacturing operations at the site of the debtor, as a lessee,
was not a claim susceptible to discharge under the Code, even though the debtor was no longer in
possession of the site; the debtor's liability to abate any ongoing pollution that it created at the
site as a lessee "ran with the wastes"). Cf. Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Continental Airlines (In re
Continental Airlines), 125 F.3d 120, 132-3 (3d Cir. 1997) (equitable remedy of seniority
integration under collective bargaining agreement was a "claim" held by pilots because monetary
payment was a viable alternative remedy). Compare Torwico, supra with, United States v.
Whizco, Inc., 841 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1988) (to the extent that the debtor, a former coal mine
operator, would have to spend money to comply with an injunction directing the debtor to
reclaim a mining site abandoned by the debtor prior to his subsequent bankruptcy, was a claim
discharged in the debtor's bankruptcy) and In re Ben Franklin Hotel Assocs., 186 F.3d 301 (3d
Cir. 1999) (former general partner's equitable demand for reinstatement of its partnership interest
in debtor was not a "claim" discharged in debtor's bankruptcy case). See also, discussion in
paragraph H(4)(e), (t) infra.
(t)
Notice of the bankruptcy discharge must comport with
fundamental principles of due process. See, e.g., Jones v. Chemetron Corp., 212 F.3d 199 (3d
Cir. 2000), the Third Circuit held that a potential toxic tort claimant who had not even been born
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prior to the expiration of the claims bar date was not, as. a matter of due process, precluded from
pursuing her claims against the debtor by virtue of the debtor's Chapter 11 discharge; In re Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 96 F.3d 687 (3d Cir. 1996) (creditors' postpetition defamation claims
against debtor were not discharged pursuant to the debtor's Chapter 11 plan of reorganization
due to lack of notice to the creditors, whose i.dentities and whereabouts were known to the
debtor, of the confrrmation hearing).
4.

Some general principles have emerged from the caselaw:

(a)
Response costs incurred and penalties assessed prior to bankruptcy
will be treated as dischargeable unsecured pre-petition claims. See, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101(5), 1141
(West 1993). See also, In re Chateaugay Com., 112 B.R. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), later proceeding
In re Chateaugay Com., 1991 u.s. LEXIS 5242 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), and aff'd 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir.
1991).
(b)
A threshold requirement for a contingent claim for the recovery of
future environmental response costs to be deemed to "arise" under the Code is the occurrence of
a "release or threatened release of hazardous substances" caused by the debtor or for which the
debtor is otherwise legally accountable. In re Chateaugay Com., 997 F.2d at 1005; Chicago,
Milwaukee 1,974 F.2d at 785-86.
(c)
In order for a contingent claim for the recovery of future
environmental response costs to be dischargeable in bankruptcy, it may also be necessary to
establish that the claimant had sufficient knowledge or notice of the "release or threatened
release" in order to effectively assert its rights in the bankruptcy case in a timely manner. See,
Chicago, Milwaukee I, 974 F.2d at 787; In re National Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 407-9. But see,
Texaco Inc. v. Sanders, 182 B.R. at 952-57. But see, In re Reading Co., 900 F. Supp. 738 (E.D.
Pa. 1995), affrrmed, 115 F.3d 1111 (3d Cir. 1997).
(d)
In order for a contingent claim for the recovery of future
environmental response costs to be dischargeable in bankruptcy, it may also be necessary to
establish that the claimant had sufficient knowledge or notice that the debtor was a potentially
responsible party with respect to the environmental hazard in order to effectively assert its rights
in the bankruptcy case in a timely manner. See, Chicago, Milwaukee I, 974 F.2d at 788; Ninth
Ave. Remedial Group v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 195 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. Ind. 1996); In re National
Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 409; AM Int'l, Inc. v. Data Card Corp., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9372 (N.D.
Ill. 1992), adopted, partial summ. judgment granted, in part, partial summ. judgment denied, in
part, AM Int'l v. Data Card Corp. 146 B.R. 391 (N.D. Ill. 1992); U.S. v. Union Scrap Iron &
Metal, 123 B.R. at 835-9. But, see, Texaco Inc. v. Sanders, 182 B.R. at 952-8, and In re Reading
Co., 900 F. Supp. 738 (E.D. Pa. 1995), affumed, 115 F.3d 1111 (3d Cir. 1997).
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(e)
It has been held that the right of an enforcement agency to order a
debtor to perform remedial work or to obtain a court injunction to compel the debtor to do so is a
claim that can be discharged in bankruptcy if the purpose of the order or injunction is solely to
"remove ... wastes that are not currently causing pollution," but if the purpose of the order or
injunction is to "end or ameliorate current pollution" to any extent, then the order or injunction is
not a "claim" under Section 101(5) of the Code and, i! fortiori, the order or injunction will not
constitute a dischargeable claim under Section 1141 of the Code. See In re Chateaugay Corp.,
944 F.2d at 1006-9; 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101(5), 1141 (West 1993). But see U.S. v. Whizco, 841
F.2d at 150-1.
(t)
In Torwico, the Third Circuit, following and extending Chateaugay
and CMC Heartland Partners, held that a debtor's duty to abate ongoing pollution caused by the
debtor's pre-discharge conduct may not only be nondischargeable under the Code but may "run
with the wastes" even when the post-conftrrnation debtor does not own the site and is not in
possession of the site. See, In re Torwico Elecs., F.3d at 151. See also, Heidt, "Undermining
Bankruptcy Law and Policy: Torwico Electronics, Inc. v. New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection," 56 PittL. Rev. 627 (1995).

(g)
Environmental claims based upon statutes enacted after a debtor
receives a bankruptcy discharge generally will not be affected by the discharge. See, In re Penn
Cent. Transp. Co., 944 F.2d 164, 168 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 906, 112 S. Ct. 1262,
117 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1992); Cf. In re Duplan Corp., 212 F.2d 144, 151-53 (2d Cir. 2000) (where
debtor's reorganization plan under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act excluded postpetition
administrative claims from the scope of the discharge, claims for response costs under CERCLA,
which was enacted after the debtor's petition was ftled but before it emerged from bankruptcy,
were not discharged but assumed by the reorganized debtor). However, such claims may be
barred where the type of liability imposed by the new statute is the same as liability imposed
under another statute which was in effect in the jurisdiction at the time of the bankruptcy
discharge. See, Chicago, Milwaukee II, 3 F.3d at 208. On remand from the Seventh Circuit in
Chicago, Milwaukee II, the district court afftrrned a magistrate's fmding that a private claim for
indemnification asserted under a state statute against the successor of a debtor railroad company
which had received a discharge under the former Bankruptcy Act was not cut off by the
bankruptcy discharge because the state statute had been enacted after the discharge order was
entered and it created a "type of liability" that differed from the liabilities imposed upon the
debtor by the state statutes which were in effect at the time the discharge order was entered. See,
In re Chicago, M. & St.P. & Pac. R.R.Co., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18570 [*6] - [*28] (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 29, 1994), mot. denied, request denied, In re Chicago, M.St.P. & Pac. R.R., 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10060 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 1995).
(h) In In re Reading Co., 900 F. Supp. 738 (E.D. Pa. 1995), afftrrned,
115 F.3d 1111 (3d eir. 1997), a federal district court held that a claim asserted in 1991 by the
United States to recover incurred and future response costs under CERCLA against the successor
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to the old Reading Railroad Company (the "Debtor") was barred by the railroad reorganization
court's December 31,1980 consummation order under Section 77 of the former Bankruptcy Act
even though CERCLA had been enacted only twenty (20) days prior to the entry of the
consummation order. Compare Reading Co. with In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 71 F.3d 1113,
1116 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, American Premier Underwriters v. USX Corp., 517 U.S. 1221,
134 L. Ed. 2d 951, 116 S. Ct. 1851 (1996).
(i)
A debtor's successor by merger is not liable for environmental debts
of the debtor that were discharged pursuant to debtor's Chapter 11 plan prior to the merger. See,
In re Chicago, Rock Island and Pac. R.R. Co., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19455 (N.D. Ill., Dec. 7,
1999) (debtor's successor by merger was not liable for CERCLA debts previously discharged in
bankruptcy). Similarly, a claim for contractual indemnification against environmental liability
brought against a company after it receives a Chapter 11 bankruptcy discharge will be barred if
the contract was entered into prior to the company's bankruptcy filing, even though the claim is
based upon an environmental statute enacted after the company received its bankruptcy
discharge. See, Olin Corp. v. Riverwood Int'l (In re Manville Prods.), 209 F.3d 125 (2d Cir.
2000) (a claim for contractual indemnification against environmental liability brought against the
legal successor to a company that had previously received a Chapter 11 discharge based upon a
prepetition indemnification agreement between the debtor and the creditor was a "contingent
claim" discharged by the Chapter 11 confrrmation order even though liability was based upon a
~tatute enacted after the debtor emerged from bankruptcy).
(1)
Notice of the bankruptcy discharge must comport with
fundamental principles of due process. See, cases cited in paragraph H(3)(t) supra.

5.
A debtor's pre-confrrmation obligations under the environmental laws
(which may be dischargeable claims) must be distinguished from the obligations which may arise
anew under such laws if the debtor continues to own or possess the contaminated property after
confrrmation of the plan. See, Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 285, 83 L. Ed. 2d 649, 659-60, 105
S. Ct. 705, 711 (1985); In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 1008-9; In re CMC Heartland Partners,
966 F.2d at 1146-7; Chicago, Milwaukee I, 974 F.2d at 783. See also, Industrial Salvage v.
Illinois (In re Industrial Salvage), 196 B.R. 784, 789-90 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1996).

I.

Channeling Injunctions and Nondebtor Releases

1.
Two increasingly common features of reorganization plans are the socalled "channeling injunction" and nondebtor releases. These mechanisms are usually seen in
plans under which the plan proponent seeks to (i) insulate nondebtor entities that are making
substantial fmancial contributions to the reorganization plan from future liability for debts shared
with or related to the debtor or (li) insulate from liability for the debts of the debtor a transferee
of property under the reorganization plan that is supposed to operate free and clear of such debts
in the future. See, e.g., New National Gmsum Co. v. National Gmsum Co. Settlement Trust (In
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re National Gjpsum Co.), 219 F.3d 478 (5th Cir., 2000) (where trust created pursuant to debtor's
confrrmed Chapter 11 plan to pay asbestos-related claims arising from the debtor's torts sued for
a declaratory judgment as to whether a new entity created under the plan to p~rchase a portion of
the debtor's assets was liable for any unknown asbestos disease claims that were not resolved by
the trust, it was held that the plan and confrrmation order provided that the new entity would be
liable for unknown claims not satisfied by the trust only to the extent provided under nonbankruptcy, successor liability law, and the entity was not a de facto reorganized debtor). See
also, In re Dow Corning Com., 256 B.R. 445 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (in case involving debtor that
manufactured silicon-based products, the bankruptcy court had authority to issue permanent
third-party injunction, in connection with confrrmation of debtor's Chapter 11 plan, to prevent
creditors, even those wh voted against the debtor's plan, from trying to recover from debtor's
shareholders or settling insurers on products liability claims, where shareholders and insurers
would make important contributions to the debtor's reorganization, release and injunction
provisions were essential to debtor's reorganization, large majority of creditors impacted by
release and injunction provisions had approved plan, there was a close connection between the
creditors' claims against the debtor and their claims against the shareholders and insurers, and the
plan provided for payment of all claims affected by the release and injunction provisions of the
plan).
2.
In In re Continental Airlines, 203 F.3d 203, 217 (3rd Cir., 2000), the
debtor proposed a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization pursuant to which claims asserted by the
debtor's shareholders in lawsuits they had ftIed against the debtor's officers and directors were to
be released and permanently enjoined. The shareholders objected to confrrmation of the plan.
The bankruptcy court confrrmed the plan over the shareholders' objections and the district court
affrrmed. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the releases and injunction that purported to
bar the shareholders' claims against the directors and officers were invalid. The court held that
assuming, arguendo, that the bankruptcy court otherwise had the power to approve a plan of
reorganization containing such releases and injunctive provisions, the record in the case before
the court did not support such relief:
In summary, we fmd, based on the record before us, that the
Bankruptcy Court and District Court lacked sufficient evidentiary
and legal basis to authorize the release and permanent injunction of
Plaintiff's claims under any of the standards adopted by the courts
that have evaluated non-debtor releases and permanent injunctions.
Under these circumstances, the release and permanent injunction
amounted to nothing more than a lockstep discharge of non-debtor
liability and falls squarely into the Section 524(e) prohibition.
203 F.3d at 217.

F· 25

3.
The proponent of a plan involving a debtor with environmental liabilities
might seek to utilize a channeling injunction and/or nondebtor releases to insulate nondebtor
entities making substantial contributions to the reorganization from environmental liabilities to
which the nondebtors might otherwise be subject by reason of their involvement with the debtor.
4.
However, the authority of a bankruptcy court to insulate a nondebtor from
liability under a state or federal environmental statute as part of the plan confirmation process is
doubtful. See~, Southern Pacific Transportation Company v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups,
Inc., 252 B.R. 373, 383-85 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (bankruptcy court, not being an Article III court,
lacked authority, as part of plan confrrmation process, to approve and then issue mandatory
injunctions implementing debtor's settlement with state of claims arising under CERCLA where
court was required to determine, inter alia, whether the settlement was fair to other potentially
responsible persons against whom the state may have outstanding claims.)

J.

Settlements and Voluntary Cleanups

1.
The settlement mechanism is a tool used with increasing frequency to
resolve environmental compliance disputes in bankruptcy cases.
2.
A small sampling of the many bankruptcy cases in which major
environmental settlements occurred include the following:
(a)
In re Chateaugay Corp. et at, Case Nos. 86 B 11270
(BRL)-86 B 11334 (BRL), 86 B 11402 (BRL) and 86 B 11270
(BRL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), settlements with EPA and various states
approved during May, 1993 (LTV Corp. settlements).
(b)
In re D.E. Sys., Inc., No. 01-32791-HCD, 1992
W.L. 472113 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. Sept. 28, 1992) (Uniroyal Plastics
settlement).
(c)
New York v. SCA Servs., 36 Env't. Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1439 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
3.
A Chapter 11 debtor operating a business will often fmd it more prudent
to participate in "voluntary" cleanup programs than to take an "adversarial" approach with
enforcement agencies. See, e.g., "Armstrong World Wants to Join Cleanup Program at Plant,"
The Daily Bankruptcy Review (June 14, 2001), at 11 (reporting on motion fued by Armstrong
World Industries, Inc., a Chapter 11 debtor to obtain bankruptcy court authorization for it to sign
up to participate in a voluntary environmental cleanup program at one of its plants).
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K.

Recent Statutory and Regulatory Changes Designed to Facilitate the
Development of Contaminated Sites and to Protect Fiduciaries and
Lienholders

1.
The reluctance of private developers to acquire property affected by
environmental contamination because of the risk of incurring liability under the environmental
laws for hazardous conditions created by prior owners or operators is a growing impediment to
economic development. In addition, concerns about incurring liability for existing environmental
contamination has impeded fiduciaries and lienholders from taking actions with respect to
property which would otherwise be prudently taken in the ordinary course of discharging their
fiduciary duties or protecting their security interests.
2.
Legislative and regulatory developments addressing these concerns have
occurred at both the federal and state levels. Examples include:
(a)
In 1996, CERCLA was amended to create a "safe harbor" that
limits the. liability of a ''fiduciary'' that acquires ownership or control of contaminated property
"in a fiduciary capacity" to the "assets held in the fiduciary capacity." See, Pub. L. 104-208, Div.
A, Tit. II, § 2502(a), 110 Stat. 3009-462, effective Sept. 30, 1996, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(n) (West
Supp.2oo0). There have been only a few reported cases under section 9607(n) since its
enactment. In one case, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the "negligence exception" to the safe
harbor, which is codified in section 9607(n)(3). See, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(n)(3) (West Supp.
2000); Canadyne - Georgia Corp. v. NationsBank, N.A., 183 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 1999).
The defmed term ''fiduciary'' presumably would include a bankruptcy trustee. It is uncertain,
however, whether it would include a "debtor-in-possession", which, for most purposes, is
deemed the equivalent of a trustee under the Code and clearly acts "in a fiduciary capacity". See
11 U.S.C.A. § 1107(a) (West 2000). Also, query whether, by stating that a fiduciary's a liability
"shall not exceed the assets held in a fiduciary capacity", section 9607(n) might be cited as
providing additional substantive authority for requiring a bankruptcy trustee to use the assets of a
bankruptcy estate to fund environmental cleanup? For a general discussion of the liability of
fiduciaries under the environmental laws, see, Marchetti, K. and Fitzsimmons, J.F., ''Trustee,
Executor and Fiduciary Liability for Environmental Contamination in New Jersey," 21 Seton
Hall Legis. 1. 347 (1997).
(b)
The Pennsylvania Economic Development Agency and Lender
Environmental Liability Protection Act, 1995 Pa. S.B. 11 (enacted May 19, 1995) (limits
environmental liability for economic development agencies, fmanciers and fiduciaries).
(c)
On April 25, 2001, the U.S. Senate voted 99-0 for Senate Bill 350,
which was described as bipartisan legislation to help transform thousands of "mildly
cOlltaminated", abandoned "brownfields" sites into productive, tax-generating properties. See,
"Senate Overwhelmingly Approves Brownfields Recycling Bill; S. 350 Would Ease Real Estate
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Liability, Provide Economic and Environmental Benefits," PR Newswire (April 25, 2001); s.
350, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001); S. Rep. No. 107-2, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001); 147 Cong.
Rec. SI481-93, S3879-3912 (dailyed. Feb. 15, April 25, 2001) Senate Bill 350, would "ease real
estate owners' and prospective purchasers' environmental cleanup liability under [CERCLA] ...
including the liability that faces landowners whose properties become contaminated by pollution
migrating from adjacent sites. Importantly, S. 350 also would provide real estate owners with a
greater sense of "fmality" on voluntary brownfields cleanup projects approved by state
authorities. Additionally, the bill would provide some fmancial incentives for the investigation
and remediation of these types of sites." Id. Key House lawmakers were reported to be looking
to use S. 350 as a starting point for House brownfields legislation. Id.
3.
See generally, Vasiliades, K.X., ''Encouraging Industry in Order to
Preserve Non-Commercial Property," 9 Ville Envtl. L. !. 29 (1993).
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EXHffiITA

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

lnre

)
)

Chapter 11

ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES, INC.,
et al.,
-

)
)

Case No. 00-4471 (JJF)

) Objection Deadline: 9/5/01 at 4:00 p.m.
) Hearing Date: 9/20/01 at 12:30 p.m.

Debtors.

STIPULATION AND ORDER EXTENDING
BAR DATE FOR CLAIMS OF THE UNITED STATES
ENVIRONl\'IENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND
THE FEDERAL NATURAL RESOURCE TRUSTEES

RECITALS:
A.

On December 6 t 2000, Annstrong World Industries, Inc. ("A wr'),

and two of its affiliates, Nitram Liquidators, Inc. and Desseaux Corporation of North
America (collectively, the "Debtors"), each commenced a case under chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code. The Debtors continue to operate their business and manage their
properties as debtors in possession pursuant.to sections 1107(a) and 1108 of the

Bankruptcy Code.
B.

Pursuant to an order of the Court dated April 18, 2001 (the "Bar

Date Order"), August 31, 2001 (the "Claims Bar Date") was set as the last date by which
certain prepetition claims must be filed in the Debtors' chapter 11 cases, including claims
held by the United States Environmental Protection Agency and the Federal Natural

Resource Trustees (the ''United States").
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c.

The United States has requested an extension of the Claims Bar

Date to December 18,2001 with respect to any claims of the United States.
D.

The Debtors, subject to the Court's approval, have agreed to such

request.
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AGREEMENT
Solely with respect to the United States, ,the Claims Bar Date shall be
extended to December 18, 2001, at 5:00 p.m. Eastern time. All other provisions of the

Bar Date Order shall remain in full force and effect.
Dated: August..\.!.L' 2001

For

..

t~e.
United St~tes,.../ .\
. .
" .' : !
,

t

v=
~C.~

\ \ \ ,i.
,

" . '

'._~-~

Mark D Collins (No. 2981)
Deborah Spivak (no. 3220)
Rebecca L. Booth (No. 4031)
RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER
One Rodney Square

Ellen lights
Assistant United State ~ttomey
1201 Market Street
Suite 1100, P.O. Box 2046
Wilmington, DE 19899
Telephone: (302) 573-6277

P.O. Box 551
Wilmington, DE 19899
(302) 658-6541
and

and
David E. Street

Stephen Karotkin

Environmental Enforcement Section

Debra A. Dandeneau

United States Department of Justice
P.O. Box 7611

WElL, GOTSHAL & MANGES, LLP
767 Fifth Avenue

Ben Franklin Station

New York, NY 10153

Washington, D.C. 10044
(202) 514-5471

(212) 310-8000

SO ORDERED this _ _ day
of

,2001

Honorable Joseph J. Farnan, Jr.
United States District Court Judge
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For the past several years, and to an even more heightened degree in the past several months,
much of the attention in the bankruptcy arena has been centered on legislative developments. The
House and Senate have each passed their own versions of bankruptcy reform legislation, and they
are now in the early stages of a conference to attempt to resolve the differences in the two versions
of the bills. Of course, the events of September 11, 2001, have properly moved bankruptcy reform
to a secondary status in the Congress as a number of legislative developments relating to the tragedy
have taken precedence. It also appears that the economic impact of the terrorist strike may cause
Congress to reevaluate the propriety of bankruptcy reform at this time.

THE LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT
In the meantime, Congress has not been completely inactive in the area ofbankruptcy reform.
On December 21, 2000, Public Law No. 106-554 was enacted. This law amends the Bankruptcy
Code in several places, including § 109 on eligibility. The change makes an uninsured state member
bank or corporation organized under § 25A of the Federal Reserve Act that operates a multilateral
clearing organization eligible to be a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code. Importantly, however, such
an entity may be a debtor only if the petition for relief is fued at the direction of the Governors of
the Federal Reserve System. It essentially creates a new category of debtors under the Code. The
law generally created a new Subchapter V entitled "Clearing Bank Liquidation" in Chapter 7.
Sections 781-784 essentially provide that the conservator or receiver who fues a petition is the
trustee in the Chapter 7 case of the clearing bank. (There are proposed amendments to the
Bankruptcy Rules to recognize this restriction on the appointment of trustees in Chapter 7 cases.)
Ironically, however, the amendments to § 109 do not limit these entities to Chapter 7 cases. There
is no comparable restriction on debtors in possession or the appointments of trustees in Chapter 11
cases should these entities seek relief in that forum. However, since the petition must be fued by the
conservator, it would seem that only Chapter 7 petitions would be ftIed. Nevertheless, one can
conceive of the debtor seeking to convert the case to Chapter 11 and be appointed debtor in
possession. Given the nature of the legislation, however, it would seem unlikely that the Court
would grant such a motion.

THE RULES PROCESS
The Supreme Court promulgates amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure. It does so only after the Judicial Conference of the United States has approved the
proposed changes. Judicial Conference approval of the proposals in turn follows from a
recommendation of the Conference's Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, commonly
referred to as the Standing Committee. The Standing Committee receives a recommendation for
the amendment or addition to the Bankruptcy Rules from its Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy
Rules. The Advisory Committee consists of fIfteen members, additional advisors and
consultants, and a reporter. Bankruptcy Juqge A. Thomas Small of the Eastern District of North
Carolina chairs the Advisory Committee.
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The Advisory Committee considers amendments and additions to the Bankruptcy Rules at
its meetings that are typically held in the Spring and Fall. Mter due consideration, the Advisory
Committee recommends to the Standing Committee (usually in June of each year) that specific
amendments or additions to the Rules be published for comment by the public. A public hearing
also is scheduled. Mer considering written comments and any oral testimony on the proposals, the
Advisory Committee determines whether to recommend to the Standing Committee that the
proposals be adopted. This recommendation normally is made at the next June meeting of the
Standing Committee, one year after the proposal that the amendment be published for comment. If
the Standing Committee accepts the recommendation of the Advisory Committee, the proposed
amendment or addition to the Rules is sent to the Judicial Conference for consideration at its Fall
meeting. If the Conference accepts the recommendation (i.e., the recommendation of the Standing
Committee that the Rules proposal be promulgated), the Conference then sends its recommendation
to the Supreme Court for action no later than May 1 of the following year. The Supreme Court then
considers the proposals and, if it fmds them acceptable, promulgates the new Rules or amendments
to the Rules. These become effective on the following December 1, unless Congress acts in the
meantime to reject or revise the proposed changes. The Rules are promulgated under the Bankruptcy
Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2075.

AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE
On December 1, 2000, amendments to five bankruptcy rules became effective. The
amendment to Rule 1017(e)(1) provides that the Court may grant a timely request by the United
States Trustee for an extension of time to fue a motion to dismiss under § 707(b). The amendment
makes clear that the Court need not rule on the request prior to the expiration of the sixty-day period
within which to fue such motions. Rule 2002(a)(6) was amended to increase the dollar amount of
compensation or reimbursement requests from $500 to $1,000 in Rule 2002(a)(6). Thus, requests
for compensation or reimbursement under $1,000 do not require notice. Rule 4003(b) was amended
to overturn the decisions in cases such as In re Laurain, 113 F.3d 595 (6th Cir. 1997). Under the
amended rule, the Court may extend the time within which to fue objections to exemptions as long
as the request for the extension is made prior to the expiration of the thirty-day objection period.
Rule 4004(c) was amended to prevent the entry of a discharge while a motion requesting an
extension of time to fue a motion to dismiss under § 707B is pending. Finally, Rule 5003 was
amended by adding a new subdivision (e) to the rule. That subdivision directs the clerk to keep and
maintain a register of mailing addresses for the United States or the state or territory in which the
court is located. The address register is updated annually effective January 2 of each year. The rule
further provides that the mailing address is conclusively presumed to be a proper address, but the
failure to use that address does not invalidate notices that are otherwise effective under applicable
law.
The Supreme Court has promulgated additional bankruptcy rules amendments that will
become effective on December 1, 2001, unless Congress acts in the meantime to reject or amend
those proposals. (These materials were prepared prior to December 1, 2001.) Those amendments
are briefly described as follows:
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(a)
Rule 1007 is amended so that, if the debtor knows that a creditor is an infant or
incompetent person, the debtor will be required to include in the list of creditors and
schedules the name, address, and legal relationship of any representative upon whom process
would be served in an adversary proceeding against the infant or incompetent person. This
information will enable the clerk to mail notices required under Rule 2002 to the appropriate
representative.
(b)
Rule 2002(c) is amended to assure that parties entitled to notice of a hearing on
confrrmation of a plan are given adequate notice to any injunction included in the plan that
would enjoin conduct not otherwise enjoined by operation of the Bankruptcy Code.
(c)
Rule 2002(g) is amended to clarify that where a creditor or indenture trustee fues both
a proof of claim which includes a mailing address and a separate request designating a
different mailing address, the last paper fued determines the proper address, and that a
request designating a mailing address is effective only with respect to a particular case. The
amendments also clarify that a fued proof of claim is considered a request designating a
mailing address if a notice of no dividend has been given under Rule 2002(e), but has been
superseded by a subsequent notice of possible dividend under Rule 3002(c)(5). A new
paragraph has been added to assure that notices to an infant or incompetent person are mailed
to the person's legal representative identified in the debtor's schedules or list of creditors.
(d)
Rule 3016 is amended to assure that entities whose conduct would be enjoined under
a plan, rather than by operation of the Bankruptcy Code, are given adequate notice of the
proposed injunction. The amendment would require that the plan and disclosure statement
describe in specific and conspicuous language all acts to be enjoined and to identify the
entities that would be subject to the injunction.
(e)
Rule 3017 is amended to assure that entities whose conduct would be enjoined under
a plan, but who would not ordinarily receive copies of the plan and disclosure statement or
information regarding the confrrmation hearing because they are neither creditors nor equity
security holders, are provided with adequate notice of the proposed injunction, the
confrrmation hearing, and the deadline for objecting to confrrmation of the plan.
(t)
Rule 3020 is amended so that, if a plan contains an injunction against conduct not
otherwise enjoined under the Code, the order confrrming the plan must describe in detail all
acts enjoined and identify the entities subject to the injunction. The amendment also requires
that notice of entry of the order of confrrmation be mailed to all known entities subject to the
injunction.
(g)
Rule 9006(t) is amended to expand the 3-day rule so that it will apply to any method
of service, including service by electronic means, authorized under proposed amendments
to Civil Rule(b), other than service by personal delivery.
(h)

Rule 9020 is amended to delete provisions that delay for 10 days the effectiveness of
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an order of civil contempt issued by a bankruptcy judge and that render the order subject to
de novo reviewed by the district court. Other procedural provisions in the rule are replaced
with a statement that a motion for an order of contempt made by the United States trustee or
a party in interest is governed by Rule 9014 (contested matters).
(i)
Rule 9022(a) is amended to authorize the clerk to serve notice of entry of a judgment
ot order of a bankruptcy judge by any method of service, including service by electronic
means, permitted under the proposed amendments to Civil Rule 5(b).
Remember, these rules, although they have been promulgated by the Supreme Court, are
not effective at this time. They will only become effective in the absence of a change or rejection
by Congress. In that event, they will become effective on December 1, 2001.
The Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules is currently preparing rules necessary to
implement the provisions of the bankruptcy reform legislation, should Congress enact such
legislation. It is also considering other amendments in the ordinary course of its work. The
following is a listing of proposed Bankruptcy Rules Amendments set out according to their
effective dates should they complete the full rules enabling act process.
December 1, 2001
1007
2002(c)
2002(g)
3016
3017
3020
9006
9020
9022
December 1, 2002 *
1004
1004.1
2004
2015(a)(5)
4004
9014
9027
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* A proposed amendment to Rule 2014 has been withdrawn.

A.

December 1, 2003

1007
2003
2009
2016
7007.1

CASE LAW DEVELOPMENTS
While much of the focus in the last several years has been on Congress, the courts do not
have the option ofremaining idle while Congress decides how it wants to revise the bankruptcy laws.
Consequently, there are a number of issues that the courts have addressed over the past two years.
This outline focuses primarily on decisions of the Courts of Appeals and the Bankruptcy Appellate
Panels in addressing a wide range of issues.

Sovereien Immunity
Goldberg v. Ellett (In re Ellett), 254 F.3d 1135 (9 th Cir. 2001), amended and rehearing en
banc denied, 2001 WL 965028 (9th Cir., Aug. 27,2001). The Ninth Circuit held that a Chapter 13
debtor could seek an injunction against the collection of past franchise taxes that had been
discharged in the proceeding. The action for an injunction is allowable under Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908). The Court rejected the State's assertion that the action was in violation of the
State's eleventh amendment immunity as recognized by the Supreme Court in Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). The Ninth Circuit distinguished the Bankruptcy Code from the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act at issue in the Seminole Tribe case. Instead, the Court ofAppeals noted that
the Bankruptcy Court does not include a detailed statutory system restricting remedies comparable
'to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. Thus, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Seminole did
not prohibit the injunction action.
Lazar v. State of California (In re Lazar), 237 F.3d 967 (9 th Cir. 2001). "We hold today that
when a state or an "arm of the state" flies a proof of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding, the state
waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity with regard to the bankruptcy estate's claims that arise
from the same transaction or occurrence as the state's claim." In determining whether the Trustee's
claims against the state board arose out of the same transaction, the Appellate Court applied the
"10 gical relationship test." Applying the "logical relationship test," the court found that the Trustee's
claim was logically related to the proofs of claims fued by the state board, and, accordingly, the state
board waived its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.
Mitchell v. Franchise TaxBoard, State ofCalifornia (In re Mitchell), 209 F.3d 1111 (9 th Cir.
2000). The court held that because the outcome of the debtor's complaint would affect the legal
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position of the State, the proceedings constituted a suit within the scope of the Eleventh Amendment
via federal court jurisdiction, the proceedings constituted a suit within the scope of the Eleventh
Amendment. Accordingly, because the State did not fue a proof of claim and waive its sovereign
immunity, the debtor's claims against the state were barred. This was an action by the debtor against
the State rather than against a State official as in Ellett.
Arecibo Community Health Care, Inc. v. Commonwealth ofPuerto Rico, 244 F.3d 241 (1 st
Cir. 2001). Relying on Seminole Tribe, the Court held that §106(b) ofthe Bankruptcy Code "violates
the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution and that the adversary proceeding instituted against the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico should be dismissed. The Chapter 7 Trustee commenced an
adversary proceeding against the Commonwealth seeking to recover on contract claims against the
Commonwealth. The Court held that sovereign immunity barred the action and that the
Commonwealth had not waived its immunity.
Chandler v. Oklahoma (In re Chandler), 251 B.R. 872 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2000): Debtor fued
a complaint against the Oklahoma State Tax Commission ("OTC") seeking to discharge of his
alleged tax debt. In response, the OTC moved to dismiss the case on sovereign immunity grounds.
OTC also maintained that it had not waived its immunity in Debtor's case. The bankruptcy court
dismissed OTC's motion stating § 106(a) validly abrogated OTC's sovereign immunity. The Panel,
reversing the bankruptcy court, stated that "[i]n bankruptcy, the overwhelming view is that an
adversary proceeding that names a State as a defendant and summons it to appear in federal court
is a suit for Eleventh Amendment purposes, regardless of whether the plaintiff is seeking monetary
relief from the State." The Panel further provided that OTC did not waive its immunity because it
did not fue a proof of claim, and common law waiver did not apply. Consequently, because
proceeding involved was a "suit" to which the 11 th Amendment applied and OTC did not waive its
immunity, the case had to be dismissed. See also, Straight v. Wyoming Dep 't Transp. (In re Straight),
248 B.R. 403 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2000) (holding, in a split decision, that § 106(a) is not a constitutional
abrogation of a governmental unit's sovereign immunity.).
Hood v. Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation (In re Hood), 262 B.R. 412 (B.A.P. 6th
Cir. 2001). Debtor fued for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 and fued an adversary proceeding to attempt
to discharge her educational loans under § 523(a)(8). The creditor was added as a defendant, and it
fued a motion to dismiss asserting that the adversary proceeding was barred by sovereign immunity.
The bankruptcy court denied the motion, holding that §106 properly abrogated the creditor's
sovereign immunity. On appeal, the Panel, following the "footsteps" of In re Bliemeister, held that
as part of the plan of the Constitutional Convention, the States ceded their sovereignty over matters
relating to the discharge in bankruptcy. The District Court in the Middle District of Tennessee has
taken a largely contrary position on the issue. In In re Service Merchandise, 265 B.R. 917 (M.D.
Tenn. 2001), the court rejected the arguments relied on in Hood and Bliemeister and held that
Massachusetts could rely on the sovereign immunity defense. The court denied the refund of the
debtor's corporate excise taxes fmding that it was an attempt to reach the public funds in violation
of the sovereign immunity doctrine as set out by the Supreme Court. The district court also held that
Massachusetts had not waived its sovereign immunity defense by filing a claim for the recovery of
other taxes owed by the debtor. The court held that waiver applied only if the claim involved the
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same claim (e.g., the excise taxes for which a refund was being sought).

Property of the Estate
The Official Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery (In re
Cybergenics Corp.), 226 F.3d 237 (3rd Cir. 2000). A State law fraudulent transfer action, which the
debtor was authorized to pursue under § 544, was not an asset which belonged to the debtor
personally. The Court noted:

The fact that section 544(b) authorizes a debtor in possession, such
as Cybergenics [Debtor] to avoid a transfer using a creditor's
fraudulent transfer action does not mean that the fraudulent transfer
action is actually an asset of the debtor in possession, nor should it be
confused with the separate authority of a trustee or debtor in
possession to pursue the pre-petition debtor's causes of action that
become property of the estate upon the filing of the bankruptcy
petition. See, e.g., Sender v. Simon, 84 F.3d 1299, 1304 (10th
Cir.1996) (explaining the difference between these separate grants of
authority). Rather, it simply enables a debtor in possession to carry
out its trustee-related duties.
Accordingly, the court approved sale of Debtor's assets to a third party did not include this
"cause of action."
O'Dowd v. Trueger (In re o 'Dowd), 233 F.3d 197 (3rd Cir. 2000). Debtor retained counsel
to pursue a legal malpractice claim ("Claim #1") during her bankruptcy case. Counsel fued
complaint, but failed to include certain causes of action. Ultimately, this case was settled, however,
Debtor initiated a second post-petition malpractice claim against the attorney who represented her
in Claim #1 and another attomey("Claim #2"). The attorneys moved to have Claim #2 dismissed
because this claim was property of the estate and not property of Debtor. The bankruptcy court
dismissed the case. The Circuit Court affrrmed. The Court recognized that the conduct giving rise
to Malpractice Claim #2 occurred post-petition, however, it felt it was "conceptually impossible to
sever Malpractice Claim #2 from Malpractice Claim #1. Further, the Court found that the
malpractice claims presented in Malpractice Claim #2 were traceable directly to Debtor's prebankruptcy dealings.
WestmorelandHuman Opportunities, Inc. v. Walsh, 246F.3d233 (3 rd Cir. 2001). Debtor was
selected by the Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") to receive rent moneys
under the federal Supportive Housing Program. Soon thereafter, Debtor experienced fmancial
difficulties and fued for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11. Because Creditor was one of
Debtor's largest creditors, it accepted a place the Unsecured Creditors' Committee ("Committee").
During its tenure on the Committee, Creditor assumed Debtor's position as recipient of Supportive
Housing Program funds. Debtor's trustee initiated an adversary proceeding alleging Creditor
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breached its fiduciary duty to Committee by assuming Debtor's interest in the Housing Program
funds. Creditor argued that Debtor's interest in the Housing Program funds was not property of the
estate, and thus did not trigger a fiduciary duty. Reversing the District Court, the Circuit Court
agreed with Creditor. The Court stated that because of HUD's "strong federal interest in
safeguarding the effective administration of Program funds, demonstrated by the rigorous controls
imposed on the grant relationship ... suffices to exclude LSS's [Debtor's] interest in the grant
relationship from LSS's [Debtor's] bankruptcy estate." The Circuit Court remanded the case to the
District Court for further determination of whether Creditor breached its fiduciary duty to the
Committee.
In re Stamm, 222 F.3d 216 (5 th Cir. 2000). Debtor commenced a Chapter 13 case, but the
case was converted to Chapter 7 prior to confrrmation of any plan. The Court of Appeals held that
the debtors' wages earned after the filing of the Chapter 13 petition and prior to the conversion of
the case to Chapter 7 did not become property of the estate. Instead, the effect of the conversion was
to make the property of the estate decision as of the commencement of the case rather than the time
of conversion.
Safeway Managing General Agency, Inc. v. Osherow (In re Davis), 253 F.3d 807 (5th Cir.
2001). Automobile insurer fued an adversary proceeding against Debtor-Insured seeking a
declaratory judgment that Debtor did not hold a Stowers claim against it under Texas law. The
bankruptcy court held that a Stowers claim did exist and the bankruptcy estate was the owner of such
claim. The district court on appeal affrrmed. The Fifth Circuit reversed holding that a Stowers claim
did not exist at the time of the bankruptcy filing and therefore could not be property of the
bankruptcy estate. Furthermore, Debtor's discharge more than two years prior to the judgment in the
state action negated the existence of a Stowers claim because Debtor was no longer personally liable
to the plaintiffs in the state court action.
Taunt v. General Retirement System of the City ofDetroit (In re Wilcox), 233 F.3d 899 (6th
Cir. 2000). A debtor's defmed contribution retirement plan was not a spendthrift trust because the
debtor had supplied the funds to create the trust. Additionally, the anti-assignment provision in the
plan did not contain any specific enforcement mechanism. Nevertheless, the Court held that the antiassignment provision was a "restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust
that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law" under § 541(c)(2) and excludes the debtor's
interests from "property of the estate."
Booth v. Vaughan (In re Booth), 260 B.R. 281 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2001). At the time he fued
his Chapter 7 petition, Debtor was party to a profit sharing program. Post-petition, Debtor received
a profit sharing payment from his employer. The Chapter 7 trustee moved to have any bonus or profit
sharing check turned over to the estate. Debtor objected arguing that at the time his petition was
fued, he had no interest in any profit sharing and that if he did have any interest, it was in the form
of a beneficial trust. The bankruptcy court granted the trustee's motion. The Panel affrrmed holding
that Debtor's interest in the profit sharing payment is property of the estate to the extent that it is
based upon pre-petition employment. The court further provided that under Ohio law, the profit
sharing payments were not held in a constructive trust for the benefit of the debtor.
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Harker v. Troutman (In re Troutman Enterprises, Inc.), 253 B.R. 1 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2000).
Debtor purchased a life insurance policy of a shareholder and officer of Debtor; Debtor was the
owner and beneficiary under the policy. Subsequent to purchasing the life insurance policy, Debtor
fued for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 11 and failed to list its interest in the life insurance policy
on its schedules. The case was later converted to a Chapter 7. Three years after conversion, the
shareholder died and the death benefits became payable to Debtor. The trustee fued a complaint for
the turnover of the death benefits under § 541(a)(I) and (a)(6). The bankruptcy court ruled that upon
confrrmation, all property of the estate revested in the "Reorganized Debtor" and subsequent
conversion did not bring the property back into the estate. However, the court further held, that the
aforementioned general rule did not apply to the insurance policy because Debtor failed to disclose
it on its schedules, and thus became property of the estate upon conversion. Citing § 1142(b)'s use
of the words "all property of the estate vests in the reorganized debtor," the Panel reversed the
bankruptcy court holding that the policy vested in the reorganized debtor upon plan confrrmation
even though that interest was not disclosed.
Pioneer Liquidating Corporation v. United States Trustee (In re Consolidated Pioneer
Mortgage Entities), 264 F.3d 803, (9th Cir. 2001). Debtor fued for protection under Chapter 11 and
fued a Joint Plan of Reorganization with the Unsecured Creditors' Committee. The Plan provided,
among other things, that a company would be formed to liquidate and converting to cash the assets
of the estate. The plan also provided that the bankruptcy court would retain jurisdiction to hear all
actions in connection with the plan. Therefore, upon confmnation of the plan, all assets of the debtor
were transferred to the liquidating company. Because the liquidating company was failing to comply
with its duty to provide an adequate accounting offmancial activity, the United States Trustee moved
to have the case converted to Chapter 7. The bankruptcy court converted the case, and the B.A.P.
affrrmed this decision. On appeal the liquidating company argued that conversion was technically
futile because the Chapter 11 estate vanished upon confrrmation of the plan. Thus, no estate existed
to be converted to Chapter 7 for administration by a Chapter 7 trustee. The Appellate Court
disagreed stating:
The language and purpose of the Joint Plan demonstrate that assets that vested in
PLC [the liquidating company] upon confirmation revested in the estate when the
bankruptcy court converted the case to Chapter 7. Although typically confrrmation
of a plan "terminates the existence of the estate[,] ... reversion of property from the
estate to the debtor upon confmnation contained in §11 U.S.C. 1141(b) is explicitly
subject to the provisions of the plan." Hillis Motors, Inc. v. Hawaii Auto. Dealers'
Ass'n, 997 F.2d 581,587 (9th Cir.1993); see §11 U.S.C. 1141(b) (providing that
property of the estate vests in the debtor upon plan confrrmation "except as otherwise
provided in the plan It) (emphasis added).
Despite the fact that the Joint Plan in this case did not specifically provide that
remaining assets would revest in the estate in the event of conversion, it (1) contains
explicit provisions regarding the distribution ofliquidation proceeds to the investors,
the plan's primary beneficiaries; and (2) gives the bankruptcy court broad powers to
oversee implementation of the plan. See Hillis, 997 F.2d at 589 (concluding that
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assets revested in estate after confrrmation because, although plan did not explicitly
so provide, plan's clear purpose was to pay back creditors, and plan stated that
bankruptcy court would be closely involved in administering Chapter 11 estate).
Contrary to PLC's assertions, PLC was not created to be an independent for-profit
corporation. Rather, the Joint Plan directed PLC to distribute proceeds for the benefit
of the investors. The Joint Plan further placed PLC under the supervision of the
bankruptcy court, empowering the court to "determine all controversies, suits and
disputes that may arise ... including, without limitation, the actions of the Board of
Directors ... [and] such other matters as may arise in connection with this Plan or the
Confrrmation Order." Under these circumstances, assets held by PLC for the benefit
of the investors become assets of the estate upon conversion to Chapter 7.

Williamson v. Jones (In re Montgomery), 224 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2000). In deciding whether a
refunded portion of an EIC can constitute a portion of the bankruptcy estate, much deference needs
to be given to the fact that Congress intended contingent interests to be included in the property of
a bankruptcy estate. As a result of that deference, it is apparent that a debtor's EIC is property of the
estate. This is the case regardless of whether the petition was fued before the end of the tax year.
Johnston v. Hazlett (In re Johnson), 209 F.3d 611 (6th Cir. 2000). Earned income tax credit
was found to be property of the estate when bankruptcy is fued before the end of the tax year in
which the EIC was earned by the debtor.
Morris v. Rubia (In re Rubia), 257 B.R. 324 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2001). Chapter 7 trustee, after
avoiding and preserving for the estate a vehicle lien that Creditor perfected during the 90 day
preference period, fued a complaint for turnover of payments that Debtor made to Creditor postpetition. The trustee argued that the avoided lien in the automobile is property of the estate under §
541(a)(4), and accordingly the post-petition payments are proceeds thereof under § 541(a)(6). The
Panel disagreed providing that as a result of the lien avoidance, Creditor held an unsecured claim
against Debtor's estate. "Only the Creditor, not the Trustee, has the right to collect that debt.... [t]he
Trustee has no right to any payment made to [Creditor] on the debt, but rather he only has rights in
the [automobile] up to the amount of [Creditor's] debt on the petition date." Since the Trustee has
no right to claim those payments, the debtor might assert a right to recover those payments. It is
unlikely that the payments were "voluntary payments" as anticipated by § 524, and the debtor might
have a restitution claim against the creditor.
Johnson, Blakely, Pope, Bokor, Ruppel & Burns v. Alvarez (In re Alvarez), 224 F.3d 1273
(11 Cir. 2000). The question presented to the Eleventh Circuit was whether a malpractice claim
arising out of plaintiff's negligence/malpractice claim in filing a Chapter 7 petition rather than a
Chapter 11 petition was property of the estate and, thus, required the Chapter 7 trustee to bring the
malpractice claim. The Court provided that the malpractice claim became property of the estate at
the time the Chapter 7 petition was fued. The court established that the elements of a
negligence/malpractice claim were establish, under Florida law, at the time of the incorrect filing.
Accordingly, the malpractice claim was property of the estate, and the debtor could not maintain an
action without the participation of the Chapter 7 trustee.
th
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Telfairv. First Union Mortgage Co., 216 F.3d 1333 (11 th Cir. 2000). Confrrmed Chapter 13
plan of reorganization provided that the debtor would pay mortgage payments "outside of the plan."
The debtor failed to make some of the plans, and the creditor assessed attorney's fees against the
debtor's account as provided by the mortgage. The debtor moved to have the creditor held in
violation of the automatic stay. Accordingly, at issue was whether the payments, made "outside of
the plan" were property of the estate. In determining this issue, the court adopted the estate
transformation approach where only the property necessary for the execution of the plan remained
property of the estate following confrrmation. Consequently, the court held because the mortgage
payments made "outside of the plan" were not necessary for the execution of the plan, the creditor's
actions did not constitute a violation of the automatic stay.
In re Shearin, Jr., 224 F.3d 346 (4th Cir. 2000). Chapter 7 trustee moved to recover portions
of debtor's interest in pre-petition profits of law fum, in which he was an equity member, as well
as an amount representing the prepetition value of the male debtor's capital account. The Fourth
Circuit affrrmed the lower court's holding that the trustee could recover the pre-petition profits
because those profits were a "legally cognizable" interest of the estate at the time of filing even
thought profits were contingent and not subject to possession until a further date. Likewise, the
debtor's right to be repaid capital contributions existed as of the petition date, and the prepetition
capital account was held to be property of the estate.
In re Carlson, 263 F.3d 948, (7th Cir. 2001). Debtor-attorney fued bankruptcy and failed to
disclose in his schedules a contingent fee that had been earned but not yet received. The attorney
asserted that under Illinois law the expectation of a contingent fee was not property. The court
disagreed noting that "a lawyer has a legally enforceable interest in a potential contingent fee is
shown by the fact that if the client terminates his employment before judgment or settlement (for
reasons other than wrongful conduct by the lawyer) and so before the lawyer receives any fee, he is
entitled to the fair value of the services that he performed up to the termination." Because the debtor
completed all work before he fued bankruptcy, the contingent fee was part of the bankruptcy estate.

Exemptions
Zibman v. Tow (In the Matter ofZibman), _ F.3d _, 2001 WL 1149737 (5h Cir. 2001). In
November 1998, Debtors sold their home in Houston, Texas and placed the proceeds of the sale in
an unsegregated bank account. In February 1999, Debtors fued for bankruptcy under Chapter 7,
claiming as exempt the full amount of the proceeds of the sale of their home. Just six months after
filing for bankruptcy relief, the trustee objected, pursuant to Texas law, to Debtors claimed
exemption of the ,sale proceeds. The Texas homestead exemption provides that the proceeds from
a homestead sale must be reinvested in another Texas homestead within six months after the sale,
or such proceeds cease to be exempt. The bankruptcy court relied on the snapshot rule, which
provides that exemptions are determined by the facts and the law as they exist on the date of the
filing the bankruptcy petition, to allow the exemption as permanent and no longer subject to the
automatic expiration upon failure to reinvest within six months. On appeal the trustee argued that
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the bankruptcy court's decision was erroneous in that the six month limit of the exemption for
proceeds was an integral feature of the Texas law "applicable on the date of the filing of the
petition." Agreeing with the Trustee, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held:

As observed by the Owen Court, a state may choose not to provide exemptions at all,
or it may provide exemptions limited as it sees fit. When a debtor elects to avail
himself of the exemptions the state provides, he agrees to take the fat with the lean;
he has signed on to the rights ...but also to the limitations ... integral in those
exemptions as well. In Texas, the 6-month limitation is inextricably intertwined with
the exemption the state has chosen to provide for proceeds from the sale of the
homestead.

****
When the Zibmans [Debtors] failed to invest the proceeds from the sale of their
Houston homestead in another Texas homestead within the allotted time, the
exemption on these proceeds evanesced by operation of law. Allowing the
intervening bankruptcy petition to improve the Zibmans' pre-petition exemption by
expurgating the 6-month clock and thereby freezing the exemption permanently
would not only require a fragmented reading of state law, but would contravene the
purpose of the exemption, transforming it into a protection of the proceeds, in and
of themselves. This we refuse to do.

Moldo v. Clark (In re Clark), 266 B.R.163 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001). Debtor fued a chapter 13 petition
that was later converted to a chapter 7. In Debtor's schedules he listed real property as "five lots
listed in q~alified retirement plan." In the list of property claimed as exempt, Debtor listed again
"five lots listed in qualified retirement plan" ("the Properties"). Neither the Trustee or any other party
fued an objection to the claimed exemption. Subsequently, the Trustee fued a Motion to sell the
Properties that was granted. Debtor moved to reconsider the order to sell the Properties on the basis
that the Properties had been claimed exempt without timely objection and therefore the Properties
were not longer part of the bankruptcy estate. The Trustee contended that the exemptions were not
proper because the property was not sufficiently identified and as a result there was no exemption
to object to, and the time to object never commenced. The trustee further objected that the debtor
was not the legal owner of the proper, but rather a trust. The bankruptcy court held for the Debtor.
On appeal the Panel reversed, noting that exemptions are automatic in the absence of a timely
objection, unless an exception to this general rule applies. The ambiguous exemption claim, which
applies when an exemption is so ambiguous that potential creditors/objectors are not put on notice
of what property is being claimed exempt, applied in the present case. The Court stated:

In this case, Debtor's exemption claim is just as ambiguous and imprecise as the
claims that were found defective in the foregoing cases. The exemption claim states
"FIVE LOTS LISTED IN QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLAN,lI values them at
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$100,000, and cites the source of the exemption as §CCP 704.115 (which pertains
to exempting private retirement plans). Yet the documents that Debtor provided to
the Trustee did not demonstrate that a qualified retirement plan had been established,
and the Trustee's own efforts revealed title records showing that four of the lots in
question were owned by a trust rather than by Debtor (although Debtor stated in his
schedules that he held no interests in any trusts). (footnote omitted)

****
By describing the property claimed exempt as "FIVE LOTS LISTED IN QUALIFIED
RETIREMENT PLAN" when there is no such plan and the property is actually owned by an
entity other than Debtor or a retirement plan, the exemption claim refers to property that does not
exist, and fails to refer to the property that does exist (i.e., four lots with their titles held by a
trust, in which trust Debtor may have an interest). Such a claim of exemption is not effective to
render exempt any direct interest that Debtor may have in the trust that holds title to the subject
lots, much less any indirect interest that Debtor may have in the lots themselves as property of
the trust. Since the exemption claim does not, by its terms, pertain to either the lots or Debtor's
interest in the trust that owns the lots, it cannot cause such property to become automatically
exempt under Taylor when no timely objection is made to the claim. Accordingly, the
Bankruptcy Court erred in denying the Trustee's motion to sell, based on Debtor's exemption
claim.
Bell v. Bell (In re Bell), 225 F.3d 203 (2nd Cir. 2000). The Second Circuit considered whether
the conversion of a bankruptcy case from a Chapter 11 to a Chapter 7 triggers a new period for filing
objections to exemptions claimed during the Chapter 11 proceeding. The Court held that conversion
from a Chapter 11 to a Chapter 7 does not trigger a renewed time period to object to exemptions
claimed under the initial Chapter 11. Accordingly, the trustee's objection was untimely and property
claimed as exempt revested back to the debtor.
Shaia v. Meyer (In re Meyer), 244 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2001). Debtor, pre-petition, received a
bequest from his late father that provided he was to receive a sum equal to the remaining balance on
Debtor's mortgage. Debtor received the bequest and subsequently pre-paid the balance on his
mortgage. Over one year later, Debtor fued bankruptcy under Chapter 7. Debtor claimed an
exemption in his residential property. Trustee objected to the claimed objection and fued an
adversary complaint asserting that by pre-payment of his mortgage, the transfer of the debtor's
individual nonexempt cash bequest into an exempt interest in the residential real property constituted
both a voluntary conveyance and a fraudulent conveyance under Virginia law. The bankruptcy court
avoided the mortgage pre-payment under the theory that there were two separate transactions: (1)
from Debtor to the mortgage creditors; and (2) from Debtor to the tenancy by the entirety as a result
of the increased equity in the residence was freed of all encumbrances. The bankruptcy court held
that the second transfer was not supported by consideration under Virginia law and avoided the prepayment of the mortgage. The District Court affrrmed. The Circuit Court reversed, holding that the
pre-payment of the mortgage was a single transaction that was supported by consideration deemed
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valuable in law.

Mayer v. Nguyen (In re Nguyen), 211 F.3d 105 (4th Cir. 2000). When the state in which the
bankruptcy petition is fued opts out of the federal exemption scheme, state law, rather than Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, governs the procedural requirements for perfecting an exemption.
In re Orso, 214 F.3d 637 (5 th Cir. 2000). Applying Louisiana law, the Appellate Court
reversed the bankruptcy court concluding that installment payments resulting from a tort settlement
did not constitute an annuity and therefore were not exempt from the bankruptcy estate.
Dettmann v. Brucher (In re Brucher), 243 F.3d 242 (6th Cir. 2000). Following other courts,
the court found that a portion of the debtor's IRA as exempt under § 522(d)(10)(E). An IRA meets
the statutory requirements because payments are made "on account of age," even if they are not
"solely on account of age."
Polis v. Getaways, Inc. (In re Polis), 217 F.3d 899 (7 th Cir. 2000). The debtor fued for
Chapter 7 relief and sought to exempt her interest in a class action lawsuit, assigning it a value of
zero. On the day after of the filing of the class action suit she was discharged from bankruptcy, and
a week later the bankruptcy proceeding was terminated. Shortly after discharge, the trustee and the
named defendant in the class action moved to reopen the bankruptcy proceeding on the grounds that
the debtor's interest in the class action was worth more than $900.00 (the amount of the claimed
exemption) and therefore had been improperly exempted. The Appellate Court found that the value
of the debtor's exemption is the fair market value of the claim on the date of filing, and since there
was no evidence that debtor's claim exceeded $900.00 as of the date of filing the debtor did not
exceed her exemption.
Alexander v. Jensen-Carter (In re Alexander), 236 F.3d 431 (8 th Cir. 2001). Debtor fued for
relief under Chapter 13 and claimed an exemption in non-residential property at the time of his
filing. The Trustee objected to the claimed exemption, and ultimately prevailed. Debtor's case was
contemporaneously converted to a Chapter 7. Debtor again claimed the aforementioned property as
exempt, and the Chapter 7 trustee objected. Debtor argued that because he was living in the property
at the time of conversion, the rationale provided in In re Lindberg, 735 F.2d 1087 (8 th Cir. 1984),
permitted him to claim the property as exempt. The bankruptcy court sustained the Trustee's
objection. On appeal the Circuit Court affrrmed holding that pursuant to the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1994, Lindberg is no longer relevant and effectively overruled by Congress. The Court noted that
Congress now supports the line of cases that hold that the "property of the estate in a converted case
is the property the debtor had when he fued his original Chapter 13 petition."
Kaler v. Overboe (In re Arzt), 252 B.R. 138 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2000). Four days before filing
for bankruptcy under Chapter 7, Debtors granted two creditors mortgages in the equity in their
homestead. Accordingly, the trustee fued adversary proceedings to avoid the mortgages as
preferential transfers, and also moved to preserve the additional equity created as a result of the
avoidance actions. Creditors conceded that the transfers were preferential, however, they argued the
trustee could not avoid the transfers by the Debtors of their exempt property because creditors could
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not otherwise reach the exempt property. The bankruptcy court granted the trustee's motions. The
Panel affirmed noting that the debtors can only exempt property to the extent there is value in the
property over and above consensual liens against the property. Therefore, on the date the debtors
fued their Chapter 7 petition, they could only claim as exempt that equity remaining after they had
granted the Creditors consensual liens against their homestead. The Panel further held that the trustee
was permitted to retain the property for the benefit of the estate because the debtor could not exempt
the property recovered under the preferential transfers because none of the elements under § 522(g)
applied.

Lieberman v. Hawkins (In re Lieberman), 245 F.3d 1090 (9 th Cir. 2001). Debtor's income
stream from noncompetition agreement did not qualify as a "private retirement plan" under
California law, and is not exempt from the bankruptcy estate.
Dudley v. Anderson (In re Dudley), 249 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2001). Chapter 7 Debtors
claimed two IRAs as exempt property under California law. The IRAs were "rollovers" from ERISA
qualified plans and were valued at $110,271.00; which was the aggregate amount after Debtors
withdrew approximately $107,000.00 to pay living expenses. The trustee objected to the claimed
exemption. The bankruptcy court sustained the objection reasoning that the IRAs were not being
used for retirement purposes because Debtors had removed $107,000.00 for living expenses. The
district court affrrmed. The Circuit Court vacated and remanded the case to the district court to
remand to the bankruptcy court to determine whether the Debtors used their IRAs principally for
retirement purposes. The Court explained that the bankruptcy court correctly "determined that the
'designed and used for retirement purposes' test was the test to be applied to evaluate whether
Debtors' IRAs were exempt under California law. The bankruptcy court erred, however, by failing
to recognize that an I~ may qualify for the exemption under California law if the IRA was designed
an used principally for retirement purposes, as opposed to only for retirement purposes.'"
Manchester v. Annis (In re Annis), 232 F.3d 749 (10th Cir. 2000). When a case arises under
the Bankruptcy Code, the estate will usually include that property in which a debtor has an equitable
or legal interest. However, Section 522 of that Code exempts certain property from the estate.
Additionally, Section 522 allows a state to substitute the federal exemptions its residents are entitled
to receive with the exemptions that are provided for under state law. Oklahoma is such a state that
has opted to use its state exemptions rather than federal ones. Under Oklahoma law, "a tax refund
does not constitute ... 'earnings from personal services. '" Id. at 753. As such, federal and state tax
returns will not be exempted from Oklahoma Stat. tit. 31, § 1.1 which exempts "by reason of undue
hardship that portion of any earnings from personal services necessary for the maintenance of a
family or other dependents supported wholly or partially by the labor of the debtor." Okla. Stat. tit.
31, § 1.1
Gregory v. Zubrod (In re Gregory), 246 F.3d 681 (10th Cir. 2000). In the state ofWyoming,
which does not participate in the federal exemption plan, a frrearm that is not necessary for fulfilling
one's employment duties will not be considered exempt property. Moreover, if such a frrearm is
only used for purposes of practicing, it will also not be considered exempt property.
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Kwiecinski v. Community First Nat'l Bank of Powell (In re Kwiecinski), 245 B.R. 672
(B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2000). Chapter 13 debtors claimed as exempt, under Wyoming law, a 60 acre tract
of farmland contiguous to the 20 acre tract on which their residence was located. Creditors did not
object to the claimed exemption. The bankruptcy court denied the debtors' claimed exemption. The
Panel reversed providing that because no Creditors objected to the claimed exemption, the property
scheduled as exempt shall be exempt. "As the Supreme Court held, when no objection is made
within the time established by Federal Rule ofBankruptcy Procedure 4003(b), § 522(1) provides that
the property claimed as exempt in the Debtors' schedule is exempt." Further, the Panel concluded
that under Wyoming law, the fact that Debtors received separate deeds to the two tracts when they
bought them did not preclude their homestead exemption from extending to the contiguous 60 acre
tract.
Sawczak v. Goldenberg (In re Goldenberg), 218 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2001). Creditor sued
Debtor in state court, pre-petition, for negligently performing gall bladder surgery on her. On the day
the jury was to begin deliberating, Debtor fued for relief under Chapter 7. Creditor obtained relief
from the stay to continue the trial, and ultimately obtained a $4,000,629.00 verdict. Debtor listed
assets of$3,791,119.00, of which he claimed $3,751,678.00 as exempt. The alleged exempt property
included, among other things, seven annuities valued at $355,894.00. The annuities were single
premium annuities, and to obtain them Debtor paid a single premium that accumulated interest until
the maturity date. Further, the annuities all contained a "net surrender value," which could be
invoked up until the corresponding maturity dates. Creditor objected to the claimed exemption as
to the annuities asserting that the cash surrender values were not exempt under Florida law. The
Circuit Court concluded that the issue presented to the court involved an unanswered question of
state law and certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Florida: Are the cash
surrender values of Debtor's annuity contracts exempt from legal process under Florida law? As
provided inSawczakv. Goldenberg (In re Goldenberg), 253 F.3d 1271 (9thCir. 2001), the Supreme
Court of Florida in Goldenberg v. Sawczak 791 So.2d 1078, (Fla. 2001), answered the Circuit
Court's question in the affirmative. The Florida Supreme Court held that "the proceeds of an annuity
contract where there is a surrender penalty are exempt from legal process" under Florida law. Thus,
the Circuit Court concluded that the annuities were exempt.
Havaco of America, Ltd. ~ Hill, 790 So.2d 1018 (Fla. 2001). In response to a certified
question from the Eleventh Circuit, the Florida Supreme Court has held that under the Florida
Constitution, a debtor's homestead is protected from creditor claims, even if the property was
acquired with previously nonexempt assets and with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.
Under the State's Constitution, a homestead is vulnerable only to claims for taxes and assessments
on the property, obligations for the purchase, improvement or repair of the property, and obligations
contracted for the house or field or other labor performed on the real estate.

Lien Avoidance
Lehman v. VisionSpan, Inc. (In re Lehman), 205 F.3d 1255 (ll th Cir. 2000). Chapter 7 debtor
and his wife owned a residence as tenants in common. The residence, valued at $225,000.00 was
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encumbered by frrst priority mortgage ($165,000.00) and a judicial lien ($53,878.19). The debtor
moved to avoid the entire amount of the judicial lien as impairing his homestead exemption. The
court disagreed explaining:
In this case, under the express language of the statute, the following
calculation would be made:
Add (i) $53,878.19 (the amount of the VisionSpan judgment lien);
(ii) $165,000 (the amount of the mortgage held by NationsBank);
and (iii) $5,312 (the amount of the exemption claimed by Lehman).

The total of these figures is $224,190.19. The value of Lehman's
"interest in the property ... in the absence of any liens" is $112,500.
$224,190.19 "exceeds" $112,500 by $111,690.
Therefore, VisionSpan's lien would be "considered to impair"
Lehman's exemption by $111,690 and Lehman could avoid it to that
extent, which would permit Lehman to avoid all of VisionSpan's lien
of $53,878.19.
This would be the consequence of applying the precise terms
of the statute: Lehman, as shown above, would avoid all of
VisionSpan's lien. Lehman, however, would still have equity in the
property of $30,000 (derived by subtracting the $165,000 amount of
the NationsBank mortgage from the $225,000 property value and
dividing by two, to account for Lehman's one-half ownership of the
property).
In effect, Lehman would shield his entire equity of
$30,000 from VisionSpan's lien of$53,878.19, even though Lehman
was entitled to a debtor's exemption of only $5,312.00.
Concluding this result would provide Lehman a windfall and
would be "absurd," the bankruptcy court took the following common
sense approach:
The value of the entire property is $225,000.00.
Deducting the mortgage,
$165,000.00, leaves
$60,000.00 equity in the property, not accounting for
VisionSpan's lien. The Debtor's half-interest in the
Mter
property is therefore worth $30,000.00.
deducting the debtor's exemption, ·$5,312.00, there is
remaining in the property $24,688.00. [VisionSpan's]
lien is in the amount of $53,879.00, which clearly
impairs the Debtor's exemption. [VisionSpan] is,
however, entitled to retain its lien on the
unencumbered, nonexempt portion of the Debtor's
property, in the amount of $24,688.00.
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In effect, the court was simply substituting, in the statutory formula,
the total value of the home ($225,000) in place of Lehman's interest
in the home in the absence of any liens ($112,500). The ·same
outcome would also be produced by substituting the value of the
NationsBank mortgage attributable to Lehman's share of the property
($82,500), in place of the value of the mortgage on the whole
property ($165,000).

Nichols v. BJ Fox Enterprises (In re Nichols), 265 B.R. 831 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2001). Debtor
failed to make payments on a promissory note secured by a mortgage on real property, and Creditor
obtained a default judgment of foreclosure against him. The state court scheduled a hearing to
confrrm a sheriff's sale on January 26, 2001. On January 8,2001, before confrrmation of the sale,
Debtor fued a chapter 7 petition. Debtor scheduled the value of the real property as $30,000.00 and
he claimed the real property as exempt in the amount of $30,000.00. Debtor moved to avoid
Creditors lien in the real property pursuant to § 522(f), arguing that Creditor's state court foreclosure
judgment was an avoidable judicial lien that impaired his homestead exemption. Creditor objected.
The bankruptcy court held in favor of Creditor concluding that the lien on real property was a
consensual lien that was not avoidable under § 522(t)(1)(A). Affrrming the bankruptcy court, the
Panel held that a "judicial lien is defmed as a 'lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or
other legal or equitable process or proceeding.'" Consequently, Creditor's interest in the real
property was not obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process, "but
rather arose as a result of the agreement between the debtor and [Creditor]. Accordingly, as defmed
by § 101(51), [Creditor's} lien is a 'security interest' and § 522(t)(1) does not apply. The Panel
further established that Creditor's security interest did not transform into a judicial lien as a result
of the state court's foreclosure decree. "'It is the origin of the interest rather than the means of
enforcement that determines the nature of the lien. Just because a creditor resorts to the judicial
process to enforce the lien, it does not mean the lien is a judicial lien under § 522(f)(1)(A).'"

Raleigh v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 120 S.Ct. 1951 (2000). The Court was
faced with the issue of "who bears the burden of proof on a tax claim in bankruptcy court when the
substantive law creating the tax obligation puts the burden on the taxpayer." The Court concluded
that when the substantive law creating a tax obligation puts the burden of proof on a taxpayer, the
burden of proof on the tax claim in bankruptcy court remains where the substantive law put it - in
this case, on the trustee in bankruptcy. The Court further provided "Bankruptcy courts are not
authorized in the name of equity to make wholesale substitution of underlying law controlling the
validity of creditors' entitlements, but are limited to what the Bankruptcy Code itself provides."
Internal Revenue Service v. Cousins (In re Cousins), 209 F.3d 38 (1 st Cir. 2000). Chapter
12 Debtors completed a plan of reorganization whereby they paid the IRS $43,195 in satisfaction of
the IRS's pre-petition claim. However, the payments did not include post-petition interest on the preG-18

petition obligation. The IRS never objected to such payments or provisions addressing the IRS's
claims in the plan, and Debtors were discharged. The IRS subsequently demanded a payment from
Debtors of$15,560.11 for interest that had accrued post-petition on the pre-petition tax liability. The
Court stated:
The plain language of § 1228(a)(2) provides that discharge
specifically does not apply to any debt listed in § 523(a). Section
523(a)(1)(A), in turn, unequivocally notes that "[a] discharge under
section ... 1228(a) ... does not discharge an individual debtor from any
debt" for a tax liability, irrespective of "whether or not a claim for
such tax was filed or allowed." §11 U.S.C. 523(a)(1)(A). In
addition, Debtors' reading of the Code would render even the
principal of a tax liability extinguished after the plan is completed if,
for example, the claim for tax liability was not [tied or allowed and
This
therefore was not included in the Chapter 12 plan.
interpretation is untenable. See Bruning, 376 U.S. at 360 ("It is
undisputed that ... petitioner remained personally liable after his
discharge for that part of the principal amount of the tax debt and prepetition interest not satisfied out of the bankruptcy estate. "). Tax
liabilities survive the bankruptcy proceeding's termination, and as
Bruning held, so does the interest upon these liabilities.
Young v. United States (In re Young), 233 F.3d 56 (1 st Cir. 2000). The First Circuit adopted
the majority view and concluded that the three year lookback period provided in §507(a)(8) is tolled
during the pendency of an earlier bankruptcy case. Specifically, the Court stated that:

Virtually all of the circuit cases dealing with successive bankruptcy
petitions and the three-year lookback provision have chosen to
supplement the statute; the only difference between the judges is how
to do it. The most common rule, adopted by five circuits, is that the
lookback period is automatically tolled during a prior bankruptcy.
These courts differ only in using different analogies or arguments to
support the rule; four borrow from some combination of tolling
provisions elsewhere in the Bankruptcy and Tax Codes, see note 3
above, while the Tenth Circuit relies on the general equitable powers
of bankruptcy courts under §26 U.S.C. 105(a).
By contrast, three other circuits have held that the lookback period is
not automatically tolled by a prior bankruptcy proceeding but that
equitable considerations may permit tolling on a case-by-case basis.
The Eleventh Circuit states that the equities will usually favor the
government, Morgan v. United States (In re Morgan), 182 F.3d 775,
779-80 (11th Cir.1999); the Sixth seems to require a showing of
debtor misconduct, Palmer v. United States (In re Palmer ), 219 F.3d
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580, 585 (6th Cir.2000); and the Fifth agnostically demands a "[t]ull
development and examination of the facts," Quenzer v. United States
(In re Quenzer ),19 F.3d 163,165 (5th Cir.1993).
We follow the majority view in favor of automatic tolling. In some
cases, the equities alone might justify tolling, but the automatic
tolling rule rests on a broader basis: it preserves for the government
the benefit of the 1966 compromise by giving it the full three years to
assess and collect taxes. The taxpayer is faced with "old" tax claims
only if he or she has chosen to make back-to-back bankruptcy filings.
And, as a [mal, although less important benefit, automatic tolling is
infmitely easier and more predictable to administer.
New Haven Projects Ltd. Liability Co. v. City ofNew Haven (In re New Haven Projects Ltd.
Liability Co.), 225 F.3d 283 (2nd Cir. 2000). Chapter 11 Debtor moved for a redetermination of its
tax liability pursuant to Section 505. The bankruptcy court denied the motion. On appeal, the Circuit
Court affrrmed. The Court frrst provided that it is within the bankruptcy court's discretion to
redetermine a debtor tax liability. Next, the Court agreed with the bankruptcy court noting that the
only party to benefit from a redetermination of Debtor's tax liability was an insider-creditor, and at
the same time prejudice outside creditors. "It [Section 505] was not enacted to afford debtors a
second bite at the apple at the expense of outside creditors."
In re Armstrong, 206 F.3d 465 (5 th Cir. 2000). The Court was presented with the issue of
whether the trustee's refund claim was timely considering the automatic stay provision and, in a
matter offrrst impression, whether the automatic turnover provision of § 542(a) obviated the need
for a refund claim once the amount of the debtor's tax overpayment had become certain. The trustee
argued that the automatic stay allowed a trustee to fue a refund claim for pre-petition taxes at any
time during the pendency of the bankruptcy case, thus providing an implied exception to the time
limits set forth by the IRC. The Circuit Court disagreed and held that the automatic stay does not
indefmitely extend the time for a trustee to take action against the IRS. The trustee further argued
that it was unnecessary for him to fue a return because § 542(a) required the IRS to return Debtor's
pre-filing overpayment to the trustee as soon as the amount of overpayment became certain. The
Circuit Court again disagreed establishing that § 542(a) "does not in itself, or with the coincidence
of a stipulation as to amount of overpayment, abrogate the overall statutory scheme requiring
compliance with non-bankruptcy statute of limitations."
In re Lewis, 199 F.3d 249 (5 th Cir. 2000). At issue was the time in which Louisiana state
income taxes were "assessed" within the meaning of § 507(a)(8). Concluding that fmality should be
the focus of a § 507(a)(8) assessment, the court determined that the Louisiana tax collection
procedure as applied to debtor qualified as an assessment under § 507(a)(8) and the debt was nondischargeable under §§ 523 (a)(l)(A) and 507(a)(I)(A)(ii).
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Fraud
United States v. Paradis, 219 F.3d 22 (l st Cir. 2000) Defendant, non-debtor, pled guilty to
bankruptcy fraud for laundering $3 million in proceeds from Chapter 7 estate. The District Court
sentenced Defendant to ftfteen months in prison and three years of supervised release, and ordered
Defendant to pay $ 3 million in restitution to the U.S. trustee. The Circuit Court, recognizing that
the trustee may be a victim of bankruptcy fraud," overturned the District Court's restitution order
providing that there "was no evidence of identifiable victims who suffered harm as a result of
Defendant's money laundering, ..."
In re Betacorn of Phoenix, Inc., 240 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2001). Mter a thorough review of
recent case law construing Section 510(b), the court held that Section 510(b) is not restricted to
security fraud claims only. As a result, the creditors' claim for damages concerning the sale or
purchase of a security of the debtor fell under § 51O(b) even though the creditors did not allege
violations of the securities laws.
United States v. Hatton (In re Hatton), 220 F.3d 1057 (9th eir. 2000). The court held that a
substitute return completed by the I.R.S. without any assistance from the Chapter 7 debtor nor an
installment agreement which debtor agreed to sign only after the I.R.S. had threatened to levy his
wages and to seize his personal property qualified as a tax return. Accordingly, the debtor was not
entitled to discharge the corresponding tax liability.

DischargelDischargeability
Tavennerv. Smoot, 257F.3d401, (4thCir. 2001). Debtor, pre-petition, agreed to a settlement
with his former employer and former union, and received $250,000.00 in exchange for a release of
all of Debtor's claims. The same day, Debtor transferred $210,000.00 of the settlement funds to a
corporation owned exclusively by members of his immediate family, and received no consideration
for this exchange. From this "family business" account, Debtor made subsequent transfers to his son
for a home down payment, bought cars for his wife and daughter, and purchased a motorcycle for
his son. However, because of creditors attempting to execute against his property, Debtor fued for
bankruptcy. In his bankruptcy schedules, Debtor listed the settlement funds as exempt property. The
Chapter 7 trustee objected to Debtor's discharge and sought to recover the transfers made with the
checks drawn on the "family business" account. Thus, the bankruptcy court was presented with the
novel issue of whether a trustee can avoid a transfer ofexempt property on the ground that the debtor
transferred the property with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors under Section 548.
The bankruptcy held that the trustee was permitted to do so. The Appellate Court affrrmed. In so
holding, the Court noted that it was undisputed that if Debtor had left the settlement funds in his
account, he could have exempted those proceeds from his bankruptcy estate under Virginia
exemption law. Nonetheless, two factors persuaded the Court to conclude that exemptable property
is amenable to avoidance and recovery actions by bankruptcy trustees. First, § 522(g) permits the
debtor to exempt property recovered by the trustee under certain circumstances, namely if the debtor
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could have exempted such property had it not been transferred and if the transfer was involuntary
and the debtor did not attempt to conceal the property. "Section 522(g) is, thus, premised on the
notion that a bankruptcy trustee can avoid the transfer of exemptible property and recover the
property." Second, under a statutory scheme in which all property is presumed to be part of the
bankruptcy estate, and no property is exempt until such time as the debtor claims an exemption for
it, creditors can be harmed by transfers of potentially exempt property because it is not a foregone
conclusion that such property will be exempt from the estate. "Potentially exempt property can be
used to satisfy the demands of the creditors 1£ the debtor never claims the exemption."
Peklar v. Ikerd (In re Peklar), 260 F.3d 1035, (9th Cir. 2001). Mter Debtor rued for
bankruptcy protection, Creditor initiated an adversary proceeding seeking to have Debtor's
conversion debt, which arose from a state court civil action, declared non-dischargeable under 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) under collateral estoppel principles. The bankruptcy court rejected the collateral
estoppel argument and concluded that the conversion debt was dischargeable. The district court
reversed. The Appellate Court reversed the district court. In so holding the Court recognized
Supreme Court precedents providing '''the word willful in (a)(6) modifies the word "injury,"
indicating that nondischargeablity takes a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury
[n]ot
do not
every tort judgment for conversion is exempt from discharge. Negligent or reckless acts
suffice to establish that a resulting injury is 'willful and malicious.' ... debts arising from recklessly
or negligently inflicted injuries do not fall within the compass of § 523(a)(6)." Therefore, the Court
held that a "judgment for conversion under California substantive law decides only that the
defendant has engaged in the 'wrongful exercise of dominion' over the personal property of the
plaintiff. It does not necessarily decide that the defendant has caused 'willful and malicious injury'
within the meaning of § 523(a)(6)."
Merrill v. Merrill (In re Merrill), 252 B.R. 497 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2000): "While a bankruptcy
court ultimately determines whether a debt is nondischargeable under § 523, a state court judgment
may preclude the relitigation of settled facts under the collateral estoppel doctrine. When a federal
court reviews the preclusive effect of a state court judgment, the full faith and credit statute directs
a federal court to look at the preclusion law of the sate in which the judgment was rendered."
Accordingly, the bankruptcy court, applying Oklahoma law, was correct when it refused to
reconsider factual issues already resolved in a state court proceeding.
Brightful v. Pa. Higher Education AsistanceAgency (In re Brightful), 267 F.3d 324, (3rd Cir.
2001). Debtor initiated an adversary proceeding to have her student loans discharged under the
"undue hardship" provision of § 523(a)(8). Mer a hearing on the merits, the bankruptcy court held
in favor of Debtor. During the adversary proceeding, the bankruptcy court made the following
[mdings of fact, among others: Debtor was the mother of a 14 year old daughter and they were living
with Debtor's sister in a three bedroom house; Debtor had no college degree, however, she had
completed the equivalent of two years of college; Debtor was employed full time at a prestigious law
[trm and earned approximately $18 per hour, but was only working between 8 and 30 hours a week;
During 1999 Debtor earned $8,500.00 and in 1998 earned $20,000.00; Debtor had fued sexual
discrimination and sexual harassment charges against the law ftrm; and Debtor had "glaring
psychiatric problems" and that she was "emotionally unstable." On appeal, the Third Circuit
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reversed. The court concluded that Debtor was unable to meet her burden in establishing that
additional circumstances existed indicating that her state of affairs were likely to persist for a
significant portion of the repayment period for the student loans. The court stressed that this prong
of the three-prong test under § 523(a)(8) is a demanding requirement, and it is not enough to show
that the debtor is currently in fmancial straits. The debtor must show total incapacity in the future
to pay his/her debts for reasons not within his/her control. The court concluded that Debtor provided
sufficient evidence to show that she was in fmancial straits but not total incapacity to pay debts in
the future. The court empathized with Debtor's psychiatric problems, but found no expert testimony
was introduced to establish that such problems precluded Debtor from paying future debts.

Cazenovia College v. Renshaw (In re Renshaw), 222 F.3d 82 (2nd Cir. 2000). Two colleges
essentially permitted two different students to attend classes without paying for tuition. Each student
signed agreements stating that they would pay for their education, but ultimately did not pay. Each
student fued a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and each Creditor-College attempted to have their claim
rendered non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(8). The students argued that whatever services or goods
they received did not constitute a loan within the meaning of § 528(a)(8). The Circuit Court agreed
with the students, and concluded that the agreements between the Creditors-Colleges and the
students were not loans under § 523(a)(8) and therefore were dischargeable debts.
In re Rashid, 210 F.3d 201 (3rd Cir. 2000). The Appellate Court was presented with the issue
of whether an order to pay restitution to fraud victims in federal criminal proceeding, prior to the
1994 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, is dischargeable under § 523. The Court concluded that
the restitution obligation was dischargeable because it was payable to the benefit of Debtor's
defrauded victims and not "to and for the benefit" of any government unit.
Lind-Waldock & Co. v. Morehead, 1 Fed. Appendix 104 (4th Cir. 2001). The Court held that
a debt incurred by debtor while speculating in the futures market is not a "consumer debt" under §
523(a)(2)(C) and therefore the debt was dischargeable.
Pleasants v. Kendrick (In re Pleasants), 219 F.3d 372 (4th Cir. 2000). Debtor,
misrepresenting he was an architect, was hired by Creditors to construct an addition to their home.
The project was delayed, by no fault of Creditors, and Creditors discovered Debtor was not an
architect. Giving the Debtor a second chance, Creditors entered into a forebearance agreement with
Debtor providing Creditors would not terminate contract if Debtor met nine milestones. Debtor
missed a milestone and Creditors frred Debtor and brought an action for fraud, breach of contract,
and negligence. Days before trial, Debtor fued its bankruptcy petition. Creditors fued an adversary
proceeding seeking to have their debt deemed non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A). The
bankruptcy court deemed the debt to be non-dischargeable. On appeal, Debtor argued that the debt
was dischargeable because under § 523(a)(2)(A) some portion of a creditor's claim must have been
directly transferred from the creditor to the debtor, and Creditors' claim included only the amount
paid by them to third parties - architect and the other builder hired to fmish project. The Fourth
Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court decision of Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 118 S.Ct.
1212 (1998), where the Court established that § 523(a)(2)(A) prevents the discharge of all liability
arising from fraud, was broad enough to encompass "a situation in which no portion of a creditor's
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claim was literally transferred to the fraudulent debtor."
In re Mercer, 211 F.3d 214 (5 th Cir. 2000). The Court of Appeals initially held that a credit
card company, which provided Chapter 7 debtor with a pre-approved credit card with a pre-approved
credit limit, did not justifiably rely on any false representations or false statements of debtor, and
accordingly debtor's credit card debt was discharged. 211 F.3d 214 (5 th Cir. 2000). However, the
Appellate Court granted a rehearing en banc. Sitting en banc the Appellate Court found that the
debtor did represent her intent to repay and the credit card company relied on this representation.
246 F.3d 391 (5 th Cir. 2001). Consequently, the Appellate Court remanded the case to the
bankruptcy court to determine whether the debtor's representation was knowingly false and whether
the credit card company's reliance was justifiable.
In re M.M. Winkler & Assoc. , 239 F.3d 746 (5 th Cir. 2001). "[W]e hold that § 523(a)(2)(A)
prevents an innocent debtor from discharging liability for the fraud of his partners, regardless
whether he receives a monetary benefit. A rational legislator might conclude that an innocent debtor
should be able to discharge debts in these situations, but § 523(a)(2)(A) does not permit this." Thus,
an "innocent" partner cannot discharge a claim arising out of the fraud of another partner.
Keeney v. Smith (In re Keeney), 227 F.3d 679 (6th Cir. 2000). Applying the "continuous
concealment" doctrine, the court prevented a discharge when the debtor fraudulently transferred
property more than one year before the debtor bankruptcy filing. "Under the 'continuous
concealment' doctrine, a transfer made and recorded more than one year prior to filing may serve
as evidence of the requisite act of concealment where the debtor retains a secret benefit of ownership
in the transferred property within the year prior to filing."
In re Frain, 230 F.3d 1014 (7 th Cir. 2000). The Court held that because of the debtor's
"ascended" position over other shareholders, under a shareholder agreement, a fiduciary relationship
existed for purposes of § 523(a)(4). The Court concluded that the control wielded by the debtor
allowed him unchecked power over the claimants, and thus created the fiduciary relationship.
McClellan v. Cantrell, 217 F.3d 890 (7 th Cir. 2000). In a departure from prior case law, the
court held that misrepresentation is not the only type of fraud that falls within the discharge
exception of "actual fraud" under § 523(a)(2)(A). The court concluded that "actual fraud" may
encompass "any deceit, artifice, trick or design involving direct and active operation of the mind,
used to circumvent and cheat another." The fraud in this case was collusion in the fraudulent transfer
of property.
Graves v. Myrvang (In re Myrvang), 232 F.3d 1116 (9 th Cir. 2000). Debtor's former wife
flIed an adversary complaint seeking determination that a divorce decree debt was nondischargeable. The bankruptcy court ordered debtors (debtor and his new wife) to pay creditor
$102,000.00 over a five year period. On appeal, the debtors argued, among other things, that the five
year time limitation order was erroneous. Noting that the issue was a novel question in the Ninth
Circuit, the Appellate Court dismissed the debtors' argument. It held that exceptions to discharge
under Chapter 7 are special and need not conform precisely to the "fresh start" philosophy of the
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Bankruptcy Code, and therefore the bankruptcy court did not err in providing the five year limitation.
Moreover, the Court held that there can be a partial discharge of debts under § 523(a)(15).
O'Loghlin v. County of Orange, 229 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000). The district court dismissed
an employee's claim for violations of the American with Disabilities Act holding that the claim was
discharged in the debtor's bankruptcy proceeding. The employee's claim was founded on three
separate alleged violations: the frrst occurred pre-petition, the second during the pendency of the
bankruptcy, and the third post-discharge. The district court concluded that the second and third
alleged violations were the "inevitable consequence" of the frrst violation, rather than actionable
continuing violations of the ADA, and thus were discharged. The Appellate Court reversed. It
concluded that the district court's ruling rewarded the County for its pre-petition violations, for if
the County had not violated the ADA during the pre-discharge period it would clearly be liable for
a violation in the post-discharge period. "A fresh start means only that: it does not mean a continuing
license to violate the law."
Petralia v. Jercich (In re Jercich), 238 F.3d 1202 (9 th Cir. 2001) Debtor-employer's
intentional breach of contract in electing to not pay wages owed to his employee, even though he had
funds available, and instead choosing to use fund for a variety of personal investments, rose to the
level of tort under California law. Accordingly, such a debt falls under the "willful and malicious
injury" exception to discharge.
Short v. Short (In re Short), 232 F.3d 1018 (9 th Cir. 2000). In evaluating a debtor's ability to
pay a debt under 523(a)(15), "a bankruptcy court may consider the income of a debtor's live-in
romantic companion whenever the debtor and his live-in romantic companion are economically
interdependent or form a single economic unit."
The State Bar of California v. Taggart (In re Taggart), 249 F.3d 987 (9 th Cir. 2001). Costs
incurred in prosecuting Chapter 7 debtor attorney for disciplinary purposes are not penal in nature
and thus are dischargeable.
Groetken v. Davis (In re Davis), 246 B.R. 646 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2000). In determining
whether a claim should be nondischargeable, a court will look for a fraudulent representation. If a
debtor does not intend to pay the creditor when the debtor gives a check to a creditor or the debtor
knows that a check will bounce when the debtor gives it to the creditor, there has been a fraudulent
representation. Additionally, a pledge to wire funds with no intention of wiring the funds will also
constitute a fraudulent representation. Also, before sanctions can be imposed under Rule 9011, a
party has the right to receive notice that such sanctions are being considered and an opportunity to
respond before judgment has been awarded.
Burks v. State of Louisiana (In re Burks), 244 F.3d 1245 (11 th Cir. 2001). Debtor was a
participant in a state program where he received educational stipends to obtain his graduate level
degree. In exchange, the debtor was contractually obligated to teach at "other race" institutions of
higher learning upon graduation for three years. If the debtor failed to do so, he was required to repay
the "stipends." Upon graduation, the debtor failed to teach at an "other race" institution of higher
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learning, and subsequently ftied bankruptcy under Chapter 13. The Board of Regents moved to have
the debt for receiving the stipend be declared non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(8). The debtor
argued that because his stipends were received for the purpose of achieving diversity among
instructors in Louisiana's universities, his stipends were not for an educational benefit and therefore
not excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(8). The Court disagreed noting that a number of courts
have held that loans made to assist students with their education in exchange for service obligation
are non-dischargeable.

Griffith v. United States (In re Griffith), 206 F.3d 1389 (11 th Cir. 2000). The court addressed
the issue of whether Section 523(a)(I)(C) renders a tax debt nondischargeable in bankruptcy where
the debtor has willfully attempted in any manner to evade or defeat the payment of a tax but has not
in any manner willfully attempted to evade or defeat the assessment of a tax. First, the court noted
that the mere nonpayment of a tax debt is insufficient to establish the exception found in section
523(a)(1 )(C). However, the Court found that the debtor's actions ofattempting to evade paying taxes
by fraudulently transferring his property to his wife was a willful attempt to evade payment of his
taxes. The Court held that a tax debt is nondischargeable where the debtor has willfully attempted
in any manner to evade or defeat the payment of a tax, even though a debtor did not attempt to evade
the assessment of a tax.
United States v. Fretz (In re Fretz), 244 F.3d 1323 (11 th Cir. 2001). The debtor, an
emergency room doctor, failed to ftie federal income tax returns or to pay his taxes for the years 1982
through 1992, due to his battle with alcoholism. However, the debtor never attempted to move his
assets around or otherwise conceal them. Thus, the Court was presented with the issue of whether
a debtor's intentional failure to [tie tax returns and to pay taxes is sufficient, even without any
supporting affrrmative conduct, to show that he "willfully attempted in any manner to evade or
defeat [a] tax," within the meaning of the non-discharge provision of § 523(a)(I)(C). The 11 th Circuit
concluded that the debtor's tax debts were non-dischargeable for two reasons: (1) § 523(a)(1)(C)
covers both acts of omission and commission and thus the debtor's conduct of failing to fue his tax
returns and pay his taxes fulfilled the conduct requirement under § 523(a)(I)(C); and (2) the debtor's
conduct of ignoring to pay his taxes and ftie tax returns was "willful" under § 523(a)(I)(C).
In re Morris, 223 F.3d 548 (7 th Cir. 2000). Court found that the creditor's reliance on written
statement by the debtor regarding his fmancial condition was not reasonable under § 523(a)(2)(B),
where the creditor's testimony revealed he had serious doubts about the truth of the statements.
"While we understand that the concept of reasonable reliance does not generally require creditors
to conduct an investigation prior to entering into agreements with prospective debtors, such a
precaution could be the ordinarily prudent choice in circumstances where the creditor admits that is
does not believe the representations made by the prospective debtor."
Nardei v. Maughan (In re Maughan), 268 B.R.128, (B.AP. 6th Cir. 2001). Debtor fued for
bankruptcy under chapter 7 on June 30, 1998. Three days after the deadline for the filing of
complaints to determine the dischargeability of a claim, Creditor ftied a motion to extend the
deadline. Debtor objected arguing that the time limits set by Bankruptcy Rule 4007 were
jurisdictional in nature and could not be extended. The bankruptcy court disagreed. stating that the
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time limits are not jurisdictional in nature but rather more like a statute of limitations that are subject
to equitable tolling. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court granted the motion of Creditor extending the
time to flie a complaint to determine the dischargeability of a claim. Although noting that a minority
of courts have held that the deadline set forth in Rule 4007(c) is not jurisdictional but rather a statute
of limitations, subject to the defenses of waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling, the Panel reversed.
The court did not resolve the jurisdiction debate, but rather asserted that Creditor had not
demonstrated sufficient cause to warrant an extension, particularly when the request for an extension
was not timely flied.

Automatic Stay and Exceptions To The Automatic Stay
SEC v. Brennan, 230 F.3d 65 (2nd Cir. 2000). The Court confronted the issue, as a matter of
frrst impression, of whether an order obtained by the SEC from a district court requiring Debtor to
repatriate the assets of an offshore asset protection trust violates the automatic stay. The SEC argued
that the order was protected under the "governmental exception" to the automatic stay. The Court,
however, disagreed. It concluded that the police power exception "under § 362(b)(4) permits the
entry of a money judgment against a debtor so long as the proceeding in which such a judgment is
entered is one to enforce the governmental unit's police or regulatory power." However, "the
'collection of [a money] judgment after entry ...is not authorized ... and requires a separate
application to the bankruptcy court. ,,, The Court found that the order went beyond the mere entry
of a money judgment, and rather was an attempt by the SEC to enforce a money judgment. But see,
In re Federal Communications Commission, 217 F.3d 125 (2nd Cir. 2000). Automatic stay did not
prevent the FCC from enforcing its regulatory power by treating debtor's failure to make timely
payment for its licenses as resulting in automatic cancellation of the licenses.
Internal Revenue Service v. Westberry (In re Westberry), 215 F.3d 589 (6th eir. 2000).
Federal income tax debt is not a consumer debt for purposes of § 1301 co-debtor stay. "Consumer
debt is incurred for personal or household purposes ... while taxes are incurred for public purpose
... [T]axes arise from the earning of money, while consumer debt result from its consumption."
Berg v. Good Samaritan Hospital (In re Berg), 230 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2000). Sanctions
imposed against Chapter 13 debtor's attorney for unprofessional conduct fall within the government
regulatory exemption under § 362 and therefore are not subject to the restrictions of the automatic
stay in the attorney's subsequent bankruptcy case.
Sanchezv. Gordon (In re Sanchez), 241 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2001). Chapter 7 debtor's attorney
did not violate the automatic stay by collecting fees for post-petition services in an amount greater
than the bankruptcy court later determined to be reasonable fees.
Aiello v. Providian Financial Corp., 239 F.3d 876 (7 th Cir. 2001). Debtor who claimed
admittedly minor emotional injuries from alleged extortive tactics reportedly used by creditor, could
not recover under § 362(h) for her alleged emotional injuries.
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Factors Funding Co. v. Fili (In re Fili), 257 B.R. 370 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2001). Creditor fued
its proof of secured claim prior to the bar date, but afterthe debtor Chapter 13 plan was confrrmed.
Under the plan, Creditor's claim was discharged. The bankruptcy court held that confrrmation of
the debtor's plan precluded allowance of Creditor's claim under res judicata principles. Relying
upon the fact that Creditor received notice of the plan of reorganization and failed to object to said
plan, the Panel upheld the bankruptcy court's decision. The Panel stated that "the creditor may not
ignore the confnmation process and fail to object simply because the bar date for filing a proof of
claim has yet to expire. A creditor who disregards a procedurally proper plan notice that its interests
are in jeopardy does so at its own risk."
Jones v. Chernetron Corporation, 212 F.3d 199 (3rd Cir. 2000). Court held that mass tort
claimants, who waited four years after claims bar date and two years after plan was confrrmed to
attempt to fue late proof ofclaims, did not demonstrate "excusable neglect" under Rule 9006(b). The
court also concluded that the plaintiffs' claims accrued pre-petition so as to have been discharged
under the plan. However, potential tort claimants who had not been born prior to the expiration of
the claims bar date were not, as a matter of due process, precluded from pursuing his/her claims
against the debtor.
State Bank & Trust v. Dunlap (In re Dunlap), 217 F.3d 311 (5 th Cir. 2000). The court held
that when a bankruptcy court dismisses a Chapter 7 case and then vacates the dismissal, the 60 day
period for filing nondischargeability complaints runs from the rescheduled creditors' meeting after
reinstatement of the case rather than the date of the originally scheduled creditors' meeting.
Christopher v. Kendavis Holding Co. (In re Kendavis Holding Co.), 249 F.3d 383 (5th Cir.
2001) Employee was employed by Debtor and participated in Debtor's American pension plan. Mter
Employee retired, an involuntary bankruptcy was initiated against Debtor. Debtor excluded the
pension beneficiaries from its bankruptcy schedules and decided not to inform the beneficiaries of
the proceedings. Debtor took 20 million dollars out of a surplus in the American pension plan for
the benefit of its creditors. Debtor sent Employee a letter notifying him of its intention to terminate
the pension plan and assuring Employee that his benefits would not be affected. Employee had
elected to receive his benefits, but claimed he received less than he was entitled. In response, Debtor
asserted that Employee's claim arose before the bankruptcy was fued, and, therefore, Employee's
claim was discharged. The bankruptcy court agreed with Debtor and concluded that Employees claim
was discharged, and further sanctioned Employee $40,000.00 for violating its previous injunction.
The District Court reversed concluding that discharge of Employee's claim violated his right to
adequate notice as required by due process even though he knew ofDebtor's bankruptcy proceeding.
Mfrrming, the Fifth Circuit stated:

Despite Christopher's [Employee's] actual knowledge [obtained through old
newspaper articles] of Kendavis's bankruptcy proceeding, an unrepresented person
in his position should not be expected to fue a claim in the bankruptcy court to
protect his rights. An employer owes a fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries of a
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pension plan when an employer seeks to recoup surplus funds by terminating the
plan. See Bussian v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 223 F.3d 286, 295-96 (5th Cir.2000) (citing
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a». Christopher therefore acted reasonably by relying on
Kendavis's assurance that his pension benefits were not injeopardy. The fact that the
letter does not specifically refer to the bankruptcy proceeding does not diminish the
effect of the message. Any concern that the bankruptcy case may have affected
Christopher's right to pension benefits was reasonably dissipated by Kendavis's letter.
Due process requires, at the very least, a debtor to refrain from assuring potential
claimants that their rights will not be adversely affected during bankruptcy
proceedings. This is especially true when the debtor is a large corporation who owes
a fiduciary duty to the individual claimant. Although Kendavis may not have
harbored any deceptive intent by assuring Christopher that his rights would not be
affected, "fundamental notions of fairness and due process" dictate that we not place
the burden on Christopher to come forward with his claim. United States v.
Henderson, 707 F.2d 853 (5th Cir.1983) (holding that the requirements of due
process were not satisfied by notices of foreclosure that misrepresented Mississippi
law). Before he was deprived of his claim for pension benefits, Christopher was
entitled to notice that would reasonably apprise him "of the pendency of the action
and afford [him] the opportunity to present [his] objections." Mullane, 339 U.S. at
314, 70 S.Ct. 652. In these limited circumstances, perfunctory knowledge of the
bankruptcy proceeding did not constitute adequate notice to satisfy constitutional due
process requirements.
Barlowv. M.J. Waterman &Assoc. (In re M.J. Waterman &Assoc., Inc.), 227 F.3d 604 (6th
Cir. 2000). The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 requiring all proof of claims to be timely fued, did
not extinguish the equitable device known as the informal proof of claim. Allowance of an informal
proof of claim requires a showing that it would be equitable under the circumstances to allow the
informal claim. It was not an abuse of discretion (which is the standard on appeal of the bankruptcy
court's order) to disallow a number of pre-bar date motion as informal proof of claims.
In re Rimsat, Ltd., 212 F.3d 1039 (7 th Cir. 2000). Creditor's counsel received adequate notice
for due process purposes when Creditor's counsel received notice addressed to Creditor's counsel
rather to each attorney individually. Further, the court may rely on its inherent authority and the
powers provided under § 105(a) to impose sanctions.
Bak v. Vincze (In re Vincze), 230 F.3d 297 (7 th Cir. 2000). The Court held that valid service
of process did not require actual receipt ofthe mailed summons and complaint. The Court explained,
"Rule 7004(b)(9) does not require proof of actual receipt; it requires only that the summons and
complaint be mailed to both the debtor and the debtor's attorney. Thus, 'service is effective on a
debtor even if mailed to the wrong address, if the address to which it is mailed is the last listed by
the debtor in a fued writing. '"
Lee v. National Home Centers, Inc. (In re Bodenstein), 253 B.R. 46 (B.A.P.8 th Cir. 2000).
The Panel was presented with the issue of whether the Chapter 7 trustee's complaint to avoid
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preferential transfers is time barred by the statute of limitations set forth in § 546(a) where the
adversary proceeding was initiated more than two years after the commencement of the bankruptcy
case. Debtor [tied his Chapter 13 petition and almost two years later the case was converted to a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy. However, the Chapter 7 trustee attempted to avoid certain transactions as
preferential transfers more than two years after the original Chapter 13 petition was ftIed. The
Defendants objected arguing that the Chapter 7 trustee was prevented from initiating the adversary
because the statute of limitations expired. The bankruptcy court dismissed the trustee's complaint.
The Panel affrrmed concluding that statute of limitations of § 546(a) is not equitably tolled during
the course of Debtor's Chapter 13 case.

Plotner v. AT&T Corp., 224 F.3d 1161 (10th Cir. 2000): Normally, if a filing deadline
mandated by rule or statute occurs on a weekend, the affected individual has until the next working
day to meet the deadline. This extension due to the filing day landing on a weekend or a holiday also
applies to both Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a) and 8002(c). The effect of this is that the initial ten day
period in which one has to ftIe a notice of appeal and the twenty day extension to that time period
can both be extended if both of these deadlines occur on a weekend of holiday.
Carpenter v. Williams (In re Carpenter), 205 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2000). It is acceptable for
a bankruptcy appeal to be referred to a magistrate for an advisory opinion. The purpose behind such
a referral is to "defme and focus the issues on appeal."
Carter v. Rodgers, 220 F.3d 1249 (11 th Cir. 2000). Chapter 7 debtor sued Chapter 7 trustee
and the antique company responsible for conducting the sale of the debtor's property for breach of
fiduciary duties and duties of care stemming from the trustee's wife and principals of the antique
business purchased items at the auction. The debtor ftIed the action in District Court. The District
Court dismissed the debtor's action on grounds the debtor failed to obtain leave from the bankruptcy
court prior to instituting the civil action in District Court. The Eleventh Circuit held that a debtor
must obtain leave from the bankruptcy court prior to initiating an action against a Chapter 7 trustee
or other bankruptcy court appointed officers for acts done in their official capacity.

Reaffirmation Agreements and Redemption
BankBoston v. Claflin (In re Claflin), 249 B.R. 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000). The debtor ftIed
bankruptcy under Chapter 7 and soon thereafter executed a reaffrrmation agreement with the creditor.
The debtor's attorney refused to certify the agreement, thus invalidating the agreement when ftIed
with the bankruptcy court. It could only become enforceable pursuant to approval from the
bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court did not approve the reaffrrmation agreement on the grounds
the debtor would not realize any economic benefit from reaffrrmation as compared to retaining the
vehicle without reaffrrming the loan. However, the Panel noted that in the First Circuit, it is well
established that a debtor may only reaffrrm, redeem or surrender; the debtor may not retain the
property by merely staying current on the underlying obligation. Accordingly, the Panel vacated and
remanded the bankruptcy court's decision.
In re Kinion, 207 F.3d 751 (5 th Cir. 2000). Areaffrrmation agreement ftIed after the debtor's
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discharge was not accompanied by declaration of debtor's counsel and was therefore unenforceable.
The court also concluded that a local bankruptcy rule purporting to limit reaffrrmation agreements
to only secured claims was inconsistent with the Code and was invalid. Finally, the decision to
reopen the bankruptcy case for purposes of denying ineffective and incomplete reaffnmation
agreement and to avoid creditor's lien was an abuse of discretion.
Pertuso v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 233 F.3d 417 (6 th Cir. 2000). §524 does not provide a
private right of action for an asserted violation of this provision. "As the law now stands [under the
proposed bankruptcy reform an individual would have a private cause of action for violations of §
524] we have no hesitancy in joining those courts (a clear majority) that have held § 524 does not
impliedly create a private right of action."
Coxv. Zale Delaware, Inc., 239 F.3d 910 (7 th Cir. 2001). Former Debtor brought class action
suit to recover for Creditor's alleged violation of discharge injunction when it collected on payments
made pursuant to unftled and unenforceable reaffrrmation agreement. The court concluded, and
agreed with the majority of circuits who have addressed this issue, that the former debtor could not
bring a private right of action against the creditor for violating § 524(c). A suit for violation of §
524(c) may only be brought as a contempt action under § 524(a).

IIurisdiction
City ofPerth v. Custom Distribution Services, Inc. (In re Custom Distribution Services, Inc.),
224 F.3d 235 (3rd Cir. 2000). Debtor initiated an adversary proceeding under § 505 to determine,
modify, and reduce real property taxes assessed against its property on grounds that the tax assessor
failed to properly account for environmental contamination when determining property's value. The
Circuit Court held that the bankruptcy court was without jurisdiction to grant Debtor's request. The
Court held that because Debtor failed to comply with state procedures in contesting the city's
valuation, the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to modify the tax assessment under § 505.
Ferren v. Searcy Winnelson Co. (In re Ferren), 203 F.3d 559 (8 th Cir. 2000). Debtor initiated
an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court seeking to recover the proceeds from the foreclosure
and sale of certain real estate which had been disbursed to satisfy judicial liens against Debtor. The
bankruptcy court dismissed the case pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The B.A.P. affrrmed
and Debtor appealed. On appeal the Circuit Court agreed with the B.A.P. and affrrmed. The Court
provided, "the state court determined that the judicial liens had not been discharged during federal
bankruptcy proceedings. In our view [Debtors] only remedy at that point was to appeal with the state
courts of Arkansas, because the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to overturn the state court
judgment.
Harpin v. Oakley Custom Homes, Inc., 232 F.3d 901 (10th Cir. 2000): The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine precludes any litigant who lost in state court from seeking appellate review of that decision
in a federal district court. A district court also may not issue a declaratory judgment that is
inextricably connected with a state court decision. However, a federal court can issue a bankruptcy
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court judgment if the declaration does not speak to the validity of the state court judgment.

Sterling Consulting Corp. v. United States, 245 F.3d 1161 (10th Cir. 2001): 11 U.S.C. § 505
allows a bankruptcy court to "determine the amount or legality of any tax, any fme or penalty relating
to a tax, or any addition to tax, whether or not previously assessed, whether or not paid." This
section only applies to those claims that arise in a bankruptcy proceeding. Otherwise, courts cannot
determine the tax liabilities of parties pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act. While 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334(b) allows a district court to determine tax liability under § 505, § 1334 makes it clear that
only those district courts in which the bankruptcy case has been filed may adjudicate claims related
to the bankruptcy cause of action.
Crysen/Montenay Energy Co. v. Shell Oil Co. (In re Crysen/Montenay Energy Co.), 226 F.3d
160 (2nd Cir. 2000). The court held that it is clear that a bankruptcy court has the power to stay noncore proceedings in favor of arbitration. The Court noted that it has a strong interest in maximizing
scarce judicial resources, and therefore may retain jurisdiction in non-core proceedings.

§

707 Dismissals

Tamecki v. Frank (In re Tamecki), 229 F.3d 205 (3rd Cir. 2000). Chapter 7 Debtor filed for
Chapter 7 protection seeking discharge of approximately $35,000.00 in credit card debt. Debtor
possessed only one substantial asset; his share of a tenancy by the entirety in his home, which he held
with his estranged wife. Debtor and his wife were in the process of getting a divorce. Debtor claimed
an exemption under § 522(b)(2)(B) on his share of the equity in the home. Trustee challenged this
election and moved to have the case dismissed for his lack of "good faith." The bankruptcy court and
District Court both found that Debtor failed to fue his bankruptcy petition in good faith. The
Appellate Court found no clear error and affrrmed.
Neary v. Padilla (In re Padilla), 222 F.3d 1184 (9 th Cir. 2000) In a case offrrst impression
for the Ninth Circuit, the court concluded that "bad faith," in general, is not cause to dismiss a
Chapter 7 petition pursuant to Section 707(a). The Court sided with the Eighth Circuit and rejected
the Sixth Circuit's position. The Ninth Circuit noted that the list of grounds for dismissal in § 707(a)
operate to restrict the reach of the term "including" in that section. Thus, the case of a debtor who
attempted a "credit card bust out" is not dismissed under § 707(a).
Attorney Fees

In re Top Grade Sausage, Inc., 227 F.3d 123 (3rd Cir. 2000). The Third Circuit joined with the Ninth
Circuit in fmding that debtor's attorneys (as oposed to attorneys for a debtor in possession) can be
compensated under § 330. The Court stated:
Accordingly, because the statutory scheme would be rendered
inconsistent if we were to read § 330(a) to omit debtors' attorneys and

G-32

because the legislative history does not manifest an intent by
Congress to change the long-standing practice of compensating
debtors' attorneys, see Century Cleaning, 195 F.3d at 1058-60
(comprehensively detailing legislative history of the statute); see also
Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 419-420, 112 S.Ct. 773, 116
L.Ed.2d 903 (1992) ("[T]his Court has been reluctant to accept
arguments that would interpret the Code, however vague the
particular language under consideration might be, to effect a major
change in pre-Code practice that is not the subject of at least some
discussion in the legislative history. "), we conclude that debtors'
attorneys may still receive an award of compensation from the estate
for services rendered and expenses incurred.
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits take the contrary position.
In re Barron, 225 F.3d 583 (5 th Cir. 2000). Trustee moved to have counsel for the trustee
appointed on a contingent fee based on the amount recovered in preferential or fraudulent transfer
complaints. Counsel recovered an amount not anticipated and fued an application for 1/3 of the
recovery. The bankruptcy court entered an order approving compensation, but in an amount less than
the 1/3 contingent fee. The bankruptcy court explained that the approval of the contingent fee "had
been improvident." The circuit court reversed holding that if a particular compensation scheme is
approved under § 328, a bankruptcy court may only depart from that scheme if such terms and
conditions prove to have been improvident in light of developments not capable of being anticipated
a the time of the fIXing of such terms and conditions.... It is not enough that the developments were
simply unforeseen." See also In re Texas Securities, Inc., 218 F.3d 443 (5 th Cir. 2000).
In re Milwaukee Engraving Co., Inc., 219 F.3d 635 (7 th Cir. 2000). Following denial of
debtor's application for employment of law ftrm on grounds that the fmn was not disinterested, law
ftrm sought payment for professional services rendered for the time after commencement of the case
and approval of its replacement. After reviewing all relevant case law, the court concluded that § 327
does not permit such a practice.
Brown v. Smith (In re Poole), 222 F.3d 618 (9th Cir. 2000) Debtor fued her bankruptcy in the
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona. Debtor's attorney who was properly admitted practice
in the state of Illinois and admitted to practice in the Arizona federal courts, was an attorney under
the BanknlptCY Code who was eligible to receive compensation for his services.
Burns v. Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. (In re Burns), 242 F.3d 387 (10th Cir. 2001): In
bankruptcy cases and federal litigation, attorneys' fees can only be awarded if a federal statute or
contract authorizes them. However, if state law governs the substantive issues raised in the case and
the state law provides for attorneys fees, a prevailing party in a bankruptcy proceeding may be
awarded such attorneys fees.
In re Albrecht, 233 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2000). A law ftrm that has been denied post facto
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appointment as a professional under § 327(a) may not recover compensation under § 503(b)(1)(A)
for services it rendered prior to and during the time that its application for employment was pending
and after the application was disallowed. Allowing recovery would permit professionals to
circumvent § 327.
Speights & Runyan v. Celotex Corp. (In re Celotex Corp.), 227 F.3d 1336 (11 th Cir. 2000).
Counsel, who represented several property damage claimants, petitioned the bankruptcy court for
an award of attorneys' fees under § 503(b) on the grounds that the firm "made a substantial
contribution to the successful approval of a consensual plan of reorganization. The bankruptcy court
denied the request on grounds that the law frrm had an adverse interest to the debtors and that the
law frrm's services were conducted on behalf of its clients and not for the particular benefit of the
estate. On appeal, the 11 th Circuit disagreed and provided that counsel's motive in taking actions that
benefited the estate had little relevance in the determination of whether counsel has made a
substantial contribution to the case.

Chanter 13 Practice
Kielisch v. Educational Credit Management Corp. (In re Kielisch), 258 F.3d 315, (4th Cir.
2001). The Court was presented the with issue of whether Creditor was precluded from applying
Debtor's Chapter 13 plan payments to post-petition interest on Debtor's non-dischargeable student
loans. The Court concluded that pursuant to §§ 523(a)(8) and 502, student loans are nondischargeable and that a creditor may fue its claim with the bankruptcy estate only for pre-petition
interest and principal balance. ,However, 34 C.F.R. § 682.404(t) provides that a creditor generally
must apply student loan payments frrst to payment of interest before loan principal. As the court
noted, Section 502 "only addresses a creditor's ability to fue proof ofclaims for post-petition interest
and not its ability to apply estate payments to accrued interest (including post-petition interest) once
those claims are paid by the estate, § 502 does not provide a basis for concluding that [a creditor]
may not apply the Debtors' estate payments to the post-petition interest on their nondischargeable
student loan debts."

Bently v. Boyajian (In re Bentley), 266 B.R. 229 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2001). Debtors fued a chapter 13
plan whereby they divided nonpriority unsecured creditors into two classes. The frrst class was
comprised solely of creditors holding student loan obligations that, by operation of § 1328(a)(2),
would be excepted from discharge. This class of creditors were to be paid in full over the life of the
plan. The second class consisted of all other unsecured creditors, and the plan proposed to pay them
3.6 cents on the dollar. The trustee objected to the plan for, among other reasons, unfairly
discriminating against the class of general unsecured creditors in contravention of § 1322(b)(1). The
bankruptcy court denied confrrmation of the plan and Debtors appealed. In its analysis the court
noted that many courts have addressed the fairness of discrimination in favor of student loan
creditors in Chapter 13 plans by implementing a four part test, while other courts have opted for a
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test which focuses on whether the discrimination furthers a legitimate interest of the debtor. The
court declined to adopt either test. Rather, the court chose to evaluate discriminatory provisions for
fairness on the principles and structure "of Chapter 13 itself." The court provided four guiding
principles of Chapter 13: (i) equality of distributions; (li) non-priority of student loans; (iii)
mandatory or optional contributions; and (iv) the fresh start. Mer applying the four aforementioned
factors the court concluded:
When this exception from discharge is viewed with the other significant features of
Chapter 13--the expectation that nonpriority unsecured creditors will share equally
in the required plan contributions, and the fact that student loans are not accorded
priority--what emerges is a clear expectation in Chapter 13 that the balance due on
nondischargeable student loans after bankruptcy (that is, after the student loan claims
have shared on a pro rata basis with other general unsecured claims in the distribution
funded by the Chapter 13 plan) must be paid by debtors out of assets that they need
not contribute to the plan. In the balance of burdens and benefits that the Code
establishes as a baseline, the postbankruptcy balance due on student loans should be
paid by the Debtors out of assets that they are not required to commit to the plan, not
by general unsecured creditors out of their share of the Debtor's minimum
contribution. The Debtors' interest in a fresh start, in the sense of emerging from
Chapter 13 without further obligation on their student loans, does not justify the
discrimination here proposed, which, in essence, would foist upon the unsecured
creditors a burden that Chapter 13 places on the Debtors themselves.
Where a plan redistributes benefits and burdens to the debtor's benefit and the
unsecured creditors' detriment, as this one does, it can remain fair only if the debtor
"plac[es] something material onto the scales to show a correlative benefit to the other
unsecured creditors." McCullough v. Brown, 162 B.R. at 517-18. This plan offers
no correlative benefit. It arrogates the unsecured creditors' dividend for the Debtors'
benefit without compensation of equivalent value (or any compensation at all).
Therefore, we conclude that the plan discriminates unfairly and AFFIRM the order
denying its confrrmation. (footnotes omitted).
Barbosa v. Soloman, 235 F.3d 31 (1 st Cir. 2000). Debtors, post-confrrmation, sold
investment property for almost twice the scheduled value after stripping down the secured creditors'
liens. The trustee moved to compel Debtors to modify their Plan in order to pay the excess proceeds
of the sale to Debtors' unsecured creditors; to increase the dividend to the unsecured creditors from
10% to 100%. The Court found that Section 1329 allows post-confnmation modification of a plan
to capture the increased value of the property notwithstanding res judicata principles. Additionally,
the Court provided "given the factual circumstances of this case -- where the debtors realized
through the sale an appreciation in value of almost 215% of the stipulated value of the property at
confrrmation -- we fmd that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in granting the
amendment."
In re Taylor, 243 F.3d 124 (2nd Cir. 2001). Bankruptcy Judge concluded that contributions
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to debtors' contributions to their pensions and repayments of their pension loans were "disposable
income" under § 1325(b) which debtors had to devote to their Chapter 13 plan. On appeal the
Appellate Court affmned providing it is within the bankruptcy court's discretion to make decisions,
based upon facts of each individual case, whether pension contributions of Chapter 13 debtor
represent a reasonable and necessary expense.

Chrysler Financial Corp. v. Nolan (In re Nolan), 232 F.3d 528 (6th Cir. 2000). Debtor cannot
modify plan after confmnation under § 1329(a)(1) to surrender car [collateral] to the creditor so it
can sell it and treat any deficiency as an unsecured claim. Modification permits an alteration in the
amount or timing of payments, not in the reclassification of claims.
Taylor v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 212 F.3d 395 (8 th Cir. 2000). The bankruptcy court was
presented with whether a bankruptcy court may include an ERISA qualified pension in its calculation
of a petitioner's disposable income, an issue offrrst impression in the Eighth Circuit. Debtors argued
that pursuant to ERISA's anti-alienation provision, a bankruptcy court may not include an ERISA
qualified pension in its calculation of disposable income. The Court rejected this argument and held
that:
''The question of whether income from a pension is exempt from
creditors is a wholly independent inquiry from the question of
whether the pension income is reasonably necessary to support the
debtor.... [N]othing in the language of Chapter 13 prevents the
funding of a Chapter 13 plan with exempt income."

Keach v. Boyajian (In re Keach), 243 B.R. 851 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000) Debtor fued Chapter
7 bankruptcy petition, and in response Creditor fued an adversary proceeding arguing its debt was
non-dischargeable pursuant to § 523 (a)(2) (fraud). The bankruptcy court agreed with Creditor and
held the debt was non-dischargeable. Rather than appeal, Debtor attempt to convert the case, but the
court disallowed the conversion fmding instead that as of the filing date Debtor was ineligible for
Chapter 13 relief. Debtor appealed this order, however, an order was entered discharging debtor of
his debts with the exception of Creditor's claim. During the pendency of the appeal, Creditor
obtained a judgment lien upon Debtor's home and scheduled a sheriffs sale for the property. Shortly
before the sale date, Debtor fued another Chapter 13 case, thereby imposing the automatic stay. The
bankruptcy court denied confrrmation ofDebtor is plan of reorganization on grounds oflack of good
faith. In denying confrrmation on bad faith grounds, the bankruptcy court considered eleven nonexclusive factors to determine good faith, and found all eleven factors supported a conclusion oflack
of good faith. Reviewing decisions under prior Bankruptcy Act, pre-1984 Code case law, the
amendments of 1984, and case law of multiple filings, the Panel reversed the bankruptcy court. The
Panel opined that courts have construed the term "good faith" too far and are applying
"individualized standards of moralistic decision making reserved only for Congress, ... fairness is
a relative term, and there is no evidence that Congress intended that courts apply such a fairness
standard to each Chapter 13 plan."
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Scovis v. Henrichsen (In re Scovis), 249 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2001). "We now simply and
explicitly state the rule for determining Chapter 13 eligibility under § 109(e) to be that Chapter 13
eligibility should normally be determined by the debtor's originally fued schedules, checking only
to see if the schedules were made in good faith."

"Lien Stripping" Under § 1322(b)(2)
Section 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits the modification of a claim secured solely by
an interest in the debtor's principal residence. In Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, 508 U.S. 324
(1993), the Supreme Court held that a partially secured mortgage could not be bifurcated or stripped
down. Rather, the partially secured loan was fully protected by § 1322(b)(2). Since that time,
however, the Courts have addressed the issue of wholly unsecured mortgages. Those are mortgages
that are junior to other lien interests in amounts greater than the value of the property. In other
words, there is no value available for the "wholly unsecured" mortgage. The overwhelming trend
in the cases is to permit the "strip-off' of these wholly unsecured mortgages. See, e.g., Pond v. Farm
Specialists Realty (In re Pond), 252 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2001); Tannerv. FirstPlus Financial, Inc., 217
F.3d 1357 (ll th Cir. 2000); Bartee v. Tara Colony Homeowners Association (In re Bartee), 212 F.3d
277 (5 th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Financial, Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606 (3rd Cir.
2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

In re Harvey, 213 F.3d 318 (7 th Cir. 2000). Chapter 13 debtor fued two versions of proposed
plan. The long version proposed to "strip off' a portion of the creditor's claim. The short version did
not specifically provide for the "lien stripping." The plan was confrrmed without objection from the
creditor. Post-confrrmation, the creditor objected to the debtor's proposed "lien stripping"
contending the "two plans" created ambiguity. The court disagreed with the creditor and held that
to the extent ambiguity was created from the submission of two plans, the creditor should have
objected prior to confrrmation. In the absence of such objection, the creditor waived its right to argue
that is lien would not be stripped upon debtor's repayment of the allowed secured claim.
Keep in mind, however, that the power to strip off these wholly unsecured mortgages is
available in Chapter 13, but is unavailable in Chapter 7. In Ryan v. Homecomings Financial Bank,
253 F.3d 778 (4th Cir. 2001), the Court of Appeals refused to allow the strip-off of a wholly
unsecured mortgage in a Chapter 7 proceeding. Rather, the Court held that it was bound by the
Supreme Court's decision in Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992), and refused to allow strip-off
in the Chapter 7 case.

Claim Priority
Commonwealth OfMass. Div. OfEmploymentAnd Training v. Boston Regional M ed. Center,
Inc. (In re Boston Regional Med. Center, Inc.) 265 B.R. 838, 2001). Debtor was a non-profit
organization that operated a hospital. As such, it was entitled under Massachusetts law to elect to
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reimburse the state Unemployment Compensation Fund ("Fund") for the amount of benefits that
were actually paid to former employees, and chargeable to Debtor, rather than pay regular quarterly
installments (such payments are known as payments in lieu ofcontribution ("the payments"». Debtor
fued for bankruptcy protection, and subsequently discharged a number of employees. Many of the
discharged employees applied for and received unemployment benefits from the State's Fund.
Creditor-State Agency fued two proofs of claims: (i) benefits that had been paid pre-petition to
discharged employees; and (li) benefits paid post-petition to discharged employees. Creditor claimed
the pre-petition claim was an unsecured pre-petition tax claim entitled to priority under §
507(a)(8)(D), and that the post-petition claim was an administrative expense claim entitled to priority
under § 503(b)(1)(B)(i). The estate objected to both proofs of claims. On appeal, the Court frrst
addressed whether such "payments in lieu of contributions" were a tax for bankruptcy purposes.
Applying the test provided by the Supreme Court in United States v. Reorganized CF & I
Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 116 S.Ct. 2106 (1996) - whether the attributes of the
exaction (1) met the general description of a tax and (2) possessed other "tax characteristics" such
that the exaction operated as a tax as distinct from a debt or penalty- the Court concluded that the
payments were a tax for bankruptcy purposes. The Court also addressed, among other issues, what
portion of Creditor's claims were administrative claims. Creditor argued that its entire post-petition
claim was a claim against the estate and was entitled to a frrst priority administrative claim. The
Court affrrmed the bankruptcy court's decision holding that benefits paid post-petition were
chargeable under state law to Debtor as the employing unit. Thus, such charges were not obligations
incurred by the bankruptcy estate, and therefore could not be qualified as a frrst priority
administrative expense.
Security State Bank v. Internal Revenue Serv. (In re Van Gerpen), 267 F.3d 453, 2001 WL
1131550 (5th Cir. 2001). Debtor fued for bankruptcy protection and the trustee retained a law fum
to perform legal services on behalf of the bankruptcy estate. The law frrm subsequently fued an
interim application for its fees which was awarded. Other interim compensation payments were also
subsequently approved by the court. Some time after the bankruptcy petition was fued, Debtor fued
two proofs of claims on behalf of the IRS and the IRS subsequently fued another claim. The bulk
of the IRS claims were entitled to priority status under the Internal Revenue Code. Another creditor
objected to IRS's claims, asserting they were fued untimely. Creditor argued that the Trustee had
commenced distribution of the estate by making interim compensation payments to the law frrm out
of estate assets, as well as paying other expenses incurred by the trustee in the administration of the
estate. The IRS contended that the claims were made before the trustee had "commenced
distribution" of the estate, and under 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(1) were entitled to priority status. On
appeal, the Court noted that the statute, § 726(a)(1), does not defme the phrase "commences
distribution." The Fifth Circuit held that "we are persuaded that the appropriate interpretation of
'commences distribution,' under the totality of the present bankruptcy law, is the date when a
bankruptcy court approves the trustee's fmal report, thus allowing the trustee to commence [mal
distribution of the estate." The vourt further provided that under Creditor's interpretation, "the frrst
expense payment made by the trustee would preclude any further tardy claims from being fued, even
though few creditors, if any, knew or reasonably could know of the preclusion."
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Cukierman v. Uecker (In re Cukierman), 265 F.3d 846, (9th Cir. 2001). The court was
presented with the issue of whether obligations denominated in a lease as "further rent" are entitled
to administrative priority, even though the obligations were actually repayments on previously
executed promissory notes. The debtor contended that the "further rent" payments were not entitled
to administrative priority because they were not in fact an obligation arising out of his use of real
property. The bankruptcy court and Ninth Circuit B.A.P. disagreed. The Appellate Court affirmed.
The court stated that "[b]ecause
Debtor's obligation to pay "further rent" was an
obligation under an unexpired lease of nonresidential
real property, it is an obligation that he was required
to perform pending the assumption or rejection of the
lease. See §11 U.S.C. 365(d)(3). Creditor's claim to
the unpaid portion of that obligation is entitled to
administrative priority under the rule we set forth in
Pacific-Atlantic. See Pacific-Atlantic, 27 F.3d at 405."
Debbie Reynolds Management Co. v. Calstar Corp., Inc. (In re Debbie Reynolds Hotel &
Casino, Inc.), 255 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2001). Bankruptcy court approved compromise agreement
between Debtor and oversecured creditor, pursuant to which the oversecured creditor agreed to
surcharge its collateral for the benefit of debtor's attorney on the condition that no other surcharges
would be permitted. Post-petition fmancier, who retained superpriority status, objected to the
compromise agreement claiming the agreement precluded it from seeking a surcharge under 11
U.S.C. § 506 and placed Debtor's counsel's fees above its "superpriority" position. The court
dismissed post-petition fmancier's surcharge argument, because it lacked standing under the
rationale provided under Hartford Underwriters. Hartford Underwriters established that only a
trustee or a debtor-in-possession has standing to invoke § 506(c). As to the post-petition fmancier's
priority argument, the Court concluded that §506(c) expenses do not fall within the priority scheme
of the bankruptcy code. Rather, "such expenses come directly from the secured party's recovery and
such expenses are paid frrst out of the proceeds of the sale, before a secured creditor is paid" [even
a creditor with "superpriority" status].
Crafts Precision Industries, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc. (In re Crafts Precision Industries,
Inc.), 244 B.R. 178 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000). The panel concluded that vacation payments, which were
earned more than 90 days before the debtor's petition, do not qualify under § 507(a)(3), and
therefore, should not be considered in determining the cap under § 507(a)(4)(B). The court further
concluded that retired employees are not to be included within the definition of the "number of
employees covered by each such plan"for purposes of § 507(a)(4)(B)(i).
United States v. Yellin (In re Weinstein), 251 B.R. 174 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000). The IRS [tied
a formal "request for payment" seeking a total of $4,593.83 for interest on the Chapter 7 estate's
post-petition tax liabilities. The trustee proposed to pay the IRS as a ftfth priority claim under §
726(a)(5), rejecting the IRS's contention that such amount was an administrative claim. The
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bankruptcy court agreed with the trustee and granted the IRS's claim ftfth priority. The Panel held,
pursuant to the clear text of the Code, that the IRS's claim should be entitled to a fIfth priority claim.

Involuntary Bankruptcy
In re Bayshore Wire Products Corp., 209 F.3d 100 (2nd Cir. 2000). Petitioning Creditors'
claims, which were personal claims against Debtor's president, were subject to bona fide dispute and
therefore could not serve as the basis for an involuntary petition under §303(b).

Section 365
Yates Development, Inc. v. Old Kings Interchange, Inc. (In re Yates Development, Inc.), 256
F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2001). Debtor was party to an option agreement whereby he was granted the
option to purchase a piece of property by August 15, 1998. However, the option included the
following clause:
[I]ffor any reason this Option Agreement is extended beyond August 15, 1998 and
[Debtor] is entitled to exercise the Option beyond August 15, 1998 date, then the
Purchase Price shall be increased by the sum of $5,000.00 per day for every day after
August 15, 1998 until the ultimate Closing Date.
Debtor fued for bankruptcy protec~ion and on August 14, 1998 fued a Motion to assume the option
contract. Subsequently, Debtor fued a declaratory action requesting the above clause to be
invalidated because it was in violation of the ipso facto provision in § 365(e)(1). The Court
dismissed Debtor's argument providing, "[t]he literal language of the condition in Paragraph 12 [the
paragraph above] is not one of the conditions expressly proscribed by § 365(e)(1). Rather than being
contingent on [Debtor's] bankruptcy or some other similar event, Paragraph 12 is contingent o'n the
passage of time."
Calet, Hirsch & Ferrell v. Microvideo Learning Systems, Inc. (In re Microvideo Learning
Systems, Inc.), 227 F.3d 474 (2nd Cir. 2000). Creditor-Lessor moved for an immediate payment of
post-petition, pre-rejection lease payments after the bankruptcy court lifted the automatic stay to
allow it to protect its collateral. The bankruptcy court held that a landlord is not entitled to immediate
payment of unpaid postpetition rent under § 365(d)(3) when the debtor's estate is administratively
insolvent. ''The payment of rent now would effectively give the landlord a super-priority over the
other administrative expense creditors. That I believe, is not the purpose of § 365(d)(3)."
In re Koenig Sporting Goods, Inc., 203 F.3d 986 (6th Cir. 2000). Debtor was obligated to pay
that month's rent to the Landlord on the frrst day of each month. Debtor, post-petition, rejected its
lease with landlord on the second day of the month and argued it was only obligated to pay Landlord
for two days rent. The court disagreed fmding "§ 365(d)(3) is unambiguous as to the debtor's rent
obligation and requires payment of the full month's rent."
Centerpoint Properties v. Montgomery Ward Holding Corp. (In re Montgomery Ward
Holding Corp.), _ F.3d _, 2001 WL 1193207 (3rd Cir. Oct. 10, 2001). Pre-petition, Debtor and
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Creditor executed a lease on commercial property. Under the lease, Debtor was required to reimburse
Creditor for real estate taxes assessed on the premises. The obligation to reimburse did not mature
under the terms of the lease until after the order, although the landlord's liability for the taxes
accrued in large part prior to the order. The Third Circuit was faced with the issue of whether § 365
required the debtor-in-possession to make the entire payment called for under the lease, or only a
pro-rated portion of the taxes representing the period subsequent to Debtor filing its petition.
Creditor argued that all the invoices were payable immediately as "obligations of [Debtor] ...
arising from ... the lease" after the petition. Debtor argued that the statue was ambiguous and it
must only pay the taxes attributable to the period after the petition date. The bankruptcy court and
district court agreed with the debtor. The Appellate Court reversed. In so doing, the Court found the
statue was not ambiguous, and that an obligation under a lease for the purposes of § 365(d)(3) arises
when the legally enforceable duty to perform arises under that lease. Consequently, Debtor's lease
obligation to reimburse Creditor for tax payments arose post-petition and prior to rejection, and its
obligation must be fulfilled in whole, not in part.

G.I. Industries, Inc. v. Benedor Corp. (In re G.I. Industries, Inc.), 204 F.3d 1276 (9 th Cir.
2000). The court stated that ''The rejection of an executory contract creates a statutory breach under
§ 365(g). However, the statutory breach is not fmal and conclusive because it is still subject to the
claims process under § 502. Therefore, in accordance with the statutory language and the structure
of the Bankruptcy Code, a bankruptcy judge may adjudicate the validity of an executory contract
pursuant to a valid proof of claim even after the trustee has rejected the contract."
Office of Thrift Supervision v. Overland Park Financial Corp. (In re Overland Park Fin.
Corp.), 236 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2001): In enacting 11 U.S.C. § 365(0), it appears that Congress
meant to include any commitment when stating that there must be a commitment to maintain capital.
This includes an informal stipulation, even if that "commitment" is not an enforceable contract.
Additionally, a debtor's commitment to assume and cure her capital deficit must be fulfilled before
the debtor may proceed with and acquire protection from Chapter 11.

Recoupment/Setoff
Folger Adam Security, Inc. v. Dematteis/Macgregor, lV, 209 F.3d 252 (3rd Cir. 2000).
Recoupment and set-off defenses held by creditor contractor, were not extinguished, as "interests"
in estate property, by bankruptcy sale of debtor's assets free and clear of any other interests.
Simsv. United States Dept. of Health & Human Services (In re TLC Hospitals, Inc.), 224
F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2000). Creditor-Dept. of Health & Human Services was permitted to deduct prepetition overpayments from sums owed to debtor for post-petition services without violating the
automatic stay under the equitable doctrine of recoupment.

Section 363
In re Rickel Home Centers, Inc., 209 F.3d 291 (3rd Cir. 2000). Landlord objected to debtor's
assumption and assignment of shopping mall lease. Bankruptcy Court excised restrictive use
provisions contained in the lease and approved assumption and assignment. Landlord appealed the
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decision, but failed to move to stay the assumption/assignment. The Appellate Court held "because
reversal of the District Court's decision to excise the use provisions would affect the validity of the
transaction between Rickel [the debtor] and Staples [assignee]" the appeal is moot.
Trustee

In re Robertson, 203 F.3d 855 (5 th Cir. 2000). Chapter 7 trustee could not use his strong arm
powers to avoid a prepetition transfer of property which occurred when debtor's property was
partitioned as a result of a divorce because a bona fide purchaser under Louisiana law likewise could
not acquire any interest in the property from the debtor at the commencement of the case. The court
found that the court judgment recited into the record of the divorce proceedings served to partition
community property and the debtor's wife retained one half interest in the property at issue.
In re Smyth, III, 207 F.3d 758 (5 th Cir. 2000). In a case of frrst impression, the court
concluded that the bankruptcy trustee should not be subject to personal liability for damages to the
bankruptcy estate unless they are found to have acted with gross negligence. The Court rejected the
lower standard of mere negligence, and the stricter standard of willful and deliberate violations.
Avoiding Powers
Morehead v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. (In re Morehead), 249 F.3d 445 (6th Cir.
2001). Creditor perfected its garnishment order outside the 90 day preference period. As such, the
bankruptcy court held that the no preferential transfer occurred. The District Court affrrmed. On
appeal the Court disagreed and reversed. It found that § 547(a)(3) requires that the debtor have rights
in the property before it can be transferred . Further it provided, "In the wage garnishment context,
this cannot logically occur until the debtor performs the services that entitle her to receive the wages
that are subject to garnishment." Accordingly, "when wages are earned during the preference period,
transfer of those wages pursuant to a garnishment order is avoidable under 11 U.S.C. §
547(b)(4)(a)."

Treinish v. Norwest Bank Minnesota, N.A. (In re Periandri), 266 B.R. 651, (B.A.P. 6th Cir.
2001). The Court addressed the issue of whether Creditor's pending state court foreclosure action
provided constructive notice to the Chapter 7 trustee pursuant to Ohio's lis pendens statute so as to
prevent the trustee from obtaining the status of a bona fide purchaser under Section 544(a)(3).
Creditor held a frrst mortgage on Debtor's house and initiated· a foreclosure action against Debtor
in state court which was stayed by the filing of Debtor's Chapter 13 petition. Debtor's Chapter 13
case was later converted to a Chapter 7. The Chapter 7 trustee initiated an adversary proceeding
pursuant to Section 544(a)(3) to determine the validity of Creditor's mortgage and to set the
mortgage aside as improperly perfected. The trustee asserted that the execution of the mortgage by
only one person in violation of Ohio law rendered the mortgage defective. Creditor argued that under
Ohio's lis pendens statute the state foreclosure action provided constructive notice to the trustee, thus
preventing the trustee from obtaining the status of a bona fide purchaser for purposes of avoidance
under Section 544(a)(3). Ohio's lis pendens statute provides:
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[w]hen summons has been served or publication made, the action is pending so as to
charge third persons with notice of its pendency. while pending, no interest can be
acquired by third persons in the subject of the action as against the plaintiffs title.
After examining the statute, the Court concluded that:
[a]nyprospective purchaser or encumbrancer 'is chargeable with constructive notice
of the pendency of such suit, so as to render his interest in the subject of it liable to
its event. ,,,
Since lis pendens charges everyone with constructive notice of this lawsuit, the
Chapter 7 trustee is on such notice. Once on notice of the lawsuit, the trustee's
situation, like that of any potential purchaser or the property, changes for:
while the provision of § 544(a)(3) state that the Trustee takes the
powers of a bona fide purchaser of real property "without regard to
any knowledge of the Trustee or any creditor, " § 544(a)(3) does
not override provisions of state law which impute notice of claims
to real estate through constructive notice, or through facts which
are legally sufficient to put a purchaser upon inquiry.
Thus, the court concluded that "after the commencement of [the foreclosure action] no party,
including the bankruptcy trustee acting pursuant to the § 544(a)(3) strong arm powers, could
attain bona fide purchaser status against the interest of Norwest [Creditor]."

COlnmodore Int'l Ltd. v. Gould (In re Commodore Int'l Ltd.), 262 F.3d 96, (2d Cir. 2001).
Unsecured creditor's committee ("the committee") brought an adversary proceeding, in the name
of the Chapter 11 Debtors, against various directors and officers of Debtor alleging breach of
fiduciary duty, corporate waste and mismanagement. The District Court dismissed the action
because the committee lacked standing. The Appellate Court agreed noting that "a creditor's
committee may acquire standing to pursue the debtor's claims if (1) the committee has the
consent of the debtor in possession or trustee, and (2) the court fmds that suit by the committee is
(a) in the best interest of the bankruptcy estate, and (b) is 'necessary and beneficial' to the fair
and efficient resolution of the bankruptcy proceedings. This approach permits a reasoned and
practicable division of labor between the creditors' committee and the debtor in possession or
trustee, while also providing bankruptcy courts with significant authority both to manage the
litigation and to check any potential for abuse by the parties." Because the committee failed to
establish that the action was necessary or beneficial to the estate, the Appellate Court affrrmed.
James v. Planters Bank (In re James), 257 B.R. 673 (B.A.P. SthCir. 2001). Ninety days prior
to Debtors filing their bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7, the state court entered an order allowing
debtor's-husband's wages to be garnished. Debtor-Husband's wages were garnished up to the time
Debtors filed their bankruptcy, and for a limited time after such filing. Debtors filed a complaint for
turnover to recover those payments made within the ninety days before they filed their bankruptcy
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petition, and, also, to hold Creditor in contempt for accepting payment after their petition was fued.
The Panel, affnming the bankruptcy court, permitted recovery, as preferential, offunds earned within
the ninety days of the filing of the petition, but did not hold the Creditor in contempt for accepting
payments. The Panel provided that under Arkansas law, where the property transferred is wages, no
transfer occurs until the wages are earned. Accordingly, those wages earned within the ninety day
period were recoverable as preferential. But, garnishments paid within the ninety day period on
wages earned outside of the ninety day period were not recoverable; the wages were earned outside
ofthe preferential time period. The Panel further held that Creditor did not violate the automatic stay
because under Arkansas law the garnishment order terminated Debtors' interest in the wages,
Debtors had no interest in the wages at the time the bankruptcy petition was fued.
Stevenson v. Leisure Guide ofAmerica, Inc. (In re Shelton Harrison Chevrolet, Inc.), 202
F.3d 834 (6th Cir. 2000). Delivery ofManufacturer's Statement of Origin ("MS 0") did not constitute
"new value" for purposes of the exception to preference recovery in § 547(c)(1). "Under Tennessee
law, legal title to the vans passed to the debtor upon delivery, and the debtor could transfer legal title
to a buyer in the ordinary course of business even without a title certificate or an MSO." The debtor
"derived the full value of the vehicles upon receipt because it had the ability to sell the vans
immediately, without the MSOs. The MSOs, in tum, had no independent value and did not augment
the value of the vans."
Dorholt, Inc. v. Dorholt (In re Dorholt, Inc.), 224 F.3d 871 (8 th Cir. 2000). Debtor granted
to creditor a lien on its inventory, accounts, and other personal property. However, because of a
service bureau mistake, Creditor's lien was not perfected for 16 days. Trustee commenced an
adversary proceeding to avoid the security interest as preferential. The bankruptcy court agreed, but
the B.A..P. reversed, concluding that Creditor's security interest may not be avoided because it falls
within the contemporaneous new value exception in § 547(c)(1). Trustee appealed arguing that the
loan and security interest were not "substantially contemporaneous" because Creditor did not perfect
interest within ten days.

The statute [§ 547(c)(1)] uses a more elastic term, substantially
contemporaneous. "The modifier 'substantial' makes clear that
contemporaneity is a flexible concept which requires a case-by-case
inquiry into all relevant circumstances." Pine Top, 969 F.2d at 328.
Congress knew how to adopt a specific time limit; it did so in the
purchase money security interest exception, § 547(c)(3). It chose a
less rigid standard for § 547(c)(1), no doubt because that provision
governs a wider variety of loans and credit transactions. We must
construe the statute accordingly.
It is undisputed that Marjorie [Creditor] injected $100,950 of new
capital into the struggling debtor on March 2, 1998, and that her
security interest would have been perfected more quickly but for a
service bureau's filing error. Thus, her loan appears to be precisely
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the type of transaction that the § 547(c)(1) exception was intended to
protect.

Dill v. Southland Corp. (In re LMS Holding Co.), 203 F.3d 835 (10th Cir. 2000): A party
who has fued a claim against a bankruptcy estate on a preference claim of a bankruptcy trustee is not
entitled to a trial by jury. This general principle, however, is not limited to those claims that are
made to recover avoidable preferences by a bankruptcy trustee. All entities in the same class should
be treated alike. As such, creditors seeking relief in a bankruptcy court should be treated the same
as others similarly situated.

Williams v. Marlar (In re Marlar), 267 F.3d 749 (8th Cir. 2001). Two days before he was to
get married, Debtor conveyed his interest in real property to his son for ten dollars with "love and
admiration." The son recorded the deed in mid-1995, during Debtor's divorce proceedings. In the
subsequent divorce decree, the wife was awarded $52,000.00 secured by a lien on any interest of
Debtor in the subject real property. Unable to collect from the Debtor, the wife initiated proceedings
in state court under the Arkansas Fraudulent Transfer Act to set aside the transfer ofthe real property
to the son. The state court ruled in favor ofDebtor. Soon thereafter, the wife and two other creditors
fued an involuntary bankruptcy petition against Debtor. The trustee initiated an action to set aside
the transfer to the son attempting to bring the real property into the bankruptcy estate for the benefit
of all creditors. The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the trustee holding "that the date the deed was
recorded by [the son] was the effective date ofthe transfer as to unsecured creditors who lacked prior
notice, and that the transfer was made without adequate consideration and rendered [Debtor]
insolvent." Debtor appealed arguing principles of res judicata and that there were disputed issues of
material fact. Relying on § 544(b)(1), the Court dismissed Debtor's res judicata argument. Section
544(b)(1) allows the trustee to avoid the transfer by invoking the rights of any unsecured creditor.
The court noted that the trustee had no avoidance power based on the wife's rights under Arkansas
law, however, Arkansas law did not bar the trustee from asserting the rights of other unsecured
creditors. Accordingly, the trustee was permitted to assert the rights of other unsecured creditors to
avoid the transfer under the Arkansas Fraudulent Transfer Act, but the wife's claim was not
permitted to be satisfied from the proceeds of the real property.

Valuation
FirstMeritN.A. v. Getz (In re Getz), 242 B.R. 916 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2000). Debtors purchased
a new vehicle for $16,214.24 pre-petition. Debtors Chapter 13 plan of reorganization valued the car
at $7,500.00 and planned on paying this amount as·a secured claim, and paying the balance as an
unsecured claim under sections 506(a) and 1325(a)(5)(B). Creditor objected to confrrmation of the
plan claiming the value of the car was $8,825.00; the N.A.D.A. retail value figure. The bankruptcy
court used the average of the N.A.D.A. retail and wholesale values as a starting point for making the
evidentiary determination of the allowed amount of the Creditor's claim. The Panel did not fmd this
valuation method clearly erroneous.
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Triad Financial Corp. v. Weathington (In re Weathington), 254 B.R. 895 (B.A.P. 6th Cir.
2000). The Panel held that the liquidation value is the appropriate value for determining the amount
that a Chapter 7 debtor must pay to redeem collateral pursuant to § 722. The court reasoned:
The liquidation value best reflects Congressional intent because the
commercial reality is that creditors that repossess vehicles most often
sell them wholesale at auctions. Indeed, because the process of
repossessing and selling a vehicle involves some additional cost to
the creditor, it is likely that when a debtor pays the creditor the
liquidation value of a vehicle to redeem it, the creditor may actually
receive more money than if it had repossessed the vehicle. In any
event, as between the liquidation value and the replacement value, the
liquidation value better approximates the creditor's recovery upon
executing its contract rights than the replacement value, and that is
the Congressional intent as reflected in the legislative history.

Chapter 11
Walton v. Jamko, Inc. (In re Jamko, Inc.), 240 F.3d 1312 (11 th Cir. 2001). Addressing an
issue of frrst impression, the Eleventh Circuit considered whether UST fees should be based upon
the total sum of all post-confrrmation disbursements the debtor makes, including its ordinary and
necessary business operating expenses. Noting that there was sufficient legislative history and case
law to support its position, the Circuit Court concluded that UST fees should apply to all
disbursements made during the "entire process, including ordinary operating expenses, before or
after confnmation, as a type of user tax on those who benefit the most from the program." There is
a proposal pending to amend Rule 2015 to clarify that the debtor must continue to fue quarterly
reports as long as payments are due.
Tenn-FlaPartners v. First Union Nat'lBankofFla. (In re Tenn-FlaPartners), 226 F.3d 746
(6th Cir. 2000). Confnmation of Chapter 11 plan was revoked based on fraud under § 1144 when
partners of debtor purchased apartment complex for $8,855.000.00 at confrrmation and sold it two
weeks later for over 12 million dollars.
Silverman v. Tracar (In re American Preferred Prescription, Inc), 255 F.3d 87 (2d Cir.
2001). Upon evidence of possible debtor misconduct in concealing assets, bankruptcy court
entered post-confrrmation order appointing a chapter 11 trustee and no appeal was taken. Later
in the proceedings, Creditor moved to remove the trustee and dismiss the proceedings fued by
the trustee on the theory that the bankruptcy court did not have jurisdiction to appoint a trustee
post-confrrmation. The bankruptcy court denied Creditor's motions. The district court reversed.
Reversing the district court, the appellate court held that a Creditor that failed to appeal the postconfnmation appointment of a trustee was barred from belatedly challenging the trustee's
authority. Consequently, the Appellate Court did not have to address the issue of whether a
bankruptcy court can appoint a Chapter 11 trustee post-confrrmation.
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Cedar Short Resort, Inc. v. Mueller (In re Cedar Shore Resort, Inc), 235 F.3d 375 (8 th Cir.
2000). A bad faith filing of a Chapter 11 petition can result in dismissal. When making the
determination whether a petition was fued in bad faith, courts will look to the totality of the
circumstances. In doing so, the court will take into consideration the debtor's fmancial condition,
the debtor's fmancial realities, and the debtor's motives. Primarily filing a bankruptcy petition to
avoid litigation often constitutes bad faith. Furthermore, a Chapter 11 petition can be dismissed on
grounds of bad faith even if a possibility of reorganization exists. The Court cites and relies on In
re SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 1999).
Universal Suppliers, Inc. v. Regional Building Systems (In re Regional Building Systems,
Inc.), 254 F.3d 528 (4th Cir. 2001). Debtor fued for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 and
listed Creditor as a holder of a claim secured by collateral valued at zero. Thus, Creditor's claims
was only entitled to allowance as an unsecured claim. Creditor knew of its claim and in fact
participated as a member of the official committee of unsecured creditors. The bankruptcy court
confrrmed Debtor's plan of reorganization that did not provide for retention of Creditor's lien.
Rather, the plan classified Creditor's claim as unsecured. Creditor failed to assert its lien at the
time of confrrmation or otherwise object to confrrmation of the plan. Just prior to plan
confrrmation, the bankruptcy court approved a settlement from an unrelated lawsuit that resulted
in payment of approximately $5 million to Debtor. Post-confrrmation, Creditor asserted that its
lien attached to the proceeds of the settlement. The bankruptcy court held that Creditor's lien
rights were extinguished upon plan confrrmation. The Appellate Court affrrmed. In affrrming the
court stated:
The bankruptcy court properly determined that all of the elements needed to invoke
§ 1141(c)'s "free and clear of all claims" language had been satisfied in this case.
First, [Debtor] submitted a Chapter 11 reorganization plan to the court. Second, the
plan was confrrmed by an order of the court, without any objection from [Creditor].
Third, the property to which [Creditor] now seeks to attach its lien was "dealt with
by the plan." Specifically, the plan stated that after certain other claims had been
paid, [Creditor] and the other unsecured creditors would receive a pro rata share of
the remainder of the estate, including any amounts left in the $5 million settlement
fund. And fourth, neither the plan nor the order confrrming the plan preserved
[Creditor's] lien rights. Rather, the plan classified Creditor as a general unsecured
creditor.
By the plain terms of § 1141 (c), therefore, confrrmation of [Debtor's] Chapter 11
plan rendered the $5 million settlement fund "free and clear of all claims" not
expressly preserved. Since [Creditor's] lien was not preserved, it was extinguished
by operation of law upon confrrmation of [Debtor's] plan. And we note that every
other circuit court of appeals to have addressed this issue has reached the same
conclusion. See Matter of Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 463 (7th Cir.1995) (holding that
under § 1141(c), "unless the plan of reorganization, or the order confrrming the plan,
says that a lien is preserved, it is extinguished by the confrrmation."); In re Be-Mac
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Transport Co., 83 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir.1996) (following Penrod); In re Barton
Indus., Inc., 104 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir .1997) (same).

Danny Thomas Properties II Ltd. Partnership v. Beal Bank, S.S.B. (In re Danny Thomas
Properties II Limited Partnership), 241 F.3d 959 (8 th .Cir. 2001). Creditor objected to Debtor's plan
of reorganization because a "drop dead" clause contained in the plan did not make it feasible. The
Court sustained Creditor's objections providing:
We agree with Beal [Creditor] that the "drop dead" provisions do not
amount to liquidations for purposes of § 1129(a)(11). "Liquidation in or
out ofbankruptcy means the end ofa [debtor's] existence," Maytag Corp.
v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 219 F.3d 587,591 (7th
Cir.2000). The "drop dead" provisions here do not contemplate the end
of the debtors' existence, but merely allow Beal to foreclose on their
primary asset. It is true that foreclosure by Beal would leave the debtors
as nearly-empty shells, but the debtors would nonetheless continue to
exist and would be free to pursue new opportunities. The"drop dead"
provisions are, therefore, more closely akin to clauses that permit a sale
of assets, an action that is contemplated by the bankruptcy laws as a
proper part of a reorganization plan. See § 1123(a)(5)(D); see also 7
Collier on Bankruptcy <j{ 1123.02[41 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed.
rev.2000). Because the provisions offered by the debtors do not provide
for liquidations, the language is entitled to no special significance under
§ 1129(a)(11), and thus the provisions certainly cannot make the
reorganization plans feasible as a matter of law.

Miscellaneous
Kennedy v. Medicap Pharmacies, Inc., 267 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2001). Debtors entered into
a franchise agreement to operate a Medicap Pharmacy. The franchise agreement contained a
covenant not to compete. The Debtors terminated the franchise agreement, and conceded that they
violated the covenant by working in another pharmacy. Subsequently, Debtors fued for protection
under Chapter 13. Creditor-Medicap initiated an adversary proceeding requesting equitable relieffor
breach of the covenant not to compete as the covenant was not discharged in bankruptcy. Creditor
also requested a permanent injunction enforcing the covenant not to compete. The bankruptcy court
granted summary judgment in Creditor's favor and terminated the automatic stay to allow Creditor
to seek an injunction in federal district court. After an extensive review of case law, the court
concluded that the right to equitable relief, such as an injunction, constitutes a claim under the
bankruptcy code only if it is an alternative to a right of payment or if compliance with the equitable
order will itself require the payment of money. The court noted that the remedy of enjoining the
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debtor was not an alternative to payment nor did it require payment of money, and thus was not a
claim for bankruptcy purposes. Therefore, Debtors' obligations under the covenant not to compete
were not discharged, and the automatic stay was terminated to allow Creditor to seek an injunction.

Nextwave Personal Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 254 F.3d
130 (D.C. Circuit 2001). The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") allows winning bidders
of broadband PCS licenses to pay its fee in installments. In return, the FCC takes a perfected
security interests in the licenses, and provides for license cancellation should a bidder fail to make
timely payments. Debtor was awarded a number of different licenses, however, it failed to obtain
proper fmancing and was forced to fue for bankruptcy protection. Consequently, post-petition the
FCC cancelled Debtor's licenses. Mter a number of trips to and from the bankruptcy and appellate
courts addressing a number of various issues, Debtor fued a petition with the FCC requesting
reconsideration of the license cancellation. The FCC denied Debtor's request for a number reasons.
Debtor appealed claiming that the FCC's cancellation is "patently unlawful" under the provisions
ofSection 525, among other sections, ofthe Bankruptcy Code. Mer addressing issues ofjurisdiction
and res judicata, the Court focused on the issue of whether the FCC's cancellation of its licenses
. post-petition violated section 525 (Debtor asserted such practices violated sections 1123 and 362 as
well, however, the court focused on section 525). The FCC asserted that since the automatic stay did
not apply, an issue that was resolved in an earlier hearing, section 525 should also not apply. The
Court disagreed stating:
Section 525 clearly and explicitly prohibits governmental units, for whatever reason,
from canceling licenses for failure to pay a dischargeable debt: "a governmental unit
may not ... revoke ... a license ... to ... a bankrupt ... solely because such bankrupt ...
has not paid a debt that is dischargeable ... under this title." § 11 U.S.C. 525(a).
Nothing in section 525 or 362 states that section 525 is subject to subsection
362(b)(4)'s regulatory power exception, or that the exception should be read to limit
section 525's clear reach. Thus, while interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code is a
"holistic endeavor," and "[a] provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation" can
often be "clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme," United Sav. Ass'n of
Tex. v. Timbers ofInwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365,371, 108 S.Ct. 626,98
L.Ed.2d 740 (1988), here we see no such ambiguity. Various bankruptcy and district
courts, accordingly, have held that section 525 can apply even if the automatic stay
does not. See, e.g., William Tell II, Inc. v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n (In re
William Tell II, Inc.), 38 B.R. 327,330 (N.D.Ill.1983) ("even if a state proceeding is
not automatically stayed, a bankruptcy court has authority to enjoin certain conduct
under § 11 U.S.C. 525"); In re The Bible Speaks, 69 B.R. 368, 373 n. 5
(Bankr.D.Mass.1987) ("[Section] 525(a) is directed at governmental units and may
apply even where the automatic stay has no effect. It).
Moreover, contrary to Intervenors' argument, this interpretation of section 525 does
not render the Code "structural[ly] [in]coheren[t]." Though this reading does mean
that an action exempted under subsection 362(b)(4) might nonetheless be barred by
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section 525, it does not render subsection 362(b)(4) meaningless, because that
subsection covers a different and wider variety of actions than section 525. For
example, subsection 362(b)(4) exempts from the automatic stay (among other things)
"any act" by a governmental unit to "obtain possession of property of the estate ... or
to exercise control over property of the estate," so long as the act is taken to enforce
the unit's "regulatory power." §11 U.S.C. 362(a)(3), (b)(4) (emphasis added).
Section 525, in contrast, prohibits governmental units only from taking certain
specific actions with respect to an extremely limited subset of a debtor's property-licenses and similar grants-- or with respect to employment opportunities.

****
We have no doubt that in developing its installment payment plan, the Commission
made a good faith effort to implement Congress's command to encourage small
businesses with limited access to capital to participate in PCS auctions. We are also
mindful that, as the Commission suggests, allowing NextWave to retain its licenses
may be "grossly unfair" to losing bidders and licensees who "complied with the
administrative process and forfeited licenses or made timely payments despite their
fmancial difficulties." Appellee's Br. at 9. Any unfairness, however, was inherent in
the Commission's decision to employ a licensing scheme that left its regulatory
actions· open to attack under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, the very purpose
of which is "to permit successful rehabilitation of debtors. NLRB v. Bildisco & 465
U.S. 513, 527,104 S.Ct. 1188,79 L.Ed.2d 482 (1984); see also H.R.REP. NO.95595, at 220, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, at 6179 ("The purpose of a
business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation case, is to restructure a business's
fmances so that it may continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its
creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders. "). The Code expressly
contemplates that bankrupts will sometimes avoid the consequences of late or nonpayment they might have faced had they not fued for bankruptcy. See, e.g., § 11
U.S.C. 1123(a)(5)(G) (stating that a reorganization plan may, among other options,
provide for "curing or waiving of any default"); United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc.,
462 U.S. 198, 204, 103 S.Ct. 2309, 76 L.Ed.2d 515 (1983) ("The creditor with a
secured interest in property included in the estate must look to [the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code] for protection, rather than to the nonbankruptcy remedy of
possession. It). And the Code's restrictions have been applied even to the official
actions ofGovernment agencies. See, e.g., Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 209, 103 S.Ct.
2309 (enforcing the Bankruptcy Code against the IRS to prevent seizure of property
under a tax lien and concluding that "[n]othing in the Bankruptcy Code or its
legislative history indicates that Congress intended a special exception for the tax
collector"). Here, as we have explained, we think section 525 prevents the
Commission, whatever its motive, from canceling the licenses of winning bidders
who fail to make timely installment payments while in Chapter 11.
II
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Kirtley v. Sovereign Life Ins. Co. ofCalifornia (In re Durability, Inc.), 212 F.3d 551 (10th Cir. 2000):
Section 108(b) of the bankruptcy code makes clear that if the grace period of an insurance contract
has not already expired by the time the bankruptcy suit commences and the contract specifies that
the policy will remain valid during the grace period and payment is made within this period, the
trustee has sixty days in which to pay the premium and assume the contract.
Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 120 S.Ct. 1942
(2000). During its attempted reorganization, Debtor 0 btained workers' compensation insurance from
Insurer. Although the policy required monthly payments, Debtor failed on a number of occasions to
pay Insurer. The reorganization plan failed, and the case was converted to a Chapter 7. Mter
conversion, Insurer attempted to charge the premiums of Debtor to Debtor's Primary Lender under
§§ 503 and 506(c). The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of Insurer, and the District Court and Eighth
Circuit Court ofAppeals affrrmed. However, the Eighth Circuit, sitting en bane, reversed. The Court
affrrmed holding that Section 506(c) does not provide an administrative claimant of a bankruptcy
estate an independent right to seek payment of its claim from property encumbered by a secured
creditor's lien.
HSBC Bank v. Handel (In re Handel), 253 B.R. 308 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000). In a case offrrst
impression, the Panel faced the issue of whether a debtor may have more than one residence for
venue purposes. The debtor argued successfully to the bankruptcy court that although he worked and
lived primarily in New York, venue was proper in the District of Massachusetts because he also
"maintained a residence" in Massachusetts for more than 180 days prior to filing. The Panel
disagreed with the bankruptcy court's holding and held that although a person can have more than
one residence, only one such residence may qualify for the purpose of establishing venue under 28
U.S.C. § 1408(1).
McCordv.Agard (In reBean), 252F.3d 113 (2d. Cir. 2001). Debtor, pre-petition, contracted
to sell his property to Purchasers. Shortly after the sale, Debtor fued for bankruptcy relief under
Chapter 11, which was later converted to a Chapter 7. On the same day of conversion, Purchaser
closed title on the property. Debtor used the proceeds of the sale to satisfy two mortgages on the
home, pay for a broker's fee, and turned over the remaining proceeds to the Trustee. Mter the sale,
the Trustee initiated an adversary proceeding claiming the sale of the property was an unauthorized
post-petition transfer under § 549(a) even though the proceeds were turned over to the Trustee. The
bankruptcy court granted the Trustee's motion for summary judgment on the issue, however, this
decision was overturned by the district court. The Second Circuit held that a Trustee is not permitted
to recover from a transferee the fair market value of the property when the Debtor has transferred
all the equity proceeds of the sale to the Trustee. The Court explained that the trustee can only
recover property that Debtor held the day of the bankruptcy filing, and because property of the estate
only includes equity in the property the trustee is only entitled to recover such an amount.
In re Continental Airlines, Inc., 203 F.3d 203 (3rd Cir. 2000). Shareholders objected to
confrrmation of Debtor's plan of reorganization where said plan released and permanently enjoined
shareholder lawsuits against Debtor's officers and directors who were not themselves in bankruptcy.
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The court found that the provisions releasing the non-debtors did not "pass muster under even the
most flexible tests for the validity of non-debtor releases. The hallmarks of permissible nonconsensual releases -- fairness, necessity to the reorganization, and specific factual fmdings to
support these conclusions -- are all absent here." Note also that rules amendments are pending to
require more explicit notice of these plan provisions.
Pearson v. Component Technology Corp., 247 F.3d 471 (3 rd Cir. April 13, 2001). Former
employees ofDebtor, a defunct company, instituted an action against Debtor's major secured lender
(Creditor). The employees' claimed that Creditor should incur liability under the Worker Adjustment
and Retraining Notification Act of 1988 (WARN), applying principles of parent/subsidiary liability,
for Debtor's unnoticed plant closure. This is a unique case because the facts do not present a
traditional parent/subsidiary relationship. Rather, the relationship between Debtor and Creditor was
one of secured lender an borrower. The Court recognized that under some circumstances, a lender
"can become so entangled with its borrower's affairs so as to engender WARN Act liability."
However, applying the factors provided by the Department of Labor, the court concluded that the
major secured lender was not liable under WARN.
In re Shearin, Jr., 224 F.3d 353 (4th Cir. 2000). Chapter 7 trustee brought an adversary
proceeding against law frrm, where debtor-husband was an equity partner, seeking to recover year
end profits already distributed to the debtor and debtor's interest in his capital account. Even though
the Law Firm no longer had possession of the year end profits when the adversary proceeding was
fued, the Court of Appeals determined that these funds were nevertheless subject to turnover under
§ 542(a) because the Law Firm had possession and control over them on the petition date and
retained such possession and control until distributing the funds to the debtor. With respect to the
funds in the capital account, the Law Firm had possession of these fund at the time the adversary was
fued and clearly was required to tum over these funds to the estate.
Community Credit Union v. Conte (In re Conte), 206 F.3d 536 (5 th Cir. 2000). The court held
that under Texas law a future advance/cross-collateralization clause in debtor's automobile loan
created a valid lien on the vehicle to secure repayment of future credit card debt. The note clearly
indicated that the automobile could serve as collateral for future indebtedness and was within the
contemplation of the parties.
National City Bank v. Troutman Enterprises, Inc. (In re Troutman Enterprises, Inc.), 253
B.R. 8 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2000). Debtor filed a petition under Chapter 11, and the bankruptcy court
entered an order confrrming Debtor's plan of reorganization. Mer Debtor defaulted on its
obligations under the plan of reorganization, the case was converted to a Chapter 7. Approximately
three years after the case was converted, four creditors filed an involuntary Chapter 7 against the
"Reorganized Debtor." These creditors based their claims on "Reorganized Debtor's" failure to pay
their claims under the terms of the confrrmed plan. The bankruptcy court dismissed the involuntary
petition holding that the creditors were limited to asserting "plan claims" in the converted case by
operation of § 348(d), and no longer held claims against the "Reorganized Debtor." The Panel
disagreed providing "§ 348(d) determines the nature of the [Creditors] claims in the converted case,
but does not eliminate their claims against the Reorganized Debtor." Accordingly, the Creditors
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continued to hold claims against the "Reorganized Debtor" and they were not precluded from
requesting involuntary relief under § 303.

Buckley v. Bass &Assoc., 249 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2001). Debtor brought class action lawsuit
against law fum alleging that the law fum's letter requesting information of Debtor's possible
bankruptcy violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCP.N'). The district court dismissed
Debtor's complaint for failure to state a claim. On appeal the Circuit Court affirmed fmding that the
law frrm's letter, inquiring as to Debtor's bankruptcy status and general bankruptcy information, was
not illegal per se. The Court further provided that the letter was not an "initial communication" as
provided by FDCPA, and thus did not trigger further notice requirements mandated by FDCPA.
Smith v. St. Louis Housing Authority (In re Smith), 259 B.R. 901 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2001)
Debtor's rent was subsidized by the Public Housing Authority ("PHA"). Prior to Debtor filing her
bankruptcy petition, PHA notified her that her participation in the subsidy program would be
terminated because she failed to report income for two years. The letter informed her that her
participation would be terminated on April 30, 2000. Debtor flied her bankruptcy petition on April
28, 2000. Two days later, PHA, with notice Debtor flied bankruptcy, sent notice that her benefits had
been terminated for failure to report income. PHA thereafter moved for relief from stay in order to
terminate the debtor from the housing program. PHA was granted relief. In response, Debtor
appealed arguing that the termination of her benefits constituted a violation of Section 525, because
PHA terminated her benefits on the ground of non-payment. The Panel dismissed this argument
noting that the letters sent to Debtor clearly establishes that Debtor's housing benefits were
terminated as a result of her fraud, not for failure to pay the debt. The court notedthat even ifPHA
had terminated solely for non-payment, because the debtor breached her contract with PHA,
providing PHA grounds to terminate the benefits. "Section 525 does not operate to cure Smith's
[Debtor's] contractual defaults and does not require the [PHA] to continue its contractual
relationship with her.
Mizuno v. Mirage Resorts, Inc. (In re Mizuno), 223 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2000). Creditor of
Japanese debtor who was appointed as administrator of debtor's estate in Japanese bankruptcy court
and who also flied involuntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy was not considered a "de facto trustee" of
Chapter 11 trustee. Accordingly, the statute of limitations for an adversary proceeding did not begin
until the Chapter 11 trustee was appointed.
Moldo v. Matsco, Inc. (In re Cybernetic Serv., Inc.), 252 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2001) Prepetition, Creditor obtained a security interest in a patent developed by Debtor. Creditor's security
interest was properly perfected under California law, however, it was not recorded with the Patent
and Trademark Office ("PTa"). Mer an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy was flied against Debtor,
Creditor moved for relief from the stay to foreclose on its interest in the patent; the major asset of
the estate. The Chapter 7 trustee objected, arguing that Creditor failed to properly perfect its security
interest because it failed to flie "notice" with the PTO. The bankruptcy court disagreed and permitted
relief from the stay. The BAP affrrmed. In an apparent issue of frrst impression on the Circuit Court
, level, the Court addressed the issue of whether a security interest is perfected in a patent when the
security interest was perfected in accordance with the applicable state law but notice of its security
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interest was not filed with the PTa. After reviewing applicable federal patent law and case law
construing such law, the Court concluded that in light of the facts presented it was not necessary for
Creditor to file notice with the PTa. The Court explained that a security interest in a patent that does
not involve a transfer of the rights of ownership is a "mere license" and is not an "assignment, grant
or conveyance" within the meaning of federal patent law. Accordingly, because Creditors security
interest did not involve a transfer of rights of ownership, it was not necessary for Creditor to file its
notice in the PTa. "Consequently, Creditor perfected its security interest in Debtor's patent by
recording it with the California Secretary of State," and therefore has priority over the trustee.

Bachman v. Commercial Financial Services, Inc. (In re Commercial Financial Services, Inc.),
246 F.3d 1291 (10th Cir. 2001): Under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) and § 726(a)(a), administrative
expenses are entitled to a·priority to increase the possibility for a successful reorganization. Such
priorities, however, are strictly construed and must be based on a clear statutory purpose. In order
to be classified as an administrative expense, the claim must have arisen from a transaction with the
debtor in possession. Moreover, the debtor in possession must have induced the claimant's
performance. Additionally, in order for a claim to have administrative priority, "the consideration
supporting the claimant's right to payment [must be] supplied to and beneficial to the debtor-inpossession in the operation of the business." Thus, employees' claims for lump sum termination
payments were not entitled to priority.
Haden v. Pelofsky, 212 F.3d 466 (8 th Cir. 2000). Three sets of Debtors proposed, in their
Chapter 12 plans of reorganization, to pay some of their creditors directly, rather than through the
intermediary standing trustee. The plan also proposed to exclude trustee fees. The trustee objected
to the direct payments, however, the plans were confrrmed. On appeal, the Circuit Court affrrmed
holding that the law of the circuit clearly allows direct payment plans may be confrrmed provided
that all the requirements of § 1225 are met, including a plan feasibility assessment.
Schwartz v, Kujawa (In re Kujawa), 256 B.R. 598 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2000). A bankruptcy court always
has the inherent power to impose civil sanctions on the parties who appear before the court. These
sanctions can include attorneys' fees, costs, or punitive damages for abuse of its procedures. When
imposing sanctions based on bad faith conduct, a court should look to .the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or Bankruptcy Rule 9011. However, if the Rules do not adequately address the particular
issues, a court may use its inherent powers as the basis for sanctions..
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Introduction
Much has been written recently about the unique ethical issues that arise in the course of
representing debtors in possession. The nature of the bankruptcy process and the lack of clear
statutory and case law guidance insure these ethical issues will remain some of the most
intractable problems bankruptcy lawyers will encounter.
In large part ethical issues in bankruptcy relate to conflict of interest problems. The fact
that Chapter 11 cases involve many parties with widely divergent interests increases both the
number of conflicts and the seriousness of conflicts that do arise. Perhaps the most notorious
example is the perjury conviction of John Gellene, a partner at Milbank Tweed Hadley and
McCoy, for failing to disclose his firm's simultaneous representation of Bucyrus-Erie
Corporation and the general partner of one of its secured creditors. In addition to the 15 month
sentence imposed on Gellene, his firm was repaid almost $2 million in fees earned in the
bankruptcy and settled a malpractice suit for a reported $50 million.
These conflicts are not, however, problems of large firms only. Lawyers in small cases
often face thorny conflict problems. In fact, bankruptcy cases involving closely held firms often
generate the most difficult conflict problems because of the emotions involved. Cases in which
an individual or family may lose control of a business they have built over many years to
creditors with whom they have a long standing relationship are some of the most hard fought.
Conflict issues in these cases are often subtle and may not arise until after the case is underway.
The hypothetical case studies that follow raise conflicts at retention and during the case.
Driving much of this discussion is the unique nature of the bankruptcy process. Bankruptcy is a
multilateral process that combines litigation and transactional roles among numerous parties.
The nature of the process often requires stricter conflict of interest rules and more disclosure than
are required when examining ethical issues in more traditional types of cases.
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I.

Retention of Professionals

A.

Hypothetical

The Company. Acme Distributing Company is a medium size business that is owned
exclusively by members of the Smith family. The company distributes high end consumer luxury .
items to specialty retail stores. The downturn in the economy coupled with changes in consumer
tastes and increasing competition from on-line and catalogue suppliers have left Acme with a
cash flow crisis and threaten the long-tenn survival of the company. In addition, Sam Smith, the
chief executive officer and majority shareholder, recently introduced a new compensation system
that has dramatically increased his compensation and that of his family members. The changes
were the result of a study done by an outside business consultant that concluded that Acme's
management staff was underpaid. This increased compensation has drained cash that could have
been used to improve Acme's line of products. and to better meet the competition.
Acme owes money to FirstBank, its primary secured creditor, to Jim Johnson, an
individual who was fonnerly a friend and business partner of Smith, and to a number of
suppliers. Acme's $5 million obligation to FirstBank is secured by substantially all of Acme's
assets and has been guaranteed by Smith. Acme owes Johnson $1 million and this debt is
unsecured. Finally, Acme owes the suppliers a total of $2 million all of which is unsecured.
The Lawyer. Leah Lanham is a partner who specializes in business transactions and
bankruptcy. Lanham is a member of a 20 person law finn and has worked with the Smiths for a
number of years. Lanham and her finn have represented the both the Smiths, personally, and
Acme itself. In fact, Sam Smith thinks so much of Lanham that he provides her with products
from Acme's line at a steep discount from the nonnal price. Most recently, Smith bought several
items that Acme would nonnally sell for a total of$10,000 for only $3,000. In light of this long
relationship, it is not surprising that Sam Smith turned to Lanham for help in resolving Acme's
problems.
A conflict check disclosed that Lanham is currently representing one of the trade creditors
in a small collection matter that is unrelated to Acme. That creditor is owed $10,000 by Acme.
The collection matter is likely to be resolved within the month and should result in total billings
by Lanham's finn of under $1,500. The finn's employment group has just entered into an
engagement letter with FirstBank under which the finn will do all of FirstBank's work in this
area. The finn anticipates annual billings of $25,000/year for this work. This engagement will
not involve any collection work and Lanham believes that it will not affect her representation of
Acme. Still, she has obtained waivers of any conflict of interest from Acme and from the trade
creditor and FirstBank.
The Workout. For the past three months, Lanham has unsuccessfully attempted to
negotiate a non-bankruptcy workout of Acme's financial problems. During this time she billed
Acme $25,000. One week before she filed a Chapter 11 petition on behalf of Acme, she received
a payment of$10,000. On the day the petition was filed, Lanham filed an application to
represent Acme, as debtor in possession.
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B.

Ethical Issues Raised by the Hypothetical

This hypothetical raises two types of ethical problems for Lanham. First, and most
obviously, Lanham must work through the conflicts relating to her representation of the creditors
of Acme. While none of the engagements relate to the Acme bankruptcy, Lanham must carefully
review whether these representations will impair her ability to represent Acme as debtor in
possession. Second, Lanhams's pre-bankruptcy transactions with Acme may create conflicts that
will preclude her from representing Acme in the bankruptcy case. At a minimum, these
transactions must be fully disclosed to the court so that the issues can be addressed.
1)

Representation of Creditors.

Model Rules of Professional Responsibility. Outside of the context of a
a)
bankruptcy case, the representation of opposing parties on unrelated matters is governed
by Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7 (Ky. Supreme Court Rule 3.130(1.7» That
Rule provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
will be directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will
not adversely affect the relationship with the other client;
and
(2) Each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that
client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to
another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests,
unless:
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will
not be adversely affected; and
(2) The client consents after consultation.
When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is
undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the
implications of the common representation and the advantages and
risks involved.
Outside of bankruptcy, if Lanham reasonably believes that her representation of Acme as
DIP would not be adversely affected by her representation of the trade creditor and
FirstBank, and all of her clients consent, she can probably undertake the representation
under the Model Rules. The ABA comments to Rule 1.7 provide, "[A] lawyer
representing an enterprise with diverse operations may accept employment as an advocate
against the enterprise in an unrelated matter if doing so will not adversely affect the
lawyer's relationship with the enterprise or conduct of the suit and ifboth clients consent
upon consultation." While the Model Rules do not appear to present an absolute
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impediment to Lanham's undertaking the representation of the debtor in possession, the
Bankruptcy Code's standards on retention of professionals may provide a different result.
b)
Simultaneous Representation under the Code. The Code provides a more
stringent examination of the conflicts facing Lanham. Section 327(a) provides the basic
standard for the appointment of a lawyer for the DIP in these situations:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this.section, the trustee,
with the court's approval, may employ one or more
attorneys, accountants, appraisers, auctioneers, or other
professional persons, that do not hold or represent an

interest adverse to the estate, and that are disinterested
persons, to represent or assist the trustee in carrying out the
trustee's duties under this title.
The highlighted language provides the two standards for the appointment of Lanham.
She must not hold or represent an adverse interest (the "no adverse interest standard") and
must be "disinterested" (the "disinterestedness standard"). Section 101 (14) defines
disinterestedness:
(14) "disinterested person" means person that(A) is not a creditor, an equity security holder, or an insider;
(B) is not and was not an investment banker for any outstanding
security of the debtor;
(C) has not been, within three years before the date of the
filing of the petition, an investment banker for a security of
the debtor, or an attorney for such an investment banker in
connection with the offer, sale, or issuance of a security of
the debtor;
(D) is not and was not, within two years before the date of
the filing of the petition, a director, officer, or employee of
the debtor or of an investment banker specified in
subparagraph (B) or (C) of this paragraph; and

(E) does not have an interest materially adverse to the
interest of the estate or of any class of creditors or
equity security holders, by reason of any direct or indirect
relationship to, connection with, or interest in, the debtor or
an investment banker specified in subparagraph (B) or (C)
of this paragraph, or for any other reason;
The two standards have resulted in substantial confusion among courts, commentators
and practitioners. In applying these standards to the hypothetical, for example, we might
conclude that Lanham's firm's representation of the trade creditor would not create an
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interest "materially adverse" to the interests of the estate but would nonetheless violate
the no adverse interest standard (which does not contain a materiality requirement).
Adding to this confusion is Section 327(c):
(c) In a case under chapter 7, 12, or 11 of this title, a person is not
disqualified for employment under this section solely because of such
person's employment by or representation of a creditor, unless there is
objection by another creditor or the United States trustee, in which case the
court shall disapprove such employment if there is an actual conflict of
interest.
Section 327(c) was amended in 1984 to make clear that mere representation of creditors
on unrelated matters would not preclude representation of the estate in the absence of an
"actual conflict." See In re Cleveland Trinidad Paving Co., 218 B.R. 385, 387 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1998).
c)
Analysis. Lanham faces two potential conflicts relating to her ongoing
representation of Acme's creditors. Prior to the 1984 amendment of Section 327(c),
simultaneous representation of a creditor and the debtor in possession even in matters
unrelated to the bankruptcy case would have been prohibited by the express language of
the Code. Since the amendment, such simultaneous representation is not categorically
prohibited. Instead the focus is on whether an actual conflict exists. In this regard,
bankruptcy courts are likely to view the two situations differently.
i)
Simultaneous representation of the trade creditor on a small unrelated
matter should pose no impediment to Lanham's representation of the debtor in
possession in this case, provided that she makes complete disclosure of the
representation (see below). This is especially true if the trade creditor's claim is
undisputed and was incurred in the ordinary course of business. See In re
Unitcast, Inc. 214 B.R 979 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1997), citing, In re American
Printers and Lithographers, Inc. 148 B.R. 862 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992).
ii)
Although Lanham's finn's representation of the secured lender does not
relate to the bankruptcy case, her finn's representation of this creditor will likely
cause an actual conflict due to the central role the secured creditor will occupy in
the case. In American Printers and Lithographers, the court stated:
In this case, Debtor and [the secured creditor] have conflicting
interests. Debtor's counsel must at least vigorously negotiate with
[the secured creditor] in order to fulfill its duties to Debtor, even if
litigation is not warranted. [The law finn] may not be able to do
this without jeopardizing its relationship with its large and very
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important client [the secured creditor]. Therefore, an actual
conflict exists. . .
148 B.R. at 865-66. In the Unitcast case, the court stated, "It is'inherently
improper for such a professional to be closely associated with the major secured
creditor, especially where the duties overlap." 214 B.R. at 988.
The financial pressure that the firm's relationship with the secured creditor creates
may therefore influence the vigor with which Lanham will pursue the estate's
interest. This is true whether or not the firm's actions are found to have favored
the bank. In In re Georgetown ofKettering, Ltd., 750 F.2d 536 (6 th Cir. 1984), the
court quoted from Woods v. City National Bank & Trust, 312 U.S. 262 (1941):
[T]he incidence of a particular conflict of interest can seldom be
measured with any degree of certainty. The bankruptcy court need
not speculate as to whether the result of the conflict was to delay
action where speed was essential, to close the record of past
transactions where publicity and investigation were needed, to
compromise claims by inattention where vigilant assertion was
necessary, or otherwise to dilute the undivided loyalty owed to
those whom the claimant purported to represent.
Thus Lanham's continued representation of the secured creditor will likely
preclude her from representing the debtor in possession.
2.

Disclosure of Simultaneous Representation
Little analysis is required to conclude that disclosure of both of the firm's
relationships is required. Most of the cases in which conflicts of interest have created
grave problems for attorneys and other professionals have involved a failure of
disclosure. Fed. R. Bankr. Proc. 2014(a) makes the disclosure obligation clear:
An order approving the employment of attorneys, accountants,
appraisers, auctioneers, agents, or other professionals pursuant to §
327, § 1103, or § 1114 of the Code shall be made only on
application of the trustee or committee. The application shall be
filed and, unless the case is a chapter 9 municipality case, a copy of
the application shall be transmitted by the applicant to the United
States trustee. The application shall state the specific facts showing
the necessity for the employment, the name of the person to be
employed, the reasons for the selection, the professional services to
be rendered, any proposed arrangement for compensation, and, to
the best of the applicant's knowledge, all of the person's
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connections with the debtor, creditors, any other party in interest,
their respective attorneys and accountants, the United States
trustee, or any person employed in the office ofthe United States
trustee. The application shall be accompanied by a verified
statement of the person to be employed setting forth the
person's connections with the debtor, creditors, any other
party in interest, their respective attorneys and accountants,
the United States trustee, or any person employed in the office
of the United States trustee.
The rules use of the term "connections" is intended to make clear that the
disclosure obligation is broad. One court has stated:
In view of the serious ramifications of the disqualification of counsel, the
disclosure provisions dictated by the Bankruptcy Rules and Local
Bankruptcy Rules are of paramount importance. It is absolutely essential
that to eliminate any possible damage to the estate there be timely,
accurate and complete disclosure in the retention papers. The parties and
the court should not be forced to engage in an exhaustive search of the
record, and have very little clue as to what questions bear on qualification.

In re Decor Corporation, 171 B.R. 277, 282 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994); see also Halbert v.
Yousif, 225 B.R.336, 346-47 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1998), appeal dismissed, 201 F.3d 774
(6 th Cir. 1999)(attorney may not decide for him or herself which conflicts warrant
disclosure).
3.

Pre-Bankruptcy Transactions
Disinterestedness, as defined in Section 101(14) prohibits a debtor in possession
from occupying a position as a creditor in the case. This prohibition has been the source
of substantial commentary and reform efforts because of its pervasive effect. Most cases
involve some pre-bankruptcy work for which the attorney for the debtor in possession
may hold a claim. These reform efforts have not, however, resulted in any changes to the
strict disinterestedness requirement.
Courts in the Sixth Circuit operate under a direction to construe the bankruptcy
code conflicts requirements strictly. In In re Middleton Arms. 934 F.2d 723 (6 th Cir.
1991) the court rejected the argument that the court, using its equitable powers, could
appoint a professional who was not a disinterested person. The debtor's argument for
retention was that the professional's familiarity with the debtor's operations rendered its
appointment (as property manager) in the best interest of the estate. The court stated:
The equitable powers of section 105(a) may only be used in
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furtherance of the goals of the Code. By forbidding employment of
all interested persons, section 327 prevents individual bankruptcy
courts from having to make detenninations as to the best interest of
the debtors in these situations. Section 105(a) cannot be used to
circumvent the clear directive of section 327(a).

Id. at 725.

Lanham's Pre-Bankruptcy Representation of Acme. Section 1107(b) of the
a)
Code makes clear that the fact that Lanham represented Acme in the past does not of
itself preclude her from representing Acme as debtor in possession. That section
provides:
Notwithstanding section 327(a) of this title, a person is not disqualified for
employment under Section 327 of this title by a debtor in possession solely
because of such person's employment by or representation of the debtor
before the commencement of the case.

Lanham's Claim for Fees. The explicit prohibition against estate professionals
b)
also occupying the status as a creditor of the estate and the Sixth Circuit's strict
construction of the Code's ethical rules lead to the conclusion that Lanham must choose
between the two roles in the case. Most courts pennit representation only on the
condition that "curative measures" be taken. In most cases this will require that Lanham
waive her claim for pre-bankruptcy fees. See In re Decor Corp., 171 B.R. at 283.
c)
Acme's Pre-Bankruptcy Payment of Lanham's Fees. The $10,000 prebankruptcy payment stands on the same footing as her claim for unpaid fees. The
likelihood that this pre-bankruptcy payment would be viewed as a preferential transfer
would place Lanham in the position of investigating and bringing a claim against herself.
Here again, this conflict can only be cured by a repayment of the transfer. Id. At the very
minimum, Lanham must disclose the pre-bankruptcy payment under Section 329 (see
below).
d)
Lanham's Pre-Bankruptcy Purchases of Merchandise. Perhaps less obvious,
Lanham's purchases of merchandise pre-bankruptcy may create a conflict and must be
disclosed. These purchases may constitute transfers for less than reasonably equivalent
value that can be avoided under Section 548 of the Code and under state fraudulent
transfer laws. Here again, this prospect creates a conflict since it would put Lanham in
the position of investigating her own transactions with the debtor. In Halbert v. Yousif,
225 B.R. 336, the court found that the attorney's pre-bankruptcy receipt of merchandise
in exchange for attorney's fees created a conflict that, at a minimum, required disclosure.
The attorney's failure to disclose the transactions resulted in the denial of all fees for
services rendered in the case.
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4.

Disclosure of Pre-Bankruptcy Fee Arrangements.
Here again, the Bankruptcy Code's disclosure requirements are strict and require
little detailed analysis. The answer when confronting disclosure issues is nearly always to
disclose everything. The consequences for failing to do so are severe. Section 329
provides:
Any attorney representing a debtor in a case under this title, or in
connection with such a case, whether or not such attorney applies for
compensation under this title, shall file with th~ court a statement of the
compensation paid or agreed to be paid, if such payment or agreement was
made after one year before the date of the filing of the petition, for services
rendered or to be rendered in contemplation of or in connection with the
case by such attorney, and the source of such compensation.
Section 329, by its terms applies only to compensation rendered in contemplation of, or in
connection with, the case. Notwithstanding this limitation, fee issues are also covered
under the general disclosure requirement of Fed. Rule Bankr. Proc. 2014 which requires
disclosure of "connections." See Halbert v. Yousif, 225 B.R. at 346.

5.

Denial of Fees/Sanctions
In the Sixth Circuit, running afoul of the Code's conflict provisions results in the
denial of all fees. In re Federated Department Stores, Inc., 44 F.3d 1310 (6 th Cir. 1995).
In Federated, the court concluded that the authority to award fees under Section 330 of
the Code requires a valid appointment under Section 327. Even where the Bankruptcy
court has approved the appointment, a conflict that renders that appointment in error will
preclude compensation. See In re BBQ Resources, 237 B.R. 639 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1999).

Failure to disclose potential conflicts may gamer a much harsher sanction. The
Bankruptcy Rules require verified statements regarding conflicts. A failure to render a
disclosure in such a statement may result in criminal sanctions as in the case of John
Gellene.
5.

Lanham's Relationship with the Smiths
Lanham's role as personal and business counselor to the Smith family itself may
create conflicts that will, at a minimum, make her representation of Acme, as debtor in
possession, more difficult. She must make clear to the family that upon taking the
representation her allegiances will lie with the estate. Representation of the debtor in
possession and the shareholders would, of course, create an impennissible conflict. See
In re Chou-Chen Chemicals, Inc., 31 B.R. 842 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1983). The following
discussion indicates just how difficult avoiding these conflicts may be.
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II.

Conflicts During the Bankruptcy'Case

A.

Hypothetical

Lanham, having successfully negotiated the requirements set out above, was appointed
attorney for Acme as debtor in possession. The case was hard fought at every turn and Acme's
efforts to reorganize failed after 2 years of litigation. After the case was converted to Chapter 7
and a trustee was appointed to carry out the liquidation, Lanham filed her final fee application in
the amount of $50,000. During the case Lanham's finn was awarded interim fees amounting to
another $50,000. Johnson, joined by the u.s. Trustee, has objected to her fees and requested
disgorgement of the $50,000 in interim fees. Johnson claims that Lanham failed to remain
disinterested throughout the case and that she really represented the Smiths. The following
paragraphs discuss the history of the case.
Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay. The first major litigation in the case was
FirstBank's motion for relief from the stay. FirstBank claimed that it lacked adequate protection
of its interest and also claimed that the debtor had no equity in the property and that the property
was not necessary for an effective reorganization. The court held an extensive hearing regarding
both issues during which the court concluded that it was too early in the case to conclude that
Acme had no prospect of reorganization. The adequate protection issue was resolved through the
entry of an agreed order for adequate protection under which Acme made periodic payments to
FirstBank. Lanham's fees for this matter totaled $15,000.
Motion for Conversion or Appointment of a Chapter 11 Trustee. The second major
challenge in the case was Johnson's motion for conversion or, in the alternative, for the
appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee. In that motion, Johnson asserted that a pattern of
continuing mismanagement by the Smiths and numerous pre-bankruptcy transactions between
Acme and the Smiths (including payments made under the new compensation scheme) warranted
conversion or a the appointment of a trustee. Here again, after a difficult and bitter hearing, the
court detennined that the Smiths' management difficulties did not rise to the level required for
such drastic relief. Regarding the pre-bankruptcy transactions, the court detennined that the best
course of action would be to pennit the creditors' committee to investigate the pre-bankruptcy
transactions. Lanham's fees for this matter totaled another $15,000.
First Plan of Reorganization. The debtor's first plan contemplated selling the assets of
Acme to a group of investors, which group, it was later discovered, included friends and business
associates of the Smith family. The plan proposed payments of$6.5 million in cash and new
debt instruments. The plan provided that FirstBank would be paid in full from the proceeds of
the sale and that the unsecured creditors would receive 50% of their claims in new debt. The
creditors of Acme rejected the plan when the investor group's relationship with the Smiths came
to light. Lanham claims that she did not know about the connections. Her fees for the
preparation and negotiation of this plan totaled $15,000.
Second Plan of Reorganization. Acme's second plan contemplated the payment in full
of FirstBank through a new obligation secured by all of Acme's assets. The trade creditors
would be paid 90% of their claims through a $1.8 million infusion ofnew cash by members of
the Smith family. Johnson would receive 50% of his claims in the fonn of new unsecured debt.
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The Smiths would retain their ownership in Acme. Because this plan called for the infusion of
new value by the shareholders, the court lifted the exclusivity period to allow for competing
plans to emerge. No such plans emerged and Johnson, voting in a class by himself rejected the
plan. In a cramdown hearing, the court rejected the plan, calling it "inherently flawed." Upon a
motion by Johnson, the court converted the case. Lanham's fees for the second plan totaled
$25,000.
B.

Ethical Issues Raised By the Hypothetical

The crux of Johnson's claim, and the principle issue raised by the hypothetical is the
question of who the attorney for the debtor in possession really represents. Lanham will merely
claim to be zealously representing the debtor in opposing the early motions to lift the stay and to
convert the case and in proposing the plans of reorganization. She will argue that bankruptcy
cases involve litigation between the debtor and its creditors and the Code itself contemplates that
these issues will be resolved through litigation. Johnson's claim is that Lanham represents the
debtor in possession, an entity that owes duties to all of the parties interested in the bankruptcy
case. By taking the untenable positions that she has taken, she is really representing the interests
of the Smiths. Each of the actions has served only to prolong the attempted reorganization of an
entity that should be in liquidation. In essence, Johnson's claim is that Lanham has forgotten
who her real clients are.
The fee dispute raises fundamental issues regarding the nature of the debtor in possession .
and the fiduciary duties of the debtor in possession and its counsel. These issues further
implicate foundational questions regarding the purpose of Chapter 11 and the ability of the
bankruptcy courts to monitor the management of Chapter 11 debtors and to control the process.
Unfortunately these questions have not been definitively answered. The lack of clear answers
leave attorneys involved in the process in an ethical quagmire that requires careful negotiation.
1)

Model Rules of Professional Responsibility.
The Model Rules provide some guidance regarding the ethical obligations of
lawyers representing organizations that themselves owe duties to third parties. Rule 1.13
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Ky. Supreme Court Rule 3.130(1.13)
provides:
(a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization
acting through its duly authorized constituents.
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other
person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or
refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal
obligation to the organization, or a violation of law which reasonably might be
imputed to the organization, and is likely to result in substantial injury to the
organization, the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best

H -II

interest of the organization. In detennining how to proceed, the lawyer shall give
due consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its consequences, the
scope and nature of the lawyer's representation, the responsibility in the
organization and the apparent motivation of the person involved, the policies of
the organization concerning such matters and any other relevant considerations.
Any measures taken shall be designed to minimize disruption of the organization
and the risk of revealing infonnation relating to the representation to persons
outside the organization. Such measures may include among others:
(1) Asking reconsideration of the matter;
(2) Advising that a separate legal opinion on the matter be sought for
presentation to appropriate authority in the organization; and
(3) Referring the matter to higher authority in the organization,
including, if warranted by the seriousness of the matter, referral to the
highest authority that can act in behalf of the organization as detennined
by applicable law.
(c) If, despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b), the highest
authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon action, or a
refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law and is likely to result in substantial
injury to the organization, the lawyer may resign in accordance with Rule 1.16.
(d) In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, members,
shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client
when it is apparent that the organization's interests are adverse to those of the
constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.
(e) A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors,
officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the
provisions of Rule 1.7. If the organization's consent to the dual representation is
required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of the
organization other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the
shareholders.
The ABA's comments to the rules provides, "Decisions concerning policy and
operation, including ones entailing serious risk, are not as such in the lawyer's province."
These rules seem to indicate that the attorney for the debtor in possession should take his
or her direction regarding questions involving litigation strategy from the current
management of the debtor. After all, the Code provides that the debtor continues in
control of the business and retains the exclusive right to propose a plan of reorganization.
The nature of a lawyer's job requires the existence of a client to whom the lawyer can
look for direction regarding legal issues that implicate the future of the organization.
2)

The Bankruptcy Code
The Bankruptcy Code's rules regarding disinterestedness also govern the lawyers
behavior during the case. Section 327 prohibits the attorney from holding or representing
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an interest adverse to the estate and requires the attorney to be "disinterested." Section
328(c) makes clear that the attorney must remain disinterested throughout the case as a
precondition to an award of fees. That section provides:
(c) Except as provided in section 327(c), 327(e), or 1107(b) of this title, the court
may deny allowance of compensation for services and reimbursement of expenses
of a professional person employed under section 327 or 1103 of this title it: at any
time during such professional person's employment under section 327 or 1103 of
this title, such professional person is not a disinterested person, or represents or
holds an interest adverse to the interest of the estate with respect to the matter on
which such professional person is employed.
Section 330(a) provides another way to approach the problem. Short of a finding
of disinterestedness, the court could deny the attorney's application for fees upon a
finding that the legal work was not necessary or was not reasonably likely to provide a
benefit to the estate. Section 330 provides in part:
(a)(I) After notice to the parties in interest and the United States Trustee and a
hearing, and subject to sections 326, 328, and 329, the court may award to a
trustee, an examiner, a professional person employed under section 327 or 1103-(A) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by
the trustee, examiner, professional person, or attorney and by any
paraprofessional person employed by any such person; and
(B) reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses.

(4)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the court shall not allow
compensation for-(i) unnecessary duplication of services; or
(il) services that were not(I) reasonably likely to benefit the debtor's estate; or

(II) necessary to the administration of the case.
Cases addressing contested fee applications have used both approaches to limit
attorneys' fees when courts have concluded that the attorney has taken actions that were
designed to benefit one group of interested parties at the expense of others.

In re Kendavis Ind. Int'l Ltd., 9IB.R. 742 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) remains the
a)
best example of a case finding that the debtor in possession's lawyer's actions during a
case provided evidence that the attorney was not disinterested. In Kendavis, the court
also found evidence of a lack of disinterestedness in correspondence between the attorney
and the shareholders of the debtor. The court made clear that the ethical obligation of the
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attorney for the debtor in possession is to exercise independent professional judgment on
behalf of its client. Actions that benefitted only shareholders evidenced an unwillingness
to exercise that judgment and resulted in the denial of $2 million of fees.
b)
In re Office Products ofAmerica, 136 B.R. 983 (Bankr. W.D. Tex 1992),
provides a different take on the analysis. In that case, the court was confronted with
claims that the attorney for the debtor in possession had failed to remain disinterested.
The court rejected the approach stating:
The trustee would have this court hold that, in essence, proposing
such a plan necessarily created a conflict of interest, and debtor's
counsel, by advancing that plan in the face of creditor opposition,
developed a conflict of interest, justifying their disqualification
under § 327(a) and a concomitant disallowance of their fees under
§ 328(c).
There are serious policy ramifications to such a holding, however,
which auger against deciding the case on that basis. The
.
cramdown provisions of the Code are an expression of
congressional intent regarding the importance of reorganization
values even in the face of considerable creditor opposition,
provided those creditors' interests are appropriately protected.
H.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220-21, 416-18 (1977).
Were we to hold here that pursuing those goals over the objections
of creditors in and of itself created a conflict of interest, lawyers
would be discouraged from even representing debtors in the face of
creditor opposition (even if the plan could pass muster under §
1129(b», for fear of not being paid.
Such a result is so antithetical to the structure of the reorganization
chapters that we must retreat from such a harsh ruling. If there is a
basis for the trustee's objections to the fees requested, this is not it
(at least not under the facts of this case). We tum to the other
arguments raised by the trustee.
Id. at 986-87. Thus, rather than use a blanket approach to the question, the court chose to
examine the attorney's fee application on an issue by issue basis.

In conducting this examination, the court focused. on the requirement of Section
330 that compensation be awarded only if the services rendered were necessary to the
estate. The court concluded:
The fee detail does indeed suggest that there was a point in time
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when the debtor knew or should have known that pursuit of this
plan flew in the face of § 1129(a), yet the debtor pushed on
anyway. At that point, the services of counsel were no longer
"necessary," as the debtor was no longer at that point discharging
its duties as fiduciary of the estate, was no longer pursuing
legitimate reorganization. Instead, the fight against conversion
and the insistence on pursuing the plan served interests other than
those of the estate, namely maintaining then-current management's
control over the enterprise. Counsel could no longer expect to be
compensated for its services at this point under the standards set by
§ 330(a), for its services were no longer "actual, necessary"
services associated with representing the debtor-in- possession in
the discharge of its fiduciary duties to the estate and its
beneficiaries, the creditors.
Id. at 990-91. Thus, the court recognized a responsibility on the part of the attorney to
exercise his or her own judgment as to whether continued efforts at reorganization are
futile. At that point, counsel proceeds only at the risk that fees for those continued efforts
will be denied.
c)
In re Wilde Horse Enterprises, Inc., 136 B.R. 830 (Bankr. C.D. Calif: 1991), the
court denied the attorney for the debtor in possession all of her fees because the attorney
failed to investigate the circumstances surrounding the sale of assets of the estate to a
party related to the debtor's principals. In the opinion, the court provided an extensive
review of the obligations of the attorney for the debtor in possession:
An attorney's "client" is the person or entity on whose behalf the lawyer
acts. In certain proceedings an attorney may have more than one client,
and where this is so, they owe duties of loyalty to all the interests
represented. The duty of loyalty includes a duty of candor--candor to all
the interests represented. "A lawyer like a trustee is bound to higher
standards than the morals of the marketplace." MGIC Indemnity
Corporation v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir.1986). "Professional
ethics requires ofa lawyer a decent sense of responsibility to all those he
[or she] serves." Id, at 504.

Because the attorney for debtor in possession is a fiduciary of the estate
and an officer of the Court, the duty to advise the client goes beyond
responding the client's requests for advice. It requires an active concern
for the interests of the estate, and its beneficiaries, the unsecured creditors.
Consequently, the attorney may not simply close his or her eyes to matters
having a legal and practical consequence for the estate-- especially where
the consequences may have an adverse effect. The attorney has the duty
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to remind the debtor in possession, and its principals, of its duties under
the Code, and to assist the debtor in fulfilling those duties.
186 B.R. at 840. The court went on to analyze the red flags that should have resulted in
further investigation and concluded that the attorney had utterly failed to uphold her duty
to the court and the estate.
3)

Analysis
Lanham's ethical obligations exist regardless of whether she will be paid for her
work. Nevertheless, bankruptcy decisions regarding the obligations of attorneys to the
estate focus almost exclusively on fees. I have, therefore, provided such a focus while
remaining mindful that bar counsel will maintain a broader agenda.
The amount of Lanham's fee award depends on whether the court views her
position on the various motions and plans as providing evidence of her fundamental lack
lack of disinterestedness. Following Kendavis, if the court believes that her positions
throughout the case indicate that she was really representing the Smiths·, the result is
likely to be that her lack of disinterestedness precludes the award of all of her fees in the
case. See In re Chou-Chen Chemicals, 31 B.R. 842. It: on the other hand, the court
chooses the approach of Office Products ofAmerica, it may analyze each of her actions in
an effort to detennine at what point those actions failed to meet the standard of necessity
to the estate and instead benefitted only the shareholders. This analysis would allow the
court to award partial fees. Of course, without a complete record, it is difficult to come to
any hard and fast ~onclusions. What follows are some observations on the facts as
presented.
a)
Prior Representation of the Smiths. While it may be theoretically neat to
separate issues regarding conflicts at retention from those that manifest themselves later
in the case, it is unlikely that a court will treat the issues as distinct. Recall that Lanham
has a long history with the Smiths. While that history does not preclude representation of
Acme, it is an important fact to keep in mind when analyzing Lanham's actions
throughout the case.
b)
Sam Smith's Guaranty of FirstBank Debt. Recall that Sam Smith, the CEO of
Acme, personally guaranteed the debt ofAcme to FirstBank. This fact calls for close
scrutiny of the two plans of reorganization, both of which paid the FirstBank debt in full.
The guaranty may also raise questions about the tenns of the agreed order for adequate
protection, negotiated by Lanham in order to resolve FirstBank's motion to lift the stay.
Finally, the guaranty may require closer scrutiny into potential avoiding actions that
Acme as debtor in possession may have had against FirstBank.
c)

Motion to Lift Stay. Apart from the concern noted above, Lanham's position
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regarding the motion to lift the stay is unlikely to raise any serious concerns regarding her .
disinterestedness or the benefit of that position to the estate. Resisting an early motion to
lift the stay is not unusual and such motions are often brought by secured creditors for
strategic reasons. Courts are generally reluctant to pull the plug on debtor's
reorganization efforts at an early stage in the case. Thus, Lanham's resistance of the
motion does not say anything in particular about her lack of disinterestedness and would
likely be found to be of benefit to the estate.

Motion for Conversion or Appointment of Trustee. In analyzing this motion,
d)
the timing and facts underlying the motion are of critical importance. Certainly the fact
that the court denied the motion speaks to the appropriateness of Lanham's actions in
contesting the motion. Events transpiring later in the case may, however, cause the court
to scrutinize Lanham's presentation to the court at the hearing to assure that the court was
fully infonned of the relevant facts and that· Lanham discharged her duty to the estate.
e)
First Plan of Reorganization. The questions here revolve around the effort
Lanham took to investigate the relationship between the proposed buyer and the Smiths.
In the Wilde Horse case, the court noted several red flags that should have caused the
attorney to undertake further investigation into the bona fides of the parties to the
transaction. A reading of that case makes clear that the attorney for the debtor in
possession may not remain blind to the shenanigans of her clients but must instead
actively promote the interests of the estate through an independent investigation.
f)
Second Plan of Reorganization. The court's finding that the second plan was
"inherently flawed" may have foreshadowed Lanham's problems in obtaining
compensation for her work on this plan. The Supreme Court's decision in Bank of
America v. 203 North LaSalle Limited Partnership, 526 U.S. 434 (1999) casts
considerable doubt on the viability of new value plans such as this. In addition, choosing .
to pay unsecured trade creditors 90% of their claims while paying Johnson only 50%
raises both classification problems. The overall object of the plan seems to be the
preservation of the Smith's equity interest and minimization of Sam Smith's exposure on
the guaranty obligation. On the other hand, Johnson seems to have taken the role of
spoiler in this case. Facts that indicate a non-economic motive on his part may serve to
justify Lanham's actions in the case.
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3)

Conclusion
Its hard to say what the conclusion should be on such sketchy facts, but, if forced,
I would be inclined to grant Lanham's fees as follows:
$
General Representation of the Debtor
Representation for Lift Stay Motion
Representation for Conversion Motion
(I sense that Johnson may have been acting from
spite rather than out of a real desire to promote
the interests of the estate or his own interest as
creditor - I could be wrong here)
Representation for 1st plan
Representation for 2nd plan

$

Total
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30,000
15,000
15,000

Denied
Denied
60,000
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SECTION I

See Sections A, B, E and G of these course materials
for substantive materials for use in panel discussion.
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